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4Abstract
In 1951 Tibet was incorporated into the People’s Republic of China by the
Seventeen Point Agreement. Today the legal status of Tibet remains a matter of
contention between the PRC and the Tibetan-Government-in-Exile. Both rely upon on
legally ambiguous British engineered treaties to make their case. The inconsistent
representation of Tibet’s status in treaties is not, however, a reflection of the ambiguity
of Tibet’s status itself; it is a reflection of the ambiguity of such treaties in the context
of the positivist-colonial encounter.
Drawing primarily upon British Government archives, this thesis examines
the issue: to what extent, in what ways, and with what effects has the British imperial
legacy in the region converged with Chinese formulations of law and governance in
Tibet to prejudice understanding of Tibet’s legal status. This addresses a significant
gap in international legal literature, which seldom discusses Tibet outside of
considerations of minority rights within the PRC.
This thesis argues that an assessment of imperialism and its relationship with
nineteenth century international law is essential to explaining the events of 1951, but it
is only through a reassessment of the postcolonial that the absence of discussion of
Tibet’s status in international legal discourse can be explained. The history of Tibet’s
legal status highlights contradictions embedded within modernity and exposes the
mythological foundations of the modern secular state’s narrative of progress.
This thesis concludes that the much emphasised clash between Western and
East Asian values in the field of international law in truth operates along a much
narrower divide than might be presumed. This is best assessed as a reflection of the
contradictions inherent to the postcolonial within international law; involving both a
pushing away of the imperialistic past and a reaffirmation of its continuity in order that
modern commitments to the rule of law retain value.
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8Chapter One
Introduction
I hereby make known these commands to all you righteous folk, that ye
may strive with one accord to exterminate all foreign devils, and so turn aside
the wrath of heaven. This shall be accounted unto you for well doing; and on
the day when it is done, the wind and rain shall be according to your desire.1
[T]he demon-masked ones from England came to the border and
invaded with an army . . . Not long after they came to Lhasa making a
clamour of meaningless noise.2
This thesis begins with the observation that there were fundamental differences
in how Tibet and China sought to resist Western imperialism. At the end of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China embraced Western styled legal and
scientific values as a means to achieve modernisation and preserve China's international
standing. Meanwhile, the religious foundations of the Tibetan state necessitated a
different kind of negotiation with modernity.
Furthermore, Tibet's freedom to pursue a unilateral strategy of modernisation
was limited by its geographical location between the three great powers of Russia,
China, and British India. Initially Tibet sought to minimise contact with British India.
This policy changed in the early twentieth century when China became the more
immediate threat.
By strengthening ties to British India, Tibet gained some measure of
protection from Chinese encroachment. However, this set Tibet apart from a rapidly
modernising society of postcolonial states. Additionally, it was British policy to keep
1 Excerpt from a placard posted in West City, Beijing during the Boxer uprising of 1900 (Coates 2000:128).
2 From the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s (1876-1933) official hagiography, A String of Wondrous Gems, a Drop from the Ocean of
Liberated Life of the Great Thirteenth, the Incomparably Kind Lord of All Buddhas, He of the Highest Stage, Crown Ornament of
Samsara and Nirvana. Cited in French (1995:240).
9Tibet’s legal status ambiguous. This ambiguity has complicated subsequent
considerations of Tibet’s legal identity.
The legacy of the British involvement in the region is discernible in
contemporary PRC law and policy in ethnic Tibetan areas. It has also, as this thesis
will show, revealed contradictions within postcolonial international legal discourse.
There is a shortfall in legal orientated historical studies that place Tibet’s legal identity
in such a context. It is hoped that this study might help to fill this gap.
1:1 Context
In 1950 the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) invaded Tibet. Following the Tibetan defeat, Tibet was incorporated into the
'motherland' by the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951. In the contemporary
international legal context, the primary issue is the nature of Tibet's status prior to 1951.
If Tibet was a state when China took military control of Lhasa, then the legal principles
governing the use of force (Art 2(4) UN Charter) and the conquest of territory apply. If
Tibet was not a state, the issue is one internal to China, although certain issues of
international human rights law may be relevant. Self-determination principles may also
apply, regardless of whether China is an occupying or colonial power. However,
prevailing opinion is that self-determination does not generally signify a right of
secession except in the decolonisation process. In the postcolonial world, self-
determination is a gift bestowed by states, not a privilege usurped by Emperors, and '[t]he
end of Empire has merely revealed most states to be imperial' (Simpson 1996:35)
In this context, it is not surprising that the debate over Tibet's status tends to
present the issue as a local conflict between Tibet and China. Whether or not the conflict
is seen as inter-state or intra-state varies, but the essential dynamics of the arguments
employed remain the same. This has obscured from view the fact the legal status of Tibet
was first brought into question by European powers. Britain, in particular, played a key
role by employing the term suzerainty to define Imperial China's role in Tibet. The
British use of the term suzerainty served strategic purposes, for the British objective at
the turn of the twentieth century was to establish Tibet as a neutral buffer state. Reports
of intrigue between Russia and Lhasa had compelled the British Government of India to
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adopt a 'forward' policy so as to secure the frontier of the Empire. For the British project
to be successful, it was essential that Tibet was neither wholly part of the British Empire
nor wholly part of the Chinese Empire. At the same time, it was equally important that
Tibet was not wholly independent and free to forge an alliance with Russia.
The use of the term suzerainty had far reaching consequences, creating an
uncertainty about Tibet's status before 1951 that has yet to be fully resolved.
Suzerainty is a highly ambiguous term, derived from European feudalism, and falling
into an indeterminate conceptual space somewhere between that of protectorate, which
implies international legal personality, and that of autonomous region, which does not.
The Raan of Kutch Arbitration implied that vassal states did possess international legal
personality. 3 However, much earlier the Permanent Court in Nationality Decrees in Tunis
and Morocco, had emphasised that the legal status of dependencies needed to be
assessed according to their individual characteristics, a task which the international
legal community has largely failed to do in the case of Tibet. 4 Furthermore, there is a
danger that the use of ambiguous terminology is taken to reflect an actual ambiguity of
status, rather than any ambiguity in the defining process itself. Questions remain
regarding the applicability of European feudalistic terminology, to a non-European legal
tradition grounded in distinctly non-European philosophy.
Although known primarily as a centre of religious monasticism, Tibet has a
long, culturally distinct, legal tradition and exerted significant regional influence,
mediating in the Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1774 for example. Meanwhile both the
Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China have claimed that Tibet was
part of China. This claim draws heavily upon accounts of Tibet’s incorporation into the
Chinese sphere according to the overarching ideology of the traditional Chinese tribute
system. This ideology was grounded in Confucian values which placed the Chinese
emperor at the apex of a moral, hierarchical order.
Both Tibet and China viewed themselves as centres of advanced civilisation,
but so too did the Western imperial powers. The ideological impetus of Western
colonialism was the 'civilising mission,' this being central to late nineteenth century
3 1968 7 ILM 675, 696-699
4 1928 Ser. B No 4. 27
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juristic efforts to locate international law, as a discipline, within the context of a rational,
scientific discourse. At the heart of this project was the need to establish a basis by
which political entities could be dealt with in the context of the empire, and the
perceived need to achieve this according to the dictates of rational, objective scientism.
In this context, the British policy of keeping Tibet’s legal status ambiguous became
problematic.
The traditional Chinese tributary system gradually broke down following the
annexation of Chinese territory by Western powers after 1842. The regime of unequal
treaties, by which Western powers gained control of Chinese ports, was clearly the
most overt threat to China. However, Western expansionism throughout Asia was seen as a
threat to the traditional Chinese world order. Both fuelled a growing wave of Chinese
nationalism, a movement that gained momentum by the end of the nineteenth century.
To better compete with Western powers efforts were made to translate European
jurisprudence into Chinese. Post 1911, the Nationalist Government of China furthered this
cause, using the language of science and international law to articulate its strategy to
restore China to greatness. To these ends, there was an adaptation of Social
Darwinism—a system of thought that had supported colonialism in Western constructions.
Against this backdrop, there was considerable hostility towards religious
activity. Between 1900 and 1930, various campaigns against rural religion were launched
and various laws were promulgated to bring about the rational advancement of the
masses.
The Nationalist anti-religion drives were not anti-Buddhist, and the implication
is not that they became implicitly anti-Tibetan. Their significance lies in the
formulation of a dichotomy between a traditional, religious, and superstitious past, on
the one hand, and a secular, rational, and scientific future on the other. This laid the
foundations for later ideological developments, where Maoism denounced all religion
as not merely 'opium of the people,' but as 'poison' (Miller 1990:223). According to the
theory of Marxist historical materialism, including that as adapted by Mao, societies
founded on a religious basis are at a lower stage of evolution. Furthermore, Marxist
historical materialism 'assumes a progressive development of human society towards
greater union and the eventual overcoming of cultural, racial and linguistic barriers'
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(Keller 1994:62). When the People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet to conduct the
'Peaceful Liberation,' their advance was distinguished from that of a non-socialist army.
The People's Liberation Army was an interventionist force that existed to help the
people when they were incapable of helping themselves, and should they be so
uncivilised that they failed to appreciate the fact, then this only heightened the urgency
of the development task at hand.
Religious activity remains one of the primary areas of contention between the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Tibetans living in what are now Tibetan
Autonomous Areas of the PRC. Religious activity in Tibet is routinely regarded as a
threat to national security. Tibetan religious activity is equated with Tibetan resistance,
and is seen as more dangerous than the equivalents in the Chinese population.
The PRC has put considerable effort into redefining Tibetan culture in socialist
terms with 'national local characteristics' (TIN and HRW 1996:156). This process
requires a restructuring of Tibetan history. Hence, in schools the Tibetan word for
history (rgyal rabs) is reserved for Chinese history, whereas Tibetan history is termed
legends or fables (lo rgyus) (Kolas 1998:75).This reflects a dynamic also present in the
wider international legal community. It is a dynamic born of the tension between the
self-determining state, committed to modernity, and a wayward faction of potentially
self-determining minorities, who may assert a worrisome, competing version of that
modernity. The Communist assertion of a universal and inherently superior ideology has
parallels within the traditional Confucian concept of lai-hua; it also has parallels with
Western imperialism's 'civilising mission.'
1:2 Literature Review
Tibet's legal status is seldom considered in mainstream international legal
literature. Perhaps the first examination was provided by Alexandrowicz-Alexander
(1954), who argued against the PRC's claim to Tibet. This article later served as the
basis for Crawford's comments in The Creation of States in International Law, where
Crawford (1979:213) conceded that the 'case of Tibet, in particular, highlights the
rather arbitrary way in which, for their own purposes, the 'Powers' decided upon a
particular course of action, and thus, in effect, determined the status of a people.'
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The alternative position was argued by Rubin (1968). Whilst Rubin analysed the
complex history of treaty relations between Tibet, China and Britain more extensively
than Alexandrowicz-Alexander, his analysis is flawed by a failure to consider the
evidence of other Himalayan states, or to consider Tibetan arguments on their own
terms. Rubin disparages Tibetan claims on the basis that they rested solely on the Dalai
Lama's religious authority. Tibetan statements are henceforth viewed with suspicion,
whereas China, as a power seen to be more fully in line with the Western system, is
ipso facto more capable of approaching legal truth. Rubin's article is interesting in that
it underlines the ease with which the international legal documents regarding Tibet give
rise to ethnocentric readings.
More recently the issue has been taken up by Sautman (2001) who has been
critical of claims made by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, viewing the Dalai Lama's
arguments for Tibetan self-determination to be analogous to those made by the French far
right leader, Le Penn. Sautman has rightly questioned the accuracy of statistics
presented by the Tibetan Governmen-in-Exile regarding Tibetan deaths resulting from
the Chinese occupation. However, he equates statistical discrepancy in the number of
deaths with the falsity of Tibetan claims per se. Sautman argues that the Cultural
Revolution resulted in numerous civilian deaths throughout China. On this basis
Sautman argues that the humanitarian crisis in Tibet during that period should not be
viewed as derived from illegal occupation. As an appeal to probability this argument is
a logical fallacy and simply sidesteps the issue of Tibetan claims to self-determination.
Sautman's critique of the Tibetan-government-in-exile can be seen as a
response to the notion that pre-1951 Tibet was a Shangri-la untainted by social
inequality and injustice. Sautman challenges the notion that Tibetan rule was wholly
good and Chinese rule is wholly bad. A similar attempt to undermine this dichotomy has
been made by Grunfeld (1996), who asserts that Tibetans were superstitious, immoral, and
promiscuous. Yet, this fails to collapse the dichotomy in question, for it relies upon the
same opposition between a pre-modern Tibet and a modern China. The difference is
only that in Grunfeld's analysis the pre-modern condition is unproblematically bad,
rather than unproblematically good. Grunfeld employs a late twentieth century Western
model of modernity to be the standard against which early twentieth century Tibet is to be
measured. This is a fallacious argument. The Tibetan claim for self-determination is not
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invalidated by the fact that pre-1951 Tibet, in common with most human societies, had
failed to generate a truly egalitarian society.
Studies based upon extensive fieldwork in Tibetan communities, both in exile
and in China, present a more balanced, and complex, picture of Tibetan society. Of
particular note is the work of Goldstein, who has not shirked from discussions of
inequality in Tibetan society. At the same time, Goldstein's work presents a clear
picture of the uniqueness, continuity, and coherence of Tibetan political and legal
institutions.
Whether arguing for or against Tibetan claims, the literature seldom provides
any extensive historical analysis of Tibet's legal status. The exception is Van Walt Van
Praag’s analysis, The Status of Tibet (1987), which examines the legal history of the
Sino-Tibetan conflict. This study presents the history of Tibet's independent treaty
relations and argues that Tibet must be viewed as an independent state prior to 1951.
Van Walt Van Praag draws attention to the fact that the use of the term suzerainty in
describing China's relationship did little justice to the traditional relationship that existed
between Tibet, China and neighbouring Asian states. The study highlights that the use
of the term suzerainty was a product of Britain's commitment to the 'Great Game,' rather
than any objective desire to ascertain Tibet's legal status according to Tibetan history.49
This is the benchmark study, but because it maintains such close focus upon the
question of whether Tibet possessed independent legal personality, the wider context of
the Western colonial encounter with China is not examined. This leaves the question of
the extent to which Western imperialism had a bearing upon China's reformulations of
Tibet's status in international legal terms, and the extent to which China's expansion in
Tibet was a defensive measure against the imperialist threat, largely unanswered. One
of the original contributions that this thesis makes to the subject is that it addresses
these issues. This thesis then moves beyond this by considering in what ways the legacy of
this encounter continues to impact upon first, perceptions of Tibet’s legal status and
second, the development of PRC legislation in Tibetan Autonomous Areas.
Whilst the legal aspects of the conflict have not given rise to extensive
literature, the 'Great Game', and its impact upon Tibet, has been extensively written
about. The most notable studies are those by Addy (1984), Lamb (1989), and McKay
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(1997) who have all made use of British Government of India archives to write
diplomatic histories of British relations with Tibet from the end of the nineteenth century
up to 1950. The studies all shed valuable light upon how British involvement precipitated
a deterioration of Sino-Tibetan relations.
The degree to which the British involvement may be seen to have had a
predominantly negative or positive effect is subject to slightly different interpretations.
For example, the introduction to McKay states that, 'the author argues...that the most
lasting contribution made by the British who served in Tibet lay in the powerful
historical image they constructed of an independent Tibetan state' (McKay 1997:viii).
Certainly, the writings of Sir Charles Bell and Hugh Richardson, both resident British
officers in Lhasa prior to 1950, became central to the discipline of Tibetology (Bell
1987 and 2000, Richardson 1951, 1977, 1989, 1990 and 1998). Hugh Richardson, in
particular, devoted his life to the scholastic study of Tibetan language and society,
translating Tibetan legal documents, for example (Richardson 1989 and 1998).
Drawing on fist-hand knowledge he insisted that Tibet was an independent state prior to
1951. However, the sympathetic efforts of Richardson and Bell were reduced by the
effects of an overarching British policy significantly less sympathetic to Tibetan
interests. Indeed, Addy, concludes that there was, at times, a working alliance between
British India and China, particularly around the time of the Younghusband invasion of
Tibet (Addy 1984:29, 47, 55 and 59).
The reason for an alliance between British India and China is that British India
and Imperial China shared a concern about Tsarist Russian expansion. To both, rumours
about Russian and Tibetan intrigue were a source of concern. Russian government
archives are a useful supplement to the literature. The work of Andreyev (2003) and
Kuleshov (1996 and 2000) provide an analysis of these files in English, and provide
important evidence regarding the complexity of Tibet's foreign relations. This reveals
that the Tibetan government conducted independent negotiations with Russia, whereas
China asserts that the Tibetan government had no such independent relations.
The nature of Tibet's dependency upon Imperial China is called into question
by evidence from the Himalayan states of Bhutan, Ladakh, Nepal and Sikkim. Studies
of Nepalese government archives concerning Tibet are of particular significance (Khan
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1997, Mishra 1991, Rose 1971). Rose's study of Nepal's foreign relations with Britain,
China and Tibet, from 1770 through to 1970, is useful in that it utilises both Nepalese
and Chinese primary sources. These studies show that whilst Nepal paid tribute to
China, Nepal considered itself a fully independent state. Furthermore, following the
Nepal-Tibet War of 1854-6, Tibet paid tribute to Nepal in return for Nepalese military
assistance. During this time both Nepal and Tibet continued to pay tribute to China. This
reveals a far more complex web of trans-Himalayan/East Asian relations than Imperial
Chinese based accounts suggest.
The dominant understanding of tributary relations between Imperial China
and foreign states emerges from studies utilising Imperial Chinese archives (Fairbank
and Teng 1941, Fairbank 1942 and 1968). These studies are useful in that they present
the orthodox, Confucian worldview. However, caution must be exercised as the
archives provide only a partial, one-sided, glimpse of the political reality of the time.
For example, European states were recorded as tributary states of China and both
England and Sweden were recorded as Dutch dependencies. With regards to Tibet, it is
the orthodox Confucian Chinese representation of tributary relations that has
subsequently gained pre-eminence. However, recent work has shown that Qing legal
statutes dealing with border control incorporated a second level of rules and practices
based upon principles of 'fairness, equality, reciprocity, and mutual respect for
"territorial sovereignty"' (Edwards 1987:34).
The orthodox representation emphasises Tibet's inferiority and subordination
to Imperial China. In part, the pre-eminence of this interpretation reflects the political
reality of post 1950 events. Yet, it seems that the PRC's interpretation of traditional
Sino-Tibetan relations is in sympathy with Western readings of the religious-secular
dynamics that informed Tibet's traditional ties to China. Crucially, the tributary
relationship existing between Tibet and Imperial China was distinct in that there was a
religious element to the relationship not present elsewhere in the Chinese tributary
system. In Tibetan terms, the relationship between China and Tibet was governed by
the concept of Cho-Yon (priest-patron), in which the Dalai Lama gave spiritual
protection to the Chinese Emperors in return for military assistance. The Cho-Yon
concept is usefully discussed in a number of articles (Samdhong 1977, Norbu 1992,
Klieger 1989, and Seyfort 1991, Shakebpa 1967).
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There are many autobiographies published in English by Tibetans that
experienced the events of the PRC takeover and later went into exile (Norbu 1997,Taring
1970 , Shakebpa 1967, Gyatso 1990). These accounts are rich in eye-witness detail and all
bring slightly differing perspectives. Taring, Gyatso, and Shakebpa were all members of
the political elite. Norbu, meanwhile, came from a less-privileged rural background. In
addition there is the account of the Tibetan revolutionary Phuntso Wangye, who founded
the Tibetan Communist Party in the 1940s and the acting translator between Mao and the
Dalai Lama (Goldstein, Sherap and Siebenschuh 2004).
In Tibet, complex legal and political ideas were transmitted in religious terms,
and the spiritual authority of the Dalai Lamas did not preclude temporal authority, rather
the two were intrinsically linked. This view is supported by French (1996), Shakebpa
(1967), Thurman (1986), and Wangyal (1975), all of whom discuss the overlaps
between Buddhist philosophy, law and politics in Tibet. However, throughout the period
of British influence in Tibet, modernist Western discourse tended to emphasise the
secular basis of legal and political power, and in this construction the legal and political
authority of the Dalai Lamas, and by extension the Tibetan government, was diminished.
The prevalence of this view is particularly evident at the end of the nineteenth century,
and the turn of twentieth century, and can be discerned from the firsthand accounts of
Western travellers to Tibet, including explorers, journalists, and British government
officials. This literature includes primary source material such as unpublished official
correspondence, private letters, diaries and published travelogues and memoirs (Landon
2002, Waddell 1905 and Younghusband 1996). Meanwhile in secondary sources,
Bishop (2000) and Lopez (1998) have elaborated the persistence of this view in
contemporary Western discourse.
The view that ecclesiastical rule was in some way inconsistent with
modernisation was a view taken up by Nationalist China. Work by Paul Cohen, Duara,
Li, and Shrecker provide insight into the shifting ideological and political landscape of
Nationalist China in the period before the Communist victory of 1949 (Cohen and
Schrecker 1976, Duara 1991 and 1997, Li 1964, Schrecker 1969). An understanding of
the Chinese Nationalist movement is also dependent upon an understanding of the
'unequal treaty' system, whereby Western Powers secured territorial concessions
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within China. In this regard, the work of Jerome Cohen, Chiu, Fung, Wang and Wesley-
Smith is of note (Cohen and Chiu 1997, Fung 1997, Wang 1990, Wesley Smith 1998).
Marxist historical materialism, as adapted by Mao, extended the Social
Darwinist theories of the Chinese Nationalists and advocated the evolutionary
superiority of the non-religious, socialist state. The theory of historical materialism
also supported a pre-existing racial classification system, in which Tibetans were
ranked at the lowest rung of racial evolution and Han Chinese at the top. This racial
classification in some ways reflects the Imperial Chinese assertion that Tibetans were
barbarians, but in the traditional Chinese worldview, all foreigners were barbarians and
the distinction made was arguably based upon cultural, rather than racial, characteristics.
The rise of Nationalism shifted the conceptual basis of these distinctions, and a
distinctive racial discourse emerged alongside concerns with modernisation, science,
and rational progress. This discourse achieved continuity in Communist thought and
persists today. The literature available to trace these developments includes translations
of speeches and writings by Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedhong.
Contemporary sources include internal Chinese Communist Part reports and official
PRC government white papers. The subject has also been usefully discussed by in
secondary sources by Dikotter (1992), Schram (1963), Sautman (1997) and Zhao
(2000).
1:3 Limitations
a) Geographical
Traditional Tibet was divided into three principalities: Ut'sang, Khams, and
Amdo. After 1951, Ut'sang became the Tibetan Autonomous Region of the PRC.
Meanwhile, after 1955, Khams and Amdo became incorporated into modem-day PRC
provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Today, the Tibetan areas within
these larger Chinese provinces are granted a measure of autonomy at the prefectural and
county level. This division is an extension of an earlier administrative division made by
the Qing, which distinguished Outer Tibet (Ut'sang) from Inner Tibet (Khams and
Amdo).
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The separation between Ut'sang and the outlying regions of Khams and Amdo
presents various methodological difficulties. For example, it becomes problematic to
make general statements about the policy of the Tibetan state unless one identifies the
territory being referred to. The Tibetan government in Lhasa exercised exclusive
control over Ut'sang, but in Khams and Amdo the law and policy of the central
government was applied inconsistently. Central government control was particularly
weak in Khams, a sparsely populated region inhabitant by nomadic tribes. Khams was
largely autonomous and customary nomadic law prevailed. Furthermore, the Sino-Tibetan
border was highly indeterminate; ongoing cross-border conflicts between the Tibetans of
Amdo and Khams and the Chinese meant a constant shifting of alliances. Hence, ethnic
Tibetans in such areas sometimes found themselves subject to both Tibetan and
Chinese (Qing and Nationalist) law and tax obligations.
When turning to contemporary analysis, it is necessary to remain mindful of
the fact that by incorporating large tracts of Tibetan areas into Chinese regions, not
only does the land mass of traditional Tibet appear radically reduced, but so too does
its population. One of the frequent sources of discrepancy between statistics given by
the PRC, and those given by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, is that the former will
refer to the 'reduced' Tibet, whilst the latter will be considering 'greater' Tibet in its
entirety.
b) Sources
This study utilises a variety of primary and secondary sources. These sources
are limited to English language materials. Primary historical sources include British
government files that cover the period of British influence in Tibet (1904-1950). Other
documents that can be considered primary sources are treaties between Tibet, China,
Britain, Nepal, Russia and Mongolia. Contemporary primary sources comprise of
official translations of PRC legislation. There are also a large number of official PRC
government white papers and speeches by key party members that exist in translation.
In addition my analysis is at times informed by personal conversations held with
Tibetans in exile. This includes conversations with Samdhong Rinpoche, the Prime
Minister of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the ex-political prisoner Ven Bagdro, as
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well as many individual Tibetans who have undertaken unauthorised and dangerous
journeys across the Himalaya in order to reach the exile community.
The British government files are wide ranging. They include subjective
accounts, in the form of diaries and personal letters, as well as official correspondence and
reports. As such, they provide crucial insight into the frequently divergent views and
objectives of Whitehall, the British Government of India, and British officials in the
field. One of the limitations of these files is that internal power struggles between key
correspondents impinge upon content. For example, in the decade preceding the British
1904 invasion of Lhasa, the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, gave increasing
significance to the threat of a possible Russian and Tibetan collaboration. It is true that
the Lhasa administration were strengthening diplomatic ties with Russia at this time, but
it is also evident that Curzon was manipulating the extent of this threat so as to win
support from the home government for his expansionist imperial policy.
As far as Chinese materials go, there is a significant corpus of work existing in
translation. Certainly, one cannot be confident that these translated materials are
representative of the situation on the ground, but they are invaluable for understanding
the official policy position.
Unfortunately, the limitations that arise when considering Tibetan materials are
more severe. In part, this is due to the destruction of Tibetan records, along with all but
a handful of Tibetan monasteries, following the Chinese occupation (Shakya 1999:512).
At the same time, many Tibetan texts were preserved by the tens of thousands of
refugees who fled into exile after 1959, following the final disintegration of the 1951
Seventeen Point Agreement. The priority at this time was preserving key religious
scriptures. This study does not provide an extensive examination of the domestic legal
system of Tibet, and therefore this documentary deficit is not a substantial limitation.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the loss of Tibetan legal materials has helped perpetuate the
view that Tibet was a society without law. Tibetologists have focussed upon matters
relating to Tibetan Buddhist philosophy rather than Tibetan law.
One of the underlying challenges to balancing Tibetan and Chinese accounts
of their shared history is the fact that there is a general lack of overlap between Tibetan
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and Chinese historiography. It is not simply that they each give divergent accounts of the
same events. Rather, they tend to be concerned primarily with events taking place within
their own geographical boundaries, and hence display a lack of awareness of external
developments. An important caveat here is that it is difficult to ascertain the extent to
which this is a product of Western academic classification, and the inadequacy of
translated sources. However, within the Qing sources that exist in translation there is a
lack of coverage of Sino-Tibetan relations. As with the limitations affecting the British
records, this highlights the necessity of triangulating data between a variety of sources.
c) Theoretical
As well as a number of specific limitations inherent to the source materials
utilised in this study, there are a number of more theoretical limitations to be
considered.
Delgado and Stefancic have shown how classification systems within Western
academic libraries lead to an implicit favouring of traditional legal theory. Meanwhile,
"transformative ideas and analogies" remain hidden from view (Delgado and Stefancic
1990:225). Whether conscious or not, the result has been an implicit acceptance that
particular Western legal sources carry more weight. This state of affairs is self-
perpetuating, for once excluded, minorities, by definition, lack the authority of central
sources, and can hence be dismissed.
Processes of marginalisation within Western academia have particular
significance in relation to Tibet. For example, due to the way in which the discipline of
Tibetan studies has been constructed, defined, and funded within academia,
Tibetologists have found themselves sidelined from mainstream academic discourse.
Katz (1983) has shown how the reclassification of the discipline as an East Asian
subject in America, resulted in the erasure of Tibetan Studies from traditional academic
fora. This was a direct result of a corresponding shift in the government's foreign policy.
The situation was compounded by an already existing disparity between Sinology and
Tibetology, for there has seldom been a meaningful confluence between the two
disciplines. After all, the Tibetan language and religion has South Asian, Sanskritic
origins, rather than East Asian, Sinitic ones. Katz also highlights how Tibetologists were
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placed under increasing institutional pressure to display 'academic neutrality,' the
argument being that, only then 'can issues of political, moral and intellectual import be
addressed rationally.' The net result was, according to Katz, that 'in essence, I have
found it more difficult to locate a forum for addressing questions about Tibet than for
any other issues' (Katz 1983:8).
1:4 Evaluation
This thesis covers a large terrain, both geographical and historical. It is
necessary to acknowledge that clarity gained at the macro level, will be at the cost of
micro detail. Nonetheless there are important reasons for undertaking such a broad
survey. Placing the issue in historical and comparative perspective reveals some of
underlying dynamics that have shaped perceptions of Tibet’s legal identity. The terms
by which China expressed a claim to Tibet underwent a significant shift after the demise
of the Qing dynasty. This shift was both a product of and a response to Western
imperialism. The belligerency with which China has subsequently defended its claim to
Tibet can be seen as a defensive reaction against foreign aggression. However this does
not adequately explain the lack of consideration of Tibet’s legal identity in international
legal discourse.
In official PRC statements regarding Tibet it is possible to detect a genuine
incomprehension as to why Tibet should fail to welcome Chinese intervention. From
this point of view, Tibet was feudal and superstitious and in need of external help in
order to achieve modernisation. There are important parallels between this perception
and that embedded within nineteenth century European imperialism: both legitimised
their role by reference to a 'civilising mission' based upon a combination of science and
law, and framed by a universalistic discourse of modernity. By conducting a wide
ranging analysis, this study highlights significant overlaps between the project of
modernity, colonialism, international law and Chinese reformulations of Sino-Tibetan
relations.
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1:5 Organisation
There are nine chapters in this thesis. Following the introductory chapter, the
second chapter presents an overview of the traditional Tibetan legal system and
considers Tibet’s relations with China in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. This is
placed in the regional context.
Chapter Three explores the changing nature of the frontier in nineteenth and
early twentieth century China and Tibet, within the context of European, in particular
British, imperial discourse surrounding the nature of civilised and uncivilised society.
A key event was the British invasion of Tibet 1904 which marked the beginning of a
period of British influence in Tibet, and a corresponding disintegration of the traditional
Chinese and Tibetan systems governing international relations. The treaties made
between Tibet, China and Great Britain in this era had a profound effect upon
perceptions of Tibet’s legal status.
Chapter Four considers the impact of the increasing circulation of Western
legal values in the region. This Chapter argues that rather than being tangential to and
superseded by the era of institutional international law, the ‘standard of civilisation’
remained central and pervasive, achieving continuity in modernist assumptions of
rationality and scientific administration. This places perceptions of Tibet’s legal status
in historical and comparative perspective.
Chapter Five discusses the relationship between Western imperialism and
Nationalist China's attempts to consolidate its territorial sovereignty. During the era of
the Nationalist Republic of China (1911-1949), Tibet enjoyed at least de facto
independence. However, throughout this period, the Nationalist Government of China
worked to undermine the legitimacy of the Tibetan government. This chapter considers
the legal and ideological means of legitimation employed by both Western imperialism
and by Nationalist China in pursuit of territorial goals.
Chapter Six considers the space left for independent Tibetan national identity
in a rapidly modernising society of postcolonial states and explores how theoretical
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tensions within postcolonial international legal discourse have reinforced an existing
lack of consideration for Tibet’s legal identity.
Chapter Seven presents an overview of the system of Regional National
Autonomy in the PRC, this being the legal framework governing Tibetan Autonomous
Areas. An analysis of legislation reveals a tension between the state goal of socialist
modernisation and the state protection of Tibetan ethnic difference. A result of this
tension is that law is used as a tool to make Tibetan cultural identity compliant to
overarching goals of modernisation.
Chapter Eight examines the PRC’s efforts to separate Tibetan religious and
ethnic identity, a feature of the state’s efforts to redefine Tibetan culture in the terms of
socialist modernisation. This reveals contradictions within the state’s ideological
commitment to modernity. It also challenges the official PRC view that present day
Sino-Tibetan conflict is a product of British imperial intervention.
Chapter Nine presents an overall conclusion.
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Chapter Two
2.1 Introduction
In a letter to Chiang Kai-shek in 1946, the Tibetan government affirmed the
ideological grounds of the Tibetan state, outlining the structure upon which its
institutions were founded: ‘There have been many great nations on this earth who have
achieved unprecedented wealth and might, but there is only one nation which is
dedicated to the wellbeing of humanity in the world and that is the religious land of
Tibet which cherishes a joint spiritual and temporal system’ (FO371/53616). This
brazen assertion of national spiritual superiority is strikingly in contrast with dominant
Western models of state structure. Even the more extrovertly ideological of political
systems in the West such as communism and fascism have tended to locate the force of
political change as a function of the evolutionary progress of universal history, with
emphasis placed upon the increased rationality of state administration and the
modification of economic relations. In such terms, the Dalai Lama’s statement
becomes an expression of faith rather than reason, which is a private not a public
matter. The statement is, however, much more than an expression of religious faith. It
articulates the conceptual ground of Tibetan law and governance, cho sid nyi, ‘the
union of religion and politics.’ It projects the combined spiritual and legal power of the
state, recalling the preamble to the Dalai Lama Law Code: ‘Like the union of the sun
and the moon the priest [the fifth Dalai lama] and the patron [Gushri Khan] together
promulgated the legal system in the name of the universal chakravartin emperors [of
Buddhist India], and led their subjects towards an age of peace and wellbeing,
heralding sunny days of happiness shining from above’ (French 1995a). The purpose
of this chapter is to present an overview of the Tibetan legal system and examine the
development of traditional Sino-Tibetan relations prior to the emergence of significant
Western imperial influence in the region. Such an analysis will show that, whilst Sino-
Tibetan relations were complex, Tibet was not incorporated into the traditional
Chinese administrative structure. Moreover, Tibet’s distinct legal system provided a
very different basis for foreign relations than the one at the heart of the traditional
Chinese vision of an empire. The Mahayana Buddhist imperative for the individual to
achieve enlightenment for the benefit of all had a fundamental effect upon the rationale
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of the Tibetan state. Since, according to this imperative, monasticism was perceived as
socially productive, the state had a specific responsibility to support the spiritual
endeavours of the nation. Moreover, this imperative defined the role the Tibetan nation
played in the world. After all, the cultivation of Buddhism was ultimately directed at
achieving liberation for all sentient beings. The ideological conflict between Tibetan
and Chinese systems of law and governance that is examined in this chapter is
essential to an understanding of the impact of Western imperialism on Sino-Tibetan
relations, which will be explored further in later chapters. Of equal importance is the
conflict between Tibetan and Western discourses of law and religion. The erasure of
Tibetan social theory, including law and politics, from Western studies of Tibet has
reinforced the mistaken notion that for all its religious uniqueness, Tibet possessed few
or none of the institutions necessary to the modern state.
2:2 The Tibetan Legal Tradition
As far as Tibetan legal tradition goes, the literature that remains is notable
primarily by its absence, in either Tibetan or foreign languages.5 With regard to studies
published in the English language, there is only a small body of literature that
comprehensively delineates the chronological development of Tibetan law. The
majority of references to legal codes, principles and procedures are embedded within
studies primarily concerned with other aspects of Tibetan social life, and are therefore
not readily accessible. It is apparent that one of the most comprehensive surveys of
Tibetan law available, by French (1995a), contains several notable discrepancies in
relation to the historical context of Tibetan legal development (Huber 1998). For these
reasons, part of this chapter’s concern is to draw together some of these disparate
threads of information into a cogent outline.
With regard to English language accounts of Tibet and its people, the lack of
interest in Tibetan legal institutions runs consonant to the elaboration of the myth of
Shangri-La in Western discourse. This is evident in, for example, the Victorian
Theosophists appropriation of Tibetan Buddhism through to the contemporary ‘new
5 In exile, the Tibetan government has established centres of advanced learning such as the research orientated Tibetan University
at Sarnath and the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics in Dharamsala, but as a matter of priority emphasis has focused primarily on
theological studies.  The Library of Tibetan Works and Archives preserves a copy of the Dalai Lama Law Codes, one of which has
been translated into English (French. 1995a).
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age’ superficial fascination with traditional wisdom. In reference to more scholarly
work, nineteenth-century Britain saw a considerable collection and translation of
Buddhist texts from across the empire, with Buddhism being seen as ‘an object
determinable…by its own texts’ (Almond 1988: 24). The sense of intellectual
ownership that pervaded the endeavour created a distance between the texts and the
practice, with distinctions being made about what were ‘pure’ or ‘debased’ forms of
the religion. Tibetan Buddhism (‘Lamaism’) in particular was presented as corrupt
(see, for example, Waddell 1895). This scholarly enterprise fed into a wider imperial
discourse in which traditional Buddhist societies were seen as incapable of self-
governance. Whilst the historical Buddha was admired by Victorians as a reformer and
moralist, and was seen as comparable to Martin Luther, the appropriation of Buddhist
texts remained contradictory and fraught by poor translation and incomplete sources.
It has been argued that to some extent this appropriation has been challenged
by Tibetans-in-exile who have counter-appropriated the artefacts of Tibetan culture
popular in the West in order to reconsolidate Tibetan national identity in Western eyes
(Shakya 2001). Yet this in itself highlights the displacement of complex traditional
value systems implicated in the operation of the Tibetan state by tokens of exchange
that are part of a global circulation of cultural exotica. Such a process of ‘mimicry,
hybridization, and appropriation of Western representations of Tibetaness or Buddhism
among sections of the Tibetan diaspora’ is, as Tsering Shakya argues, ‘only at the
margins of Tibetan subjectivity’ (Shakya 2001:185). In this light, it seems that such
tokens occupy an uncertain position as vehicles of identity and resistance. This is
especially so as modern nationalism widely presupposes that ‘secularisation is a
prerequisite for the modern state…and the modern state is necessarily an essentially
secular state’(Carroll 1984:362). Furthermore, the secular nation has its own ‘rituals
and monuments’ affirming its transcendence by importing ‘the sacredness or holiness
of its territory’ (Fitzpatrick 2007:170).
This returns full circle to consideration of Tibetan law. It is true that dharma
is the ultimate law from a Tibetan Buddhist perspective, but this is not the only law
that existed within Tibet. The Tibetan legal tradition stretches back to the royal law
codes of the seventh-century Tibetan empire. Law codes attributed to King Gampo are
preserved piecemeal in later Tibetan histories such as the Mkha-pa’i dga’-ston (Uray
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1972b:26). More extensive information on early Tibetan law is available from a series
of original eighth and ninth-century Tibetan documents from Tunhuang, which deal
extensively with legal regulations and attest to a comprehensive, utilitarian legal
system that prescribed specific punishments for specific crimes (Huber 1998). Matters
pertaining to contract, sales, loans, land holding, taxation and marital disputes are all
recorded in the documents, along with examples of correct judicial decisions in
accordance with the law. Criminal penalties to be applied in cases of theft are also
outlined in detail and it is evident that judges applied the law in a legal forum, and that
legal representatives probably assisted those appearing before a judge (Thomas
1933a:101).6 The most identifiable antecedent of modern Tibetan law (1650-1959) is
the Tsang Code, which was disseminated in the early seventeenth century and was the
product of an extensive survey of various ancient texts and legal approaches employed
throughout the regions of Tibet, Mongolia, Bhutan and Monpa (French 1995a:43). By
the time the Fifth Dalai Lama came to power in 1642, the Tibetan legal system had
developed into a complex blend of secular (royal) law and Buddhist precepts, the Fifth
introducing the system that remained in place until a full administrative takeover by
the PRC in 1959.7 It should be noted that Tibetan law remained in force in Tibet
throughout the interim period of dual administration that ensued after the PRC
occupation in 1951 and before the 14th Dalai Lama went into exile in 1959.
To place the development of Tibetan law in a regional context, at around the
same time that King Gampo was reportedly compiling the first law code of the Tibetan
empire, the Tang dynasty (618-907) introduced a new and highly influential law code
in China. The Tang code of 653 became the foundation upon which all major dynastic
law codes were constructed.8 Furthermore, the Confucian styled Tang code was
transplanted into the legal traditions of Korea, Japan and Vietnam, having a significant
regional influence (McKnight 1995). The fact that there is no discernible
transplantation of Tang law into the Tibetan legal tradition is indicative of the major
6 One of these documents translated by Hugh Richardson (1990) gives a detailed account of the system of indemnity payments
that were the basis of the early law codes.
7 For details of law codes promulgated between the Tenth and Seventeenth centuries, see French (1996), Huber (1998) Ekvall.and
Cassinelli (1969). Law codes in this era show a continuation of the early codes of the empire with increasing Buddhist influence
e.g. the Detsen Code, Neudong Code and the Tsang Code.
8 Previous drafts of the Tang code date from 617, 624 and 637, but the 653 version is held to be the definitive form. A new
version was also promulgated in 737.
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cultural disparity that existed between Inner Asia and East Asia; a disparity that has
had enormous ramifications for Sino-Tibetan relations up to the present day.
As Katz wrote of the field of Tibetan studies in Western academia generally,
‘the ghost of Max Weber still haunts us, his view of Buddhism as one-sidedly
otherworldly inhabits our contemporary perceiving’ (Katz 1986:3). In light of
contemporary Tibet this remains relevant, for the absence of studies on Tibetan social
theory and legal institutions feeds into the PRC’s claim that Tibet has always been part
of China. Without the presence of an articulate discourse of Tibetan social theory,
what remains is largely the circulation of discourses on Tibetan religious culture.
Yet, from the Tibetan perspective, law/politics and religion were inseparable,
the twin pillars upon which Tibetan society was founded. Expressed in Tibetan by the
term cho sid nyi, this was established as a fundamental principle of Tibetan law and
governance from the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama. Cho sid nyi, which translates as
‘religion and politics joined together,’ expresses the belief that the ideal government
works ‘for temporal happiness in this world and spiritual happiness in the hereafter’
(Wangyal 1975:79). The reciprocal of the notion that the ideal government operated in
both the spiritual and worldly domain was the belief that civil society had both
spiritual and temporal obligations to fulfil towards the state. The purpose of the laity
was, therefore, to subsidise the clergy, whereas the purpose of the clergy was to seek
salvation for all sentient beings. The concept was essentially one of reciprocity, ‘a
government of dual character and for a dual cause’ (Wangyal 1975:81). Yet from a
Western perspective law, as it emerged post-Enlightenment, was its own religion:
‘Faith and belief in the law and its beneficence were, like the language of religion,
evoked by jurist after jurist’ (Sugarman 1991:58).
The religious nature of Tibetan law challenges modernity, not just by
affronting secular values, but also because the core of its jurisprudence highlights the
contradictions of Western law’s claim to autonomy. In Tibetan law, law and morality
are seen as contingent. The principles of res judicata and stare decisis or jurisprudence
constante did not apply. In Tibetan civil law, judicial decision required the consent of
all parties and should consent be lost after a decision was issued, even if years later,
then a case could be reopened by either party. In criminal law, the shift towards
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institutional Buddhism was given expression in the Fifth’s legal reforms which meant
that whilst early Tibetan law codes listed specific punishments to fit specific crimes,
by the twentieth century there was a reluctance to apply such universal measures
(French 1995a:139). This dynamic element is also evidenced in great flexibility in the
type and level of legal forum where a case could be heard. During a lawsuit’s progress
through the judicial system, it could move between levels in a non-linear manner and
could likewise be subject to different types of legal procedure, shifting from informal
mediation to formal adjudication and back again.9 As one legal specialist who
practised in Tibet prior to 1959 remarked ‘The reason for not specifying crime with
punishment is that each infraction must be investigated individually in Tibet. This is a
method, a process, and not a specific rule’ (French1995a:318).
The jurisprudential concern that this reflects is that the complex web of cause
and effect, action and reaction that spans the entire universe has enormous implications
for a human understanding of ‘truth’. Buddhist jurisprudence stressed the relevance of
such concepts as the illusive nature of reality, karma, non-decay, the cyclic existence
of rebirth, the non-duality of being, and the existence of multiple concepts of time and
causation (French 1995a:59). In a world in which it was perceived that the mind
essentially obscured the truth, creating attachments to false beliefs such as the
permanence of ‘I’, a value was attached to ‘calming the mind’ and attaining a correct
view. No action, be it crime or punishment, could be considered in isolation; it could
only be understood in the context of karma — the cosmological law of cause and
effect.10 Past causal factors and the future ramifications of an action both had to be
taken into account. To prevent the future continuation of a negative effect, it was
therefore necessary to unearth, and eliminate, the ‘root cause’ of a conflict (French
1995a:142-143). As, ultimately, all such root causes lay in the mind, fundamentally
subjective factors such as ‘attitude’ and ‘motivation’ also played a key role in
determining guilt and punishment.
9 This is based upon studies of the judicial process in Tibetan courts circa 1900 to 1959 (French.1995a) However, many of the
bureaucratic structures described had been in place since 1792 (Carrasco: 1959:83).
10 A party’s awareness of the principles of karma was considered necessary. Judges also had to take karmic responsibility for their
decisions. (French. 1995a:63, 161,319).
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Determining hidden factors such as the mental attitude of a party to a suit was
a task fraught with uncertainties. On the one hand, it was essential for a correct
decision and a permanent resolution; on the other hand, ascertaining the attitude that
lay behind an action required perspicacity not yet developed by ordinary mortals. After
all, it is said that the Buddha, in a previous life, killed a man because he foresaw that
the man was going to commit a murder that would result in the death of five hundred
people (French 1995a:205).  Thus, what on the surface can seem to be a negative
action can in fact be a positive deed motivated by compassion. Such stories informed
Tibetan legal reasoning in the twentieth century, and underpinned the emphasis placed
upon ascertaining motive. They could also invoke a concept of relativism that
threatened to undermine individual rights and promote the overvaluation of social
tolerance. Hence, when a dispute erupted on a Tibetan estate between a monk and an
elderly beggar who relentlessly beat his child, the beggar was able to stall the debate
by saying, ‘you may think I am just a common beggar, but how do you know I am not
an enlightened saint?’ (French. 1995a:223). 11
Such concepts pose a challenge to Western legal thought. As French observes,
‘The legal cosmology of Buddhist Tibet brings into question the autonomous
framework [of Western law] and most of the basic presumptions we have about the
very nature of law, from precedent and res judicata to rule-formation and closure’
(French  2001:xiii ). This conceptual opposition between Western and Tibetan
jurisprudence is particularly evident in relation to positivist legal theory, which was
dominant in the West when Tibet first became a significant object of interest to British
India. The British Government of India kept a detailed record of Tibetan law codes and
institutions since the British-employed pundit Sarat Chandra Das undertook an
intelligence gathering mission to Lhasa in 1881-82 (Das 1895). However, it took over
a century for the first full-length study of the Tibetan legal system to appear in
Western literature (French 1995a). Even accounting for practical limitations on
scholarship such as access and funding, it seems more than coincidental that the
Western legal tradition, particularly in its more positivist form, would have great
difficulty in accommodating Tibetan jurisprudence as valid grounds for law. Only in
these postmodern and postcolonial times have such studies begun to emerge. For
practitioners of law in nineteenth-century England, the willingness of the Tibetan
11 Truth could be further ascertained through the use of oaths, oracles and ordeals (French. 1995a:130, Ekvall.1963).
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system to accommodate such a wide array of contingent factors and narratives would
have led to a destruction of law itself: ‘We are perpetually in danger of giving law a
literary instead of a scientific character, and of slipping in our thoughts from what the
law is into speculating upon the coincidences which made it what it once was.’12
The Tibetan system would not have it so, for ‘rationality’ is itself a position
that must be open to critique. The Buddha, in the Brahmajala Sutta of the Pali Digha
Nikāya, criticised mimamsika Brahmin practitioners of the rationalist school by
highlighting that their rational arguments masked their economic self-interest in
perpetuating a certain system of beliefs. Buddha argued that ‘rationality is far from a
sui generis phenomenon’ (Katz 1983:9). This view was developed by Candrakirti, the
seventh century abbot of Nalanda University and scholar of primary significance in the
Tibetan monastic curriculum, who concluded that ‘no position could be neutral in
principle,’ that affective passions ‘ultimately rooted in egoistic ignorance, determine a
position to be an expression of self-interest rather than an enquiry into truth,’ and ‘it is
only in the absence of self-interest that an objective or neutral claim could be made’
(Katz 1983:9).
2.3 The Tibetan Administrative System
It is often said that Tibet was a theocratic state governed by monks. In fact,
technically Tibet was not a theocracy, and neither did monasteries have a significant
formal role in the central government.13 The leading abbots of the larger monasteries
around Lhasa did have places on the Full National Assembly, but this was essentially
only a consultative body that assembled infrequently at the request of the Cabinet
(Goldstein1989:19-20). The assembly had neither the power to initiate action, nor to
fix a course of administrative measures. The monasteries did, however, exert
considerable informal influence over political affairs, in which they maintained
considerable interest.14 Indeed, this was made explicit in the annual Mon Lam (Great
Prayer) festival, when monks took over the capital of Lhasa for a period of three
12 Frederick Hanson, Professor of Jurisprudence at the Inns of Court, 1879, cited in Sugarman.1991:51.
13 Tibet was not a theocracy because the Dalai Lama is a direct incarnation of his human predecessor and only an indirect
incarnation of the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara. Stein.1972:138-139.
14 See, for example, the Toba Abbot incident (Goldstein.1990: 243, Goldstein.1989:365).
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weeks. During this time, secular legal control was suspended, and instead legal
authority was transferred to the monasteries (French 1995a:47, 180-181).
Additionally, when the Tibetan state gave institutionalised religion priority,
even if monasteries did not have a formal role in government, individual incarnate
lamas did, of which the Dalai Lama was the most important. The nobility, meanwhile,
was potentially in conflict with the ecclesiastical elites, as both competed for
representation in the political arena. To a certain extent, this meant that the two
institutions operated as a check and balance to each other, but on the other hand the
accountability of both to civil society was relatively negligible.  Furthermore,
Goldstein has shown that the system of ennobling the families of important
incarnations led to a circulation of property that ultimately favoured the ecclesiastical
community, for it was the nobles’ property that was confiscated and redistributed to
meet these ends (Goldstein 1973). Consequently, a distinct tension between secular
and religious objectives remained. This tension was reflected in the legal system, with
one significant primary source of written law relevant to a study of Tibet’s legal
tradition being tsa-yig, which outlined the fundamental governing principles and
institutions of a monastic community. To date, little research has been undertaken into
these documents, despite the fact that considerable attention has been paid to the
evolution of monastic power in Tibet. Given the obvious impact that Tibetan monastic
institutions had upon the administration of the entire polity, this signifies a
considerable gap in the understanding of Tibetan law and governance. As Ter
Ellingson points out, this is a gap with significant ramifications, given  ‘…the extent to
which Tibetan monasteries are still widely characterised as mysterious enclaves of
‘priests,’ Rasputin-like powers behind thrones, and hordes of ignorant fanatics who
periodically and inexplicably march forth to topple governments’
(Ellingson.1990:206). Challenging these widely held presumptions, the tsa-yig clearly
established a constitutional framework designed to prevent the arbitrary abuse of
power within monastic communities. Essentially, the tsa-yig, by distributing authority
among a range of offices and institutions, provided a framework for an interactive and
accountable system of monastic governance in which each individual had veto rights
over important policy matters. To give some insight into the social significance of the
tsa-yig, from approximately the seventeenth century through to 1950, monks
comprised about one fifth of the entire population, a greater proportion than in any
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other Buddhist society. Sera monastery, for example, was one of three ‘great
monasteries’ in Lhasa, and by the end of the nineteenth century was home to between
seven thousand and ten thousand monks (Stein 1972:139). Monks were not averse to
more aggressive expressions of their political will. They frequently exerted this
influence to great effect, opposing, for example, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s proposed
expansion and restructuring of the Tibetan Army, which was perceived as a threat to
monastic power (Goldstein.1989:Ch3). Connected to this is the fact that the Great
Monasteries had their own large populations of errant fighting monks, dobdos, who
were generally not accountable for their actions (Goldstein, Siebenschuh & Tsering
1997:27-29).15 As Goldstein states, ‘Monasticism in Tibet was not the otherworldly
domain of a minute elite; rather it was a mass phenomenon’(Goldstein 1990:231).
Tibetan customary law specified that each family should give over their third son to
monastic life.16 This meant that a representative from nearly every household in the
polity exerted some influence over monastic governance.17
By the end of the nineteenth century, at least one half of all government
officials were monks (Goldstein.1989:8).  Monks had played an important political
role as ministers, ambassadors and mediators from the time of the ninth century,
although the systematic appointment of monk officials seems to derive from positions
first created by the Fifth Dalai Lama (Stein 1972:143 and Goldstein 1989:8). Monk
officials were, however, trained very differently from other monks, and their positions
were not dependent upon their having risen through the monastic academic
examination system. In fact, monastic officials had only cursory religious training, and
in the twentieth century were typically literate members of the middle classes who
took the requisite monastic vows upon entering office simply to further their
career(Goldstein.1989:8, Macdonald.1929:56). This was necessary, because lay
officials were exclusively drawn from the nobility. Despite being obliged to take a vow
of celibacy, monk officials lived similar lives to their lay counterparts, occupying
houses in the city rather than monasteries, and working on day-to-day government
15 However, cases from the districts suggest that litigation could be brought against errant monks. (French.1995a:93, 278-290).
For details of the overlapping rights of clergy and laity in family law, see Stein.1972:98.
16 See King Trhisong Detsen’s law-code (Stein.1972:98) This remained the custom among agricultural communities of the
twentieth century (Carrasco.1959:47).
17 The scholastic education of monks, in particular their training in the art of debate and formal logic, gave them the capacity to
act in external legal fora. However the impoverished lower clergy did not necessarily achieve literacy. Stein.1972:140.
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administration rather than engaging in religious rites and prayer ceremonies
(Goldstein, Siebenschuh & Tsering 1997:27). They operated in a predominantly
secular domain, without affiliation to any monastery, and were subject to a series of
official regulations designed to prevent the arbitrary use and abuse of power, and
which provided an avenue of complaint for citizens seeking redress (French
1995a:233-235). For these reasons, monk officials were known as ‘token monks’
(Goldstein, Siebenschuh & Tsering 1997:27). Thus, whilst it can be said that monk
officials operated half of the administration, monasteries had little formal control over
governmental affairs. For this reason, whilst Buddhism has a notably egalitarian form
of social philosophy, this philosophy was never fully realised in political Tibet. Yet,
for all this, Buddhism had an enormous impact upon Tibetan life, and monasticism
fostered a level of sophisticated scholarship and philosophical debate that had no
secular counterpart.
2.4 Tibetan Relations with the Mongols
The phenomenon of mass monasticism evolved following the collapse of the
Tibetan empire at the end of the ninth century. The expansion of monasteries,
following the model of Indian monastic universities, ensured rapid scholastic progress.
When Genghis Khan entered Tibet in 1206, seeking the country’s submission, Tibet
resisted on the basis of religious rather than military power. A special relationship was
established between Genghis and Kunga Dorje, the hierarch of the Sakya, then the
most powerful Buddhist sect in Tibet. This relationship was conceptually founded
upon a principle of Buddhist theory which defined the ideal relationship between the
priest/preceptor on the one hand, and the lay donor on the other (Seyfort Ruegg 1991).
In Tibet, this type of relationship was expressed by the term cho-yon, and entailed the
Buddhist preceptor bestowing spiritual protection upon the donor. In return, the donor
was obliged to provide physical protection to the preceptor. In the context of Buddhist
theory, the preceptor, as a bearer of dharma, was the superior. From the Tibetan point
of view, Tibet was the centre of Buddhist civilisation, and as such, an agent of spiritual
transformation in the world. The cho-yon relationship therefore became overlaid with
geopolitical considerations. What began as a concept relating to a personal relationship
between guru and disciple, developed into a notion that expressed Tibet’s national
status. When Mongol Khans, and later Qing emperors, entered into cho-yon
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relationships with Tibetan rulers, they were placing themselves under an obligation to
protect not only the individual lama, but also that lama’s subjects (Goldstein 1989:44,
Shakabpa 1967:61-72).
The cho-yon relationship was continued by the sons of Genghis and the
Sakya-pas. In either 1253 or 1260, Kublai Khan granted the Sakya-pas temporal
authority over all Tibet’s ‘thirteen provinces’ (Stein 1972:78). The Sakya went on to
exert administrative control over Tibet for the rest of the thirteenth century, an
arrangement that granted Tibet a considerable degree of autonomy from the Mongol
empire.
During the reign of Kublai, the Mongol empire was at the height of its power.
It stretched from Korea, in the east, to the Mediterranean Sea in the west, and from
Vietnam, in the south, to Siberia in the North. Genghis had conquered Yanjing in
1215, and his sons had secured northern China by 1241. It was Kublai, however, who
succeeded in ousting the Chinese Sung dynasty from south China in 1279, after
moving the Mongol capital from Mongolia to Beijing (then known as Dadu) in 1271,
and assuming the dynastic title of Yuan. The Mongol Yuan dynasty ruled China from
1271 to 1368 and Chinese historians have since claimed that the legitimacy of PRC
rule in Tibet originates in the events of this period. The official PRC history of Tibet,
for example, states that ‘Tibet was officially incorporated into China during the Yuan
Dynasty’ (Wang and Nyima 2001:20). Apart from the significant question of whether
the modern Chinese state can derive legal title or obligation from a Mongol empire
which temporarily colonised Chinese territory, the validity of this claim is undermined
by the fact that Mongol officials did not directly administer Tibet. Furthermore, the
period in which the Khans exerted influence over Tibet was not coterminous with the
time during which the Yuan dynasty ruled China. In 1354, over a decade before the
end of Yuan dynasty, control of Tibet was seized by the Tibetan former monk ‘Great
Situ’ Chanchub Gyalsen, who promulgated the Neudong Law Code and founded the
Phagmotru-pa dynasty ( Stein.1972:79-80, French.1995a:43).18
18 It remains uncertain to what extent Mongol law was transplanted into Tibet during the reign of the Sakya-pas (Huber.1998:86,
French.1995a:42 and French.1996:316, 445-446).
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2.5 Tibetan Relations with the Ming Dynasty
In China, the Ming Chinese dynasty overthrew the Yuan dynasty in 1368,
reinstating Confucianism as the state ideology. Accordingly, the vibrant legal culture
of the Yuan was thoroughly replaced, and a revised and expanded version of the
preceding Confucian-styled Tang code was disseminated in 1373. State sponsored
scholars turned to the classics for guidance in composing a theory of statecraft that
would reinforce the dynasty’s claim to legitimacy. This marked the beginning of a
systematic attempt to ‘reassert the validity of the Confucian view of China’s place in
the world’ (Wang 1968:34).
The system of foreign relations that was implemented by the Ming fell within
the overarching ideology of the tribute system. The origins of the tribute system can be
traced back to the period of the Warring States when Confucian philosophers first
popularised the terminology, later to become central to the language of imperial
diplomacy. Of particular note is the division of the world into superior Chinese and
inferior barbarians, which became the convention at this time (Yang 1968:21). Also
significant is the identification of the ruler as the Son of Heaven, to whom barbarians
‘offered up’ tribute. This formulation projected the same hierarchal Confucian ethos
that had proven so successful in regulating domestic society onto international society.
Theoretically, this placed the Chinese emperor, the Son of Heaven, at the apex of the
moral order, not only in China, but in the entire world. By manifesting Confucian
virtue (te), the emperor received the mandate of heaven, mediated between heaven and
earth, and inspired the barbarians to come to court and be transformed (lai hua). This
view is exemplified in the statement of the Han dynasty Confucianist Hsieh Pi : ‘…[I]f
a Son of Heaven acts according to filial piety, the barbarians of the four directions will
become peaceful; nothing but filial piety can save the borders...’ (Suzuki 1968:181).
The Ming efforts to establish relations with Tibet began almost as soon as the
dynasty had consolidated their rule over China. Whilst Tibet did not pose a significant
military threat, in the post-Yuan period, the Mongols did, and the possibility of a
Tibetan-Mongol alliance caused anxiety. Furthermore, tension between the Mongols
and the Ming put a halt to the horse trade between China and Mongolia, precipitating a
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crisis at the court.19 It was imperative that the Ming establish new trade routes, and
Tibet was a primary alternative source (Sperling 1980:280).
In 1369, Emperor T’ai-tsu sent the first Ming mission to Tibet, which
according to Chinese records met with failure. Subsequent missions met with more
success in Tibetan frontier areas, and Ming records, in conformance with Confucian
ideology, chronicled several Tibetan ‘tribute’ missions to the Ming Court.
Additionally, the Ming court bestowed titles and seals on several Tibetan hierarchs.
That these ‘tribute’ missions were in fact trade missions, and the title bearers those
Tibetans who facilitated this trade, has since been clearly shown through careful
analysis of Ming and Tibetan records (Sperling 1983).
The fact that the lofty rhetoric of the Chinese tribute system disguised a much
more prosaic system of trade relations has been well documented (Fairbank and Teng
1941, Fairbank (ed.) 1968). The first Ming Emperor had been quick to ban all private
overseas trade, and prohibited citizens from having contact with foreign traders, using
foreign commodities, or travelling overseas (Chan 1968:414). This ensured that the
official tribute system was the only legal way of conducting cross-border trade in Ming
China. Foreign envoys were admitted only as tributaries and conducted their trade
under close surveillance, hence restricting their interaction with Chinese civilians. The
emperor, meanwhile, was able to ensure that the court received a steady flow of goods
and, furthermore, was able to reinforce the legitimacy of the dynasty’s reign at home
by fostering the myth of Chinese superiority abroad. As Fletcher (1968:209) points
out, ‘Chinese subjects met no foreigners who were not also ‘subjects’ of the realm: no
living challenge to the ruler’s claims walked the streets of the Middle Kingdom.’
This was the ideal, but the system was not without its faults. Firstly, in order
to persuade foreign envoys to trade through official, rather than black market channels,
the court had to offer various incentives.20 These incentives included the court bearing
the full cost of the tribute mission’s journey within China’s borders. This, alongside
the ‘gifts’ given by the court in exchange for the ‘tribute,’ frequently meant that the
19 Ming records show that the emperor sought horses from as far afield as the Ryukyu Islands (Sperling.1983:344).
20 Despite the threat of the death penalty, Chinese merchants operated large scale horse smuggling operations, flooding Tibetan
markets and destabilising Ming attempts to control the exchange rate (Sperling.1980:281).
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court suffered a loss (Sperling 1983:352). Indeed, after the horse crisis had subsided,
the cost of tribute missions from Tibetan lamas was considered too much of a burden
upon the court and relations were curtailed (Wylie 1980:335). To some extent, costs
could be justified by the argument that returning tribute missions would glorify the
Celestial Court abroad. This appeared to be particularly successful in the South East
Asian countries that adopted Chinese cultural values. Korea, for example, had already
embraced aspects of Tang law, and continued to have a close relationship with the
Ming and Qing dynasties, fully accepting its inferior ‘tributary’ position in accordance
with the Confucian hierarchy. The situation in Central and Inner Asia was not so stable
and the court’s arrogance in adhering to the Confucian ideology was a source of
ridicule, and even conflict (Suzuki 1968:184, Fletcher 1968: esp.209-215).
This underlines the difficulties faced by the Chinese court. Confucian
orthodoxy had facilitated the dynasty’s rule within China, but the gap between
Confucian ideals and the competing heterodox values of ‘barbarian’ societies still
needed to be bridged. In fact, the tributary system had been developed precisely for
this purpose; it was a way to neutralise, and accommodate, the potentially disruptive
effect of non-Confucian peoples, without diluting the superior Confucian values of
Chinese civilisation.21 It became clear, however, that there were times when the court
would need to deviate from the orthodox tribute rituals if it were to maintain good
relations abroad. This meant that, despite the external veneer of Confucianism, behind
the scenes the court could prove unexpectedly accommodating to competing
philosophies. This deviation from ritual occurred at various times throughout Ming and
Qing history, and is well documented in court dealings with Muslim Central Asia,
imperial Russia, and imperial Britain. It was also a significant feature of Sino-Tibetan
relations, a fact evident in the unorthodox interaction of Confucian emperors and
Tibetan Buddhist dignitaries.
Buddhism had been established in China by the year 64, but in its
development became split from Tibetan Buddhism, which more closely followed
Indian Buddhism. Despite the fact that the first Ming Emperor placed Confucianism at
the heart of his state-building project (and established a Confucian bureaucracy that
21 ‘Barbarian’ is a translation of the Chinese term generally used to denote foreigners. For further discussion see Fairbank and
Teng.1941:137.
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remained in place until 1911) before his rise to power, the emperor had been a
Buddhist monk. He continued to be interested in Buddhism throughout his reign,
retaining Buddhist monks at his court and obtaining important scriptures from Tibetan
lamas. Nevertheless, he was astute enough to limit the political power base of
Buddhists within China.22 This illustrates the complex, and often contradictory,
relationship between Confucianism and Buddhism in China. Although Buddhism and
Confucianism were not always in conflict, in fact, Confucianism came to incorporate
Buddhist concepts in much the same way as it incorporated elements from Legalism
and Taoism, the Confucian state was frequently wary of Buddhist institutions. Periodic
suppressions of Buddhism occurred from the Tang dynasty onwards, and both the
Ming and the Qing placed institutional limits on Buddhist organisations and
monasteries in China (Goossaert 2000: 41-42, Lee 1977-1978:1322-1325). Whatever
the private spiritual inclinations of Chinese emperors, Buddhism remained a potential
threat to the legitimacy of the state. Chinese Buddhism, by cultivating an ethic of non-
attachment, envisaged a largely autonomous religious community that had cut its ties
to state and family. This had political implications that were attractive to a gentry class
seeking autonomy from the Confucian elite, but was profoundly unsettling for the state
(Brook 1993). Whilst Buddhism, especially Mahayana Buddhism, taught social
responsibility, in China ‘loyalty to the Buddha was incompatible with the Confucian
and Legalist ideal of ‘one king, one ideology’ (Lee 1977-1978:1322).
China had its own distinct form of Buddhism, meaning that Tibetan
Buddhism occupied an uncertain position there, Confucian rivalry notwithstanding.
Yet, this did not preclude genuine interest in Tibetan teachings, particularly as Chinese
rulers were at times worried about the degeneration of Buddhism in China (Sperling
1980:283). For example, the third Ming Emperor, Ch’eng-tsu invited the Tibetan
hierarch the Fifth Karma-pa to his capital, an event recorded in the Ming-Shih
(Sperling 1980:283).
Despite the religious nature of the Karma-pa’s visit, there are still political
considerations to be taken into account. The Mongols remained a constant threat to the
Ming, and this meant that the dynasty could not overlook the potentially pacific effect
22 The Ministry of Rites was responsible for examining and certifying all Buddhist priests (Hucker.1958:35).
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that their patronage of Tibetan Buddhism might have. It is perhaps for this reason that
Emperor Ch’eng-tsu proposed an alliance with the Karma-pa based upon the cho-yon
principle. The Karma-pa, despite giving teachings to the emperor, rejected this
proposal, and the Ming subsequently failed to establish any meaningful relationship
with Tibet. This was especially so after the Ming Emperor Shih-tsung (1522-1566)
came to the throne, who ‘embraced Taoism, degraded lamas, and suppressed
Buddhism,’ and the Ming-Shih records show from this time on ‘Tibetan lamas rarely
went to China’ (Wylie 1980:338).
Instead, Tibetan lamas turned towards the Mongols and in 1578 a new cho-
yon alliance between the powerful Tibetan Buddhist Gelug-pa sect and Altan Khan
gave rise to the institution of the Dalai Lama. In 1642 Gushri Khan sponsored military
intervention on behalf of the Fifth Dalai Lama, giving him authority to rule Tibet in its
entirety (Stein 1972:81). The ‘Great Fifth’ was the first Dalai Lama to gain spiritual
and temporal rule over the country, and was responsible for consolidating the legal,
religious and political institutions that were the foundations of modern Tibet prior to
1959 (Stein 1972:84-85). A new Tibetan law code was circulated under the influence
of a Mongol nominated governor, and later revised when the Fifth Dalai Lama
appointed his own governor.23
2:6 Tibetan Relations with the Qing Dynasty
Not long after the Fifth Dalai Lama gained control over Tibet, the Ming
dynasty fell to the Manchu Qing dynasty, which gained control of China in 1644.
Before the conquest, the Manchus, an Inner Asian people, had been in contact with the
Gelug-pas through the Mongols. Whilst the Manchus had cultural characteristics in
common with the Mongols, the early Manchu interest in Tibetan Buddhism had
significant political motives; by giving respect to Tibetan Lamas, the Manchus hoped
to win the assistance of the Mongols in the invasion of Ming China. At the same time,
the Manchus, like the Ming, turned towards Confucianism in order to facilitate their
takeover of China. Thus, once in power, the pre-existing Confucian civil service was
23 French. 1996:448, Das.1904:228 As much as one-third to a half of the first code replicated the Tsang Code. The influence of
the earlier Neudong code has also been detected. French suggests that both codes remained current, although other evidence
refutes this (Macdonald.1929:60, Huber.1998). The second Dalai Lama Code exists as a Tibetan manuscript held at the Library of
Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala.
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retained, and in 1646 the Ming penal code was transplanted into an expanded Qing
Code. By adopting the trappings of Confucianism, the Manchu Emperor was able to
claim the mandate of heaven. To successfully take his place at the apex of the moral
order, the emperor was required to act according to Confucian rules of propriety and
deal with foreign barbarians according to the tribute system.
This left the problem of how to effectively deal with the conflicting cultural
values of the dynasty’s Inner Asian allies largely unresolved. It was imperative that the
Manchus avoid hostilities on the northern frontiers if they were to be free to
consolidate power in China. Even more so than in the Ming, it was clear that the
Confucian system would not suffice. To deal with this conflict of interests, the Qing
established a special administrative department, the Lifanyuan, to manage Inner Asian
relations, dividing the diplomatic system into two. Customary relations with the east
and south, including the maritime nations of Europe, continued to be dealt with under
the orthodox Confucian rubric of the Reception Department, under the Board of Rites
(Fairbank and Teng 1941:158). Meanwhile, Inner Asia, and later Russia, were dealt
with according to a different set of rituals. The significance of this dual approach was
not initially acknowledged in the literature dealing with the Qing tribute system. In
part, this is because Qing historical records tended to be the products of Confucian
scholarship. As scholars and officials sought to locate the present within the context of
a distinctly Confucian tradition, this led to a glossing over of troublesome
contradictions. Moreover, Manchu emperors could not afford to alienate Chinese
Confucian elites, such as the influential culture of Ching I, and so sought to portray
their rule within China in Confucian terms (Eastman 1965). Thus, the Kangxi edition
of the Hui-tien explained that the newly established Lifanyuan had been created to deal
with an overwhelming tide of people flocking to the court to admire the new dynasty’s
great virtue (Fairbank and Teng 1941:159). Yet, behind a screen of orthodox
Confucianism, like their Ming predecessors, the Qing emperors dealt with Central and
Inner Asia on very different terms. As Fletcher concludes:
‘Within the empire, the myth of world suzerainty was a useful
ideological instrument for ruling China…But in foreign affairs the myth often
proved a hindrance. Then, quietly, the emperor practiced what he pleased, not
what he preached. Relations on an equal basis with Heart, Lhasa, Kokand, or
Moscow were not exceptions to Chinese practice at all. They were customary
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dealings on the unseen side of a long-established tradition.’ (Fletcher
1968:224).
Formal Qing-Tibetan relations began not long after the Manchus came to
power. At the suggestion of the Mongols, the first Qing Emperor invited the Dalai
Lama to Manchuria before the invasion of China. However, a meeting between the two
rulers did not take place until after the conquest in 1652, when the Dalai Lama,
accompanied by a retinue of 3,000, finally visited Beijing (Rockhill 1998:9-11). This
visit is significant in that it highlights the difficulty that the new emperor faced in
reconciling the competing cultural interests of the Buddhist north and Confucian south.
His Manchu advisors, mindful of the necessity of pacifying the Mongols, advised the
emperor to receive the Dalai Lama at his court. The emperor’s Han Chinese advisors,
meanwhile, insisted that the Dalai Lama should not be permitted to cross the Chinese
border (Rockhill 1998:11). In the event, the Dalai Lama proceeded to Beijing, where
he was treated with the ceremony befitting an independent sovereign (Rockhill
1998:15, Bell 2000:36). The Dalai Lama gave spiritual teachings and afterwards the
two rulers exchanged titles. The Dalai Lama received the title ‘The Unifier in one
religion of the people living in the extremely healthy, tranquil, and celestial land of the
west, the immutable Vajradhara, the Ocean of Wisdom’ (TMC 2001:17). The emperor,
meanwhile, received the title ‘The Heavenly Lord Manjushri, the Great Emperor’ from
the Dalai Lama (TMC 2001:17). The title was significant, as it identified the emperor
as the incarnation of the Bodhisattva Manjushri, a very important figure in Tibetan
Buddhism. Nonetheless, such a title did not grant the emperor sole rights to a
Manjushri identity, as such titles could be given to more than one individual
simultaneously (Uspensky  2002:218). The title was appropriate, as in Buddhism the
Bodhisattva Manjushri had long been identified as a protector of China (Farquhar
1978:13, Manandhar and Mishra 1986:1).
The bestowal of titles had been an integral part of the Confucian tribute
system since earlier dynasties. As previously noted, Tibetan hierarchs received titles
from the Ming as part of tributary-trade relations. The rulers of Laos, Korea, Annam,
Burma, and Siam also received complimentary titles and seals from the Ming, and
continued to do so under the Qing. The ritual of title giving underlined the emperor’s
authority, but also his supreme benevolence and virtue. Theoretically, the barbarians
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coming to court were attracted by superior Confucian civilisation, and were there ‘to
be transformed.’ Thus, title-giving symbolised the successful, and harmonious,
incorporation of the uncivilised into the civilised world. The Son of Heaven, the
ultimate patriarch, henceforth treated the tributary countries as his subordinates, as a
Confucian father might his sons. In Western scholarship, this has led to the tributary
countries being labelled as ‘vassals’ of China, although such a Sinocentric
interpretation fails to account for the complex system of regional relationships that
operated beyond the traditional Confucian world view.
Commentators have since attributed great significance to the fact that
Tibetans received titles from Chinese emperors. Li, for example, has claimed that
‘hereditary titles tended to consolidate Chinese power by their psychological effect
upon the Tibetan mind’ (Li 1960:28). This view originates from the constructions of
traditional Confucianist historiography. Yet, studies of the tribute system have clearly
shown the disparity between Confucian ideals and diplomatic reality. Even more
problematic is the fact that the exchange of titles between Qing emperors and the Dalai
Lamas was reciprocal. This reciprocity transformed the Confucian basis of the ritual.
From the Tibetan point of view, meanwhile, this signalled not only a suspension, but
an inversion of the Confucian hierarchy. According to the principles of cho-yon, the
Fifth Dalai Lama had accepted the emperor as his donor-patron. As he had already
entered into cho-yon relations with Gushri Khan in 1642, this meant that the Fifth
Dalai Lama now had two powerful donors to whom he acted as preceptor, a fact that
greatly enhanced the legitimacy of his rule in Tibet. In China, the concept of lai hua,
‘come and be transformed,’ implied that the barbarians could not help but be drawn to
Chinese civilisation (Fairbank 1942:132). In Tibet, meanwhile, it was accepted that the
Tibetan state, by privileging monastic education over military might, was working
towards the enlightenment of all sentient beings.24 The fact that Tibetan lamas had
successfully established the dharma at the Manchu court was evidence of the greatness
of Tibetan civilisation and, ultimately, this demonstrated the superiority of the dual
system.
24 In Tibet monks represented 13% of the population, and about 26% of the males (Goldstein. 1990. p231).
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Certainly, the Fifth Dalai Lama had little reason to doubt his influence. In
Tibet, increasing trade and scholarship ensured rapid advancement (Stein1972:84-85).
Meanwhile, in the early reign of the Kangxi Emperor (r. 1661-1722), Mongol chiefs
were received at the Qing court as vassals of the Dalai Lama, and the Dalai Lama
helped mediate in Qing-Mongol disputes (Rockhill 1998:17-18, Wang 1995:20). Tibet,
therefore, had a persuasive and compelling regional influence at this time. Indeed, in
1674, the Dalai Lama refused the Qing emperor’s request for military aid when China
was beset by internal revolts (Shakabpa 1984:120-121).
Nevertheless, in 1720, the balance of power underwent a dramatic shift.
Following internal unrest, certain factions in Tibet appealed for military aid from the
Dzungars to help them defeat Lhapsang Khan, who had attacked Lhasa on the pretext
that the Sixth Dalai Lama should be deposed due to his predilection for women and
love-poetry (Stein 1972:85). This intervention backfired, leading to the massacring of
numerous Tibetans. In the early eighteenth century the Dzungars, the last of the nomad
empires of Central Asia, competed for regional power alongside imperial Russia and
China and represented a threat to Manchu rule (Barfield 1989:266-296, Perdue
1996:757-793).  When Tibet appealed to China for support Qing troops entered Lhasa
and expelled the Dzungars. In the process, however, the Qing army also annexed part
of eastern Tibet and installed a small garrison at Lhasa, which operated under the
authority of two Ambans. This marked the beginning of the Chinese protectorate,
which remained in place until 1911 (Stein 1972:85, Petech 1950: esp.8-77).
Emperor Qianlong finally defeated the Dzungars in 1757, and the Mongols
too were soon subdued through a Qing policy of divide and rule (Barfield 1989:294).
In the process, Tibet lost strategic relevance to the Manchus, but the patronage of
Tibetan Buddhism still remained an essential tool for avoiding conflict in Mongolia.
The two Ambans in Lhasa remained at their post, keeping the lines of communication
open between the two governments. During this time, the Tibetan government took
charge of its own foreign affairs. In 1770, Tibet closed its borders to Nepal as a protest
against debased coinage that contravened a 1650 treaty between the two countries
(Rose 1971:13-15). In 1772, Tibet sent military aid to Sikkim following a Bhutanese
invasion, an event that brought Tibet closer to the British, due to conflict between
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Bhutan and the Rajah of Kuch Bihar. Subsequent Tibetan mediation brought about the
first treaty between the British and Bhutan in 1774.
The dispute between Tibet and Nepal reignited in 1775 resulting in a new
treaty. This reaffirmed a provision of the 1650 treaty which stipulated that Tibet must
close its Himalayan trade routes to all countries except Nepal. Tibet violated this treaty
almost immediately by opening up new trade routes in the Chumbi valley sparking a
war between the two countries in 1788. In the resulting settlement Nepal gained
extraterritorial rights in Tibet and installed an envoy at Lhasa. Tibet also agreed to pay
an annual tribute to Nepal.
Of particular significance is the fact that at the same time Nepal was
collecting tribute from Tibet, Nepal was paying tribute to the Qing Emperor (Edwards
1987:35). This underscores the independence of all three parties. It also highlights the
complexity of the tribute system in Asia. Studies of the Chinese tribute system have
encouraged the view that the institution emerged from, and was ultimately controlled
by, the Beijing court. Research that has unearthed deviations and inconsistencies
within the Chinese tribute system have certainly challenged perceptions of Chinese
hegemony, but the fact that China was not an exclusive recipient of tribute has seldom
been noted. Whilst both Nepal and Tibet paid tribute in Beijing, they also maintained
separate tributary relations with surrounding states. Nepal succeeded in securing
tribute from Tibet. Tibet, meanwhile, received tribute from Bhutan and Sikkim, and
held them to be Tibetan dependencies. Ironically, Bhutan objected to the Tibetan
classification, insisting that it only presented ‘gifts’ to the Dalai Lama in his capacity
as a religious rather than political leader (Rose 1977:60). Tibet, however, insisted that
Bhutan was its political subordinate and invaded Bhutan several times during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but only succeeded in gaining actual political
influence for short intermittent periods (Rose 1977:59). The tributary relationship of
Tibet and Bhutan is significant in that the PRC later used it as a basis for claiming
control over Bhutanese territory (Belfigio 1972:683). What was crucial about this
claim is that Bhutan had never entered into tributary relations with an emperor of
China. During the period that Lhasa was accepting missions from Bhutan, tributary or
otherwise, Qing archives record no Bhutanese tribute missions (Rose 1977:60).
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The Nepal-Tibet conflict erupted again in 1791. Tibet’s military was soon
struggling to defend the country and it was clear that Lhasa would have to involve its
Manchu donor-patron. The hostilities provoked a clear reaction from the Qing court,
and clearly not for altruistic reasons. Rose, in his analysis of official Nepali, Chinese
and Tibetan documents concludes that:-
‘The Nepali invasions of Tibet in 1788 and 1791 were not merely
conflicts between Nepal and Tibet, nor were they only raids at the seizure of
loot. More fundamentally they constituted an intervention in Tibetan politics
and an attempt by the Gorkhalis to support those Tibetan political factions
whose interests were, temporarily at least, most closely aligned with those of
Nepal. Kathmandu may even have harboured the hope of replacing the [Qing]
dynasty as the nominal suzerain of Tibet, at least for Tsang and the Western
Tibetan districts’ (Rose 1971:36).
This is significant, for despite the fact that the Qing had no direct economic or
military interest in Tibet, the Manchu rule over the Mongols was still potentially
precarious. The emperor thus issued a statement reiterating that the dynasty could not
afford to lose its interest in Tibet, and that ‘Nepal would have to be taught a lesson it
would remember for all time (Rose 1971:54). The emperor dispatched a military
mission to aid Tibet, and a letter to the British Governor general demanding that the
British punish the Gurkhas, stating that ‘it behoves the Rajahs of all the adjacent
countries to obey my commands’ (Rose 1971:56). The British, however, did not accept
commands from the emperor, and in fact signed a commercial treaty with Nepal not
long after, an event that led the Qing to suspect British-Nepali collaboration in the
invasion (Bell 2000:45). The British did offer to mediate between Tibet and Nepal, but
by the time the British delegation arrived a peace treaty had already been concluded.
The treaty was favourable to China, stating that both Nepal and Tibet had
tribute obligations to the emperor. Under its terms, Nepal was required to send a
quinquennial tribute mission to China, whereas China promised to protect Nepal from
foreign incursion. Meanwhile, alarmed at the fact that certain factions in Tibet had
collaborated with the Gurkhas, in 1793 China pushed through reforms in the Tibetan
administration designed to protect Chinese interests in the country. The emperor made
clear that he would withdraw his protection of the Tibetan government if they did not
accept the reforms, and stated that the Qing would not involve itself in such conflicts
in the future (TMC. 2001:63). As a result, the power of the two Chinese representatives in
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Lhasa increased significantly. Qing dynasty regulations for the Lhasa Amban of this
period state that:-
‘The Amban will consult with the Talé lama [Dalai Lama] or Pan-
ch’en Rinpoch’é [Panchen Lama] on all local questions brought before them
on a footing of perfect equality. All officials from the rank of Kalon down,
and ecclesiastics holding official positions, must submit all questions to him
for his decision.’ (Rockhill 1891:7).
The regulations laid down the Amban’s responsibilities regarding frontier
defence, the collection of revenue, finance and trade. The regulations also state that the
Amban is responsible for filing any indemnity payments arising from formal
adjudication in ‘Anterior or Ulterior Tibet’ (Rockhill 1891:11). Furthermore, the
Amban reserved the right to investigate and decide cases ‘where doubt exists as to the
exact nature of the crime,’ although, ‘with the above exception, the native judges will
judge all crimes according to justice, but they are not permitted to order of themselves
confiscations’ (Rockhill 1891:11). For the first time there is evidence that China
influenced Tibetan law.
Nonetheless, it was not long before the Qing court had lost what power it had
gained. In 1793, the Qing dynasty was at the height of its economic and military
power, and the court could well have been optimistic about extending its influence in
Tibet. However, expensive campaigns and lavish expenditures had taken their toll, and
by the time the emperor had crushed the White Lotus Rebellion of 1796-1804, it was
clear that the Manchu’s could not afford to divert resources away from their own
increasingly turbulent internal affairs. This ensured that the reforms were on paper
only (Rose 1971:65). The subsequent withdrawal of the Manchus from Tibet is evident
in the failure of the Qing court to intervene in the Ladakhi invasion of Tibet in 1841..25
Then, in 1855, the third Nepal-Tibet war erupted, as Nepal sought to regain rights lost
under the 1792 treaty. A cho-yon relationship between the Buddhist rulers of Tibet and
the Hindu monarchs of Nepal was impossible, and following heavy losses, Tibet
signed a treaty that restored Nepal’s extraterritorial rights and reinstated Tibet as a
tributary of Nepal. To further strengthen the tribute agreement, for the first time Nepal
promised to be the ‘protector’ of Tibet, pledging military assistance in the event of a
25 A peace agreement was concluded in 1842, and later reaffirmed by the Tibet-Ladakh treaty of 1852.
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foreign threat.  Meanwhile, the Lhasa Amban was seldom involved in the negotiations,
and if he was, his advice was frequently ignored (Rose 1971:115).
Qing officials objected to the terms of the treaty, arguing that ‘as both
governments were tributary to China it was improper for Tibet to become also a
tributary of Nepal’ (Rose 1971:117). Interestingly, however, Qing concerns were
clarified when, after Nepal refused to modify the terms, the Ambans asked the Nepali
representative if Nepal had been fighting against China or only Tibet, and whether the
King of Nepal still respected the emperor. In reply, the envoy stated that Nepal ‘had
suffered no provocation from China and had only warred against Tibet’. At this point,
Nepal agreed to add a statement to the treaty declaring that Nepal would continue to
respect the emperor, and the Amban’s seal was duly fixed to the treaty.
Tibet’s association with Nepal clearly illustrate that the extent to which Qing
China was willing or able to intervene in Tibetan affairs varied considerably over time.
Even during the brief periods in which the Qing did exert significant influence, 1720
and 1792, the Ambans had limited capacity to exert authority beyond Lhasa. There
were other reasons, rather than any significant Manchu control, as to why the Ambans’
presence was tolerated. First, some factions in Tibetan monastic and political
institutions favoured a nominal Chinese presence in Tibet, seeing it as a way to
weaken political rivals in the Lhasa administration (Rose 1971:112).26 Additionally, in
Tibet the continual sponsorship of Tibetan Buddhism by the Qing court instilled
confidence, reinforcing the notion that Tibet was a respected power rather than a mere
‘vassal’. The seriousness with which Manchu emperors took their roles as Buddhist
patrons has since been obscured by official Confucianist historiography, but becomes
clear if the role of Tibetan lamas at the Qing court is examined.
2:7 Tibetan Buddhism at the Qing Court
One of the most important Tibetan reincarnate lamas connected with the Qing
court was the Chankya Khutukhtu. The Manchu relationship with this respected
26 For further background see Goldstein. 1973:447 and Macdonald. 1929:52-53.
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incarnation began in 1706, when the Kangxi Emperor declared him to be the great
national preceptor of China. This title was renewed by Yongzheng emperor in 1734
(Wang 1995:109). It was during the reign of Qianlong (r. 1736-1795), however, that
the Chankya Khutukhtu came to occupy a very special position at the court. Whilst, as
noted above, the habitual bestowal of titles had little significance in the context of the
tribute system, the Qianlong Emperor severely limited the number of lamas with
imperial ranks. More importantly, Chankya Khutukhtu became the emperor’s personal
advisor, residing at the court and supervising the court’s Buddhist affairs.
In the reign of Qianlong, the incarnate Chankya Khutukhtu was Rolpai Dorje
(1717-1786). By all accounts, Rolpai Dorje was a prestigious scholar, his erudition
earning respect throughout Tibet, China and Mongolia. He became the fourth-highest
ranking incarnation in the Tibetan Buddhist world (Wang 1995:256). His high position
at the court of Qianlong is evident in the fact that he was granted a yellow cushion and
a yellow umbrella, both with golden dragon patterns matching the emperors. In
addition the emperor allowed Rolpai Dorje to lay a golden top over his yellow
palanquin, an honour even imperial family members were denied (Wang 1995:296).
Despite living at the Manchu court, Chankya Khutukhtu shared Tibetan beliefs about
the superiority of the spiritual preceptor over the patron, even if that patron was the
Qing Emperor. He maintained contact with the Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lama, and
worked on their behalf for more favourable Qing policies regarding Tibet. Importantly,
Chankya Khutukhtu provided clear reasons for the Tibetan government to view Tibet-
Qing relations as a cho-yon alliance, rather than in terms of the Confucian tribute
system. After all, Chankya Khutukhtu declared, ‘I live in the Chinese area and have
converted the emperor into a pious Buddhist’ (Wang 1995:166). Certainly, throughout
Qianlong’s reign, Tibetan Lamas were highly acclaimed. This is illustrated by the fact
that when the Panchen Lama was officially invited to a court event the Emperor issued
an edict excusing the Panchen Lama from the ritual of kowtowing. The edict also
noted that Rolpai Dorje was routinely exempt from this court ritual (Wang 1995:246).
It is highly significant that court protocol deviated from Confucian norms. As
noted above, Qing law severely punished officials who transgressed the strict rules of
ritual propriety, as seen in the case of the official who failed to alight from his
palanquin before crossing the temple threshold (Bodde, Derk and Morris 1973:277).
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The performance of the kotow, ‘three kneelings and nine knockings of the head,’ was a
Confucian ritual that expressed the nature of the relationship between inferior and
superior (Pritchard 1943:165). The emperor too, as mediator between heaven and
earth, would perform the kotow before the altar and his ancestral tablets. As such, the
ritual had a theocratic significance that would have been distasteful to Tibetan lamas,
whose vows as ordained monks prohibited them from prostrating before a layperson.
Despite receiving religious titles from Tibetan lamas, and being identified with an
important bodhisattva, the Qing Emperor was a lay student. According to the Tibetan
Buddhist hierarchy, both Panchen Lama and Chankya Khutukhtu were spiritually
superior to the emperor. Indeed, when Qianlong received initiations from Chankya
Khutukhtu, the emperor was required to pay honours to his master, and ‘knelt down on
the bare floor, and bowed his head to the lama’s feet’ (Wang 1995:294).
The treatment of important Tibetan lamas was all the more remarkable, given
that the kotow ceremony was usually demanded of foreign envoys up until about 1873.
As late as 1859 the American Minister John E. Ward was denied an audience after
refusing to perform even one kneeling and three head knockings (Pritchard 1943:165).
There were precedents for departure from prescribed protocol, and Tibet was not an
exclusive case. The 1690 edition of the Qing collected administrative statutes states
that ‘in 1664 it was settled that whenever foreign countries admire (Chinese)
civilisation (mu hua) and come with a tribute of local produce, it should be examined
and accepted as they present it, without adhering too closely to the old regulation’
(Pritchard 1943:181). Indeed, the 1689 Russo-Mancho Treaty of Nerchinsk was an
agreement between equals. Furthermore, in 1731, Qing envoys performed the kotow in
Moscow, and did so again in St Petersburg in 1732. These deviations have been
interpreted ‘only as partial deviations, because the early Ch’ing [Qing] emperors had
not yet been assimilated by Chinese culture (Fletcher 1967:224).Yet, significantly such
deviations persisted even when the dynasty was at the height of its power. These
departures from Confucian orthodoxy occurred not only in Tibet, but in Qing dealings
with the Begs of Kokand, and the Qing encounter with the British emissary Lord
McCartney in 1793 (Fletcher 1967:219-224, Hevia 1989, Pritchard 1943). In all cases,
deviation occurred when the Manchu Emperor was required to recognise the authority
with which the foreign party wielded cultural and political difference. However, in the
case of Muslim Central Asia and early British relations, Beijing still insisted that
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contact took place within a Confucian framework, albeit a modified one. The case of
Tibet is unique in that Manchu emperors were willing to base relations on entirely non-
Confucian principles.
There can be no doubt that some Qing emperors revered leading Tibetan
Lamas. Even as they destroyed rebel monasteries along the frontier, they still became
the disciples of Tibetan lamas and preached Tibetan Buddhism in the court. The
political advantages of patronising Tibetan Buddhism were undoubtedly great, and it is
clear that Qing emperors were willing to exploit titles given by Tibetan lamas to these
ends. Yet, even so, the lengths to which some Qing emperors went suggests that the
commitment to Tibetan lamas was as significantly personal as it was politically
expedient. Jianxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors all took a personal interest in
Tibetan Buddhism, with Yongzheng and Qianlong in particular committing themselves
to the study of Buddhist texts and encouraging young princes, imperial clan members,
court officials, and concubines to do the same (Wang 1995:126). It can be no
coincidence that the emperor who forged the closest tie with the Tibetan government
was also the emperor who displayed the greatest personal commitment to Tibetan
Buddhism. The Qianlong Emperor used Tibetan Buddhism to pacify the Mongols, but
he also sought divine blessings and believed in the power of magic (Wang 1995:134).
He invaded and seized control of territory on the Tibetan frontier occupied by
independent tribes who paid allegiance to Lhasa, yet ordered that the Fugian
Governor-general carry a sacred Tibetan relic for protection when on a military
mission to Taiwan (Wang 1995:133-134, 317). Once, in 1750, Tibetans murdered the
Qing Amban in Lhasa, and Qianlong threatened to seize temporal power from the
Dalai Lama and incorporate Tibet into China. Yet, ultimately, Qianlong listened to his
religious teacher Chankya Khutukhtu, who argued that, as a Buddhist, the emperor had
a duty to protect the Dalai Lamas’ temporal and spiritual rule (Wang 1995:217-218).
Finally, despite turning away European envoys who refused to perform the kotow, the
Qianlong Emperor himself prostrated before the feet of Chankya Khutukhtu in order to
receive religious initiations.
Throughout, Qing official documents distinguish Tibet and China as separate
political entities. Even when Tibet was officially considered China’s inferior, there
were clear references to borders between the two countries. Thus, when Qianlong’s
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official Tibetan Buddhist preceptor suggested that the emperor give certain frontier
territories to the Dalai Lama, the emperor refused, declaring that such places ‘should
remain within China’ (Wang 1995:215, 217). Similarly, when writing to the British
regarding the Nepal-Tibet dispute, the emperor referred to both Nepal and Tibet as
separate countries. The Manchu court did intervene in Tibetan affairs, but only on a
limited basis. Qing intervention was not unique to Tibet; for example, Qing troops also
intervened in internal revolts in Korea (Rockhill 1887:16). What was unique to Qing-
Tibetan relations was the spiritual authority exercised by Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs.
Because this meant that Tibet had political influence in Mongolia, Qing policy in Tibet
was therefore one of careful balance. It was on this basis that the Qing dynasty
maintained legitimacy in Mongol regions. (Wang 1995:63).
To maintain this balance, it was essential that Qing policy remained flexible.
It was against Qing interests to try to incorporate Tibet into China.  After all, the
dynasty had barely succeeded in establishing administrative control over the Chinese
provinces adjacent to the Tibetan frontier (See generally Adshead 1984, and Herman
1997). This made it even more essential that frontier conflicts were rigorously
suppressed. These frontier areas were inhabited by Tibetans and Mongols who were
subject to shifting alliances, and were largely independent of either Lhasa or Mongolia.
To a certain extent, this allowed the Qing relative freedom the area, if conflicts arose.
At times, however, securing the frontier also meant ‘challenging the Dalai Lama’s
suzerainty’, and when this occurred the Manchu court had to tread carefully,
compensating the Dalai Lama through a system of annual payments (Perdue 2001:292-
293). The success of Qing frontier policy relied upon maintaining good relations with
the central Tibetan administration, for the spiritual authority of the Dalai Lama was
key to maintaining regional stability. This created tension between the ethos of the
Chinese Confucian state and Qing sponsorship of Tibetan Buddhism, a situation that
was further complicated by the personal Buddhist beliefs of individual emperors. The
Manchus could not afford to alienate Confucian elites, and risk undermining the
legitimacy of their rule. However, through careful management, Qing emperors
ensured that deviation from Confucian ritual could, and did, take place. It was not until
Western imperialism challenged the viability of the Manchus’ rule, that this deviation
was to become an impossibility for the Confucian state.
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Chapter Three
3:1 Introduction
The period spanning the end of the nineteenth into the early twentieth century
has been described as ‘the most intense period of boundary construction in the Earth’s
history.’27 According to Embree, ‘everywhere the last undemarcated frontiers were
being replaced by linear boundaries marked with precision both on the ground and on
maps’ (Embree 1977:275). This period of transition from indefinite frontiers to clearly
defined borders marked the culmination of a century of imperialism in which jurists
had become increasingly preoccupied with the question of sovereignty in international
law. As David Kennedy observes, ‘by the end of the nineteenth century, sovereignty
was a key term, an abstract and artificial conception of authority, suitable for doctrinal
definition. In the early years there were many different sovereigns and many types of
sovereignty, which overlapped unproblematically’ (Kennedy 1996:406).
The process of demarcating boundaries was, therefore, part of the project to
define the territorial limits of sovereignty, but more than that, it was a process that
recognised a very specific type of sovereignty, one that was dependent upon the
existence of ‘civilised’ society. Hence, for positivists such as Westlake, Wheaton and
Oppenheim, uncivilised societies lacked the capacity to exercise sovereignty. In this
sense, the process of demarcating linear boundaries not only laid the foundation for the
modern state, but also transcribed the boundaries of a moral community defined by
international law and bound together by a universalistic discourse and identity (Keal
1995:204).
For Tibet, this process had several implications. First, with the rise of the
unequal treaty system in China, and the attendant increasing circulation of
international law amongst the Chinese literati, the foundations of the traditional Qing-
Tibetan alliance became unsustainable. As the Imperial Court moved towards a policy
of defending China’s sovereignty, the complex system of overlapping religio-political
27 Prescott, J. R.V cited in Embree 1977:274.
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jurisdictions that characterised the administration of the Qing-Tibetan borderlands
became overlaid with an increasingly absolute assertion of Qing authority in the face
of British and Russian imperial expansion. By the early twentieth century, Beijing had
tightened its administrative control over large areas of territory along the Qing-Tibetan
frontier.
As part of this ongoing process of frontier reinforcement, a new province,
Xinjiang, was created in 1894 that significantly extended the existing Sino-Tibetan
frontier. Inhabited primarily by Inner Asian Muslim tribes first conquered by the Qing
in the eighteenth century, Xinjiang was politically disconnected from Tibet.
Geographically, however, Xinjiang stretched from Western China, up and across the
northern frontiers of Tibet to the edge of Afghanistan, thus dividing Tibet from
Mongolia and acting as a buffer between Tibet and Russia. Whilst Qing influence in
Tibet during this same period was almost non-existent, the incorporation of Xinjiang
fundamentally altered Qing perceptions of China’s frontier. By the early twentieth
century, Beijing had shifted its position from a mid-nineteenth century official
recognition of its lack of authority in Tibet, to an explicit assertion of its sovereign
rights over Tibetan territory.
Second, whilst both China and British India were engaged in projects of
frontier construction and demarcation, defining the limits of sovereignty so as to better
preserve its centre, Tibet was increasingly represented, particularly within Western
discourse, as beyond the frontiers of civilised society. Whilst this can be seen as part of
the wider Western imperial phenomenon of Orientalism, Tibet, the land of mystery,
was distinguished from both British India, the jewel of the Empire,  and from China,
home to ‘that most commercial of races’ (Morse Stephens 1899:246). Both India and
China had proven to be founded upon ancient civilisations, even if in the eyes of
Europe they were civilisations that had failed to evolve. Tibet, meanwhile, inhabited a
more ambiguous space. On the one hand, nineteenth century Europe saw the birth of
the discipline of Indology, and in relation to that the development of Buddhist studies.
This, combined with increasing geographical knowledge, meant that certain aspects of
Tibetan culture were more accessible to European scholars than ever before. On the
other hand, as nineteenth century European philosophy perceived non-Western thought
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to be based on non-rational myth, the foundations of Tibetan culture could not be
considered synchronous to a coherent political society.
The political influence of Tibet’s ruling Gelugpa sect was diffused through a
religious network that stretched beyond the territory directly administered by Lhasa. In
this sense, Tibet had indefinite frontiers. McMahon, who in 1914 gave his name to a
much contested boundary line between China, India and Tibet, was guided by the
following distinction:-
A frontier often has a wider and more general meaning than a
boundary, and a frontier sometimes refers to a wide tract of border country, or
to hinterlands or buffer states, undefined by any external boundary line. Such,
until recent times, were the North-West Frontier and the North-East Frontier
of India; the one comprising the wide indefinite area of independent tribes on
the Indian Afghan border, the other a wide tract of a similarly indefinite
nature on the Indian borders of Tibet and China.28
Yet, if Tibet’s religious network was suggestive of indeterminate frontiers,
this is not to say that Tibet’s political administration had no concept of fixed linear
borders. Tibet had demarcated its border with Ladakh by treaty as early as 1684, and
reconfirmed it by treaty in 1852. The border between Tibet and China, meanwhile, was
clearly demarcated in 1727 (Teichman 2000:2).
It is true that territory either side of the Sino-Tibetan boundary consisted
largely of autonomous principalities, but those to the west of the line were essentially
under the protection of Lhasa, whereas those to the east were governed by Beijing. The
demarcation between Tibet and China, therefore, was similar to that employed by the
British in India. In 1891, for example, Lyall made a distinction between ‘boundaries of
jurisdiction and boundaries of influence,’ arguing that in the case of India, ‘the
outermost political boundary’ was projected ‘beyond the administrative border.’29 This
concept was subsequently championed by Curzon, who sought to implement a policy
based upon the ‘threefold Frontier.’ The first frontier was an internal administrative
border ‘up to which the Government of India exercised its full authority, enforcing its
28 McMahon, H. A. 1935. ‘International Boundaries,’ Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 84, 4. Cited in Embree 1977:257.
29 Lyall, Alfred. 1891. ‘Frontiers into Protectorates.’ The Nineteenth Century, 30, 315. Cited in Embree 1977:.276.
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own legal and political systems as the standard for society’ (Curzon 1907). This was
followed by a zone that was left primarily in the hands of tribal chieftains, under loose
government supervision. It was the outer limits of this zone that marked the second
frontier, and also constituted a fixed boundary. Beyond that boundary line, the British
sought to maintain a series of protectorates, or buffer states. The British system was
thus analogous to the system already in place in Tibet and China. For China, Tibet was
essentially a buffer state that protected its ‘second frontier.’  Until the early twentieth
century, that second frontier was demarcated by the boundary line of 1727, which on
the eastern side was followed by a swathe of territory incorporated only loosely into
the Chinese provincial system as Native States. Beyond that lay the first frontier, from
which standard provincial administration began.
What this comparison shows is that recognition of a wider zone of influence
did not necessarily preclude the existence of a more narrowly demarcated entity within
it. By the end of the nineteenth century, the traditional Qing-Tibetan cho-yon alliance
had proved to be an untenable method of maintaining frontier security, not only for the
Imperial Court, but also for the Lhasa administration who could no longer rely upon an
assertion of spiritual power as the basis for its political influence. In its place, a
Western system of treaties emerged that, while negating the basis of the traditional
system, did little to clarify the status of Tibet in the international legal context. This
ambivalence was underscored by the emergence of a Western discourse that
represented Tibet as ‘other-worldly.’ This chapter sets out to explore the changing
nature of the frontier in nineteenth century China and Tibet, and place it in the context
of European, in particular British, imperial discourse surrounding the nature of
civilised and uncivilised society.
3:2 The Frontier in Qing China
The preceding chapter outlined the historical relationship between Tibet and
China up to the end of the Qianlong reign. This underscored the fact that the
geographical space occupied by the Tibetan people was also a space within which a
historically distinct worldview operated. Whilst Fairbank put forward a highly
influential argument that the Qing emperors’ worldview recognised ‘no boundedness’,
only ‘varying degrees of accommodation to Chinese custom as one moved outward
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from the Sinic center,’ the encounter between Tibet and the Qing court complicates
this picture (Millward 1998:7). Fairbank’s approach reflected the concern of early
Western Sinologists to explain imperial China’s failure to successfully meet the
challenge of modernisation that arose as a result of its encounter with Western powers.
Answers to this question constructed an image of a static, unchanging China whose
inflexible Sinocentric institutions were incapable of innovation. It is true that Manchu
emperors projected an idealised imperial cosmology that to some extent accords with
this view, but, as argued in Chapter Two, this projection of Confucian essentialism did
not necessarily represent the absolute reality of Qing rule.
More recently, research has emphasised the responsiveness and adaptability
of the Qing emperors. For example, Waley-Cohen (1993a:1527)  has shown how Qing
emperors’ condemnation of Western technology was double-edged and ‘intended for a
multiple audience,’ allowing them to mediate between frequently contradictory goals.
Berger (2003:6), in an analysis of the relationship between Buddhist art and political
authority in Qing China, argues that Qianlong’s daily Buddhist practice was evidence
of his fluid sense of self. Hevia, meanwhile, looking at Qing tributary ideology,
suggests that:-
‘The imperial hierarchy is a continuously negotiated set of fluid
relationships; relationships in which the superior and inferior are mutually
dependent and contingent upon conditions that each produce for the existence
of the other. This is not oriental despotism…It is, rather, a means of
fashioning, sometimes tenuously or unsuccessfully, a cosmo-moral world in
response to ever changing conditions (Hevia 1989:100).
These analyses present a picture of the Qing Empire as a decentred rather than
centralised entity. Fairbank’s model of a Sinocentric empire erased the distinction
between the Empire and China proper, and in so doing failed to account for the agency
of the peoples and nations that occupied the territories that ‘lay beyond the pass.’30
However, the image of the Qing Court as the unequivocal Sinic centre from which the
civilising influence of Confucian culture radiated has given way to an impression of
the Qing Empire as ‘a confederation of discreet, culturally distinct blocks’ (Berger
30 The administrative limits of China were the eighteen provinces the Qing inherited from the Ming. Millward 1996:115.
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2003:9). This permits the reframing of the role and scope of the frontier in the Qing
Empire.
Frontier studies have a specific place in Chinese intellectual history, and
constituted a distinct discipline by the end of the nineteenth century. As a field of
research frontier studies in Qing China did not evolve until after Qinalong. Indeed,
during the reign of Qianlong, frontier studies, along with other writing on security and
strategic matters, were banned. The defeat of the Dzungars by the Qing in the mid-
eighteenth century brought a large area of Inner Asian territory into the Qing Empire
for the first time. Although this territory became part of the greater Qing Empire, it
was not incorporated into the provincial administration system. The eighteen provinces
that made up the ‘inner land’ (neidi) of the Qing were clearly demarcated from
territories ‘beyond the pass’ (guanwai). Nevertheless, this extension of the Qing sphere
was in part facilitated by an exercise in imperial cartography that brought the Tarim
Basin and its neighbouring Muslim oases ‘onto the register and onto the map’
(Millward 1999:61). This, in turn, led to a radical development in how the frontier was
perceived in Qing China, which when combined with later developments along the
Chinese maritime frontier and an unstable internal situation, had a significant impact
upon the perception of traditional Sino-Tibetan relations.
The frontier in traditional Chinese painting and poetry was frequently
portrayed as a barren landscape that symbolised emotional alienation and spiritual
isolation, but which also offered the potential for transformation. This separation of
inhabited place from imaginative space was reflected in traditional Chinese
cartography, which throughout the seventeenth century depicted Inner and Central
Asia as terra incognita beyond the Chinese sphere. In the early eighteenth century, this
perception was modified slightly following Jesuit trigonometric surveys commissioned
by the Kanxi Emperor.31 These maps were not considered suitable for public
dissemination, however, and were kept secure at the Imperial Court. This knowledge
continued to be suppressed throughout the Qianlong era due to a prohibition on public
debate of frontier issues. More traditional imagery of cultural ‘otherness’ beyond the
frontier continued to be perpetuated in the writing of the officials sent to the ‘New
31 The Kanxi atlas maintained a distinction between China proper and Inner and Central Asia by employing Manchu as opposed
to Chinese toponyms for Manchuria, Eastern Turkestan, Mongolia and Tibet (Millward 1999:75).
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Dominions.’ L.J Newby, for example, explores how, over time, this literature
‘contributed to how the region was created and shaped in the minds of Chinese literati
and how the intellectual and cultural borders of China were expanded to incorporate
the ‘new frontier’ (Newby 1999:2). Officially commissioned administrative handbooks
also served to increase knowledge of, and interest in, the North-West frontier, even
though these publications had a limited audience. These official publications included
a revision of the famous eighteenth century Jianxi atlas (Millward 1999:73). Yet,
despite these developments, because of court restrictions upon publication, the
cartographic tradition of presenting Inner and Central Asian regions as abstract,
otherworldly spaces continued well into the nineteenth century (Millward 1999:72).
The newly acquired Western Region, Xinjiang, did not appear upon a
commonly available map until 1822 (Millward 1999:76).It was also about this time
that frontier issues became a popular issue amongst the literati. In the capital, the
romantic accounts of travels in frontier regions fuelled an interest in the exotic that
made the frontier the fashionable topic of the day (Chou 1976:86). Additionally,
increasing population pressures coupled with visible dynastic decline in the post-
Qianlong era prompted a group of scholars, collectively known as the Statecraft
school, to press for reform of frontier administration. They argued that China could
revitalise its weak military and utilise untapped natural resources through the
resettlement of impoverished people from Southeast China in the frontier territories
(Chou 1976:100, 117). As part of this project, it was proposed that Xinjiang be
incorporated into the provincial administrative system.
The continued popularity of frontier studies was made possible by the
Daoguang Emperor’s (1821-1850) decision to actively promote rather than prohibit
such research in an effort to strengthen the court’s knowledge and bolster its power
(Millward 1996:117).This change in policy was a result of the Qing Court being
weakened following years of internal uprisings, in particular the rebellions of the
White Lotus and Eight Diagrams sects (Yang in Schurmann and Schell (eds.)
1968:159). In addition to this, the Daoguang Emperor faced a growing crisis over
opium. The resulting Opium War of 1840 led to a series of Western incursions that
further increased anxiety about frontier defence. In particular, the calls for reforms on
the North-West frontier became more persuasive following Russian expansion in Inner
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Asia in the 1860s and 1870s.  In addition Muslim tribes in the Western Region had
united under Yakub Beg and were engaged in a widespread rebellion against the Qing.
Due to the geographically strategic location of the territory involved, these
developments potentially threatened China’s control of the entire Mongol-inhabited
frontier.
It is within this context that traditional cartographic depictions of Inner Asia
changed abruptly. In 1871, a popular book-format atlas, by Yu Shouyi, was published
depicting Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet alongside China proper (Millward 1999:75).
Unlike its imperial predecessors, the outermost limits of the map were demarcated
with a clear line, whilst at the same time there was no distinction between the ‘inner
lands’ and the territories ‘beyond the pass.’ This represented a new way of viewing the
frontier, one which radically altered conceptions of a Qing Empire, and posited a
‘greater China’ in its place. Significantly, this move was in line with European
conceptions of political sovereignty, and thus began the process by which the Qing
Empire was transformed into the Chinese state. By the end of the nineteenth century
the frontier had taken on a new significance, and moreover was a topical issue
discussed amongst a wider demographic section of the population than ever before.
Ironically, during this timeframe, Tibet was growing increasingly remote from
the Qing Court. The breach in Sino-Tibetan relations has been commonly associated
with the modernising efforts of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who ascended to power in
1895. It is true that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was the strongest Dalai Lama to emerge
in Tibet for over a century.32 However, the decline in Qing power in Tibet occurred
much earlier than 1895. Qing officials attributed the decline of imperial power in Tibet
to the relinquishment of key military and financial powers to the Government of Lhasa
in 1847, and to the cession of Nyarong to Lhasa in 1865 (Ashead 1984:57, Teichman
2000:3-5).
Nyarong was one of several states in Eastern Tibet that bordered China.
Occupied primarily by nomadic Tibetan tribes, these areas were largely autonomous,
but had been partitioned by the Yung-cheng Emperor in 1727 into Chinese and Tibetan
32 Between the demise of the Seventh Dalai Lama and the ascendancy of the Thirteenth, Tibet was governed primarily by a
succession of Regents. Macdonald 1929:52-53.
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protectorates. This fairly straightforward arrangement had become increasingly
complex due to the extension of Gelugpa monastic power in the region, meaning that
lamaseries on the Chinese side of the frontier paid taxes to Lhasa and received local
taxes, whereas the Qing Court maintained only the protectorate’s right of
transportation, animals and labour (wu-lu) (Ashead 1984:56-57). The declining power
of imperial authorities on the Chinese side of the frontier encouraged Tibetan tribes in
the region to unite in a mission to establish a separate Khamba state.  In response, the
Central Tibetan authorities suggested a joint Tibetan-Qing mission to restore peace
along the frontier, but the Taiping rebellion meant that the Qing Imperial army could
not afford to divert resources to the Tibetan borderlands. Taking unilateral measures,
Lhasa then demanded an indemnity from the Governor-general of Sichuan to cover
military expenses. Unable to pay, Nyarong was ceded to Lhasa by the imperial
government. In addition, Lhasa also appointed high commissioners to the neighbouring
states of Hor and Derge, meaning that the Qing Court lost control over a significant
portion of its Tibetan frontier protectorates.
At a later date, imperial officials were to place high importance upon the loss
of the Qing protectorates in the Tibetan borderlands. However, it does not necessarily
follow that the result was either a weaker frontier or a loss of Qing influence in Central
Tibet. Arguably, the intervention of Central Tibetan forces merely restored peace to
the frontier, and moreover allowed for commercial and diplomatic traffic between
Lhasa and Beijing to resume, something of key concern to both governments during
the crisis (Ashead 1984:57).Certainly, the Imperial Court’s acceptance of the cession
of Nyarong, Hor and Derge was formally reconfirmed in 1898, suggesting that it was
seen as a long term practical solution (Willoughby 1924:193).The significance
attached to the loss of these Native States by late Qing commentators is perhaps better
understood as an indication of a fundamental shift in perceptions of the frontier that
occurred in the 1870’s. Chou has observed that whereas early nineteenth century Qing
writers portrayed the frontier peoples ‘with interest and amusement,’ in the later
century ‘references made to the minorities were often phrased in contemptuous ways.
This change reflects the difference between a genuine self-confidence and a nervous
chauvinism’ (Chou, cited in Millward 1988:196-197). It is therefore of interest that this
same period saw a growing cultural gap develop between Lhasa and Beijing. As the
literati within China became increasingly fixated upon how to preserve or reform
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Confucian Han Chinese culture in the face of Western onslaughts, and the Manchu
administration increasingly fought to retain its legitimacy in the face of anti-Manchu
agitation, there was little scope for displaying a flexible ideological policy towards
potentially troublesome frontier territories.
In this context, it is of little surprise that post-Qianlong emperors withdrew
their religious patronage of Tibetan lamas. Whereas Manchu emperors up to and
including Qianlong had commissioned the building of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries
and temples, the sponsorship of Tibetan Buddhism tailed off when Jiaqing came to the
throne (1796-1820) (Farquhar 1978:26). It seems likely that rebellions of the White
Lotus, a millenarian Buddhist sect, during the first eight years of Jiaqing’s rule were a
significant factor in the decline in the court’s overt interest in Buddhism. Confucian
elites had long been critical of Buddhism, and the White Lotus rebellions reinforced
these prejudices by underlining the danger of religious heterodoxy. Qianlong had been
openly criticised for his interest in Tibetan Buddhism, but had sufficient power to
avoid being politically damaged by such censure.  However, as the Manchu throne
became progressively weakened during the course of the nineteenth century, any
association of the throne with heterodoxy became increasingly hazardous.
3:3 The Unequal Treaty System
After end of the Opium War, China suffered a series of incursions along its
frontiers, starting with the cession of Hong Kong and the opening of five treaty ports to
British trade in the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing.
This was followed by the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858, the result of French and
English forces occupying Canton, and the 1860 Treaty of Peking [Beijing], which was
the outcome of a joint French and English military mission to the capital. The indignity
of being forced to enter into the ‘unequal treaties’ was amplified by the Taiping
Rebellion, which raged for fourteen years between 1851 and 1864 and espoused a
revolutionary Christian ideology grounded in anti-Manchu sentiments. The rebellion
was eventually defeated in 1864 with the aid of Western mercenaries, who feared that
a Taiping victory would lead to a loss of concessions granted under the treaty system
(Franke in Schurmann and Schell (eds.) 1968:175). Together these treaties formed the
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basis of the unequal treaty system, and mark the point at which China’s tributary
system began to be replaced by a modern system of international law. Nevertheless,
the tributary system was not abandoned and, although elements of international law
began to be incorporated into Qing diplomatic practice, this adaptability was not in
itself a new phenomenon. As Cranmer-Byng points out ‘throughout the Chinese
documents of the period from the 1840s into the 1880s these treaties were regarded not
only as concessions extracted by force, but also as traditional methods of controlling
those who did not accept the Chinese world view’ (Cranmer-Byng 1973:69). In fact
the Qing court had used Western-style treaties as early as 1689, when it concluded the
Treaty of Nerchinsk following the Sino-Russian military conflict in the Priamurye
region.
What is unique is that this adaptability was accompanied by an unprecedented
level of public debate, spurred on by the development of journalism. Furthermore, the
opening of the treaty ports and an increase in missionary activity increased civilian
contact with Western ideas. Missionaries in particular were instrumental in
disseminating Western secular educational materials, including works on Western law,
history and geography (Barnett 1972). As the Chinese literati became increasingly
concerned with China’s vulnerable position in the face of Western imperialism,
scholars and officials began to turn towards such works for strategic knowledge of the
Western powers. Barnett has argued that such materials, although useful to Qing
officials, only served to strengthen prejudices against the Western barbarians, and that:
‘Notices of the territorial expansion of European nations, their struggle for supremacy
on the seas, their allegiance to the Christian God, and the power of the Pope provided
arguments against, rather than for, the ‘open’ China the missionaries had in mind
(Barnett 1972:148). However, even if early nineteenth century Chinese interest in
Western knowledge was defensive rather than sympathetic, by the end of the
nineteenth century the circulation of Western ideas was sufficient to constitute a
significant challenge to Confucian orthodoxy.33
33 See also Dikotter, who argues military and economic impact was overemphasised (Dikotter 1994:33) , and Chang who opines
that the late nineteenth century reform movement owed as much to the inner dynamics of the tradition as Western impact (Chang
1969:25).
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One of the outcomes of the Treaty of Peking was an increase in missionary
activity in the interior of China. Missionaries had already succeeded in gaining a
greater presence within China over the first few decades of the nineteenth century, but
their activities met with both local and government opposition (Bray 1995:86, and
generally, Bray 1989). In 1844 the emperor issued an edict prohibiting missionaries
from travelling beyond the five treaty ports that had been opened to foreigners after the
Opium War. The emergence of the Taipings as a revolutionary force in 1846 could
only have strengthened imperial hostility towards the spreading of Christian
heterodoxy, but the rise of missionary activity did not just pose a problem to the
internal administration of China, it also caused a very specific disruption in the
emperor’s relationship with Tibet.
Western missionaries were not unknown in Tibet. Jesuits had travelled to
Lhasa as early as 1661 and a Catholic mission was active in Lhasa throughout the first
half of the eighteenth century (Lopez 1995:253-256). By the nineteenth century,
however, the government of Lhasa had come to associate Western missionary activity
with Western colonial activity. Missionaries attempting to cross into Tibet were
therefore routinely turned back. In 1846, two French Lazarist missionaries, Huc and
Gabet, succeeded in reaching Lhasa by travelling in disguise from China, but were
frustrated to find that the local population believed them to be British agents and that
they had ‘come to make maps, and to devise means to get possession of the country’
(Cammann 1942:350). Rumours of an impending British attempt to invade Tibet
gained force following the British annexation of Ladakh, a territory considered to be a
dependency of the government of Lhasa. Subsequently, Huc and Gabet were
summoned by the Qing Amban of Lhasa and extradited to China where they were
charged with illegally travelling beyond the treaty port from which they had originally
begun their journey.
The Imperial Court’s actions in this situation conformed to its role as the
protector of Tibet, as established by the Cho-Yon alliance, but from the point of view
of the French authorities, the limits to Qing jurisdiction in Tibet were far from clear.
Consequently, the issue of missionary rights in Tibet continued to be a cause of
contention between the French legation and Beijing. In 1860, the controversy took a
new turn following the Treaty of Peking. The treaty, which had been obtained by the
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Anglo-French allies under threat of force, stipulated that the Qing Government was to
guarantee the freedom of religion throughout the Chinese Empire. The French
legation, believing that the treaty guaranteed rights in Central Tibet, pressured the
Zongli Yamen to issue missionaries with passports to enter Tibet. The Zongli Yamen
relented, but had considerable reservations about the possible ramifications of issuing
the passports.
The ambivalence of the Zongli Yamen, who desired to avoid further conflict
with Western powers on the one hand, but could not afford to alienate Lhasa on the
other, is evident in its refusal to deal further with the French mission after it was
subsequently expelled from Tibet. In 1863, the Tibetan government issued an edict
threatening punishment to any Christian converts who refused to return to Buddhism.
The French Mission, then established in Bonga in Eastern Tibet, argued that they had
the support of the Emperor of China, but this had little impact upon the local Tibetan
representative, who Huc records as responding ‘Si l’Emperor de Chine est grand ou
petit, gras ou maigre, je’ l’ignore, dit grossierement le chef de satellites, mais je sai que
nous avons des orderes du roi de Hlassa et que nous devons agir en consequence’
(Bray 1995:94). The mission was finally expelled by force, resulting in the death of a
missionary and several converts, but when the surviving mission lodged a complaint in
Beijing, the Zongli Yamen stated that ‘the Emperor’s temporal authority in Tibet was
conditional on his acceptance of the Dalai Lama’s spiritual authority. If the Chinese
government declared itself the protector of Christianity it would be seen to be opposed
to Buddhism and would therefore undermine the moral position of its position in
Tibet’ (Bray 1995:91).
The French authorities, seeking to uphold their missionaries’ rights, refused to
accept that the Qing Emperor was the spiritual vassal of the Dalai Lama, despite the
statement of the Zongli Yamen. To the French, Qing authority in Tibet was either
absolute, in which case the Treaty of Peking applied, or Qing authority in Tibet was
negligible and neither the Tibetan Government nor the Lhasa Amban had any right to
expel the missionaries from Tibetan territory. The refusal of the French Legation to
accept that the Dalai Lama’s spiritual authority placed limits upon the political
authority of the Qing Emperor was partly a strategic argument to secure missionary
rights. It is also indicative, however, of a more pervasive Western perception that Tibet
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did not possess a viable indigenous system of law and governance. This perception
played a significant role in negating the agency of the Tibetan Government, and thus
provided the foundations upon which later Chinese claims for sovereignty over Tibet
were based.
3:4 British India and Tibet
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the religious and spiritual aspects
of Tibetan society became increasingly exoticised in Western discourse. As part of this
process, the frontiers of Tibet’s religious authority were redrawn. The spatial
representation of Tibetan Buddhism in Western discourse depicted Tibetan culture as
being governed by an ‘other-worldly’ aesthetic (Lopez 1998 and Tambiah 1973).This
construction displaced the rational foundations of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and
deferred its social, legal and political contingency. The representation of Tibetan
Buddhism as ‘other-worldly’ coincided with an attempt by the British Government of
India to turn Tibet into a neutral buffer state, as part of a forward policy designed to
protect British India against Russian imperial expansion. This project necessarily
involved the suggestion that Tibet’s status was ambivalent. Hence, by the turn of the
twentieth century, Tibet had come to occupy a contradictory space, neither
independent nor part of the Russian, British or Chinese empires that sought to control
Tibet’s status as part of their own frontier defence strategies. In Western discourse,
Tibet was at once an other-worldly domain that transcended the temporal, mundane
concerns of Western colonialists, and, in British Indian sources in particular, a
potentially dangerous worldly frontier, across which a Tibetan-Russian alliance might
threaten India. Despite the paradox of Tibet’s other-worldly mystery and its menacing
worldliness, in both constructions Tibet represented the limits of the British Empire, a
space that hovered on the borderlines of civilisation, but remained somehow apart
from it.
This perception had not always dominated. In the eighteenth century, the
British East India Company, anxious to develop a trade relationship with Tibet, sent
delegates to Tibet to forge ties and research opportunities. The first delegate, George
Bogle, arrived in Shigatse in 1774 and remained there as the guest of the Panchen
Lama for six months. Bogle wrote extensively upon his experience, and what remains
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striking about his narrative is that it departs significantly from the majority of
successive Western travelogues on Tibet in that Bogle neither idealised nor disparaged
Tibetans. Bogle presented his host as ‘one of the most pleasant men I ever saw,’ and
moreover, as an astute political and religious leader’ (McMillan  2002:24).
This contrasts with literature from late nineteenth and early twentieth century
British writers. Waddell, for example, a British functionary in Sikkim, published what
was considered to be the authoritative study of Tibetan Buddhism in 1895. Waddell
presented Tibetan Buddhism as a degenerate version of Buddha’s original doctrine,
comprised of ‘deep-rooted devil worship,’ and recorded that although ‘books now
abound in Tibet’ they were ‘for the most part a dreary wilderness of words and
antiquated rubbish’ (Waddell 1895:xi,157). Despite writing this book in 1894, Waddell
did not travel extensively in Tibet until 1904 when he was a colonel in the British
military mission which fought its way to Lhasa. This event was covered in his second
book ‘Lhasa and its Mysteries’. Here, Tibet is portrayed as ‘one of the last secret
places of the earth’, which had finally had ‘her dark veil of mystery…lifted up’ by ‘the
fairy Prince of ‘Civilisation’’ (Waddell 1905:2). By 1934, Waddell’s hopes for a Tibet
tamed by the civilising influence of Britain had been dispelled. In the second edition of
his 1895 book, he opined that Tibet was in the grip of ‘all-powerful and superstitious,
intriguing lamas’ who persistently prevented the civilising influence of the West from
being disseminated. This situation, according to Waddell, had only been made worse
by Tibet’s political independence at that time (Waddell 1895:xxxiii).
In the interim period between Bogle’s mission of 1774 and the British
invasion of 1904, two more delegates were sent to Tibet; Turner, in 1785, and
Manning, in 1811. The Tibetans, however, grew increasingly suspicious of British
motives and became hostile to British efforts to establish diplomatic or trade links. As
a result of Tibet’s refusal to enter into relations, the British increased their activities in
the adjacent Himalayan foothills, seeking to gain control over the trade routes into
Tibet from Nepal, Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan.  In response, both Nepal and Tibet
sought to deter Britain by claiming to be under the protection of the Qing Empire, a
policy that in the early nineteenth century proved to be effective. Due to the relative
weakness of the East India Company’s position in China at that time. As the British
representative in Kathmandu noted in 1803, ‘The Ghorkalis are in the habit of saying
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that…they will claim the protection of the Chinese, whose influence over the company
they seem to be much better acquainted than one would expect’ (Rose 1971:73).
The notion that Nepal was a Qing protectorate was largely dispelled when, in
1814, an ongoing border dispute between the company and Nepal led to a war between
the two parties. Although Beijing ordered an expeditionary force to the Nepal-Tibet
border, in the event the Imperial Government confined itself to threatening to invade
Nepal should Kathmandu cease its tribute missions to Beijing as a result of British
actions. Beijing desired no hostilities with the British and, providing traditional tribute
relations were uninterrupted, the emperor approved an Anglo-Nepali settlement that
gave the company the right to station a permanent representative in Kathmandu (Rose
1971:89-85). In fact, Qing officials became increasingly irritated by Nepali efforts to
broker an anti-British alliance amongst the Himalayan states, Tibet and China. From
the point of view of Beijing, Nepali agitation merely threatened the stability of the
region. The Chinese representative at Lhasa, who was also responsible for Imperial
affairs in Nepal, sought to uphold a traditional Qing policy that frontier states should
‘be maintained in the most perfect tranquillity’.  Beijing thus advised Kathmandu to
‘rest on the defensive and live in harmony with your neighbours’ (Rose 1971:100).
With the frontiers of China proper being increasingly threatened, the Imperial Court
could not afford to become embroiled in disputes in the outlying areas of its zone of
influence.
Qing influence in Tibet was, like Nepal, almost non-existent at this time
(Rose 1971:112-113). Unlike Nepal, however, Lhasa was more able to evade British
overtures by deferring responsibility for its foreign affairs to Beijing. Although, by the
mid-nineteenth century the British had increased their control over the Himalayan
foothills, geographically Tibet remained fairly remote from British India. Moreover, it
was not only the prospect of trade with Tibet that attracted the British, but also the
possibility of using Tibet to open up trade routes with Western China, an area that
remained largely inaccessible to Western commerce despite the opening of China’s
maritime frontier. This increased the willingness of the British to negotiate through
China.
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Therefore, Qing and Tibetan interests coincided at this time. From the point of
view of the Tibetan government, refusing to deal with Calcutta directly was an
effective defence strategy. Indeed, between 1811 and 1904 no British representative
openly entered Tibet. For the Qing, Tibet’s anti-British policy helped protect the
Chinese provinces along the Tibetan frontier from Western influence. Despite this, the
Imperial Court had only limited negotiating power. The treaty port system may have
helped to contain Western influence in China, but the Opium War and the events
leading up to the Treaty of Peking had made it clear just how vulnerable the court was
to Western military power. Hence, in 1861, a year after the Zungli Yamen issued the
controversial passports to the French mission, a British expedition also succeeded in
securing passports to travel from China to India, via Tibet (Rose 1971:134). The
British party claimed the right to the passports under the Treaty of Tientsin (1858)
(Van Walt Van Praag 1987:27).
As with the French mission, the Qing documents were not recognised as valid
by the Tibetan authorities. Lhasa refused entry to the British party. As a result, Britain
renewed activities in Bhutan and Sikkim. In 1861, Calcutta concluded  a treaty with
Sikkim which, building upon a previous treaty from 1817, established Sikkim as a
British protectorate (Van Walt Van Praag 1987:27). In 1865, the British secured a
similar treaty with Bhutan following the Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1884. As Britain had
already annexed Ladakh in 1846, and had controlled Assam since 1826, this ensured
that Britain had established a strong influence over all the areas traditionally under the
influence of Lhasa along Tibet’s Southern and Western frontiers. Given that Ladakh,
Sikkim and Bhutan paid tri-annual tribute to the Dalai Lama, these developments were
taken seriously by Lhasa (Norbu 1990:32). The British were fully aware that this
would have been the case, as since Bogle’s mission they had understood Bhutan to be
a vassal of Tibet, and indeed Tibet had mediated in the Anglo-Bhutan war of 1774.
At around this time, the British started sending secret agents into Tibet to
gather information on Tibet’s topography and administrative structure. Because
Westerners were forbidden entry into Tibet, the British employed Indian pundits, of
whom the best known is Sarat Chandra Das. Das, a talented linguist, made extensive
notes upon Tibet’s central and provincial system of government and produced a full
account of the Tibetan legal system, describing Tibetan courts, legal codes and
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punishments. Das’ account demonstrates clearly that Tibet possessed a well
established system of law and governance that was distinct from that of Qing China
(Das 1894).
The failure of the British mission of 1861 confirmed that the Treaty of
Tientsin, which gave British subjects the right to travel ‘throughout the Emperor’s
dominions under passports issued by their consuls and countersigned by the local
authorities,’ did not apply to Tibet (FO 405/24). British Foreign Office records show
that the British government accepted this to be the case, and indeed that none of the
treaties between Britain and the Qing government concerning the Qing Empire as a
whole were applicable to Tibet. Nevertheless, the British argued that the emperor’s
active involvement in Tibet’s foreign affairs indicated that the Imperial Government
possessed the authority to make treaties on Tibet’s behalf. In 1876, the British, whilst
negotiating a trade agreement with China, added an article to the Chefoo treaty which
stipulated that the Zonngli Yamen, and the Qing representative in Lhasa, would issue
passports to a British expedition to Tibet and ensure the party’s unobstructed passage.
This development was unprecedented in the history of Qing-Tibetan relations.
Previously, Qing officials had helped broker treaties between Nepal and Tibet, but
Tibet had been an active participant in the treaty-making process. Meanwhile, Tibet
had concluded treaties independently without Qing involvement. What the Chefoo
Convention implied, however, was that Tibetan acquiescence to Qing treaties made
upon Tibet’s behalf was mandatory rather than voluntary. For the British, this
manoeuvre helped to weaken the foundations of Tibet’s resistance to British
expansion. For the Qing, the treaty upheld the illusion that Beijing maintained its
imperial grip upon the peripheries of its zone of influence. More importantly, it also
served as a bargaining chip in the context of the Chefoo Convention, which was
concerned primarily with Sino-British trade, but also paved the way for the
establishment of a Chinese diplomatic embassy in London.
In protest, the Tibetan government issued edicts to its border posts declaring
all Qing issued passports invalid, and dispatched a military contingent to repel the
British mission (FO 405/50). Beijing, alarmed that Tibet’s continuing opposition
would expose the insubstantial nature of Qing power over Lhasa, and fearful that
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armed conflict would result in a British takeover of Tibet, took immediate steps to
have the Macaulay expedition withdrawn (Shakabpa 1967:198, FO 405/50). To these
ends, the Imperial Government offered to reach a settlement with Britain over Burma,
a Qing tributary state that by 1884 had come fully under British control. Under the
1896 Convention Relating to Burma and Tibet, Beijing recognised British supremacy
in Burma in exchange for the withdrawal of the Macaulay mission. In addition, the
Imperial Court promised to exhort Tibet to open up to trade.
Whilst the 1886 treaty, unlike the Chefoo Convention, implied that Tibet’s
acceptance of the proposals was voluntary, it did not translate into a stronger role for
Tibet in the ongoing dispute over British rights. The clash over the Macaulay
expedition had led to a detachment of Tibetan troops being positioned in Lingtu. These
troops were forcefully expelled by the British, who claimed Lingtu was in Sikkim. To
back up their claim, in 1890 the British formally fixed the Tibetan-Sikkim border in
the ‘Convention Relating to Sikkim and Tibet,’ signed in Calcutta by the Lhasa Amban
(FO 405/50). The treaty went on to recognise Britain’s ‘direct and exclusive control
over the internal administration and foreign relations’ of Sikkim. A following treaty in
1893, also concluded between Britain and the Lhasa Amban, established British
commercial rights in Tibet, securing Britain the right to station a representative at a
designated trade mart on the Tibetan side of the border.
If by signing the treaties in Calcutta with the Lhasa Amban, rather than with
Qing representatives in China proper, the British hoped that the Tibetan Government
would be more open to persuasion, it was soon clear that this was not to be the case.
Tibet repudiated the treaties and refused to recognise the newly demarcated Sikkim-
Tibet border. Increasingly frustrated, the British were finally forced to concede the
lack of Qing authority in Tibet. Indeed, even the Amban admitted the situation, stating
that whatever promises the Zongli Yamen might make ‘it is quite impossible in the
present state of relations between China and Tibet for [it] to carry out [its] promise.
People talk of China’s influence in Tibet – but it is only nominal, as the lamas are all
powerful there’ (FO 17/1056).
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Qing Empire was considerably
weakened. The inability of the Imperial Court to maintain a credible façade of
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authority in Tibet was only one aspect of the crisis facing Beijing. The defeat of the
imperial army in the war with Japan in 1885 was an even greater blow. In addition, the
Qing had lost all of its South-East Asian tributary states to Western powers, and had
suffered a humiliating defeat in the Sino-French war of 1884-5 as a result of trying to
protect some of its interests in that region. Yet, for all these setbacks, the Manchus still
held power over China proper, and managed to successfully tighten their rule over
some of the outlying provinces at this time, in particular the province of Schechuan on
the Tibetan frontier (Adshead 1984). In addition, in 1884 the Western Regions were
finally incorporated into the provincial system as Xinjiang.
3:5 The Great Game
In the 1870’s, the Imperial Russian Geographical Society began exploring
Tibet with a view to strengthening relations with the Dalai Lama and thus extending
Russia’s influence throughout the Tibetan Buddhist world (Andreyev  2003:16). The
Anglo-Chinese treaties concerning Tibet convinced Russia to step up its activities in
the region, especially as the Russian government was aware of Lhasa’s objection to the
developments. In between 1893 and 1896, the Russian government funded a project to
annex the entire ‘Monglo-Tibeto-Chinese-East’ (Andreyev 2003:19, 26). Buryat agents
disguised as Buddhist pilgrims were to agitate anti-Manchu and pro-Russian factions
in the region. There was indeed a rebellion in Gansu in 1895, but the Qing army was
able to defeat it.
Russian interest in Tibet was reciprocated by the Tibetan Government, who
were seeking new alliances to replace the traditional Tibet-Qing relationship. A
Russian Buryat Buddhist monk, Dorjiev, was employed in Lhasa at this time to act as
an intermediary between St Petersburg and Lhasa. In 1897, the Dalai Lama sent
Dorjiev on a mission to Europe to assess the political situation in St Petersburg and
Paris, with a view to securing a Russian-Tibetan and/or French-Tibetan alliance.
Negotiations in St Petersburg proved promising and, although no formal treaty was
obtained, the Russian Government promised to send military assistance to Tibet to aid
the modernisation of the Tibetan army (Andreyev 2003:27). On a political level,
Dorjiev’s visit to Paris was less successful, despite a meeting with a leading French
politician. On a cultural level, however, Dorjiev achieved considerable success, for at
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that time Buddhism was becoming increasingly fashionable in European capitals.
Hence, in 1898 Dorjiev recited prayers at the Guimet Museum before an eager
gathering of the Parisian elite (Andreyev 2003: 29-30).
Tibet continued to seek treaty relations with Russia, and further meetings in St
Petersburg took place in 1900. In 1901, a Tibetan delegation dispatched by the Dalai
Lama met with a Russian expedition on the borders of Tibet, reiterating the Tibetan
position:-
‘Until now we had relied on the help of the Chinese Emperor, but after
the Europeans, acting in concert, crushed the Chinese capital, destroyed many
cities, and killed a great multitude of people, the Chinese find it very difficult
to maintain order in their own homeland, to say nothing of giving help to the
Tibetans. Our closest neighbours, the English, have repeatedly approached us
with military forces; they are our enemies and may take advantage of our
weakness. Although there are a few members of our administration who think
differently, we, the majority, headed by the Dalai Lama, hold firm to our
opinion, and we rely only on the lofty protection of your Great
Emperor….Sooner or later we will have to open the doors of our capital, and
we think somehow that we will open them peacefully only to you, the
Russians’ (Andreyev 2003: 29-30).
The reorientation of Tibet from China to Russia represented an attempt to
safeguard Tibet’s position in modern international society. Unlike China, Russia was
classed as a Western power and a member of the civilised ‘family of nations.’ Yet, if a
Russian alliance promised Tibet a stronger role in international society, Tibet’s pro-
Russian stance was not an unprecedented move away from the traditional system of
Tibetan foreign relations. Historically Lhasa had strong ties with Russian Buddhists,
and given the fact that the Tsar had assumed the role as protector of Buddhism in
Russia, a Russian-Tibetan alliance would have been consistent with a Buddhist cho-
yon relationship. An obstacle to an agreement was Russian insistence upon the right to
set up a permanent consulate in Lhasa. The Tibetan government argued that this would
lead to other European powers seeking similar concessions and invariably lead to
conflict (Andreyev  2003:35). However, following the 1901 negotiations, and a further
promise from Russia to supply arms to Tibet, Lhasa sent an official embassy to Russia
to conclude a formal treaty.
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This embassy was the focus of significant public attention in Russia, touring
Russian factories, naval bases and an aeronautic depot. Yet despite the hype, the
resulting document only expressed the Tsar’s ‘Strong hope that, given the friendly and
fully well-disposed attitude of Russia, no danger will threaten Tibet in her fortunes
hereafter.’ The document did not place Russia under any binding obligation to protect
Tibet (Andreyev 2003:34).  The draft of a Russo-Tibetan treaty was finally rejected by
the Russian government during a special conference ‘as it might have resulted in a
conflict with England without offering any real advantages’ (Andreyev  2003:36, 38).
Finally, although Imperial Russia maintained discreet links with the Tibetan
government until around 1914, with the end of the ‘Great Game’, Russia rapidly
retreated from any plans of building overt links with Tibet, becoming more concerned
with strengthening ties with Britain and China.
Even when pursuing a Russian-Tibetan alliance, Russia sought to downplay
the political nature of its links with the Tibetan government, and assured the British
that Dorjiev’s 1901 embassy had ‘purely religious’ purposes (Andreyev  2003:38).
Britain, meanwhile, similarly denied having any political motives in Tibet, claiming
that British interests were confined solely to trade matters. Moreover, whilst the British
Government of India did not trust Russian motives, at the same time it refused to give
credence to Tibetan political agency. Prior to 1901, Curzon had dismissed reports of
the Tibetan envoy’s visits to St Petersburg as a ‘fraud’, unable to believe that ‘the
xenophobic Tibetan lamas would dare to send a mission to Europe’ (Andreyev
2003:38).
The ‘Great Game’ in Tibet reached its conclusion following the
Younghusband mission of 1903-1904. Whilst ostensibly to pursue trade, from the
outset the mission planned for the use force (Younghusband 1998:75). The resulting
invasion of Lhasa saw the massacre of the defending Tibetan troops, who faced British
machine guns armed only with matchlock rifles. After ‘the first futile rush the Tibetans
made no further resistance. There was no more fighting, only the slaughter of helpless
men,’ wrote Candler (1905:147), who was present. The British victory was given legal
validation in the form of the 1904 Lhasa Convention, which obligated Tibet to pay an
annual indemnity for the next seventy-five years, ‘for the insults offered to and attacks
upon the British Commissioner and his following’ (Art VI). Article VII provided for
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the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley, and Article IX laid down provisions
restricting Tibet’s foreign relations. ‘No Representatives or Agents of any foreign
Power shall be admitted to Tibet,’ it stipulated, without ‘the previous consent of the
British Government.’ The ‘insults’ referred to in Article VI recall the fact that the
Younghusband mission was as much about creating a moment of imperial spectacle, as
it was about achieving any substantive economic and military goals.
It has been said that the British people have a distinctive grasp of the concept
of irony. However, when Colonel Younghusband marched into Tibet in 1903,
conveying the pomp and grandeur of the British Empire to the plains and mountain
passes of Tibet, it appears that irony is one of the few things he left behind.34
Reporting to the Secretary of the British Government of India, Younghusband
described preliminary negotiations with the Tibetans near to the border. Having
explained that the purpose of his mission was to establish trade relations, he then
informed the Tibetan representatives that a trade route would ensure that ‘you will be
able to buy all your things much cheaper than you can now.’ On hearing this the
Tibetan representatives burst into laughter, presumably wondering why such a
benevolent mission should require the backup of 1,150 troops with heavy artillery,
over 11,000 pack animals and 10,000 ‘coolies.’ Younghusband, clearly perplexed by
the response of the Tibetan representatives, reported: ‘curiously enough they also
laughed equally heartily when I said that the new treaty would have to be much stricter
than the old one’ (Younghusband in Coates (ed.) 1999:105).35 Failing to understand
why the Tibetans should not only resist British overtures, but consider them a joke,
Younghusband concluded that the Tibetans were ‘very like big children’
(Younghusband in Coates(ed.) 1999:105).
Younghusband persisted in this opinion, reflecting in 1910 that ‘it may be said
that we ought to have treated the Tibetans with leniency, gentleness, and consideration,
34 Nevertheless, Younghusband found room for, among other personal effects: 67 shirts; 12 coats; numerous suits, including a
full dress suit, a morning suit, a mess suit, camp suits and various marching suits; a smoking jacket; a variety of 11 hats, including
a shikar hat to be worn when shooting partridges in the Chumbi valley (French P, 1995:200-201).
35 The old treaty referred to was the Convention Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1890, amended in 1893). Tibet’s repudiation of
this treaty and occupation of territory claimed by Britain was one cause of the mission (Younghusband 1998:43, 58, 83). The
summary of men and animals in the mission is cited by French, P (1995:194).
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because of their ignorance’ (Younghusband 1998:83). Back in England, he claimed to
have undergone a spiritual epiphany, an event he linked to his return from Lhasa:
‘Never again could I think evil or ever be at enmity with any man. All nature and all
humanity were bathed in a rosy glowing radiancy…[T]hat single hour on leaving
Lhasa was worth all the rest of a lifetime’ (Younghusband 1998:305). It is, however,
hard not to construe this to be a narrative sleight of hand designed to link the claim that
‘it was aggression on the part of the Tibetans or their vassals which led to action on
our part’ (Younghusband 1998:83) to an imperial notion ‘that all was for the best, in
the best of of all possible worlds’ (Voltaire 1918), thus eliding the Mission’s single-
minded and violent pursuit of self-interest in Tibet.36
The ‘opening’ of Tibet had become something of a personal obsession for
Colonel Younghusband and the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon. Both were ardent
advocates of a forward policy designed to dramatically expand the frontiers of British
India, and both justified the policy by emphasising the threat posed by Imperial Russia
to British Indian interests. In part, the Russian threat was exaggerated by Curzon and
Younghusband so as to gain Westminster’s approval for a forward policy at a time
when British imperial expansion was becoming an increasingly sensitive issue for the
home government. For Curzon and for Younghusband, the opening of Tibet was also a
mission to penetrate one of the last remaining unexplored countries of the world, from
which their exclusion had represented a personal insult: ‘It is really the most grotesque
and indefensible thing’ wrote Curzon in 1902, ‘that at a distance of little more than 200
miles from our frontier this community of unarmed monks should set us perpetually at
a defiance’ (Ghosh 1979:12). Despite this, their shared anxiety about the threat of a
Russian-Tibetan alliance seems to have been genuinely felt (French, P. 1995:187,
Younghusband in Coates (ed.) 1999:193,198).
The British advance prompted the Dalai Lama to depart to Urga from whence
he planned to travel to St Petersburg and achieve a Russian-Tibetan treaty that would
secure Russian protection. The Dalai Lama urged the Russian government to declare
openly ‘before all other nations,’ that they ‘take Tibet under their protection from
England and China’ (Andreyev 2003:44). According to Russian sources, the Dalai
36 Similarly, Curzon (1907) stated: ‘Had the Tibetans respected our Frontiers, we should never have marched three years ago to
Lhasa.’
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Lama claimed that he could bring ‘all the Central Asian tribes as far as the Tibetan
frontiers, under Russia’s rule’ (Andreyev 2003:44). However, shortly after
withdrawing from Lhasa, Britain began negotiating an adhesion agreement with China
in order to cancel the political damage caused by the expedition, and Russia was
uninterested in intervening once British threats to Russian interests had subsided.
In 1906, an agreement was reached by which China paid off the entire
indemnity imposed on Tibet by the 1904 Lhasa Convention. Britain also agreed that
China was to be exempt from Article IX, which barred foreign powers from Tibet
without British consent. China’s exact role was, however, left undefined. This changed
in 1907, when Britain concluded a bilateral treaty with Russia in which both powers
recognised China’s ‘suzerain’ role in Tibet. At this point, the British had superficially
succeeded in arranging matters as they wished. The 1907 treaty placed a bar on both
British and Russian expansionism in Tibet, thus securing Tibet’s role as a neutral
buffer state. Furthermore, by recognising an influential role for China, both parties
could be secure in the knowledge that Tibet was not free to independently subvert that
agreement. The way was left open, however, for future Sino-Tibetan conflict. Tibet
repudiated all the treaties to which it was subject, but in which it had not participated.
China meanwhile, sought to strengthen its regional position, ever wary that not only
did Tibetan assertiveness challenge China’s role as a regional power, but also that, at
any moment, Tibet might fall to a more dangerous enemy.37
3:6 Beyond the Pass: From Unbounded Empire to Nation State
Writing on the status of frontiers in international law, Lapradelle concludes
that ‘the modern legal concept of a frontier was impossible in the great empires of the
past, because the very essence of their existence was that they thought of themselves as
continually expanding to become universal empires’(Embree 1977:258 ). Similarly,
Kristoff argues that whilst a frontier was ‘the vanguard of a forward-moving culture
bent on occupying the whole area. A boundary indicates, on the contrary, an enclosing,
a shutting in.’ Hence, a boundary suggested, ‘the present concept of state, that is, the
state as a sovereign, or autonomous spatial unit, one among many’ (Embree 1977:258).
37 As one imperial Chinese official put it, ‘[Tibet] has long been coveted by the British…should we prove remiss, the teeth will
feel cold when the lips have gone’ Norbu 1992:42.
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The case of Qing China and Tibet, however, suggests that a concept of a fixed
boundary, analogous to those of modern international law, could exist within the
context of a ‘universal empire.’ On the one hand, the Qing recognised fixed borders,
and this implied a mutual acknowledgment of sovereignty by the political entities
adjacent to the border. On the other hand, the Qing dynasty was founded upon a
Confucian ideology that posited an all encompassing universalism. At the heart of this
paradox was the necessity that Manchu emperors negotiate between Confucian
orthodoxy and barbarian heterodoxy.
Cultivating the identity of a universal monarch was one of the ways that
earlier Manchu emperors were able to manoeuvre between the heterodox and orthodox
in the context of the empire. This concept had slightly different resonances in the
Confucian and Buddhist traditions, but the overarching image of the emperor as
sovereign of the universe provided a means for accommodating the various cultures
that straddled the frontiers of China proper. Qianlong, in particular, had sought to
articulate a universal basis of culture by promoting multilingual projects, and was
himself a talented linguist. Arguing that an understanding of the concept of ‘heaven’
was cross-cultural and independent of language, Qianlong maintained that ‘once the
names are unified, there is nothing that is not universal.’38 Writing in 1781, Qianlong
linked his study of the Uyghur language with the pacification of the Western Regions,
and his study of the Tibetan language with his pacification of Jinchuan, an ethnically
Tibetan borderland in Western Sichuan that lay beyond the control of the Lhasa
government (Berger  2002:195). 39
Despite the link between Qianlong’s study of frontier cultures and his
pacification of certain frontier territories, it does not necessarily follow that the court
was motivated in these projects by a desire for political assimilation. Berger, for
example, argues that it is ‘difficult to maintain that the Manchu emperors’ increasingly
easy multilingualism and their continued interest in and respect for cultural difference
(certainly up to and including the Qianlong reign) was an epiphenomenal by-product
38 Kristoff, Ladis. 1959. ‘The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries.’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 49, 270.
Cited in Embree 1977:258.
39 The importance of the Jinchuan conquests are indicated by the fact that Qianlong included them in a list of the ten great
military accomplishments of his reign (Waley-Cohen 1996:869-870), but it is notable that he did not allude to any conquest of
Central Tibet.
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of their political needs’ (Berger 2002:.6).  Millward too goes on to present a more
complex picture of Qing conquests in frontier territories, by showing how the
boundaries between the different culture blocs that made up the Qing Empire were
strictly maintained ‘lest excessive, uncontrolled contact lead to trouble’ (Millward
1998:202). Administrative structures and legal regulations enforced pre-existing
cultural and geographical boundaries between Inner China and frontier cultures and
actively discouraged the dilution of Han Chinese identity.40Although Millward’s study
deals with Xinjiang, many of his observations are relevant to Tibet. In particular, his
conception of the Qing Empire as a confederation of distinct cultural blocs draws
attention to the paradoxical juxtaposition of the empire’s universalising moves,
embedded in Qianlong’s desire to ‘proclaim the supremacy of the unified linguistic
universality of our dynastic house’ and the particularism rooted in a frontier policy that
was designed to both distance and control frontier cultures, whilst maintaining the
traditional boundaries of the preceding Ming Dynasty’s eighteen provinces (Millward
1998:197).
The paradoxical simultaneity of Tibetan inclusion and Tibetan exclusion
opens up a window to explore the changing role of the frontier in the late Qing. The
Qing frontier has not generally operated as a ‘unit of historical enquiry’ (Millward
1996:120). As Millward states in his studies of Xinjiang, an ‘investigation of the
frontier as ‘process’ is precluded by the historical treatment of the region as a static,
eternally Chinese place’ (Millward 1996:120). Yet the concept of the frontier changed
radically at the end of the Qing dynasty, as nationalism became the dominant political
ideology. The demarcation between the eighteen provinces that made up the ‘Inner
Land’ of the Qing, and the territories ‘beyond the pass’ became increasingly blurred in
Chinese nationalist discourse. One of the most important points about this expansion
of the inner frontiers of the Qing at this time was that it occurred initially on a
conceptual plane. The project to reconceptualise the greater Qing Empire as the
Chinese Nation-state did not involve a corresponding increase of substantive political
or military control in Central Tibet.
40 Legal regulations concerning cue-clipping, sexual activity and money all enforced the separation of those from China proper
from those from ‘beyond the pass’  Millwood 1998:203.
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The concept of the universal empire thus completed its transition from symbol
of unbounded power to relic of the premodern past. In this sense, what the newly
emerging Nationalist discourse reflected was the Western image of the Qing Empire as
‘unbounded’ until it encountered the reality of Western intellectual, cultural and
political frontiers. Although the image of an ‘unbound’ China is suggestive of power,
in that those who touched it were supposedly spontaneously Sinicised, it also
suggested an image of an Imperial Court that was as blind to its own limits as it was to
the reality of a changing, modernising exterior world. In this construction, it was not
until China encountered the West that it gained the self-knowledge necessary for
modernisation. However, actual Qing usage and adaptation of universalising Imperial
narratives to suit particular political exigencies, including the recognition of fixed
borders, problematises this view. As Millward points out, ‘the Qianlong-era ideology
of empire differs profoundly from that held by Han Chinese of the Ming or Republican
periods and, indeed, from that attributed to the Qing by the ‘Chinese world order
paradigm’ (Millwood 1998:197).However, the real irony is that as the Nationalist
Republic of China set about dismantling the edifice of the Qing’s political cosmology,
and rebuilding the nation on a modern platform of science and constitutionalism, it did
so by constructing an arguably much more totalising mythology than the one it had
usurped.
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Chapter Four
‘There is the old well-known story about the man who, during the
Lisbon earthquake of 1775, went about hawking anti-earthquake pills; but one
incident is forgotten – when someone pointed out that the pills could not
possibly be of use, the hawker replied: ‘But what would you put in their
place?’’ (Namier 1939:8).
4:1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how Imperial China’s engagement
with Western Imperialism was transformed by the modernising moves of the Republic
of China into an affirmation of the universal standards of civilisation that had arisen
within Europe. Despite the fact that resistance to imperialism was the primary
campaign platform of the Chinese Nationalists, the extensive transplantation of
Western theories and methods of law and governance into China during this period
renders this resistance contradictory. As well as throwing the revolutionary emphasis
upon the separation of Western techniques from Western civilisation into question, the
circularity of modernity created paradoxical sympathy between China and the West.
The notion that legal and political systems operated at a supra-national level, leaving
the uniqueness of the nation intact, finds a parallel in European positivist attempts to
separate law from politics. The impossibility of maintaining such a distinction in the
face of actual state practice is illustrated by the problematical rise of the rebus sic
stantibus principle, a doctrine that throws into relief the contradictions inherent in the
Chinese Nationalist project to create a modern nation-state from the ashes of the
empire. The circulation of modernity in Chinese nationalism is informative in that it
reveals an interface between an assumedly superior set of modern, universal normative
values and traditional culture, but more than that it offers interesting grounds for later
consideration of the failure of Tibet to fulfil the ‘standard of civilisation.’ The
translation of traditional relations between Tibet and China into the terms of
international law was uncompromising, and for the survival of Tibet as a self contained
legal jurisdiction and political entity, catastrophic. The question of what it is to be
modern, and what it is to be civilised, is as central to this as any concrete material
considerations concerning actual state power.
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To introduce the beginnings of the Nationalist era in China in the broadest of
brushstrokes, by the end of the nineteenth century, Qing China witnessed increasing
unemployment, heavy taxation and a large floating population of both disbanded
soldiers and civilians displaced by natural disasters. These factors, in themselves
enough to stimulate growing social unrest, were compounded by a policy of economic
and military decentralisation. The result was an increasing dilution of meaningful
control by the central Qing court. Beset by internal rebellions, foreign pressures and
courtly intrigue, the imperial administration began to fragment. This led to increased
competition for provincial control, which in turn perpetuated the destabilisation of the
Manchu regime. Distracted by internal rivalry, the court moved slowly to implement
the reforms demanded by critics. In the meantime, warlords, revolutionists and bandits
were able to take advantage of the replacement of the centrally administered military
with temporary provincial militia and foment pockets of resistance. Government
reforms, when they came, proved to be too little and too late. Furthermore, foreign
imperialism was a continuing thorn in the government’s side, with Russia and Japan
competing to turn Manchuria and Mongolia into zones of influence, and Britain
making moves to both consolidate a system of Himalayan buffer states along its Indian
frontier and to press for commercial advantage in the treaty ports, alongside other
Western powers.
To summarise, the rapidly changing geo-political context in which the Qing
Government sought to conduct its foreign affairs led to the breakdown of Qing
influence over traditional tributary states, whilst domestic disorder weakened its
internal administrative structure. The possibility, or extent, of a causal linkage between
the internal and external elements of these upheavals has been approached from
various angles, but a general thread running through accounts of the demise of the
Qing Empire is that it was the burden of pressures to modernise that irreparably
fractured the administrative structure of the regime. What reforms could, or should,
have been implemented to stave off crises are matters of conjecture, but by and large
the inevitability of the Qing demise seems agreed upon. The fact of the Qing regime’s
demise is, after the event, seemingly proof enough of the regime’s lack. It is this notion
of inevitability that I wish to examine, even contest. The point here is not to suggest
that the Qing court was victim of external circumstance, nor that the court was
possessor of an inherent worth grossly overlooked by modernity, although one might
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wish to concede the partial truth of these points.  The relevance here is, in the words of
Koskenniemi, that it suggests that ‘the limits of our imagination are a product of a
history that might have gone another way’ (Koskenniemi 2001:5). Somewhere
between the notion of the inescapable force of the modern and the fact of actual
historical change lays the thought, emotion and action of human individuals. In this
sense, ‘inevitability’ renders humanity mute.
This follows on from the observation in the previous chapter that the ‘Chinese
world order paradigm’ described the Qing Empire as ‘unbounded’ until it encountered
the reality of Western intellectual, cultural and political frontiers (Millwood 1998:197).
This paradigm narrates China’s encounter with the West as an epiphanic episode
through which it gained the self-knowledge necessary for modernisation. In this
respect, what is of issue is not whether or not foreign imperialism is seen as an
exploitative and violent force, although there are indeed strong reasons to say that it
was. Rather, it is that a global tide of modernity swept through the Qing Empire,
awakening the old regime from evolutionary stasis. In its wake came the creation of a
new myth – that of the modern nation. The irony is that whilst the Chinese Nationalist
movement allied itself with a world wide movement against foreign imperialism, the
circulation of modernity that was involved reinforced, indeed obscured, the fact that
modernity was not an inevitable event, so much as a universalising ideology created
and sustained by human contingency. It is this circularity of modernity, as a discourse,
that makes the Chinese Nationalist revolution a truly global event. What began, within
China, as a culturally centred moment of resistance and response to multi-faceted
cultural forces, both internal and external, ironically became a testimony to the
universal legitimacy of modernity and the stream of values and ideals that it
encompassed. Thus, the fact that there was a national revolution in China at all
becomes suggestive of modernity being the only valid paradigm for social
organisation.
4:2 Modernity as Myth
The Nationalist project to seek the termination of the unequal treaty system
was closely allied with a plan to modernise according to Western models. This was
made explicit by the requirements of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China,
85
set up by the Washington Conference in 1921, which specified modern legal reforms
that had to be implemented before extraterritoriality ended. The transplant of the
German Civil Code, chosen by the republic following the successful example of its
transplantation in Japan, was related to this project. This returns us to the issue of the
‘standard of civilisation’ and what this standard meant to the historical construction of
an international platform regulated by law. This became an arena which allowed no
spectators, only participants, and the journey of the new modern nation into the folds
of the ‘civilised family’ of nations is a journey replete with ironies and contradictions.
Thus, Japan in its challenge to Western Powers at the turn of the twentieth century,
‘made it necessary that the standard be articulated in specific legal terms,’ hence
formalising the existence of the paradigm it was challenging (Gong 1984:29). This
draws attention to the circularity and contingency of the normative foundations of so-
called international society. It also highlights the presence of a presumed epistemic and
moral system upon which the concepts of law and nation are to be grounded, a
presumption that circumscribes resistance. The argument to be developed here is that
the epistemic limits of modernity have constructed what Fitzpatrick terms a mythology
of law. Or, that ‘The history of what modern law is not, becomes also a history of what
it is. This is the outcome of mythic dynamics that both propel the linear progression of
law, and of society, and provide the standards whereby some are judged as having
progressed less than others’ (Fitzpatrick 1992:107).
There are a number of points in relation to this. Firstly, to emphasise the
epistemic circularity of modernity rather than its progressive linearity is to emphasise
its cultural contingency and fluidity. To speak of modernity is to speak not just of a
post-industrial age marked by certain material developments; modernity encompasses
a discourse on the theoretical underpinnings of Mankind’s progress. By the end of the
nineteenth century, concepts of race and time had already been radically altered in
light of Darwin’s Origins of the Species and Lyell’s Principles of Geology. The
subsequent development of modernity’s universal theory of progress, as traceable
through the work of thinkers such as Marx, Kant and Descartes, coalesced to form a
discourse of grand narratives. Despite divergent political positions, such theorists gave
credence to a belief that the telos of history is realisable through objective reasoning.
However, the position of modernity is somewhat altered by the discursive practices
which have later defined it. For example, Marx’s theories may be seen as integral to
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the formation of modernity, but the discourse of modernity, as a universalistic theory
of post-industrial social and economic change, is significantly removed from the
particular historical moment within which Marx, as a contributor, formed his opinions.
This creates a gap or lag whereby modernity’s theoretical contradictions become
visible, hence Fitzpatrick’s assertion that for modernity, ‘denial is the myth’
(Fitzpatrick 1992:ix).
Secondly, to question the validity of modernity’s ‘myth of progress,’ the
dialectic in which civilisation moves towards an ever more perfect state of knowing, is
to start from the assumption than modernity as an ‘ideological event’ differs from
modernity as a ‘historical event.’  It raises from the shadows those on the margins, the
local and the particular, where the experience of a lived event may be contradictory to
that of the historically received idea of the event. The revisionist use of history for
ideological or political ends is, of course, nothing new. However, critiques of
modernity do suggest that in the post-Enlightenment era there was a discernible shift in
the nature of legitimation. Modernity as an epistemic system is arguably self-
replicating, its own claim to objective rationality becoming the sole measure by which
it can be judged. The manifestation of this concept of rationality can be seen in the
increasing restructuring of social institutions, as analysed by Foucault, which involved
a decentring of the locus of power and a move towards the creation of an individual
subject that ‘does not pre-exist the imposition of power, but rather it is power which
creates the individual in the first instance’ (Litowitz 1997:69). A shift in the context of
the historical overview to include the notion of a decentred subject is relevant to this
thesis, for if one is to follow Foucault on this point, then:
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative
terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ’abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceals.’
In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals
of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this
production. (Foucault 1995:194)
What Foucault reveals in this argument is that laws and regulations based on a
system of rights do not so much protect the subject from state power as legitimate
his/her subjugation to it. ‘Rights should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a
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legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it
instigates’ (Foucault 1980:96). This becomes relevant in consideration of international
law’s normative vision to protect universal human rights, not only in relation to the
U.N Charter, but also with regard to the preceding legal principle of a ‘standard of
civilisation.’
It is, after all, arguably this ‘standard’ that shaped the formation of Chinese
Nationalism, and ultimately underscored the eventual failure of the Tibetan nation-
state.
One further preliminary point will be made here, and that is that unlike Qing
China, Tibetan culture was specifically grounded in a philosophy which denied the
existence of a permanent, autonomous self. Whilst this may not be quite the ‘death of
the subject’ envisioned by Foucault, it does reveal the fissure between the modern
nation, as the vehicle of rational progress, and a culture in which the concept of
progress is understood in a different analytical framework. The ethic of Modernity
centres on a harnessing of the power of the subject for rational societal development,
and in this the institutions of the state, products of rational organisation and objective
reasoning, are supreme. In this context, institutions of external discipline and control
are not just expedient, but evolutionarily rational strategies. Whilst one can consider
the monastic institutions of Tibet as vehicles of social discipline and political power,
there is arguably a difference in that Tibetan Buddhist philosophy takes the position
that externally imposed discipline and control are incapable of creating lasting peace.
This is because the source of all conflict is seen to flow from a mistaken belief in the
existence of a permanent, autonomous self. The modern obsession with creating ever
more rational institutions is in this context, therefore, ultimately misguided. So, for
example, to continually strive for a system of institutionally administered positive legal
rights, grounded in universal reason, fails to adequately address the issue of
responsibility. And, responsibility is ultimately to be addressed in the context of the
individual stream of consciousness and an understanding of the laws of cause and
effect, rather than through mechanisms of social discipline. The argument here is that
whilst the concept of objectivity and rational science did exist in Tibet, the analytical
paradigm in which it was understood, in which it achieved represented value,
significantly problematised the transition to the modern state and, by extension, entry
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into the family of nations. This underlines a point central to this current chapter, which
is that the concept of rationality is exactly that: a concept.
In terms of the ethics of modernity that drove the formal creation of the entity
defined as the Republic of China, this is evidenced as a contradictory moment of
resistance to, and appropriation of, a non-indigenous epistemology. The Nationalist
Government’s promulgation of laws to regulate popular religion, part of a project to
both resist foreign imperialism, and to cultivate a national identity founded on science
and rationality, is one example of this to be explored. The republic’s expansive
appropriation of entities on its fringes, such as Tibet, can also be seen as conforming to
this process. It affirmed both the republic’s refusal to allow economic and military
infiltration to destabilise its borders, and its commitment to promoting the existence of
a civilised, modern society. The definition of the ‘standard of civilisation,’ a dynamic
force in international law during the formative years of the Republic of China, may
have been challenged by the push for inclusivity on the part of such entities as China,
but nonetheless the foundational requirements for this ‘standard’ remained predicated
upon an epistemology that originated in the culturally specific terrain of Europe. The
expansion of international law, and the extension of rights, becomes somewhat
contradictory in this context.
4:3 China’s Engagement with International Law in the Nationalist Era
In 1936, the centennial edition of Wheaton’s ‘Elements of International Law’
was published as part of the classics of International Law Series. The editor, George
Wilson, draws the reader’s attention to the existence of foreign language translations
of the treatise. In particular, Wilson notes that the ‘edition published in China was
quickly exhausted’ and that ‘the work has been received with much favour in Japan.
An edition of this Chinese text reprinted and adapted for Japanese use was published in
Kyoto, Japan in 1865, and other editions are issued in the east’ (Liu 1999:127). As
Lidia Liu points out, ‘Wilson cites the existence of the foreign language editions as
evidence of the universal value of Wheaton’s text, but it requires the circulation of that
book to prove the self-same universality.’ Liu goes on to argue that ‘the coming into
being of a global universal can be plotted as a series of translated and contested
moments in colonial and cultural encounters, in which the translator, who literally and
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figuratively plays the ‘diplomat,’ is a central agent’ and observes that ‘it is not
untypical of an editor to cite the existence of foreign-language translations to prove the
universal value (not merely the applicability) of a book. What it suggests is that later
and revised editions can be just as illuminating as the original work in registering the
process whereby, in this case, international law has been globalised and universalised
over the past two hundred years’ (Liu 1999.128).
Officially sanctioned by the Zongli Yamen, in 1864 Henry Wheaton’s
‘Elements of International Law had been the first book on international law to be
translated into Chinese. Known to the Chinese as wanguo gongfa it was the work of
the American missionary W.A.P Martin and his Chinese co-workers.41 The purpose of
the translation from the Zongli Yamen’s point of view was to gain familiarity with the
doctrine that had given rise to such legal principles as extraterritoriality, most-
favoured-nation clause and tariff control, all of which had been forced upon China in
the unequal treaty system. In other words, the Zongli Yamen saw wanguo gongfa as a
practical guide to dealing with Western states. In a similar manner to Wheaton himself,
in fact, the court viewed this international law as European law, the purpose of which
was to govern European practice. As Prince Gong argued, memorialising the throne in
1864:-
We your ministers, find that this book on foreign laws does not entirely
agree with our own laws, but there are in it occasional passages which are
useful. For example, in connection with the case of Danish ships captured by
Prussia outside of Tianjin, we used some sentences from the book without
expressly saying so, as arguments. The Prussian minister acknowledged his
mistake without saying a word. This seems a good proof. (Liu 1999:145).
Aside from arguing the practical value and diplomatic applicability of
international law, Martin stressed to his Chinese detractors that knowledge of Western
law did not give rise to automatic obligation. Hence, Prince Gong was encouraged to
assert that, despite George Staunton translating the Da Qing Luli (the collected statutes
of the great Qing dynasty) into English, ‘China never attempted to force Western
41 Martin went on to translate Woolsey’s ‘Introduction to the Study of International Law (1878), Lardy’s ‘Le Droit International
Codifie’ (in itself a translation of Bluntschli’s 1879 work ‘Das Moderne Volkerrecht der Civilisirten Staten’ and Hall’s ‘Treatise
on International Law’ (1903). See Liu (1999).
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countries to practice them,’ and that therefore, ‘it cannot be that just because a foreign
book has been translated into Chinese, China would be forced to practice it’ (Liu
1999:145, Covell 1978:145-7). This assertion of reciprocity is interesting in that it
affirms the instrumentality of the law. In retrospect, it also seems extraordinarily naïve,
particularly in view of the fact that at that time China had already been forced to agree
to a punitive series of treaties. However, precisely because it affirms the
instrumentality of the law, Prince Gong’s argument also highlights that the expansion
of the international legal sphere was the product of confrontation, resistance and
contest. If the translation of international law is what made international law become
truly international in usage, it was a result of this process of confrontation, rather than
an outgrowth of the recognition of law’s universal veracity. Lidia Liu references this
dynamic in relation to the actual act of translation between the Chinese and English
languages, arguing that ‘reciprocity and commensurability are in every sense a product
of deictic encounters between the two languages and not the other way around’ (Liu
1999:145).
The self-fulfilling prophecy of international law’s universality, so evident in
the circulation of its texts, is mirrored in the development of the doctrine of the
standard of civilisation. For the Republic of China, the standards of civilisation were of
specific import. The ‘civilised powers,’ including Japan, had explicitly organised
themselves against the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 in the defence of ‘civilised’ society.
The indemnity imposed in the peace settlement of 1901 and inherited by the republic
had added weight to criticism of the Imperial Qing Government. Japan’s involvement
was of particular significance, as its concerted persistence in attaining the standard was
seen as instrumental to its rapid imperial expansion. Japan’s success also added insult
to injury in light of China’s concessions to the Powers. This was brought to the fore
following the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, in which Japan sought control of the Qing
tributary state of Korea. In the conflict, Japan, the victor, secured the respect of Europe
for its stringent application of the law of war. The military defeat suffered by China
was compounded by the fact that this acclaim was in direct contradistinction to the
international criticism levelled at China for failing to uphold the same laws (Gong
1984:18).
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To talk of the Republic of China as an entity perhaps gives an inaccurate
impression of the unity of the state in the republican era. The revolution of 1911 led
directly to the inauguration of Sun Yat-sen as Provisional President of the new
Republic on the 1st January, 1912. However, despite widespread opposition to the
Manchus, there was little collaboration between the provinces. Whilst the southern
provinces had declared independence from the Qing dynasty, most of the Northern
provinces had not (Li 1964:255). In light of the lack of unification, Sun stepped aside
to allow Yuan Shih-kai to take the presidency, a reformer who had been appointed
premier of the imperial cabinet under the Manchu’s. As well as the support of the
reformers within the previous administration, Yuan had the significant advantage of
commanding the New Army in North China. The position of president was subject to
the checks and balances of a modern-style parliament and cabinet, as outlined in the
Provisional Constitution of 1912. However, Yuan asserted increasing autonomy of
rule, going as far as to declare himself Emperor in 1915. This resulted in a split
between the Yuan Government in Beijing and the revolutionists, led by Sun Yat-sen.
By 1921, Sun Yat-sen was leader of a rival military government at Canton in the
South, set up by the Kuomintang Nationalist party (KMT). Throughout this period, it
was the Republican Government in Beijing who received foreign recognition as the
legitimate regime. On Yuan’s death in 1916, China fragmented into regions controlled
by various rival warlords, although the Beijing Government continued to operate as the
recognised leadership of China. This changed in 1928 when, following Sun Yat-sen’s
death in 1925, Chiang Kai-Shek’s New Revolutionary Army successfully seized
control for the KMT. Between 1928 and 1949, the KMT governed a unified China,
until the success of the Chinese Communist Party in the ongoing civil war led to the
retreat of the KMT to Taiwan. Regarding the republic’s relation to Tibet, despite this
lack of stability, there was a consistent official policy, the position being established in
Article 3 of the Provisional Constitution of 1912, which stipulated: ‘The territory of
the Chinese Republic consists of 22 provinces, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and
Chinghai [sic].’ Likewise, both the Northern and the Southern regimes continued to
pursue the termination of the unequal treaties. The two projects were intrinsically
linked, both an expression of the Nationalist emphasis on a strong sovereign state
identity, and both tied to the concept of the standard of civilisation in international
society.
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4.4 The Standard of Civilisation
The abolition of the unequal treaties in many respects became the cause
celebre of both the Northern and Southern regimes. It captured the fundamental
imperatives of the revolution; the removal of a defunct government whose own
imperial weaknesses were seen to have allowed foreign imperialism to encroach upon
China’s sovereignty. By taking advantage of changing international attitudes towards
self-determination in the post League era, the Nationalist Government was able to
assert its difference from the old regime and claim its place as rightful representative
of the Chinese nation. Naturally, this was much more than a struggle over China’s
status in the emerging global nation state system, for it was also a platform on which
rival parties could campaign for legitimate domestic rule over a unified China. In both
aspects, internationally and domestically, the concept of ‘being modern’ became
central to the articulation of power.
To date, the most comprehensive analysis of the standard of civilisation in
international law remains that by Gong (1984), who places the standard at the centre of
the development of contemporary social, legal and institutional structures that shape
international society. The impact the standard had upon the development of
international law has achieved increasing recognition since Gong’s study, particularly
in light of recent developments regarding international intervention in ‘rogue’ states,
and also as part of the debate on the normative vision of international law, especially
relating to human rights and development (Simpson 2004, Rajagopal 2003). The
purpose here is to examine how the standard shaped the international relations of the
Republic of China, and also to consider the circularity of the concept as it moved
across cultural boundaries, what was initially a particularistic demarcation of
difference becoming an affirmation of universal norms and values.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the standard of civilisation had become
the organising principle upon which the European powers, and the United States,
declared international society to be founded. This concept of an exclusive ‘civilised’
international society was articulated in an array of literature from publicists of the day
and sees clear expression in various agreements relating to such matters as European
consular jurisdiction in non-European territories. Generally speaking, the standard
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envisioned the state protection of life, property and freedom of conscience (in
particular for foreign nationals), the rule of law and stable government, and adherence
to international obligations. The standard also operated in the domain of social custom,
excluding from the civilised sphere, for example, customary laws of marriage based on
polygamy. Dress was also perceived as a measure of civilisation that could bear
diplomatic significance, as exemplified by the Japanese diplomatic mission to the
United States in 1871 (Gong 1984:20).
The significance of the standard is discernible in the debates over what
comprised appropriate humanitarian rules for warfare when the civilised nations
convened at The Hague Peace Conference of 1899. The British delegate justified the
use of dumdum bullets to the Sub-Commission to the First Commission of the
Conference, with the argument that ‘there is a difference in war between civilised
nations and that against savages’ and that in the case of savages use of the bullet was
justified for ‘the savage…although run through two or three times, does not cease to
advance’ (Coupland and Loye 2003:137). This distinction remained part of British
practice as late as 1914, with the 1914 British Manual of Military Law stating that
‘rules of International Law apply only to warfare between civilized nations… They do
not apply in wars with uncivilised states and tribes’ (Mazower 2006:557). At the heart
of the concept of the standard was the Darwinist notion of evolutionary development,
which when applied to the macro level of civilisation, rationalised hierarchical
distinctions between peoples by collapsing the particularities of inequality into the
universalistic model of progress. In this vein, the Hague Conference of 1907, notable
for its inclusion of China, Siam and the South American States saw its purpose as ‘the
interests of humanity, and the ever progressive needs of civilisation’(Mazower
2006:558).  Despite the universalistic presumptions of the standard, the fact that it
remained aspirational and that political entities had either attained the standard or not,
ensured that it was anything but. Indeed, in its initial construction, the only states to
have gained this universal standard were the very same states that had delineated its
existence in the first place. Whilst such posturing was not a new event in international
relations, as might be observed from the discussion of the Universal Qing Empire in
the previous chapter, the expansion of European commercial and military reach
extended the scope for the standard as a foundational principle for international
society. As engagement with the standard was ostensibly the only means by which non
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European entities could gain recognition as fully sovereign states, a process was set in
motion by which the expansion of international society became proof of the universal
applicability of the standard on which it was based. This process of explicitly
demarcating between the civilised, semi-civilised and uncivilised world became
increasingly formalised and rationalised through reference to law.
Whilst recent opinion has cautioned against attributing this development
specifically to the rise of positivism in European jurisprudence, the act of codification
in positive law clearly served as a demonstration of the a priori existence of what was
an otherwise rather fluid normative concept. After all, the adherence to international
legal standards and the capacity to grasp the complexities of such law were in
themselves presumed a measure of the degree of civilisation. That the capacity for
valid legal reasoning was something uniquely beholden to the civilised was
indispensable to the positive international law tradition. Indeed, the structure of
international society was founded upon this assumption, for without this initial
argument the validity of international legal doctrine would not hold (Anghie 1999).
In the Austinian tradition, positive law necessitated a sovereign hence
Austin’s famous denial of the existence of international law. Rather, what existed in
rules of customary practice and voluntary agreements was positive international
morality, the practice of which was subject to the vagaries of individual state will. In
the absence of an international sovereign to define or enforce positive law, the result
was a system which was, as Rousseau said of the Public Law of Europe, ‘full of
contradictory rules which nothing but the right of the strongest can reduce to order: so
that, in the absence of any sure guide, in case of doubt reason will always incline in the
direction of self-interest’ (Morrison 1997:240). If positive law depended upon the
coercive power of the nation state, then in this framework so too did the progress of
civilisation. For organised political society, within which law operated, was according
to Austin, superior to a society ‘in the state of nature,’ within which positive law did
not exist.
For an era in which positivism held sway, the doctrine of the standard of
civilisation arguably served to smooth over the contradictions inherent in international
law’s lack of a sovereign. Whilst an overarching sovereign was not identifiable, the
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flow of authority could be seen to spring from the standard of civilisation. Moreover,
this standard was identifiable in the actual practice of the states that comprised Europe.
Civilisation as a complex phenomenon that emerged from the actions of society was,
in this sense, central to sovereignty itself and the wellspring of law’s command. It
followed that the uncivilised were, ipso facto, without law and somewhat less than
sovereign. Although the exact demarcation of which peoples were subjects of
international law and which were not shifted over time and between jurists, this
fundamental distinction became key to late nineteenth century jurisprudence. This line
of positivist reasoning led in its most extreme form to the opinion that because law
could not be understood by lesser civilised states, that it was ‘discretion, and not
international law, according to which the members of the Family of Nations [were to]
deal with such states as still remain outside that family’ (Anghie 1999:24). The notion
that international law was in essence the public law of Europe therefore persisted for
considerable time after Bentham’s first construction of the phrase, hence the irony of
Wheaton’s cross cultural translation later being taken as evidence of international
law’s inherent universality. For Wheaton was clear on this point: there was no
universal law of nations (Wheaton 1916: 14-17).
This offers a point of return to Austin’s conception of a superior civilisation
being one that could first conceive of, and then subject itself to, the dictates of
‘political society.’ The refusal, or inability, to be bound by such laws as found in a
political society was due to ignorance and further signalled incapacity to develop an
appropriate and fixed relation to property. Hence Austin’s succinct conclusion that in
the state of nature ‘men…have no legal rights’ (Austin 1998:196). This is the now
familiar conceptual context for Europe’s civilising mission and formed part of its claim
to colonial possession in the uncivilised world, achieving memorable formal
articulation in The General Act of the Conference of Berlin (1886), Article VI
stipulating that the Powers agree to ‘bind themselves to watch over the preservation of
the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of their moral and material well-
being,’ this being part of the overarching objective of ‘instructing the natives and
bringing home to them the blessings of civilisation’(Gong 1984:76-77). Despite the
prevalence of argument along such lines, the standard of civilisation achieved only a
brief moment of juridical purity. After all, as Macaulay had observed in 1833, ‘to trade
with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages,’ an observation
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borne out by the fact that by 1846 ‘British colonial defence cost the value of half
colonial trade’ (Koskenniemi 2001:111).
If free trade was more financially advantageous than direct rule, it follows that
the rationale for imposing exclusionist policies derived from a strict interpretation of
the standard of civilisation was somewhat lessened. Even if the grounds for exchange
remained unequal, the interface between the European and non-European world still
relied upon the existence of exchange and acts of translation. In this sense, consular
jurisdiction, a practice so intrinsic to the Standard of Civilisation, facilitated such
exchange. Despite the fact that extraterritoriality in China became such a potent
symbol of the humiliation that China suffered at the hands of imperialistic foreign
powers, it did not follow that the existence of extraterritorial enclaves was definitive of
a lack of full sovereignty, or even that consular jurisdiction was of necessity a matter
of public international law rather than domestic law. This was the primary argument of
the Turkish delegation at the Laussanne Conference (1923), defending Turkey’s
unilateral right to terminate a capitulation treaty with America. In a reversal of the
dynamics of the coloniser-colonised Ismet Pasha stated, ‘Capitulations are essentially
unilateral acts. In order that an act may be regarded as reciprocal, it must above all
contain reciprocal engagements’ (Woolsey 1926:347) The Turkish delegation also
asserted that should the capitulations be regarded as bilateral agreements, then the right
to unilateral termination would be affirmed by the principle of rebus sic stantibus. The
rise and fall in the use of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth century illustrates clearly the dependence of
international law upon international morality and society, something with which the
standard of civilisation explicitly engaged, despite its positivist articulation.
The Turkish arguments defending unilateral action run contrary to such
publicists as Lorimer, who asserted that consular jurisdiction was the inevitable legal
solution to be imposed by civilised nations dealing with lesser civilised, partially
recognised states. Subverting this relationship, the Turkish argued that a consular
jurisdiction derived authority from the state bestowing the privilege, and could not be
seen as evidence of a lack of that state’s sovereignty. Whilst for Lorimer,
‘colonisation, and the reclamation of barbarians and savages, if possible in point of
fact, are duties morally and jurally inevitable; and where circumstances demand the
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application of physical force, they fall within necessary objects of war. On this ground,
the wars against China and Japan, to compel these countries to open their ports, may
be defended’ (Orakhelashvli 2006:319) For Vattel, ‘There exists no reason why a
nation or a sovereign, if authorised by the laws, may not grant various privileges in
their territories to another nation, or to foreigners in general, since everyone may
dispose of his own property as he thinks fit’ (Orakhelashvli 2006:327).
In the case of China, there is evidence that the court viewed consular
jurisdiction, and the unequal treaty system in general, as a way of containing the
foreigners. Certainly it was still a compromise resulting from the compulsion of force,
but nonetheless there were grounds for accommodating the development within the
context of traditional Chinese practice, representing as it did imperial ‘compassion for
strangers coming from afar’ (Teng and Fairbank 1979:37). The Republic of China
witnessed, therefore, a significant shift from seeing international law as a language of
diplomacy useful for negotiating with Europeans, to a technology capable of
harnessing political power in the modern world. Whilst the Republic of China
continued to resist Western imperialism, this being part of its revolutionary campaign
platform, the radical sweeping away of the old order produced a contradictory moment
in which the techniques of Western law and government were imported wholesale. No
longer was the negotiation of difference between the civilisations made so clearly
across the fault line of different systems of governance. Thus, whilst China was never
in the same position as post-war newly created modern states bound by the doctrine of
uti possidetis to create ‘national myths and legends in a bid to secure a coherent
‘national identity,’  nationalism was nonetheless required to crystallise an identity that
could withstand the assault of such institutional change (Castellino and Allen
2000:206).
This provides a point of comparison with the development of the standard of
civilisation in Europe. Wheaton had exhorted the practice of international law as,
primarily, a means of regulating relations between Europeans. Hall, following a similar
line, saw China as an entity beyond the sphere of the family of nations and reasoned
that its expectation that European states should act in accordance with international
law in their dealings with China as a conundrum which could only be resolved by
emphasising that European states were bound not by law but by ‘their sense of honour’
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(Gong 1984:61). To reason otherwise would be to admit jural capacity on the part of
what was only a semi-civilised state.
The point here is that the standard of civilisation operated not simply as a
discourse of subjugation in the colonial world, but as a means of reinforcing peace and
stability in Europe, between European states. In post Crimean War Europe,
sovereignty proved to be more prone to the vagaries of political fluctuation than the
diplomatic order established in 1815 had mandated. The Congress of Vienna had
preserved the balance of power in Europe, but it could not curb revolutionary
movements on the continent. As individual states pursued unilateral ‘high’ policies, the
scope for negotiation and regulation by treaty was reduced. The regime of binding
international obligations that had maintained peace since the Napoleonic wars had
failed to prevent the conflict of 1856, and by the 1860’s was also subject to the
pressures of increased competition between European states in the colonial context. If
the power balance of the European treaty based system had become more precarious
during the second half of the nineteenth century, nonetheless the fundamental
conceptual separation of law and politics in diplomatic state practice remained a
cornerstone of faith for publicists writing at this time, representing as it did the
foundations of European public order. This order depended upon maintenance of the
fundamental idea that treaties were contracts between equals, underpinning the
sovereignty and independence of the parties involved. The realities of state practice in
the global, non-European world were, therefore, something of a destabilising force. If
the treaties of capitulation and extraterritoriality were contracts between equals, then
non-European entities would have to be recognised on that basis, an event difficult to
reconcile with the imperatives of colonial expansion. If they were not equals, then
what were the implications of this institutionalised discrepancy upon the founding
principle of state equality that bound the European powers to one another? The legal
dilemma was how to reconcile the evidence of sovereignty in countries such as Persia,
Siam Turkey and China with this necessity, not simply with the colonial imperative.
Already the fact that European state practice relied increasingly upon treaties with non-
European powers to protect existing colonial interests and expand their empires was a
powerful contradiction to the juridical argument that non-European entities were
beyond the scope of both law and civilisation. This contradiction therefore provides
reasonable grounds for asserting that the practice of colonial states in this regard
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threatened the fundamental basis of the standard of civilisation, an argument made by
Anghie in his analysis of positivist jurisprudence and nineteenth century colonialism
(1999:39). Simply put, the formal interaction of different governments across cultural
boundaries did not suddenly cease because nineteenth century jurists considered it an
intellectual inconvenience.
It is, I believe, useful to take this argument a step further. Rather than
emphasising the fact that anomalous state practice threatened the integrity of the
standard of civilisation, it can be considered that the standard was in part a means of
reconciling the destabilising effect that treaties in the colonial context could have upon
agreements between European states. Furthermore, the standard’s reference to progress
and universal norms still allowed for some regulation over the acquisition of colonial
territory. For all its contradictions and inequities, the standard of civilisation was
successful in policing the peripheries of international law and regulating the flow of
the colonial encounter. Indeed, rather than falling before the reality of contradictory
state treaty practice, the standard flourished at the end of the nineteenth century. In
fact, the inconsistencies of treaty making were the foundations on which the standard
derived its meaning. Inconsistencies could be set beyond the sacred sphere of
European public law, along with any anxiety that rapid expansion of international law
might precipitate a collapse of European Public Law and, along with it, peace in
Europe. This adds a further dimension to critiques of international law that emphasise
the racial exclusivity of international law and its Eurocentric origins.  For all the
evidence that international law of the nineteenth century was a systematic attempt to
tame the uncivilised, non-European world, the existence of this world peopled by so-
called savages allowed for, and reinforced, the notion of a community of European
states civilised enough to respect obligations between themselves. International law of
the nineteenth century can also be read as a project aimed at subduing Europe itself.
The challenge to the stability of international law existed within Europe as much as it
did without.
4.5 The London Conference of 1871
This is amply illustrated by the events surrounding the London Conference of
1871 which attempted in the form of a declaration to reconcile the doctrinal principle
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of pacta sunt servanda with the contrary principle of rebus sic stantibus. The necessity
of this arose from Russia’s denouncement of the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of
Paris (1856), under which terms the settlement of the Crimean War had been decided.
Russia had used the principle of rebus sic stantibus to argue its right to unilaterally
denounce the treaty in 1870 on the grounds of fundamental change of circumstance.
Whilst clausula rebus sic stantibus (‘things thus standing’) can be considered an
implicit reservation attached to all treaties, its use in the narrow sense, particularly
with regard to the right of unilateral termination of an obligation, was a significant
departure. The doctrine subsequently achieved only an uneasy status in law. However,
Russia’s actions paved the way for several legal challenges to the capitulation regimes
and unequal treaty system in the early twentieth century. As with Russia’s use of the
doctrine in 1870, the success of arguments made on this basis seemed to depend upon
political factors governing enforcement and expediency, rather than any clear appraisal
of the principle as law.
It can be considered that when China invoked rebus sic stantibus in 1919,
1921 and 1926 to terminate international agreements, it did so with a view to not only
restore equality, but to give expression to its existing legal capacity in the context of
the standard of civilisation. In that regard, Beijing was pursuing a policy in line with
that declared by Sun at the inauguration of the republic in 1912 ‘we will try our best to
carry out the duties of a civilised nation so as to obtain the rights of a civilised nation’
(Chiu 1972:244). It is notable, however, that the 1919 denunciation of the November
5, 1913 Sino-Russian treaty, and June 7, 1915 agreement between Russia, China and
Mongolia regarding Mongolian autonomy involved agreements only recently entered
into by the Republic of China. This differs from the arguments China made in 1921 at
the Washington Conference, and again in 1926 regarding the Sino-Belgian Treaty of
1865, in that the 1919 renunciation did not involve agreements typically classified as
unequal treaties. The treaties of 1913 and 1915 concerned the autonomy of Mongolia,
an entity claimed by the republic to be integral to China, but which, like Tibet, had
declared independence after the 1911 revolution.  The Sino-Russian Treaty of 1913
followed on the back of Russia’s recognition of Mongolian independence in the Russo-
Mongolian Agreement of 3 November, 1912. In the subsequent treaty with China,
Russia modified its position, whilst securing for itself a role in Mongolia by
recognising China’s suzerainty. This development parallels events occurring across the
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border in Tibet, where British intervention led to the 1914 Simla Convention
recognising Tibetan autonomy on the one hand and both China’s suzerain role and
British rights in Tibet on the other. Whilst in 1919 the Republic of China limited its
cause for the denunciation of the treaties to change of circumstances regarding
Mongolia’s willingness to be autonomous, taking advantage of the weakness of the
newly established Bolshevik government, it is clear that the contest over both Tibet
and Mongolia was linked to Chinese views on imperialist encroachments generally, as
an outgrowth of the Great Game, but also to the unequal treaty system specifically. It
should be noted that Communist China enforced a stronger view of this issue, seeing
equality as deriving not simply from legal textual expression, but from social and
economic fact. Thus, ‘whether or not a treaty is equal does not depend upon the form
and words of various treaty provisions, but depends upon the state character, economic
strength, and the substance of correlation of the contracting states’ (Chiu 1972:63).42
The position of Communist China was that unequal treaties were by nature illegal and
thus null and void, and for that reason the problem of whether the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus allowed for unilateral denunciation was avoided, the doctrine falling from
use. The republic’s usage of the rebus sic stantibus clause not only highlights some of
the contradictions within the doctrine itself, but in the agenda of Chinese Nationalism
as a whole. The invocation of rebus sic stantibus in 1919 asserted not only a unilateral
right to terminate treaty relations, but the republic’s unilateral right to Mongolia, an
entity that, despite the wrangling of Russia and China, had declared independence in
1911 and entered into international agreements on its own behalf (Smith 1996:173).
This conflation of law and politics inherent in the use of the principle of rebus
sic stantibus was inherent in its first articulation as a specific principle of international
law in 1871. Russia’s invocation of what had previously essentially been a creature of
political theory, with its origins in the statecraft of Cicero, the theology of St Thomas
Aquinas and the reaction to Machiavelli’s first expression of real politik, was
symptomatic of the fluctuating balance of political power in Europe at the time, despite
Russia’s framing of the issue as a matter of positive law. Indeed, the peace treaty of
1856 which Russia was challenging can be viewed in a similar light. Whilst 1856 was
42 In line with this approach, the 1946 Sino-American Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was seen by some
Communist Chinese writers to be an unequal treaty, despite the fact that the treaty established reciprocal commercial privileges to
China and America (Chiu 1978:63).
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famous for bringing about the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the family of nations,
an event often cited as the point when international law shifted towards being truly
international, it is difficult to escape from the inevitable conclusion that the 1856
Treaty of Paris had been undertaken to reinforce the order of collective obligations
established in 1815. The primary issue was not so much the expansion of international
law as the shoring up of its existing boundaries.
The final declaration regarding Russia’s actions ostensibly affirmed the
concept that obligations were founded upon the principles of reciprocity, consent and
good faith. It read: ‘it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can
liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, not modify the stipulations thereof,
unless with the consent of the Contracting Parties by means of an amicable
arrangement’ (Bederman 1988:2).  Nonetheless, despite this seeming restriction upon
unilateral action, Russia’s initial denunciation was affirmed by treaty at the same
conference. As the Russian representative commented during the proceedings, ‘in our
time, treaties rarely live to a great age’ (Bederman 1988:2).  It is this reality that the
London Declaration ultimately upheld, and as such the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
remained part of international law, even if its precise definition fluctuated over the
course of the decades. To contemporary observers, the conference, in conceding as
much as it did, represented a threat to the order and stability of the system. The editor
of Wheaton’s 1880 edition, A.C. Boyd, described Russia’s action as ‘utterly
subversive of all international morality,’ destined to bring about ‘the end of all public
faith.’ As far as the subsequent declaration went, Boyd wrote that:
‘it is melancholy to think that the most civilised Powers of the world
should have considered it necessary to put forward such a declaration…it
shows that international law, however much talked of and appealed to, has not
yet acquired that moral force by which alone the welfare of nations in their
intercourse can be secured.’ (Bederman 1988:21)
Nonetheless, by the time of the League of Nations, the rebus sic stantibus had
been somewhat rehabilitated. Woolsey, for example, interpreted the London
Declaration in the context of the conference’s acceptance of Russia’s action as a
confirmation of the principle of rebus sic stantibus, meaning ‘that a treaty cannot be
annulled by one of the parties without the consent of the other in circumstances which
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involve no change in the fundamental conditions which the treaty is based and which
show no violation of the treaty by the other party.’
This is what A.C. Boyd’s anxiety about international law’s lack of ‘moral
force’ referred to; its inadequacy as a means for ensuring stability and maintaining the
status quo. Rebus sic stantibus, in its challenge to the sanctity of treaties, writ this
deficiency large. It is within this context that the standard of civilisation needs to be
understood, as an outgrowth of the anxieties of a Europe in flux, threatened by its own
expansion and competitiveness. It seems appropriate, therefore, that the doctrine
became associated primarily with challenges to capitulations and unequal treaties in
the early twentieth century.
To lay emphasis upon this dynamic of uncertainty, rather than bare-faced
imperial arrogance, adds something to the analysis of the Republic of China’s
interaction with international law. Whilst it does not lesson the inequalities inherent in
the colonial encounter, it does create a space within which to understand the agency of
the non-European world. It emphasises a locus of negotiation, however narrow or
circumscribed, in which ‘victims’ are also actors. This is what recognising the
artificiality of the civilised/uncivilised dichotomy means, since state practice, even
across the rifts of the colonial encounter, could not support a clear distinction, based as
it was upon such a fluid concept. The irony of this is that in the context of the
Nationalist project, the notion that China was a victim of imperialistic desire was very
much a foundational myth of the republic. If the standard of civilisation tells
something of the self-perception and identity crisis of Europe, it also reveals much of
how the Republic of China viewed its own position in the world. The intellectual Chen
Tu-Hsiu, early revolutionary, May Fourth participant and later Marxist, wrote in
1915:-
‘I would much rather see the past culture of our nation disappear than
see our race die out now because of its unfitness for living in the modern
world…The progress of the world is like that of a fleet horse, galloping and
galloping onward’ (Teng and Fairbank 1979:242).
This captured the driving impetus of the faith in progress, so typical of
modernity at large, found amongst the Chinese intelligentsia in the early republic. The
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provincial delegates at the inauguration of Sun as the provincial president in 1912
expressed much the same when they declared ‘We, the descendents of Han, have
groaned under the searing oppression of the Manchus; and admiring the systems of
equality of the American and French peoples, we have met and planned together…for
the overthrow of tyranny and restoration of the rights of man’(Teng and Fairbank
1979:258). In this construction, the Manchus were the obstacle to China’s progress as
a civilisation, the barrier that stalled the progressive linkage of the philosophy of the
ancient sages with the systems of the modern world. Arguably, therefore, in asserting
its own civilised identity, the republic transposed the dynamics of the standard of
civilisation onto its own historical self. It is in this sense that the standard of
civilisation became part of the myth in which the Nation of China was founded, and
not simply because it was imposed from without. To transpose national weakness onto
the past reinforced the notion of contemporary strength, becoming a powerful
statement of state sovereignty. This process finds continuity in the PRC with
communist assertions that Nationalist China remained at the mercy of unequal treaties,
in particular the ‘so-called McMahon Line’ which demarcated the Sino-Tibetan border
at the Simla Conference of 1914 (Chen 1974:190).
This faith in the modern political and legal technologies of the West, so
clearly expressed in the Provisional Constitution of 1912, gave credence to the notion
of a universal international law of nations. Whereas Prince Gong of the Qing dynasty
accepted use of international law as an expedient mechanism of negotiation, he did not
go so far as to claim it to be an expression of a universal standard of civilisation. In
this he seems to have agreed with Wheaton in that international law was drafted by
Europeans, for Europeans. Yet for the Revolutionists of the republican era, despite the
Nationalist conception of racial uniqueness, the enthusiastic uptake of modernity
implied just that. The admired systems of the American and French peoples were
techniques universally able to further the progress of Mankind. The successful
implementation of these systems may have depended upon the capabilities of the
people, for according to Sun ‘the course taken by a nation is determined by the
psychology of the multitude,’ but the systems themselves seemed to embody a
standard of civilisation fundamental to progress (Teng and Fairbank 1979:267). This
was not, therefore a superficial playing of the game to appease European tastes. It was
an affirmation that the underlying values of Western models of law and governance
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were applicable to all. The paradox of accepting such a position without accepting
Western superiority on the basis of the West’s advanced achievements in furthering
such values was resolved by referring back to China’s pre-Manchu philosophical
tradition. This time-shift, however inadequate Sun’s sweeping summary of Western
political history seems, allowed the nation to uphold a token of tradition alongside its
proclamation of modernity.
When Chinese delegates of the Beijing Government argued at the Washington
Conference (1921-1922) for the termination of the unequal treaties on the basis of
rebus sic stantibus, they did so from the assumption that China as a civilised modern
state could claim protection of the doctrine as Russia had before it. The arguments put
forward by the former Chief Justice of China, Dr. Wang, were clear on this point.
Firstly, China had a modern system of codified law, revised and prepared ‘with the
assistance of foreign experts’ and ‘based on the principles of modern jurisprudence.’
Moreover, there was a newly established system of law courts as of 1910 in which ‘the
judges are all modern, trained lawyers’ and foreign law was ‘given ample application’
under supplementary laws such as the ‘Rules of Foreign Laws (1918) which ‘deals
with matters relating to private international law’ (Woolsey 1926:353).43
This alone arguably rendered the need for extraterritoriality obsolete, as it
removed the primary grounds of legal incapacity to protect foreigners on which the
principle was based. In addition, Wang argued that the tariff regime imposed upon
China deprived China of her power to make reciprocity arrangements with the Powers
and, moreover, that since its institution over eighty years previously, it had been
inadequately and inefficiently revised despite fundamental changes in prices rendering
it ‘a danger to the political and economic existence of the Chinese state’ (Woolsey
1926:352).
Wang also pointed out that the significant expansion of foreign presence in
China, the original treaty ports rising to fifty by 1922, made a mockery of the
extraterritorial imperative to protect the rule of law, for what had actually developed
was a system of such jurisdictional confusion, replete as it was with a multiplicity of
43 Also in force were the Criminal Code, Code of Civil Procedure and the Commercial Code, which was partially in force.
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courts, that ‘in many cases the rights and liabilities of the parties vary according to
whether the one or the other sues first’ (Woolsey 1926:352). Despite the delegation’s
efforts, the resulting Nine Power Treaty designed to address the Chinese problem fell
short of meeting Chinese demands. Under Resolution V, the Powers set up a
commission to examine extraterritoriality in China, which did not convene until 1926,
when commissioners launched an inquiry in Beijing into the Chinese judicial system.
The resulting Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China,
emphasising the internal disorganisation within China, set forth a series of internal
administrative and legal requirements that needed to be met before the Powers would
relinquish extraterritorial rights, including the further revision and enforcement of
various domestic codes, covering civil, criminal and commercial law (Commission on
Extraterritoriality in China 1926). A supplementary settlement at the Washington
Conference secured the withdrawal of Japan from the Shantung peninsula, a significant
restoration of rights from China’s point of view, for there had been widespread public
antagonism to the award of the previously German held treaty port to Japan at
Versailles. Nonetheless, the treaty of 1922 did not lay down a timetable for
relinquishment of extraterritoriality; it merely affirmed the general principle of China’s
territorial integrity and right to development. A more cynical appraisal would be that
the conference as a whole was primarily concerned with Anglo-American relations
with Japan, and the Nine Power Treaty with establishing US Secretary of State John
Hay’s Open Door Policy; hence, Wang Ching-wei’s conclusion that the conference
‘freed China from the Japanese policy of independent violent encroachment’ only to
leave it victim to ‘the cooperative slow encroachment’ of all the Powers (Shurmann
and Schell 1967:100).
Modification to the tariff system under the treaty occurred only within the
context of abstention from special privileges in China and equality of opportunity to all
Powers, this being a clear expression of the American Open Door Policy. This
invariably was interpreted differently by different powers, but ostensibly it referred to
commercial opportunity for the foreign powers in China and as such was not designed
to address the issue of equality between China and the Powers. Given that Bolshevik
Russia had unilaterally renounced all of the Tsarist unequal treaties regarding China in
1918, the outcome of the Washington Conference was perceived as a significant
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comparative failure in China, particularly by the Nationalist Party which used the
event to demonstrate the Beijing Government’s incapacity. Given that it is possible to
interpret Western motives in conceding as much as they did to China as part of an
effort to mitigate Communist sympathies in China, it can also be seen as a failure on
those grounds too. The Southern revolutionists, led by Sun, were keen to emphasise
the failure of the Northern government’s efforts to secure an end to the unequal treaties
and looked to Russia for assistance. This ushered in an era of Soviet influence in the
KMT, involving Russian provision of arms, finance and expertise. Meanwhile, Russia
pursued relations with the Northern Government, concluding the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
May 1924 in Beijing.
Yet, despite the unstable internal situation, including the varying influence of
Japan over Beijing, and Beijing’s need to maintain a flow of foreign finance, the
Chinese representatives in Washington placed strong and relevant arguments before
the powers. The lack of success says more about the status of positive international law
in relation to international politics than it does about the delegation’s capacity for
presenting their case. The failure of China’s arguments to secure the abrogation of the
unequal treaty system compared with the Turkish success illustrates well how the
process of dismantling the legal obligations created by the colonial encounter was, like
the process of their becoming, subject to the whims and vagaries of state power.
Likewise, the application of rebus sic stantibus by the Republic of China, with its
emphasis upon consent and sovereign equality, is rendered contradictory by the
imperialistic motives betrayed in the republic’s unilateral claim to Mongolia in 1919
under the same principle.
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Chapter Five
5:1 Introduction
The preceding chapter developed the argument that, in its commitment to
modernity, Nationalist China’s resistance to imperialism served to reaffirm the
foundational concept of a universal standard of civilisation in international law. This
established a fundamental epistemological sympathy between China and the West
which traversed the fissures of difference. Arguably it was this sympathy provided the
grounds for Chinese resistance, with the narrative of that resistance being rewritten as
part of the myth of the nation. Hence, China’s use of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine to
restore sovereign equality marked this contradictory moment, at once affirming the
civilised legal capacity of the republic, whilst simultaneously making explicit the
presence of subjective moral and social dynamics underlying international legal
obligations.
If China’s employment of international law affirmed the universal values of
international society, then so too did international law shape the dynamics of power
within China. As part of the republic’s effort to restore sovereign equality, immense
institutional changes were implemented in the name of modernisation, involving the
replacement not only of courts and legislation so as to meet Western standards, but
also the appropriation of village institutions as part of a drive to extract resources (see,
generally, Duara 1991). One way of reading these changes invokes the notion that the
processes of Western imperialism achieved continuity in the global reach of modern
institutions, a view which finds support in an analysis of the League’s Mandate
Commission, for example (Rajagopal 2003: 37-71, Anghie 2006). However, it is clear
that throughout the era of the republic, modernity was employed as a tool to legitimise
increasing state intervention in daily civilian life. It is therefore inadequate to see
modernity as imposed from without. It was also used to enforce and restructure power
relations at the local level, becoming the legitimating factor of the state’s drive to
extract revenue.
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In the context of later developments in Sino-Tibetan relations, and Tibet’s
international status, it is pertinent to recall Chatterjee’s argument  that ‘the problems of
a liberal doctrine of nationalism can be traced back to a much more fundamental
question about the moral and epistemic status of bourgeois-rational conception of
universal history’ (Chatterjee 1998:11). If we are to assume that ‘all forms of
knowledge are born in historical society and become implicated with the dynamic of
power in this society,’ then in the modern economy of knowledge, the choice of
discourse was a matter of profit to those administrating political control (Duara
1991:68).  Whilst it would be grossly simplistic to presume the spread of European
modernist thought to be a straightforward transplantation of knowledge, nonetheless
the extent to which European systems of knowledge were imported into China was
both extensive and unprecedented. In the sense that these systems of knowledge were
often described in China as ‘technologies,’ one may also consider them to be
commodities. Paradoxically, this both complicates and reinforces postcolonial
assessments that seek to portray the rapid spread of Western ideals in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries as a feature of cultural imperialism.
The drive to develop the science of administration in the framework of law, in
its national and international aspects, circumscribed Tibetan resistance to foreign
encroachment. It rendered the task of defending traditional institutions in the face of
pressure to become modern a Hobson’s choice. Independence required that the Tibetan
state assert its ability to be modern, involving the reform of traditional systems of law
and governance and formation of a modern army (Goldstein 1989:89-145). The
alternative to independence was acceptance of the Republic of China’s claim of
sovereignty, a choice which would likewise have led to the dismantling of the Tibetan
institutions of combined religious and secular rule. Ultimately, between 1913 and
1951, Tibet chose to assert independence under British protection, which secured it
some measure of international recognition, if provoking the ire of China. However, as
noted by the historian Alex McKay, ‘There was no dispute between the two powers
[Britain and China] over the ideological model which Lhasa should follow, for China
was herself modernising on the Western model. The point of dispute was who would
control the process’ (McKay 1997:15). The familiar story of Tibet’s failure to gain de
jure sovereign independence is that it was the inevitable result of its incapacity and
reluctance to be modern. This fails to capture, however, how the criteria of sovereignty
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remained predicated upon nineteenth century concepts of the standard of civilisation.
The argument to be explored in this chapter is that the shift from colonialism towards
modern institutional international law involved a transformation from explicit legal
inequality to an institutionalised inequality, masked by a shift towards principles of
humanitarian development and self-determination. Key to this development was the
circulation of a discourse of modernity which intersected with issues of internal state
control in Republican China. The interaction of both of these forces came to have a
significant impact upon the status of Tibet. What follows illustrates how the
contradictions inherent in nineteenth century positivist attempts to separate law and
politics, as evident in the standard of civilisation, found continuity in modernist
attempts to eliminate the irrational and unscientific from secular law and governance.
The era of the de facto Tibetan state (1913-1951) straddles this change.
Hence, in its early years, ‘Modern’ Tibet was listed by Oppenheim as one of the ‘half-
sovereign’ states, a classification that greatly resembled Lorrimer’s category of ‘semi-
civilised’. As such, Oppenheim considered Tibet a member of the Family of Nations
for some purposes. For Oppenheim, Tibet was equal in this regard to China, Korea,
Persia and Siam, which were also classified as ‘half-sovereign’ (Oppenheim
1920:191). By the Chinese Communist takeover of Tibet in 1951, however, Tibet had
become something of an anachronism along with international notions of the ‘semi-
civilised’ and ‘half-sovereign.’ In a world in which the formal sovereign equality of all
nation-states had become institutionalised, there was little room for an entity awkward
enough to still be defined by such an archaic concept as suzerainty. Nevertheless, this
is how Tibet’s status remained defined, for despite periodic assertions by the British
that Tibet was independent, and despite Tibetan declarations of independence, the
concept of China’s suzerainty remained enshrined in the Simla Convention of 1914.
Beyond that, the concept of suzerainty tallied with the league’s endeavour to extend
the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ to territories ‘which are inhabited by peoples not yet
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’
(Article 22.1). The assumption that weak states would, through tutelage, be capable of
building the machinery of the modern state and become full subjects of international
law was reflected in Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist doctrine, in which the Chinese people
were to be brought to national democracy though a period of political tutelage.
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This chapter contends that rather than being tangential to and superseded by
the era of institutional international law, the ‘standard of civilisation’ remained central
and pervasive, achieving continuity in modernist assumptions of rationality and
scientific administration, which rather than being universal and neutral are intimately
indicated in assertions of state power. In the words of Duara:
‘theories of modernisation –both Chinese and Western – appeal to a
means-end gestalt to justify such intervention, but might there not be some
validity in the view of those who, in their historical experience, have seen the
reverse profile of this gestalt: where the narratives of modernisation seem to
justify the ends of state expansion?’ (Duara 1991: 81).
This chapter examines ‘the narratives of modernisation’ inscribed in the
Republic of China’s attitude to race and nation in the context of both its claim on Tibet
and in the wider context of the development of international legal institutions. The
ironic and disconcerting possibility that emerges from this inquiry is that the advent of
the self-determining age of modern states bound by humanitarian principles offered
much less in the way of recognition to the people of Tibet than the age of explicit
inequality in which half-sovereigns and full sovereigns populated the same arena.
5.2 Race and Nation in the Republic of China
Chinese leaders of the twentieth century have expressed profound resentment
at China’s humiliation at the hands of Western imperial powers. The nature of this
humiliation lay not just in the imposition of unequal treaties, but also in the loss of
China’s regional influence. Thus, both Sun Yat-sen and Mao decried China’s loss of
traditional tributary states such as Korea, Burma, Bhutan and Nepal (Sun 1924:12,
Schram 1969:365). If, as this suggests, the restoration of status was central to the
formation of Chinese Nationalism, then it is also clear that the past grandeur of the
Chinese Empire was a significant measure of that status. At the same time, on an
ideological level, Imperial China represented what had become defunct and contrary to
progress.  In this context, the republic’s claim of sovereignty, and the territorial limits
of that sovereignty, operated in a very different framework. In the new republic, the
state’s claim for legitimacy was founded upon its assumed progressiveness and ability
to negotiate modernity. This did not necessarily entail a complete negation of
112
traditional values, but it did involve a break with Manchu policy. In his speeches, Sun
Yat-sen often emphasised the superiority of the Chinese ancient, pre-Manchu,
philosophical tradition and drew parallels between ancient Chinese political
philosophy and modern Western ideas on democracy. It was imperialism, firstly under
the Manchu rule, and then through Western encroachment, that had hindered progress.
According to Sun, the ancient sages had preached democracy, but the people had not
practically implemented it (Sun 1924:57). It followed that, in comparison with the
West, ‘Chinese political history has been a development from freedom to autocracy,
while foreign political history has been one from autocracy to freedom’ (Sun 1933:99).
On this basis, Sun argued, Chinese civilisation was two thousand years ahead of
Western civilisation, although Europe did surpass China in material development (Sun
1924:35).
Thus, the amalgamation of the traditional and modern was largely conceived
of as the application of Western technology to Chinese civilisation.  Moreover, the
inference was that it was specifically the apparatus of state which was to be
responsible for implementing modern technology in the task of national reconstruction.
This was expressed in terms of economic development, but also through training the
people in the mechanisms of democracy. After all, for Sun, ‘a constitution is a machine
for control of human affairs’ (Sun 1933:107). The state was implicitly in charge of
raising the consciousness of the people, so that the nation could compete or, in the
Social Darwinist overtones of the early republican era, evolve to a superior position
amongst contending nations (Greiff 1985:451). Certainly, despite the promotion of
democratic ideals such as universal suffrage, right of referendum and constitutionally
guaranteed individual rights, over the years Sun Yat-sen increasingly emphasised the
primacy of the state. Liberty was the enterprise of the state on behalf of the nation, for
‘there is only freedom of the nation; there is no individual freedom’ (Greiff 1985:448,
Sun 1933:299). This authoritarian stance was tangible in Nationalist politics
throughout the republican period, before and after Sun’s death. It was incipient in
Sun’s early notions of militaristic government, and given expression in the concept of
‘tutelage,’ which justified autocracy in the interim period before the people had
evolved enough to be trusted with the machinery of democracy. It was finally
formalised in the 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China, the product of thirteen
years of debate in the KMT, which promised individuals rights on the one hand
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(Articles 10-16), but effectively gave the legislature the right to abrogate those rights
through ordinary legislation (Article 23). The position of the constitutional drafting
committee was made clear by the chairman, who stated:
‘Our great problem today is how to save the nation and the race. Our
nation and our race have long fallen under oppressive and exploitative
circumstances. Our current conditions are worse than ever before. If we are to
save the nation, to save the race, we cannot but ask each individual to
sacrifice his freedom with all his strength in order to seek the freedom of the
group.’ (Greiff 1985:452)
The corollary of this was that the state claimed to be coterminous with the
nation. The paradox here is that that the concept of ‘nation’ was essentially irrelevant
to the political organisation of China before the end of the nineteenth century. This is
an assessment backed up by a large body of literature, and suggested by the imperial
nature of the Manchu regime (Dikotter 1996, Zhao 2000). For the Manchus, as non-
indigenous rulers, it would have been problematic to have supported a nationalistic
notion of China when the indigenous population was Han Chinese and subordinated to
Manchu culture. Thus, the basis on which the ‘nation’ was to be understood in early
twentieth century China was by no means a decided issue, although critical for the
parties seeking political control. The concept of the ‘nation’ was the grounds on which
the new, modern state of China could assert identity. Beyond that, it was also a means
by which the ruling parties could assert their right to govern by articulating a linkage
between the territorial entity defined as China, the population within that entity, and
the government’s ability to negotiate on behalf of both with the forces of global
modernity without. From the outset, these political requirements created difficulty in
regard to the assimilation of the different races that had been co-opted in the Qing
Empire. The construction of a national identity that could stand in contradistinction to
the imperatives of imperialism, in both its Manchu and Western forms, whilst
maintaining the territorial integrity of the Qing Empire, required the resolution of
various conflicting demands, particularly in relation to any construction of the nation
on racial grounds. A racial basis for nationalism was, however, inferred by the Social
Darwinist styled theories that were in circulation amongst the intelligentsia.
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By 1946, the idea that the nation was primarily the expression and possession
of the Chinese race formed part of the curriculum of primary and secondary education.
A 1920’s primary school textbook, for example, instructed ‘Mankind is divided into
five races. The yellow and white races are relatively strong and intelligent. Because the
other races are feeble and stupid, they are being exterminated by the white race. Only
the yellow race competes with the white race. This is so-called evolution…China is the
yellow race’ (Dikotter 2001:408). Social Darwinism, a system of thought linked in late
nineteenth century China to narratives of race, influenced Chinese intellectuals in
various, but significant ways, its derivative becoming a key rallying point of nationalist
movements in the early twentieth century. Dikotter, for example, has outlined the
meaning given to the word minzu, generally translated as ‘nationality,’ in the period of
1902 to 1911. During this period it was specifically employed in the advancement of a
racial basis for the nation as a political unit.  Sun Yat-sen specifically promoted this
usage of the word in his Three Principles, stating ‘The greatest force is common blood.
The Chinese belong to the yellow race because they come from the blood stock of the
yellow race. The blood of ancestors is transmitted by heredity down through the race
making blood kinship a powerful force’ (Dikotter 2001:406). It was on this basis that
Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of ‘nationalism’, ‘democracy’ and  ‘people’s
livelihood’ were to be established. This set up an immediate conflict in regard to the
republic’s relationship with Tibet. On the one hand, the republic sought to claim
sovereignty over Tibet; on the other, in establishing a racial basis for the nation, China
was affirming the broad concept of nationalism, which was that distinctive cultures
were entitled to claim self-determination.
The dilemma this created is reflected in the fact that the definition of the
yellow race was somewhat confused. This highlights the difficulty the state faced in
projecting a coherent national identity founded on a racial basis. It also reflects the
state’s inability to reconcile the concept of a Chinese nation with a republic
territorially derived from the Qing Empire. The origins of a yellow race were traced
back to the earliest ancestor, the yellow emperor, the initial use of the term implying it
applied specifically to the Han Chinese. At the same time, the KMT and the Yuan
Government claimed jurisdiction over Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria and Sikang.
Accordingly, Sun Yat-sen and Yuan both promoted the notion of a republic formed
through the unification of the ‘five races’ or ‘five nationalities.’ This principle was
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represented by the coloured stripes of the Five-Coloured Flag of the republic: the Han
(red), the Manchus (yellow), the Mongols (blue), the Hui (white), and the Tibetan
people (black). Whilst this union was claimed to be based upon equality between the
races, in the literature of the time the position of the non-Han ethnicities in relation to
the overall concept of the yellow race remains ambiguous and contradictory. In his
1919 lectures on the Three Principles, Sun Yat-sen advocated assimilation of all five
nationalities, reflecting an earlier nationalist manifesto’s position on racial evolution
(Sun 1994:224-5). In 1923, Sun Yat-sen entered into an agreement with the Soviet
Union which saw the principle of self-determination come to the fore. The principle of
self-determination was also an issue of domestic import in relation to increasing
civilian interest in the unequal treaties. Accordingly, Sun Yat-sen included the
principle in his twenty-five-point Fundamentals of National Reconstruction for the
National Government of China. Encompassing both the idea of the state’s paternal,
civilising role and its defence of self-determination, Article 4 states ‘The government
should help and guide the racial minorities in the country towards self-determination
and self-government’ (Sun 1953:10).  By the end of the nationalist era, this position
had been modified once again. The KMT denied the existences of separate
nationalities in the Republic of China altogether, reclassifying them as branches of the
Han. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek replaced the five colour flag and declared that Tibet,
Mongolia and Sikang part of the Chinese nation. The difference between these
peoples, he stated, ‘is not due to difference in race or blood, but to religion and
geographical environment’ (Pahn 1996:88).
The fluctuations in the Republic of China’s position on race and nation reflect
the political considerations it faced in consolidating its territory. The transition from a
difference on the basis of blood, to a difference on the basis of religion and
environment significantly alters the nature of the claims made for sovereignty. It is
pertinent to recall here the Nationalist assertion that ‘a religious society is opposed to a
new society based upon the Three People’s Principles’ (Duara 1991:78). Outwardly,
the Republic of China’s position was consistent throughout, despite internal regime
changes, in that it emphatically claimed sovereignty over Tibet from the outset.
However, the shift away from the concept of distinct racial nationalities strengthened
the basis of that claim and also helped consolidate the principle of the state’s civilising
role. When Chiang Kai-shek took control, the KMT formally considered the era of
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military instruction to have ended and the period of political tutelage to have begun, in
accordance with Sun’s three stages of bringing the people to constitutional democracy.
This was made explicit by the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for
the Period of Political Tutelage, promulgated on June 1st, 1931. The eradication of
distinctions based upon separate nationalities conformed to this idea of ideological
assimilation. It also undermined the troubling notion of distinct geographical
boundaries between the nationalities, an issue of relevance to the government in light
of the failure of the Simla Convention (1914) to settle disputed boundary lines between
Tibet and China. The initial concept of a voluntary union of the adjacent tributary
nations of Tibet and Mongolia with the new Chinese Republic therefore became
replaced with an unequivocal claim of sovereignty, reinforced by a revised myth of
racial unity.
The position on assimilation established in the Nationalist party found its
parallel in the Chinese Communist Party, and in many respects this position has
achieved continuity in the present day. Whilst minorities are afforded protection under
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982) and the Law on Regional
National Autonomy (1984,ammended 2001), the tension between establishing a
universal ideological foundation of the state and allowing the expression of difference
has never been adequately resolved. This is particularly so when the religious
foundations of Tibet became placed in direct contradistinction with the necessary
institutions of modernity, subverting the modern state’s claim to be the harbinger of
progress. In this context, a challenge to the ethos of modern state development
becomes inseparable from a challenge to the state per se and is thus a destabilising
force.
The fundamental commitment to modernity in the era of the republic is
evidenced not only in the ideology of the Nationalists, but also the Chinese
Communists. Both the Nationalist Party and the Communists assumed in their vision
of assimilation that the lesser or weaker nationalities in their territory would be
brought up to the standard of the Han Nation, the advantages of modernity being
presumed too great to countenance resistance. It is noteworthy that in the wider
context, the ethos of this vision conforms to that expressed in subsection one of Article
22 of the League Mandate regarding the development of peoples’ capacity to become
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modern. This concept achieved widespread application within China throughout the
republican era, and the notion that Tibet would participate in a unified sovereign China
was implicated in this. When Mao formulated his revolutionary vision of the Chinese
Communist state in 1936 he declared ‘When the people’s revolution has been
victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become part of
the Chinese federation, at its own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples,
likewise, will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation’ (Schram
1963:415). As with the Nationalists, this was framed in terms of anti-colonial
liberation. Whilst for Mao this was a specific endorsement of Marxist-Leninist theories
on class hierarchies between nations, the dynamic remained similar. Thus for Mao, in
the republican era, Tibet and Mongolia were understood to be oppressed nations and
promised self-determination as a way of achieving equality. However, as noted by
Bulag in his historical study of class and ethnicity in Communist Chinese Mongolia,
‘Leninist morality is such that liberation from oppression is justified; but once the
Communists positioned themselves as liberators, to separate from them would be
morally unacceptable’ (Bulag 2000:537). The position of the Nationalist party
regarding assimilation should not, therefore, be seen as unique. Rather, it needs to be
viewed as a component of a global vision of modernity that, despite internal
differences along the left and right wing of the political spectrum, remained a coherent
expression of modernist values.
In terms of traditional tributary relations, the republic’s translation of China’s
actual traditional role was uncompromising. The Manchus’ claim of a universal empire
asserted cultural superiority, but it did not deny the existence of separate jurisdictions
within its zone of influence. The historical evidence also shows that Qing statements of
universal empire were frequently linked to its regulation of heterodoxy within the
domestic populace. Certainly in relation to Qing-Tibetan relations, Confucian
orthodoxy gave way to a distinctly Buddhist styled diplomacy. Thus,  actual relations
between the Qing emperors and Lhasa, as discussed in Chapter Three, conformed to
the Cho-yon concept of equality and reciprocity. The Republic of China’s declaration
of sovereignty was similarly linked to its assertion of cultural superiority, particularly
in relation to the state’s claim to meet modern standards of civilisation. Likewise, the
stated official position was considerably stronger than the reality. In this sense, a
parallel with the Qing can be drawn. It is also true that, like the Qing, the Government
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of the Republic of China desired to project an impression of control over the border
regions to increase domestic security. The discrepancy between the government’s
stated position of control, and its complete lack of substantive sovereignty in Tibet, is
indicative of the rhetorical value it placed upon these claims. However, despite this
emerging sense of continuity, the Republic of China differed from the Qing in that it
more purposively engaged with international ‘standards of civilisation.’ There was an
orchestrated endeavour to meet those standards so as to gain rank in international
society. It is this engagement with the emerging system of modern international law
and governance that shifted the grounds of China’s claims on Tibet.
5.3 Becoming Civilised: The Republic of China’s Assertion of Sovereignty
In the era of the Republic of China, the substantive basis of such a claim was
weak, if not non-existent. Tibet’s de facto status maintained general widespread
acceptance, as affirmed by the International Commission of Jurists in 1959, who
concluded that from 1913 to 1950 Tibet demonstrated the conditions of statehood as
generally accepted under international law (International Commission of Jurists
1959).This is further confirmed by the reaction of the Government of the Republic of
China in 1942 to Tibet’s establishment of a ‘Foreign Office Bureau,’ China viewing
this as a ‘sinister attempt’ to transfer their de facto status to de jure independence (Lin
2002:502). The question arises as to how the Chinese claim for sovereignty gained the
sense of validity and continuity that it did over the course of the twentieth century.
The military occupation by the People’s Republic of China in 1951 forms the
foundation of a substantive claim on the basis of actual control, but evidence so far
surveyed in this thesis indicates this to be the first instance of direct rule by China over
Tibet. The substantive aspect of territorial state control therefore seems inadequate as a
basis for examining the foundations of China’s claim. The paradox is that over the
course of the twentieth century, the issue of Tibet’s status became increasingly
circulated through the language of positive law by both sides, each calling on
substantive grounds for the claims and counter claims being made. Hence, during the
Simla Conference, Tibet insisted that boundary settlement between the Republic of
China and Tibet be settled with reference to an eighth century treaty, which not only
established a boundary line, but contained provisions regarding any breach of the
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obligations which reflected modern international law regarding reciprocal non-
compliance (Orakhelashvili 2006:330). Yet, the framework within which such legal
grounds are to be found, if at all, is the  framework of the normative values of so-
called international society. The shift that took place in the Republic of China in
accord with these emerging values carried immense weight in regard to all subsequent
claims on Tibet, not least because the normative values in question operate pervasively
within the international system as a whole. The second irony here is that the renowned
clash between Western and East Asian values in the field of international law and
relations operates along a much narrower divide than might be presumed. In relation to
this, the ‘standard of civilisation,’ and China’s engagement with this standard, remains
key.
With regard to the Republic of China’s efforts to attain the standard of
civilisation, the blurring of the racial lines between the adjacent tributary nations of
Tibet and Mongolia is significant in that it coincides with a much more absolute claim
of cultural superiority over these areas. As part of a project to negotiate and assimilate
modernity, the Republic of China’s claim to legitimacy was buttressed by its related
claim of capacity to civilise the backward peoples. In essence, the hierarchical
distinctions between the Han Chinese and Tibetans, Mongolians and Hui were not
removed by new definitions of race so much as deferred. Making these nationalities
lesser branches of the same overall race expanded the possibility, and therefore
legitimacy, of a state sponsored civilising mission. The backwards peoples were not
equal, but they did possess equal potential. This claim of civilisational superiority,
both an endorsement of the government’s ability to be modern and a statement of its
esteemed heritage, had domestic and international ramifications and the nature of the
Chinese state’s claim on Tibet was influenced by both these concerns. However, it is
not simply the changing face of China’s diplomacy that is of issue (Gong 1984:3). The
emerging ‘standard of civilisation’ in this era was central to the development of
contemporary social, legal and institutional structures that govern international society.
The Republic of China’s specific claims to modernity that took form during this period
engaged with these standards and helped shape them. By placing the issue of Tibet in
this context, Tibet’s position was increasingly undermined. Whilst China consolidated
its own claim to modern statehood, Tibetan state identity was hampered by constant
reference to traditional ties with China in which Tibet was identified as a ‘vassal,’ and
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its politics and law subsumed by references to its religious institutions. At the same
time, the nature of Tibet’s traditional foreign relations remained the basis of its claim
to statehood.
By the 1920’s China’s sovereign rights had become an issue of popular
interest, particularly after the May Fourth Movement of 1919 which saw mass protests
against the Northern government’s failure to effect an abrogation of the unequal treaty
system and secure China’s interest in the Treaty of Versailles. The May Fourth
Movement originated in the universities and can be interpreted as part of wider
intellectual debate about what it meant to be ‘Chinese’ amongst the elite. Nonetheless,
a dynamic popular basis for revolutionary mobilisation existed alongside, and it drew
on knowledge of the Western world, and China’s position in relation to it. Between
1916 and 1922, the number of industrial workers doubled, rising from almost a million
to nearly two million. During the First World War, nearly two hundred thousand such
workers were sent to Europe, an event that aided the development of a popular
nationalism based upon Western styled political systems (Schurmann and Schell
1968b:94). In 1919, the factories went on strike in sympathy with the students of May
Fourth. Labour organisations and unions became a significant social force, and an
interest in ‘nationalist’ politics gained popular momentum. International affairs
achieved wider circulation through the development of a vibrant popular press, a
development spurred on by the Literary Revolution sponsored by the magazine New
Youth (Li 1964:437).
For the revolutionists, who required mass mobilisation to challenge the
foreign backed Yuan government, the requirements of political success perpetuated a
specific vision of modernity. Their campaign positioned China within a framework of
international progress; a sovereign state of evolving technical capability and a political
entity to be taken seriously. The circulation of modern ideas in wider society did not
simply provide the grounds for party policy; it offered the means to promote a vision
by which the contesting revolutionary government could project authority.
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5.4 Scientific Administration, Modernity and Chinese Nationalism
Throughout this era, Tibet is generally considered to have been a de facto
state between 1913 and 1951, a status derived from its closer ties to Britain and
recognised in various diplomatic correspondence across the Commonwealth (Van Walt
Van Praag 1987:79). However, the definition of Tibet’s previous relations with the
Qing dynasty remained confused, and the British coinage of the term suzerainty as a
description of China’s role, this being reaffirmed in the 1914 Simla Convention, was
particularly problematic. Whilst the term did not satisfy either China’s claim of
sovereignty, or Tibetan claims of independence, what it did do is compromise accurate
representation of traditional Sino-Tibetan relations. In the context of the rise of modern
Chinese nationalism, this gains significance in that it obliterated the reciprocity of the
traditional cho-yon ties and in so doing removed all connotations of China’s religious
responsibilities to Tibet. The demise of the cho-yon relationship is key to an
understanding of Tibet’s failure to secure long term independence in the face of
Chinese claims.
The Tibetan objection to the overtures of the new Chinese Republic was
framed specifically in the context of what this meant for the religious security of Tibet.
As explored in Chapter Two, the Tibetan institutions of law and governance were
founded upon the concept of the twin pillars of politics and religion: cho-sid-nyi. This
dual system combined undertakings for the spiritual world with undertakings for the
material world. The theoretical reciprocity between these two factors is essential to an
understanding of the significance of this system in the context of Tibetan culture. The
separation of politics from religion is immensely problematic in the context of cho-sid-
nyi Firstly, despite the Mahayana Buddhist premise that the material world is empty of
true autonomous existence, it is important to emphasise here that this does not imply
that material endeavours are without import. Nonetheless, ‘undertakings for the
spiritual world’ are paramount, for they provide the framework for creating correct
motivation. Without this, material endeavours will fundamentally fail to prevent
suffering and only serve to prolong it. In this sense, it is reasonable to consider that cho
serves the critical function of providing a check and balance on the articulation of sid.
Likewise, sid offers the means for creating material conditions consonant to spiritual
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undertaking. Thus, to separate one from the other would be an irrational act which
limits progress.
Such a position is fundamentally at odds with modernist theories of
rationality, in which a faith in secularism prompts the separation of law and politics
from religion in the model of good governance. Yet, the very act of conceptualising a
category that is ‘politics’ in contradistinction to a category that is ‘religion’ assumes
that the boundaries between these categories are both rationally discernible and
enforceable. The dichotomy between the spiritual and the temporal in Western
modernity is irreconcilable with the Tibetan concept of cho-sid-nyi. As observed by
Nicholas, in the encounter between modern models of secular law and politics and
alternative models, culture is ‘invoked mainly to explain away aberrations from the
expected patterns of political development rather than treated as fundamental to an
understanding of what politics is conceived to be by the citizens of the new nations’
(Nicholas 1973:67).This is an observation supported by a vast body of literature that
sets out to examine Tibetan culture as opposed to the relative paucity of analysis of
Tibetan law and domestic political institutions.
The development of modern Chinese nationalism set the grounds for a
definitive claim for Chinese sovereignty over Tibet for the first time. The requirements
of modernity played a key role in this. In other words, the issue of territorial control
was more than a defence of substantive economical, material interests within defined
borders, even though those interests did exist to some degree. The argument here is
that an analysis of Chinese claims of sovereignty on the basis of either pre-existing
substantive territorial control or as a result of changing economic and military state
needs is inadequate for explaining the force with which Chinese claims were asserted.
The circularity of modernity, as a value system, created an imperative for this claim on
an ideological basis. This imperative was born of the impossibility of resolving the
contradictions inherent in the establishment of a modern, progressive state claiming to
legitimately represent the people. Certainly, the republican claim to sovereignty over
Tibet served the purpose of challenging any expansion of British, Russian and
Japanese influence in border regions that had no significant means of independent
defence. This was of justifiable concern given the fragility of domestic order in the
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post revolution aftermath.44 However, the Republican Government’s claim to
sovereignty over Tibet created significant diplomatic tensions between Britain and
China, at a time when arguably the resolution of the unequal treaties was a more
immediate issue, with Britain going so far as refusing the republic international
recognition unless it relinquished its claim of sovereignty and agree to the definition
put forward in Simla Convention (1914) that Tibet was under the suzerainty of China
and protection of Britain (Wang and Nyima 2001:119).  The new Republican
Government maintained no military control in Tibet, and on a diplomatic level Tibet
had formally renounced all ties with China after the fall of the Manchu dynasty. China
itself was still unsettled. The contradictions were, on the face of it, significant.
The conflict between Tibet and the Republic of China originated in events at
the end of the Manchu dynasty. The implications of a British presence in Tibet, post
1904, combined with Japanese and Russian competition in Mongolia and Manchuria,
led the Qing government to take decisive military action. Thus, beginning in 1908,
Chao Erh-feng, the ambitious Qing Governor-General of Sichuan, instigated a forward
push in the Tibetan province of Kham, seizing control and instigating a series of
reforms. These included the settlement of nomads, the required adoption of Chinese
surnames by Tibetans, and the imposition of the Manchu shaved forehead and queue.
The imposition of the queue is significant in that it was a legally enforced requirement
within provinces of China. Garnering the support of the imperial court, Chao
proceeded to march to Lhasa in 1910 with instruction to take over the post of Lhasa
Amban. The resulting conflict culminated in the 13th Dalai Lama retreating to British
territory in Darjeeling and the imperial court issuing a proclamation deposing the Dalai
Lama and directing that a new incarnation be found.
After the fall of the Qing dynasty, any remaining Manchu troops which had
not disbanded and signed an agreement to accept the jurisdiction of Lhasa, were
replaced with Han Chinese troops.  In 1912, the Manchu Amban in Lhasa was recalled
by the new republican government, and criticised for precipitating a crisis in Tibet.45
44 Lin.2002:496-497. Records show that the Republican government were genuinely concerned about the possibility that Burma
and Tibet would fall to Japanese hands. However, despite the alarmist overtones of these sentiments, they did not exist
continuously throughout the era. In this case, for example, the fears were connected to events in 1942.
45 Indeed, apart from the embarrassment caused by the Dalai Lama’s flight to British India, Chao’s forward policy had
destabilised Sichuan, bringing it close to bankruptcy. Smith 1998:174.
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However, President Yuan was not intent on withdrawing the remaining troops, and a
garrison remained under General Zhong Yin, who was assumed by Yuan to retain the
rights afforded to the Imperial Chinese Resident in Lhasa. However, by August 1912,
Yuan was forced to accept terms of surrender and  the expulsion of remaining Manchu
and Han troops in Tibet, this being formalised in the ‘Three Point Agreement’
mediated by the Government of Nepal. Despite this, Yuan issued orders to General
Zhong to delay departure, and it was not until the Tibetan Government employed
further force that a new truce and terms of surrender was reached in December 1912.
After the final retreat of all foreign troops, the 13th Dalai Lama issued a proclamation
reaffirming his position as spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet.
Chinese Nationalism as a political ideology was committed to modern secular
mechanisms of law and governance, and as such the Tibetan legislature was explicit in
its rejection of the republic’s model. This was a position consistently asserted by Tibet.
For example, the 13th Dalai Lama’s declaration of independence in 1913 announced
that China had abrogated the cho-yon alliance. Key to this was that China had sought a
subordination of the ‘priest’ to the ‘patron,’ thus subverting the equality and
reciprocity inherent in the relationship. The fact that the cho-yon operated as an
international expression of cho-sid-nyi underscores the supreme importance of such an
act (Van Walt Van Praag 1987:316, Smith 1998:182). This position was reaffirmed in
1934, when a Chinese mission was admitted to Tibet following the death of the Dalai
Lama. Here, attempts to negotiate a resettlement of the Simla Treaty (1914) failed in
light of continued efforts by the Chinese delegate to effect Tibet’s participation in the
‘Republic of five races.’ The Tibetan legislature was explicit in its refusal, issuing a
statement that ‘Tibet could not co-operate completely with other countries, and could
not join the Republic of five races, which was contradictory to Tibetan dual religious-
political system.’46 Given the republic’s commitment to secular reform, the
irreconcilability of the parties at this conference is unsurprising.
In the words of Perdue, ‘Nation states have to be built from the bottom up, on
pseudo-democratic principles of popular will, not from the top down, on pseudo-sacral
religious claims to divine mandates’ (Perdue.2001:286). Inasmuch as the supremacy of
46 Song (1995:907), using official government records of the Republic of China.
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secular law was an anathema to the Tibetan system, so too in the Chinese republic, was
the notion that the president should offer spiritual submission to the leader of Tibet. As
detailed by Duara, the rise to dominance of scientism as the definitive philosophy
amongst Chinese intellectuals in the early twentieth century is a well charted
phenomena, referred to as the Chinese Enlightenment. The pre-eminence of positive
scientism in fields of social and physical sciences had such power that even the most
conservative wing of Chinese Nationalist thought became intent upon justifying its
ideology in terms of its scientificity (Duara 1991:73).
Against this backdrop, there was considerable hostility towards religious
activity. Between 1900 and 1930, various campaigns against rural religion were
launched. These Nationalist Party campaigns marked a departure from the traditional
Confucian suppression of ideological heterodoxy in that it involved a more absolute
distinction between the scientific and the primitive. Accordingly, various laws were
disseminated to bring about the rational advancement of the masses. The 1928
'Standards for Preserving and Abandoning Gods and Shrines' insisted that religious
authority was obsolete and that a superstitious nation would become 'the laughing
stock of the scientific world' (Duara 1991:108). This was further reinforced by a range
of laws promulgated between 1928 and 1930, such as the 'Procedure for the Abolition
of Occupations of Divination, Astrology, Physiognomy and Palmistry, Sorcery and
Geomancy' (1928), and 'Prohibition of Divinatory Medicines' (1929), 'Procedures for
Banning and Managing Superstitious Objects and Professions' (1930).
The Nationalist anti-religion drives were not anti-Buddhist, and the
implication here is not that, by extension, they became explicitly anti-Tibetan. For
example, within China, organised Buddhism participated in associational politics,
gaining influence in national politics over the course of the 1920’s. Indeed, the
National Buddhist Association petitioned the provincial government of Jiangsu, a
province significantly engaged in the anti-religion drives, to halt the reforms, and this
carried enough weight to secure a policy change at that level (Duara 1991:78).
However, this policy was not enforced at the local level, indicative it seems of the
manner in which the discourse of modernity was employed in the redistribution of
power at the village level.
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This is explainable by the critical requirement of the republic, first under
Yuan, and also after the Nationalists gained power, to develop mechanisms of revenue
extraction in order to finance their reforms. Popular religion, comprising local
associations connected to rural temples, was a convenient avenue of revenue,
dovetailing neatly with party propaganda regarding national development. One
example of this is in the appropriation of rural temples, which were transformed into
elementary schools and offices for local government. Significantly, this enabled the
state to attain property and other resources, yet failed to benefit peasants who could not
afford to spare children from daily work.47 In the face of these incentives, popular
resistance failed to weaken the party’s commitment to modernity, despite widespread
anti-party campaigns ‘led by priests, monks, and the ubiquitous liesben or ‘evil
gentry’’ (Duara 1991:78). Such attempts at resistance were put down as the
insignificant work of ‘a handful of ignorant and reactionary traditionalists’ (Duara
1991:79).
As underlined in this reaction to local resistance, the Nationalist crack down
on religion sought legitimacy from an articulation of the theoretical modernist
dichotomy between the rational, secular and scientific on the one hand and the
irrational, religious and superstitious on the other. The manifestation of this dichotomy
in law and policy in the nationalist era failed to achieve objective consistency, a fact
ironically subversive to the notion that positive scientism could render not only the
material world fully comprehensible, but also enable society to function according to
the dictates of rational science. However, the entrenchment of this ideological
distinction in actual power relations laid the foundations for later ideological
developments, whereby Maoism denounced all religion as not merely 'opium of the
people,' but as 'poison' (Miller 1990:223).
Yuan Shikai revised the traditional pantheon of state-sponsored gods with ‘a
careful selection of apotheosised heroes who could embody loyalty to the national
cause.’ Chiang Kai-shek endeavoured to strengthen national Chinese identity through
47 Duara.1991:75-76. It is instructive to compare this process with Mao’s account of the Nationalist anti-religion drives, which
was also his first recorded reference to the question of religion, in his report ‘An Investigation into the Peasant Movement in
Hunan’ (March 1927). Utilising the destruction of rural temples in accordance with his own ideological needs, he enthusiastically
praised the anti-religious activities, obscuring the intrusive role of the state in the process. ‘Everywhere religious authority totters
as the peasant movement develops. In many places the peasant association have taken over the temples of the gods as their offices.
Everywhere they advocate the appropriation of temple property in order to start peasant schools’ (Welch 1972:2).
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the restoration of Confucian moral values in his New Life movement, and both Sun
Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek were committed Christians. Nonetheless, Sun and
Chiang actively supported antireligious movements, and by the time the Nationalist
party took control of a unified China and initiated the era of ‘political tutelage’, Sun’s
founding ‘Three Principles’ were interpreted through the dictum that the masses were
to be ‘shown the path to rational progress...that religious authority is an obstacle to the
development of a people and social progress...and that a religious society is opposed to
a new society based on the Three People’s Principles’ (Duara 1991:78). This presents
starkly how the concept of a ‘Republic of the Five Races’ which encompassed self-
determining nationalities of Buddhist Mongolia, Buddhist Tibet and  Muslim Uighar,
remained fundamentally incommensurable with the modernist ideology around which
the Nationalists had constructed their vision of constitutional unity.
Sun Yatsen’s 1924 speech on Pan-Asianism reiterated a distinctly familiar
argument for Chinese cultural superiority:-
‘The differential attitude of Nepal toward Great Britain and toward
China is due to the difference between the Oriental and Occidental
civilization. China has degenerated during the last several hundred years, yet
Nepal still respects her as a superior State. Great Britain, on the other hand, is
a powerful country, but Nepal has been influenced by Chinese civilization,
which, in her eyes, is the true civilization, while that of Britain is nothing but
the rule of Might’ (Sun 1941:147).
This coincided with Sun’s development of the theme of China’s ‘sub-
colonial’ status, in which he argued that China was significantly poorer in
circumstance compared to colonies such as India or Korea because it was oppressed by
multiple powers, none of which bore responsibility to the Chinese people (Li
1964:800). As part of this theme, Sun explicitly attempted to separate modern Western
imperialism from traditional Chinese imperialism, arguing by virtue of Chinese
cultural superiority, ‘that imperial China, even at the pinnacle of its power, had never
impaired the independence of Korea, Burma, Annam, and Siam, all of which had been
part of the Chinese empire’ (Li 1964:800). Similarly, Chaing Kai-sheck asserted that
China had never seized territory (Sautman 1997:82).
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This idealistic vision of China’s historic civilising influence is significant in
that it depends upon an assertion of cultural superiority consonant to that found in
Western accounts of colonialism’s civilising mission. It also embodies the same
contradictions in the face of reality. Take, for example, the argument employed by the
Chinese delegate at the 9th Institute Pacific Relations Conference in 1945, regarding
the creation of a system of international trusteeship. The Chinese representative,
Shuhsi Hsu, opposed such a system on the grounds that it would endanger the Chinese
colonial system. In a memorandum submitted to his foreign ministry on 23 November
1944, he argued that ‘if the colonies of the Axis powers were placed under trusteeship,
it would not be long until all colonies were subject to the same status.’ Shuhsi went on
to explain that ‘some may think that we [China] do not have colonies to bother with.’
Those people ‘merely deceive themselves. The Mongols and the Tibetans in the
Chinese Republic do not participate in the government like the Chinese. Nor do
Mongolia and Tibet enjoy ‘sovereign equality’ with China.’ He reasoned that ‘under
the circumstances what other than colonies could we regard the two borderland
communities?’ Thus, trusteeship would compromise China’s traditional interests in
Tibet and Mongolia and threaten its potential interests in areas of the South Sea
intended for trusteeship status’ (Wiggins 2000:68).
This is a remarkable statement, given that the republic had neither legislative
nor military authority in Tibet at the time, a fact of which Hsu was not only aware, but
must have been equally assured that the other participants at the conference were
likewise cognisant. His argument betrays much of the contradictions of Nationalist
policy, on the one hand being a statement of China’s sovereign status and an assertion
of theoretical power, on the other hand making clear the weakness of China’s claim. It
also highlights something of the attitude with which Nationalist China came to view
the peoples of its border lands, the traditional tributary ideology finding continuity in
modern conceptions of advanced, backward and dependent peoples.48 The continuity
of inequality, mediated in contemporary domestic Chinese law through the framework
of minority rights and regional autonomy, will be explored further in Chapters 7 and 8.
48 In the contemporary People’s Republic of China, many Chinese intellectuals continue to rate the main ethnic groups of the
nation in descending order from Han to Tibetan. Furthermore, the enduring effect of tributary ideology can be adduced from more
recent events. In 1994, China and South Korea publicised plans to produce Asia’s first locally built airliner. By 1996, the project
had foundered due to irreconcilable difference between the parties. Commentators attributed this in part the Chinese view of
Korean inferiority, ‘who they thought about in terms of the former subordination of Korea to China as a tributary state’ (Sautman
1997:87).
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The point of concern here is to elucidate how the incorporation of modernist values
into the mechanisms of actual state power in the Republic of China established a stable
position of sovereign equality, converging with international developments regarding
power, modernity and development.
The Nationalist state’s attempt to define in law the appropriate objects of
religious worship in the modern state presumed that such a distinction could be made
scientifically and rationally. It reflects, also, the modern ethos of humanitarianism and
the onus on development found in international legal institutions from the League’s
Mandate System onwards. Hence the laws and regulations circulated by the
Nationalists also sought to engage with the notion of freedom of religion, this
achieving a formal guarantee under Article 6 of the Provisional Constitution of 1912,
and Article 13 of the Constitution of 1946. Meanwhile, the campaign to abolish objects
of superstition, expressed in the language of rationality, science and progress,
presented the distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘superstition’ as part of a universal
standard that was both ordinary and natural. This classificatory strategy, by
demarcating religion from superstition, ‘revealed the play of political considerations in
its effect to disenchant the world and give it to us as it is’ (Duara 1991:109).
The decisive alteration in the distribution of power, and the significant
increase in the administrative penetration of the state into village life, as illustrated by
the campaigns against popular religion, is a feature of modernisation found at the
national and international level. It brought a disparate section of society, not easily
assimilated by modern institutions, under legitimate control. It is the linkage of this
modernisation process, a process carried out within a framework of power relations
(locally, individuals pursuing advancement; internationally, states seeking commercial
and diplomatic advantage), with the progress of the Nation State that is critical in the
consideration of Tibet’s changing position in regard to both international law and
China. Whilst change may have been inevitable, it is important to examine exactly
what part of the modernisation process concerned technological development, and
what part of the progression was the circulation of an organising discourse, which
regulated the dissemination of knowledge. It may be considered that the theory
preceded the application, inasmuch as science gave birth to the technological progress
that marks out the Modern age, and that theoretical considerations are subordinate to
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pressing practical considerations regarding the functionality of modern institutions.
However, even within the parameters of empirical science, the assumption that
scientific theory is capable of producing an ultimate, and final, theory of everything is
a moot point, presenting a space in which the commitment to modernity is revealed as
faith.
This space also exposes the subjectivity of law, revealing:-
‘the slippage from the epistemic to the ontological’ that ‘allows the
law and its artefactual forms, doctrines, principles, policies, and so on, to be
treated as objects in their own right. It is this slippage that enables legal
thinkers to treat the law as an authoritative source that exists independently of
the beliefs of the legal (or the wider) community’ (Schlag.1997:440).
It is in this context that the dissolution of explicit nineteenth century
sovereign inequality needs to be placed, for whilst it became seen by twentieth century
jurists as an embarrassing artefact of autocracy, linked to the failures that created the
First World War, the new institutions of international law, in their commitment to
modernity, retained the demarcation that rendered alternative ways of being always
less than and ever in the process of becoming.49 Despite the spirit of self-determination
that prevailed after the First World War, the overriding concerns for stability between
the great Powers ensured that the inequalities encapsulated in the standard of
civilisation still held sway. Whilst the year of the Washington Conference also
witnessed Rui Barbossa, the Brazilian Republican, succeed in becoming a judge at the
Permanent Court of International Justice, his arguments for strong sovereign equality
at the Hague Conference of 1907 had widely been perceived as the obstacle preventing
the court’s earlier establishment. The Hague’s shift towards a more inclusive
international order, which admitted the South American states, China, Siam and Japan
had not translated into legislative quality. Thus, whilst formal sovereign equality had
been granted to China at the Hague, the league’s attempt to balance the two principles
of collective security and self-determination ensured that legalised hegemony was
49 With regard to the post First World shift, Oppenheim, for example, modified his approach after the war, stating ‘the progress of
international law is intimately connected with the victory everywhere of constitutional government over autocratic government or
democracy over autocracy.’ Kingsley.1998:608.
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retained in such mechanisms as the de facto veto power of the Great Powers and
special representation for the Allies (Simpson 2004:158).
As argued by Rajagopal, the central structural mechanism of the Mandate
system, as it was  formulated under the league, was the institutionalisation of the
science of ‘finding the facts,’ this being derivative of Article 22’s principle of aiding
‘peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world’ (Rajagopal 2003:53). This marked a significant shift from the type of
specific data collection undertaken in the colonies by the Powers in the process of
governance, for it involved a systematic comparative study of conditions which made
it the precursor to modern development models, ‘native well-being’ becoming
‘professionalised and institutionalised during the inter-war years’ (Rajagopal.2003:60).
In a process which draws parallels with the Republic of China’s appropriation of local
resources through the intervention of modern institutions and annexation of local
religious associations, this was a process which shifted the ‘moral burden’ of
administration to a technocratic, faceless bureaucracy’ (Rajagopal.2003:52).
In Europe, from the late nineteenth century, disillusionment with the ethos of
colonialism and the progressive evolution of the civilised had been growing amongst
jurists, as expressed in Catellini’s pessimistic evaluation of 1901:-
‘If the international society must in the immediate future live and
develop in accordance with the law of the struggle for life and the survival of
the fittest, I myself wish that my country will not remain on the side of the
weak and the incapable, destined for submission and disappearance’
(Koskenniemi 2002:99).
The league’s mandate system thus consolidated the transformation of
colonialism into mechanisms of humanitarian development, reconciling what had
become the inescapable disenchantment with positivist law following the Great War,
with the interests of the Powers to maintain economic influence in the mandates. In the
words of Anghie, ‘the League attempted to render these territories completely
transparent and visible to international scrutiny and management’ (Anghie 2006:453).
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One of the functions of this intensive project to develop a ‘science of
administration’ involving the collection, interpretation and assessment of facts, was
that ‘the nation-state that the mandate system was striving to create was understood,
not merely as a juridical status, but as a massive complex of standards and regulations,
which represented the sociological, economic and political criteria that a territory had
to satisfy in order to become a functioning, independent nation-state (Anghie
2006:453-454). Rather than effecting the end of nineteenth century demarcation
between the civilised and un-civilised, this became a process in which the Permanent
Mandates Commission, in its survey of the internal situation of mandates and its
development of a ‘new technology of standards,’ was able to ‘apply the categories of
advanced and backward to every aspect of the social life of the mandate territory, this
with the purpose of transforming the backward into the advanced’ (Anghie.2006:454).
In this context, the survival of local communities, as with rural popular religion in
Nationalist China, became related to an overarching concern with economic capacity.
In a stark parallel with nineteenth century positivist concerns with the legal capacity
(or incapacity) of the uncivilised, one of the members of the PMC argued against a
policy designed to preserve particular communities within mandate territory on the
grounds that the economically unfit were better governed by more progressive
societies, the ideal being the ‘slow, unforced assimilation of weak or inferior
communities by strong or more highly developed communities’ (Anghie 2006:454).
As observed by Rajagopal, this notion of the well-being and development of the
natives as expressed by the mandate system involved the adoption of ‘a humanitarian
hue that had existed until then only at the periphery. This converted humanitarianism
‘from a principle of domination and resistance’ in the context of colonial expansion,
‘to one of governance’ in the era of decolonisation’ (Rajagopal 2003:56).
In this regard, what were initially principles of law became transformed into
administrative programmes of action, as noted in the International Status of South
West Africa Case where the International Court of Justice affirmed that the mandate
‘was created, in the interests of the inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in
general, as an international institution with an international object – a sacred trust of
civilisation’ (Rajagopal 2003:56). This concept was similarly highlighted from the
opposite side in the dissenting opinion of Alvarez in the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ,
which stated ‘because of these characteristics, the new international law is not of an
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exclusively juridical character. It has also political, economic, social and psychological
characteristics’ (Rajagopal 2003:62). It is these characteristics, expressed in the fact-
finding activities of the Mandate Commission and its derivative assessments of
standards, that Rajagopal argues are the ‘self-generative and self-deterministic aspect
of the PMC’s work, enabling it to determine its own field of reality,’ and that this has
come to be, ‘a standard aspect of international institutions in general. In part this is due
to the fact that these institutions are creatures of law and law in general displays a
heuristic tendency whereby it needs to establish its own field of autonomy only by
simplifying and excluding much of actual reality’ (Rajagopal 2003:65).
At question is the universality and neutrality of law, ‘the deeper discursive
mechanisms of power that present the contingent and partial as commonsensical and
normal’ (Duara.1991:81). Here it is not ‘mechanisms of power’ in the sense of any
abstract, external force of power that is masked, but the local, historically based agents
of power; individuals. Power is not an autonomous social force any more than
‘Rationality’, or ‘Law,’ because it cannot exist beyond the agency of its human actors.
The discourse of modernity was required to produce a revisionist history that gave
credence to its claims, and this was reinforced, and enforced, by new legal structures
which gave formal utterance to its universalistic pretensions.  The discourse of
modernity was an enabling strategy for a Nationalist party espousing the sovereign
equality of China, but it was also a limiting and contradictory one. It produced
positions ‘which do not merely refuse to recognise their own origins and limits; they
are unable to do so (Chaterjee.1998:11).
The replacement of the myth of the universal (Manchu) empire with a myth of
nationalist modernity problematises China’s relations with its ethnic minorities. It
creates a paradoxical dependency, derived from the gap between the state as modern
and the nation as ever existing. With the rapid expansion of the state into all areas of
civil society, the burden on the state to legitimate its intervention increased. In this, the
new legitimating myth of the nation arguably became a much more totalising myth
than that of the universal empire. This is partly because the institutional mechanisms
involved had achieved greater reach, partly because the discursive mechanisms
employed were reinforced by international interests.
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Traditional cultures, as representatives of pre-modern modes of being, are at
once testament to the nation’s progress and the foundations of its legitimate spatial
existence. In Republican China, the pursuit of the nation therefore radically altered the
centre’s relation to its frontiers. The struggle for cultural freedom that the revolution
represented was incommensurable with the necessity of projecting a unified national
identity within the context of the state. In part, this can be seen as an outgrowth of the
inability of totalising terms such as ‘nation’ and ‘state’ to capture the complex
interaction of individuals and groups struggling for power in the post Manchu era.
In recent years, historians such as Edmund Fung have set out to provide an
analytical framework that takes account of the complex interaction and linkages
between internal political and external international issues (Fung 1987). This is part of
a wider attempt to argue that the previously dominant ‘response to the West’
methodology, by detracting from the agency of local society, is inadequate for
understanding the complex social and political changes in China.  However, arguably
the ‘response to the West’ approach to the history of Manchu China was ironically
central to the Nationalist project, providing a counterpoint against which to
demonstrate China’s sovereignty and a basis around which to consolidate national
identity. The massive, wholesale importation of Western legal and political systems in
this era radically altered the manner in which contradictory beliefs were mediated, as
evidenced by the changing emphasis from the Qing drive against heterodoxy and to the
Nationalist drive against superstition. By invariably placing China’s modern national
identity on the international stage, there was also a resulting legal formalisation of
China’s geo-political relations. This articulation of China’s regional relations was
much more totalising than ever witnessed under the Manchus.
Part of the difficulty of Nationalism is that it is not limited to the
determination of territorial boundaries. It is also engaged in and dependent upon the
task of defining a certain ‘cognitive boundary of culture’ (Chatterjee 1998:13).  This
leads inevitably to the dilemma that ‘if the thought system of a culture is indeed
incommensurably different from those of others, we would not even have the
background of consensus necessary to recognise the difference’
(Chatterjee.1998:13).The debate on cultural relativism is relevant to consideration of
both law and nationalism. Nationalism sought to both assert difference and equalise it,
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and its principle means of doing this was through the appropriation of the discourses of
power that were operational with the wider international context, or if you will, the
overarching discourse of modernity.
In a 1905 essay, Sun writes:-
‘I consider the evolution of Europe and America was based on three
leading principles, namely nationalism, democracy, and socialism or people’s
livelihood. The fall of the Roman Empire gave rise to nationalism and
independence in various nations of Europe. When these various nations
became monarchies, with despotism and intolerable distress inflicted upon the
people under their jurisdictions, the principle of democracy was
aroused…..The more the world progressed, the more did human wisdom.
When, out of the experience of a thousand years, material inventions were
made during the last hundred years, economic problems succeeded the
political problems and thus socialism or people’s livelihood emerged; the
twentieth century may be considered the era of socialism’ (Li 1964: 204).
In this sweeping summary of the history of the Occident, Sun creates a
curious parallel to Western ‘Orientalism,’ idealising the political culture of the West.
To recall Dirlik’s argument that orientalist constructions were employed by Chinese
(particularly the Chinese diaspora) as part of an assertion of pan-Asian identity,
‘metonymic reductionism has been apparent in the identification of China among
liberals and conservatives with Confucianism, despotism, bureaucratism, familism, or
even with particular racial characteristics, all of them traceable to oriental
representations, or to unchanging ‘feudal’ or Asiatic society in a Marxist version of
orientalism. What was common to all was a rewriting of Chinese history with images,
concepts, and standards drawn from a contemporary consciousness of which ‘Western’
ideas, including the imaginative geography of orientalism were an integral component.
This consciousness was formed now not just by the circulation of Euro-Americans in
China as in the case of the Jesuits, but by the circulation of Chinese abroad’ (Dirlik
1996:107). This is, then, an example of what Chatterjee was referring to when to when
he identified ‘an inherent contradictoriness in nationalist thinking, because it reasons
within a framework of knowledge whose representational structure corresponds to the
very structure of power nationalist thought seeks to repudiate’ (Chatterjee.1998:9)
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It is a central argument of this thesis that the Chinese Republic’s self-
conscious move towards modernity was rendered less paradoxical than its Tibetan
equivalent. Chatterjee argues that nationalism reverses the dichotomy of orientalism,
but fails to remove its contradictions. It is this that renders modern nationalism doubly
problematic for Tibet, for if ‘Nationalist thought, in agreeing to become ‘modern’,
accepts the claim to universality of this ‘modern’ framework of knowledge,’ the
rationality of traditional Tibetan institutions becomes displaced by the appropriation of
the definition of the ‘rational’ in modern thought (Chatterjee 1998:11). For if ‘The
dominant system of values has been declared value-free; it then follows that all others
suffer from bias and can be thoughtlessly dismissed’ (Kairys 1982:6). This raises ‘the
possibility that it is not just military might or industrial strength, but thought itself,
which can dominate and subjugate’ (Chatterjee.1998:11).
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Chapter Six
6:1 Introduction
To recap on the themes of the previous two chapters, the changing position
that Tibet occupied in relation to China reflects a dynamic integral to the colonial
encounter: the inevitable assimilation of the non-western world into the European legal
order. China’s incorporation into the family of nations is now a classic example of this
process, marking Chinese resistance and affirming the ‘universality’ of Western legal
standards. The history of China’s encounter and engagement with international law is
central to an understanding of the history of international law generally. It is a history
that is both an affirmation and a denial of the evolution of international law and its
claim to universality in that, despite political difference and theoretical and doctrinal
challenges by Chinese jurists, China took its seat at the Security Council. In so doing, a
counter narrative of laws progress is revealed, in which the legacy of the colonial
encounter becomes discernible in a continuing debate over universal values and
cultural relativity, and within that the memory of the standard of civilisation which
marked the contradictory beginnings of twentieth century inclusion and universality.
This snapshot of international legal history, be it presented as an affirmation or a
denial of modern liberalist progress, is now a significant feature of the discourse of
international law. As such, it allows for a new approach to the issue of Tibet’s status
by widening the frame beyond consideration of the substantive legality of Chinese
sovereignty over Tibet towards a consideration of how that sovereignty has been
constructed and altered by the intersection of imperialism, modernity and Chinese
nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The previous two chapters
of this thesis were concerned in part with a broad response to these issues, and the
changing status of Tibet can be seen as an addition to this field of international legal
research. This is, however, only one aspect of the history of Tibet in international law.
This chapter considers the space left for independent Tibetan national identity
in a rapidly modernising society of postcolonial states. The boundaries of this space
are conceptually and legally marked by the two most significant legal instruments
concerning Tibet’s status in the twentieth century: The Simla Convention (1914) and
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The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of
Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (1951), also known as the
Seventeen Point Agreement. The Simla Convention, the last treaty between Britain and
Tibet, looks backwards to an era of imperial expansion in which legalised hierarchy
allowed sovereign equality to be enjoyed by only the most civilised of nations. The
Seventeen Point Agreement, meanwhile, looks forwards to a time of legalised equality
in which culture became ostensibly protected insofar as it operates behind the scenes
of the modern social and economic administration of state-led development. The fact
that it was the Seventeen Point Agreement, with its provisions for PRC sponsored
development of education, agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce in
Tibet, that marked the end of Tibet’s independent existence, rather than the Simla
Convention, raises some uncertainty about what the measure for equality is; for the
boundaries drawn around Tibet’s status in 1914, despite disavowing equality, did
affirm legal personality.
It is not, therefore, adequate to view the incorporation of Tibet into the PRC
as a final fruition of seeds of incoherency and inequality sown in the final years of the
British Empire. Certainly the evaluation of imperialism is key: it marks the dividing
line between the PRC’s claim that Western imperialism created the myth of Tibetan
independence by undermining Chinese sovereignty, and the Tibetan Government-in-
Exile’s claim that Tibet was always independent and that Tibet’s interaction with the
British Empire confirms this fact. Yet, to write Tibet back into a history of the
discipline of international law is not an endeavour that begins and ends with a
reappraisal of nineteenth century exceptionalism, or with an assessment of the impact
of Western imperialism on the non-western world. Certainly these represent aspects
integral to an understanding of Tibet’s status, but the event that was the colonial-
encounter does not explain the ongoing absence of consideration of Tibet’s status in
international legal discourse. This exclusion may have its roots in the great game of the
British Raj, and Britain’s commercial interests in China, but whilst imperialism
changed Tibet’s significance on the map, it was the end of empire that saw its erasure.
This erasure is a very twentieth century phenomenon, emerging at the very moment in
which colonial became postcolonial. Whilst Curzon’s cynical direction of
Younghusband’s invasion of Lhasa may prompt the 1904 Lhasa Treaty to be viewed as
an example of imperialism’s endeavour to secure legitimacy in positive law, that Tibet
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was a pawn on the ‘imperial chessboard’50 does not explain why in the last one
hundred years only twenty-seven articles have been published in international law
journals in which Tibet is the primary subject –with one of these being extracted from
this thesis (Kellam 2003).51
The PRC’s occupation of Tibet can be, and indeed is in official PRC
literature, viewed as a restoration of a balance disrupted by Western imperialism: ‘The
myth of ‘Tibetan independence,’ which evolved during the late nineteenth century is
actually the product of the imperialist invasion of China, with the British invaders in
Tibet as the chief architects’ (Wang and Nyima 1997:80). Yet, even if this were so, the
exclusion of Tibet from legal discourse is suggestive of more than a pragmatic
acceptance of political circumstance. It indicates a theoretical dynamic at the level of
discourse which sustains this absence and creates for itself margins of exclusion. The
question is what significance does this have, not simply for the understanding of
colonialism and international law, but the construction of the understanding of
colonialism and international law in relation to the experience of what it is to be
postcolonial and postmodern. If indeed Western modernity appears as a sudden self-
consciousness regarding the narrativisation of social ethics and a heightened sensitivity
to modernity’s perpetual reconstruction of the subject, and the present to which it
belongs in order to maintain value in the absence of actual objective status, then
possibly the exclusion of Tibet from legal discourse reveals something of the limits of
the ‘post’ in postcolonial (Bhaba 1991:197). With this in mind, this chapter is not
concerned with locating and giving voice to a subaltern Tibetan national-state identity;
the aim is to explore the space left for an evaluation of Tibet’s status within
international legal discourse and the mechanism of how subalternity is produced.
As discussed in Chapter three, the Anglo-Tibetan Lhasa Convention of 1904
was the culmination of the great game competition in the Himalayas. The result was
increased anxiety about Tibet’s status, its lack of substantive commercial and military
power ironically only increasing the perceived threat it represented as a potential tool
in the hands of imperial powers. The resolution of the threat from British, Russian and
Chinese perspectives involved not simply the prevention of a great power takeover of
50 The phrase derives from the title of Premen Addy’s study of Tibet and the British Raj (Addy 1984).
51 This figure is based upon searches of the HeinOnline databases for  articles with ‘Tibet’ or ‘Tibetan’ in the title.
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Tibet, but, necessarily, the neutralisation of Tibet’s ability to act independently. The
British-led definition of Tibet as a vassal of China was a policy designed to achieve
this, and had the profitable benefit of not irrevocably upsetting the balance of British
commercial interests in China.
A number of studies have examined the formation of these policies and their
effects on Tibet, and have emphasised the rather arbitrary way in which great power
politics have impacted upon Tibet’s legal status. The manner in which Tibet was used
as a pawn is key to understanding the ‘Tibet question,’ and the controversy with which
Tibet’s claim to independence was met. One of the difficulties in approaching the issue
of Tibet’s status within this context, however, is that the objectification of Tibet as a
pawn reinforces notions of Tibet’s passivity. Whilst it is undoubtedly the case that
Tibet’s status was largely imposed from without, the very discussion of such an
encounter that takes as its starting point the subjugating force of imperialism is in
danger of replicating the imperial imperative of neutralising Tibetan agency. Indeed,
there is a more general argument to be made that the presentation of Orientalism as an
all consuming hegemonic discourse fails to consider alternative local discourses, and
thus masks subaltern agency. A similar dynamic is evident in the discourse of modern
nationalism, as deconstructed by Chatterjee (1998) and Bhaba (1991), for example.
One of the factors hindering the representation of Tibetan agency is that it raises
contradictions within both imperialist and nationalist discourse. The Tibetan refusal to
embrace secular modernity marked Tibetan social theory as incompatible with both
imperialist standards of civilisation and the nationalist ideology that arose in resistance
to this. This reveals a contradictory space, between colonial and postcolonial, in which
Tibetan social theory has struggled to find meaningful representation. Few studies
have arisen to explore this gap: as Tsering Shakya has observed:-
‘in the field of Tibetan or Buddhist studies, where much of the
narrative relating to Tibet is enunciated, questions drawn from critical studies
on the postcolonial discourse have never been raised. Tibetan studies still
continues along the lines of an orientalist descriptive mode’ (Shakya
2001:183).
As argued in Chapter two, implicated in this is the absence of studies on Tibetan social
and legal theory.
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6:2 Tibetan Modernisation
A significant obstacle to the creation of a viable Tibetan national state in the
modern world was the fact that Tibet’s governing institutions “were not based upon
military force as a principle” (Norbu 1985: 176).  Amongst Buddhist countries, Tibet
was unique in this regard, for the sangha were not politically subservient to a
sovereign ruler, as was the case in Burma and Thailand, for example. Thus, despite the
confrontation between Western secular law and Buddhist law that occurred as a result
of colonial encounters elsewhere in Asia, the context of this confrontation was
significantly different in Tibet. The framework and institutions for a separate secular
society did not exist. The absence of any meaningful standing army was a result of
this, being contrary to the Buddhist principle of non-violence. A primary contradiction
inherent in maintaining what Dawa Norbu terms a ‘non-coercive regime’ (Norbu
1985) was that coherent and continuous territorial existence became reliant upon
external powers for military support. In Tibet this was fulfilled in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries by both Nepal and China.
In 1911, the Government of Lhasa expelled all Manchu troops that did not
agree to become naturalised and declared independence. In lieu of a suitable foreign
guarantor, the British declining to formally declare Tibet a protectorate despite Tibetan
requests, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama initiated a series of modernising reforms. These
included the establishment of a standing army equipped and trained according to
modern methods of warfare, and the establishment of a police force. In his mission to
strengthen Tibet, he had implemented significant reforms to the domestic legal system
in the years before the British incursion of 1904 and sought to develop Tibet’s
diplomatic relations.52
The advent of the new Tibetan Army and police force was highly
controversial in Tibet, splitting the establishment between a modernising faction in
favour of reform and a conservative element hostile to institutional change. The
52 An instructive analysis of this period can be gained from the work of Goldstein (1989), Dhondup (1986), McKay (1997) and
Deki and Rhodes (2003).
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modernisers were represented largely by estate holding laymen such as Tsarong Shape
and the conservatives by the great monasteries, which saw modernisation as a threat.
The conflict was by no means a clear cut struggle over the division of secular and
religious power. Multiple factions with various conflicting and intersecting demands
debated the appropriate role that modernisation could or should occupy in Tibet. A
significant feature uniting the various groups was a commitment to maintaining an
independent Tibet. The most controversial figures, such as Tsarong, commander-in-
chief of the army, cabinet minister and head of the Tibetan mint and armoury, tended
to be those who embraced aspects of British culture such as dress, sweet tea drinking,
shaking hands and playing tennis and polo (Goldstein 1989:89). Such figures remained
elitist and, whilst represented as exemplary in British records, their overt secularism
certainly outraged abbots. However, it was the intersection of modernisation and
foreign influence that was critical, made explicit, for example, in Tsarong’s policy of
dressing the Tibetan Army in British uniform.53 Ultimately, with limited military
means, Tibet’s lack of national defence left it vulnerable to attack, created dependence
that constrained its international personality and also became a political issue that
hindered internal national unity.
With regard to international law, the existence of a standing national army is
not a requirement for statehood in the jural sense, this principle being confirmed as
customary law in the Montevideo conference. However, the standard of civilisation
had established a normative framework which placed emphasis upon the existence of a
modern, state sponsored military force, this being linked to both the principle of
protection of life and property for foreigners within states, and principles of civilised
warfare between states. The lack of capacity for self-defence was a signifier of a state
of ‘backwardness.’ This awarded a certain epistemic privilege to the aggressor
comparatively in possession of such a capacity. Westlake expressed this view, citing
capacity for self-defence as an objective test of political organisation, and in the 1930’s
Italy argued for the legitimacy of its actions in Abyssinia on similar grounds (Gong
1984:17). On a more substantive level, the development of international legal rules and
obligations has rested significantly upon the existence of military engagement between
states. Thus, the existence of the prima facie capacity of the Tibetan Government to
53 For British perspectives, see Bell’s (Political Officer to Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet 1908-1918 and 1919-1920) autobiographical
account of the period (Bell 1992.)
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enter into treaties is only one aspect of the issue of Tibet’s legal personality. The
evidence shows that internally Tibet possessed the requirements of statehood. The
significance is that it did little to engage or utilise its institutions externally. Japan’s
entry into the civilised family of nations was linked to its military victories over Russia
and China. Similarly, China’s inclusion was marked by its appearance at the Hague
Conference in 1907. This leads to the ironical observation that, for Tibet, the state
sponsored pursuit of peace excluded it from involvement in the development of
international legal instruments concerning peace. Meanwhile the most championed
articles and institutions of international law from The Hague through to the U.N.
Charter were ostensibly concerned with creating and maintaining peace, the principle
of which had been institutionalised by the Tibetan state, following demilitarisation,
three hundred years previously.54 International law’s preoccupation with violence can
be presented as a valiant endeavour to create and maintain order, but this fails to shake
off the implications of Weber’s definition of the modern state as the “ultimate
monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a given territory” (Weber 1919:73).
This dynamic was one obstacle that Tibet faced in the creation of a strong
identity as a nation-state. The Tibetan political scientist Norbu concluded that under
the Dalai Lamas “Tibet had ceased to be a state in the Weberian sense” (Norbu
1985:191). A second interrelated obstacle was the decentralised nature of the Tibetan
polity, which is for Geoffery Samuel a ‘stateless society.’ However, the existence of
autonomous zones that looked towards Lhasa, but at times acted independently from
Lhasa, such as Tashi Lumpo under the Panchen Lama, for example, is not
contradictory to either a Lockean or jural definition of statehood. The three regional
provinces of Tibet were, after all, administered and legislated according to a codified
system of law that spanned a vast territory, delimited by internationally recognised
borders.55
Aside from Tibetan non-involvement in international institutions governing warfare,
there was only negligible international commercial engagement. Salt, tea, wool and
54 How successful Tibet was in maintaining this position is, of course, open to debate. See the discussion of the Nepal-Tibet wars
in Chapter 2.
55 See, generally, French.1995. Ethnographic Tibet did, however, extend beyond these borders, something which creates some
confusion over the territorial definition of Amdo and Khams. Goldstein provides a useful introduction to the debate this has caused
in Goldstein and Epstein (eds.) 1998:4-5.
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horses all figured prominently in traditional Tibetan trade relations, the supply of each
at times being of great significance to its external affairs. The tea market, for example,
was what attracted the East India Company to pursue the association, owing to the fact
that the company’s research suggested that Tibet had the highest per capita tea
consumption in the world, ‘Australia not excepted’ (Norbu 1990:41). However, by the
time Tibet declared independence and began to pursue external links through
diplomatic missions, Tibet had already been dismissed as a ‘worthless piece of
territory’ in official British documents as far as trade was concerned (Norbu 1990:43).
Beyond that, Tibet did not possess a banking system that may have facilitated a flow of
foreign finance comparable to the profitable array of loans made by the powers to
China. In this context, it is of little surprise that when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama
requested, between 1909 and 1911, that Britain declare Tibet a British protectorate, the
offer was refused, a decision made all the more inevitable given that what Tibet
lacked, China possessed in abundance, to Britain’s profit (Winston 1916).
This lack of economic value is reflected in later U.S. policy when Tibet sought
admission to the U.N. as a precursor to gaining support for a military defence against
the People’s Liberation Army of China in 1949. The U.S. evaluated the case of Tibet’s
proposal on the basis of Tibet’s stable government being a defence against the spread
of communism in Asia on the one hand, and its strategic value to the U.S. on the other,
in both economic and military terms. The arguments against granting Tibet recognition
were deemed to carry the most weight:-
‘As a political matter, Tibet’s importance both ideologically and
strategically is very limited. Because of its geographical remoteness, the
primitive character of its Government and society and the limited character of
its contacts with the outside world, Tibet’s orientation toward the West cannot
be counted upon to endure on an ideological basis unless supported by far-
reaching practical measures. If we cannot take these practical measures,
recognition in itself would not hold Tibet in alignment with the West and
might in fact work against our long-run interests. Similarly, efforts to utilize
Tibet strategically, for example as an air base or for the discharge of rockets,
would encounter not merely formidable difficulties of terrain and weather but
also Tibet’s objections on religious grounds to the passage of planes over its
territory. Unless rare minerals are found in Tibet, the Army does not regard
Tibet as of strategical significance’ (U.S. Department of State 1949:1066).
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This example is in keeping with much of the diplomatic discourse between
the Powers concerning Tibet’s status. It is significant for its treatment of the Tibetan
issue as a matter of expediency, the status of Tibet being evaluated according to its
impact upon other actors rather than as an inherent quality. The internal location of
identity, and the presence of legal rights and capacity, is of little relevance, a dynamic
entirely in keeping with nineteenth century notions of civilisation, in which legal
capacity is something extended or bestowed. This is a dynamic that finds expression in
the fact that a traditional Tibet, demilitarised and unindustrialised, was of little value in
the context of great power relations, and was even a liability. It is noteworthy that in
U.S. State Department records, China’s role in Tibet was described as both de facto
sovereignty and de jure suzerainty, even within the same documents (U.S. Department
of State 1949:1065). The interchangeable use of the terms sovereignty and suzerainty
reflects a perception that placed Tibet’s status on the periphery.
Dawa Norbu argues that it is necessary to depart ‘from the conventional
sovereignty-suzerainty dichotomy, because it is essentially a superimposition of
Western legal conceptions on a non-western phenomenon’ (Norbu 1985:193). There is
much truth in this conclusion, but on the other hand in a very real sense the
sovereignty-suzerainty dichotomy has always been peripheral to the considerations of
Tibet’s status. Whilst the terms appear central to Tibetan claims of independence, from
the point of view of the parties who were instrumental in circulating the terms, Britain,
Russia and U.S., the distinction was of only token importance. The treaties in which
the terms arose, either in the final document or in negotiations, all had purposes
connected to other, more primary interests such as trade or post-conflict resolution and
it is these factors which decided the ultimate status of Tibet as a nation-state. 56 This
raises very significant questions regarding Tibet’s refusal to modernise. The
implication of this refusal is that Tibet lacked a sense of national identity; that its
absence in the international arena was in some way connected to an internal absence of
national identity inherent to modernity itself.
56 Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet (1906), Convention between Great Britain and Russia (1907),
Agreement Between Great Britain, China and Tibet Amending Trade Regulations in Tibet of 1893 (1908), Simla Convention
(1914).
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To elaborate further, the demands of international legal identity presuppose
commercial and military engagements in the international arena, and in Western
political theory these are matters to be dealt with in the secular sphere. To simply
claim legal identity without these buttressing political forces essentially removes the
grounds on which the law is based, its raison d’etre being the mediation of power.
Whilst the Tibetan state maintained a discourse of power embedded within a
cosmological epistemology, internationally in the early twentieth century power was
rationalised primarily in terms of economic or military might. Even the liberationist
movements of nationalism and communism were committed to these principles as the
primary grounds of action, not simply for resistance, but for social reconstruction. The
implications of such a dynamic were highlighted by the British Consular Officer Eric
Teichman in 1919, when he concluded, regarding the failure of Tibet and China to
reach a lasting treaty agreement on their border, that Tibetan state existence was
dependent upon modernisation:
‘After a British representative has been installed at Lhasa, and the
country developed and thrown open to foreign enterprise, the danger of
Chinese aggression would be a thing of the past. We should never be called
upon to get whatever they required, and their economic resources developed
with our assistance would easily stand on their own legs and have nothing to
fear from China or anyone else’ (Lamb 1966:98).
Outwardly pragmatic, this is an approach that nonetheless implied the
development of an entirely different social value system.
Part of the difficulty of arguing for Tibetan agency is that the framing of the
discourse in modernist terms places the burden upon Tibetans to prove that they
engaged with modernity. Hence the claim that the significance of the Mongol-Tibetan
Treaty of 1913 is that ‘with Mongolia, Tibet initiated formal relations on a more
modern basis’ (Van Walt Van Praag 1987:137). Similarly, the legal events of the
Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 have been extricated from the historical event of
Younghusband’s invasion and represented as the grounds for a modern Tibetan foreign
policy: ‘the conclusion of a bilateral treaty between the British and Tibetan
governments constituted implicit recognition by Britain of Tibet as a State and a
subject of international law’ (Van Walt Van Praag 1987:131). Thus, it is the events
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that mark the encroachment of Tibetan identity that become, paradoxically, the
markers of its independence. This paradox leaves unresolved the encounter between
Western imperialism and the discourse of modernity, and also excludes from view the
fact that the Treaty of Urga was in itself not a modern development, as Tibet had
independently concluded treaties with its neighbours since 821/823 AD; what changed
was the context in which these relations occurred.57 A defence of traditional identity is
therefore constrained by the necessity that modernity must be embraced and
appropriated as the primary mechanism of that defence.
6:3 The Simla Convention
The Simla Convention of 1914 was prompted by the conflicting demands of
Tibet, British India, British commercial interests in China, and the Republic of China.
The Tibetan Government was a driving force behind the treaty negotiations, the
Thirteenth Dalai Lama seeking to clarify Tibet’s status and settle cross-border
hostilities between Eastern Tibet and China. As far as British interests went, the
Foreign Office had pursued talks with Russia in 1912, seeking a free hand for Britain
in Tibet in exchange for recognition of Russian rights in Mongolia (Bell 1992:148-
152). This intersected with the Dalai Lama’s negotiations with Britain to place Tibet
under formal British protection. However, as Russia demanded further concessions in
Afghanistan and Persia, and Tibet had little commercial value to Britain, no new
Anglo-Russian agreement was reached. Thus, the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty, the first
international agreement to define Tibet as under Chinese suzerainty, remained in force.
Following this failure, British officials believed a tripartite agreement with Tibet and
China to be an opportunity to expand their rights in Tibet without violating the 1907
agreement. As with the 1904 treaty, British interests were to secure the Indian frontier.
China’s interests were to check British influence in Tibet, particularly in light of
continued Russian activity in Mongolia. For the Yuan Government, the Tibetan issue
was politically volatile. The Sino-Russian Treaty over Mongolia in 1913 had provoked
57 The 821/823 treaty survived as an inscription on the west face of the stone pillar at Lhasa, (Richardson 1978). See also
IOR/L/P&S/10/343 for translations of the Tibetan and Chinese texts used in the Simla negotiations.
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a domestic crisis over perceived loss of sovereign rights, prompting Yuan to expel the
KMT from parliament. 58
Tibet’s goal of settling its border and balancing the competing powers was
further complicated by the fact that hostilities were spread across an array of intrastate
groups operating beyond the confines of the central government. The dissolution of the
Manchu Empire led to a roaming population of disbanded Manchu soldiers and
dispossessed Tibetan civilians, left behind in the wake of Chao Er-feng’s civilising
mission. Groups of hundreds of such people operated as bandits across the frontier
regions, hostile to any external authority. On the Chinese side of the frontier, Yuan
relied heavily upon the support of Northern warlords, and the situation in Sichuan was
volatile. On the Tibetan side, Eastern Tibet was held by various Tibetan groups that
answered to nomadic chieftains or sectarian Buddhist monasteries first and Lhasa
second.
The Tibetan claims, with which the negotiations were opened, were clear.
Beginning with an extensive discourse on the history of Tibetan-Manchu relations
which placed all ties firmly in the context of cho-yon, the Tibetan delegation argued
that the terms of cho-yon had been breached and that all reciprocal obligation on the
part of Tibet was henceforth terminated. Given that the sole basis of Tibet’s
obligations to China under the terms of the cho-yon was the provision of the spiritual
commodities of religious teachings and initiations, the termination of the alliance had
been implicitly acknowledged by the new Government of China when it ceased to
conduct such trade. The documentary evidence presented by the delegation traced cho-
yon to written agreements between the Sakya hierarch Phagspa and Kublai Khan
(McGranahan 2003:42-43). The later extension of the cho-yon alliance to Manchu
China was detailed at Simla by documentary evidence presented by Tibet such as the
edict of the Fifth Dalai Lama regarding Monpa (McGranahan 2003:42-43).59 The Fifth
Dalai Lama (1617 – 1682), being responsible for the reforms that established the
institutions of law and governance still in existence in 1914, was cited extensively in
58 Smith 1996:189, Goldstein 1989:Ch1, Bell 1992:Ch16. Bell, as Political Officer for Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, was intimately
involved in the Simla negotiations and its preceding events.
59 For a translation of the Monpa Edict, see Aris 1979.
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Tibetan evidence at Simla, the delegation possessing detailed records from that point
onwards regarding the Lhasa government’s administration of territory.
In the conclusion of his critique of ‘Nationalist Thought in the Colonial
World’ Chatterjee argues that despite success in challenging ‘such blatantly ethnic
slogans of dominance as the civilizing mission’… ‘Nowhere in the world has
nationalism qua nationalism challenged the legitimacy of the marriage between Reason
and capital.’ He continues, ‘the nation state now proceeds to find for the nation a place
in the global order of capital, while striving to keep the contradictions between capital
and the people in perpetual suspension’ (Chatterjee 1986:165). Such a dynamic is
discernible in the Republic of China’s opening statement at the Simla Conference:
‘What sacrifices China has made in money and lives for the sake of protecting
Tibetans and their territory,’ the delegation argued, placing the historical relations
between Tibet and China in the framework of a wider discourse in which the rationale
for state existence is allied to economic development. The assertion presents a very
different vision of sovereignty to that articulated in the Tibetan statement, which
claimed the sole purpose of the Manchu alliance with Tibet was for ‘the then
Government of China being to earn merit for this and for the next life’ (Smith
1996:190). The Republic of China asserted that owing to the material costs of the
alliance, there must, rationally, have been a territorial advantage to the Manchu Court
and an extension of sovereignty. The Tibetans, however, located the Manchu’s actions
within a cosmological framework in which advantages gained by the Manchus are
measured on a vastly expanded temporal scale, good action leading to good reward,
but not necessarily in this life, nor in strictly material terms. The initiation of hostilities
between the Qing and Tibet in 1908, in the context of the court’s loss of faith in
Buddhism, signalled the termination of this positive and reciprocal accumulation of
merit for both parties. ‘Tibet and China have never been under each other and will
never associate with each other in future. It is decided that Tibet is an independent
state and that the precious Protector, the Dalai Lama, is the ruler of Tibet in all
temporal as well as spiritual affairs’ (Van Walt Van Prag 1987:54).
If the framing language of the Chinese case was more compatible with the
wider discursive trends of modernity, then as far as empirical evidence was concerned
it was the Tibetan delegation which had the strongest position. A primary concern of
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the conference was to demarcate the entire Tibetan border, and the Tibetan
representative presented a corpus of original documents dating from the Seventeenth
century onwards in support of Tibetan claims to frontier territories. These included
details of various administrative matters such as tax, Tibetan government subsidies and
records of land tenure. In contrast, according to Sir McMahon, the British
plenipotentiary, the Chinese delegate ‘showed evident signs of panic,’ possessing no
such records in support of the republic’s counter claim (IOR/L/P&S/18/B206). Instead,
the Chinese representative claimed that his case rested upon ‘China’s position in
international law, by which Chao Er-feng’s effective occupation of the country
cancelled any earlier Tibetan claim’ (IOR/L/P&S/18/B206,IOR/L/P&S/10/343). The
weakness of this position was soon exposed, for apart from its implicit recognition of
previous Tibetan sovereignty, the Manchus had been expelled from Tibet by the
Tibetan army in 1910, and a peace treaty detailing the terms of withdrawal signed by
the Imperial Court following mediation by Nepal.60 Therefore, the negotiations
remained focused upon frontier territories and the issue became less about sovereignty
than about where the border between Tibet and China lay. It was failure to agree on the
border that ultimately stalled the negotiations (Bell 1992:156). Yet, after Simla the
Chinese continued to claim sovereignty, a position somewhat at odds with the
considerable effort made to extricate the details of what frontier territories were under
Chinese rule and which were under the Tibetan government.
The Simla Conference incorporated four agreements. The first of these was a
bilateral agreement between Tibet and Britain which established the Indo-Tibetan
frontier. The agreed line was incorporated into Article 9 of the tripartite Simla
Convention, which also defined the borders of Inner and Outer Tibet on the Chinese
frontier. In addition to this, a separate Anglo-Tibetan Declaration was agreed to which
the Simla Convention was appended. It was this declaration which confirmed that the
Simla Convention would be binding upon the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet,
and that unless ratified by China, China would be debarred from all privileges within.
A separate agreement was also concluded which set forth new trade regulation
between Britain and Tibet, replacing the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908.
60 See Bell 1992:Ch16, and Mishra 1992:Ch3, using official Government of Nepal records.
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In the event, the Simla Conference served only to confuse Tibet’s status,
although the British made considerable territorial gains in the forging of the separate
agreement with Tibet concerning the Indo-Tibetan border. These concessions were
won from Tibet after British promises to support Tibet against Chinese aggression, an
agreement on British supply of arms and munitions being made in relation to this.
Tibet was thus persuaded to sign a final treaty which recognised China’s suzerainty
over Tibet, but this was only initialled by China and never ratified. As a result, Britain
and Tibet concluded the treaty on the basis that China, by withdrawing, lost all benefits
accrued within, including that of suzerainty. However, British practice did not
subsequently affirm Tibetan independence. ‘By our past intervention in Tibetan affairs
we have incurred certain moral obligations towards the Tibetan people which cannot
be ignored,’ the India Office noted in 1914 (IOR/L/P&S/18/B324). But, despite the
bilateral Anglo-Tibetan agreement denying Chinese suzerainty, the British
prevaricated, proceeding largely on the basis that Tibet was most profitable as a
neutralised buffer state. Thus, the Foreign Office’s Handbook No.70 published in 1920
states that ‘outer Tibet would become an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty
and British protection’ (Spence 1995:918). Accordingly, the British sought to limit
Tibetan assertiveness, this being confirmed by the Tibetan government statement of
1918: ‘As the Great British Government is the Protector of Tibet, we cannot disobey
their orders about not attacking the Chinese’ (Spence 1995:919).
Norbu identifies the treaty’s true significance as being ‘the realisation that
dawned upon the British Government that no treaty concerning Tibet can be
meaningful without Tibetan participation’ (Norbu 1990:59). The Simla Convention did
affirm British recognition of Tibet’s independent treaty-making powers, but did not
lead to meaningful clarification of Tibet’s status. As discussed in Chapter five, the
term suzerainty is problematic in the context of the rise of modern institutions,
suggestive of an incapacity of self-governance.
It is at this point that the disjuncture between jural definitions of statehood
and modern liberalist conceptions of the state’s function becomes visible. If
substantive law is the criterion for evaluating Tibet’s status prior to the PRC takeover,
then the evidence weighs heavily in favour of Tibet’s de facto statehood. The strongest
support for this assertion concerns the period from 1913-1951, although the historical
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evidence surveyed in Chapters 2 and 3 suggests that such a claim extends back in time
prior to the fall of the Manchu Dynasty. With regards to Tibet’s status between 1913
and 1951, the prerequisites of a people, a territory, a government and the capacity to
enter into relations with other states have all been demonstrably proven. Additional
factors relevant to a consideration of sovereignty include the maintenance of separate
armed forces, the independent right of making peace, war, and treaties, the possession
of a separate flag and jus legationis.61 Tibet demonstrated all of these between 1913-
1951, pursuing an independent policy of non-involvement in the Second World War
and the Sino Japanese war, conducting treaty relations with Britain, Nepal and
Mongolia and independently appointing and receiving diplomatic agents.
The use of the term de facto rather than de jure is linked to the use of the term
suzerainty to describe Tibet’s traditional policy of delegating elements of its foreign
affairs to Manchu China. It is clear that such a delegation of powers did not occur after
the fall of the Manchu dynasty, although the use of the term suzerainty persisted in
diplomatic usage. The British applied the term in the Simla Convention as a device to
bring an agreement between Tibet and China regarding Tibetan de facto independence
and the Republic of China’s assertions of sovereignty over territories under the
influence of the Qing Empire. China’s suzerain rights in Tibet had first been given
international recognition in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, but the use of the term
in the 1914 treaty differed in that it was conditional on China’s recognition of Tibetan
autonomy within a clearly defined border.  The term de facto independence therefore
became used alongside the term suzerainty (which was sometimes qualified as
nominal) and the term autonomy. This struggle over semantics, which became the key
feature of the Simla negotiations, has dominated subsequent considerations of Tibet’s
status.
6:4 Suzerainty in Postcolonial Legal Discourse
To illustrate the effect of this confusion over terms, the analysis provided by
Crawford (1979) in the ‘Creation of States in International Law’ is significant.
Crawford’s study remains one of the few mainstream works of international law to
61 See Judge Sefariade, Dissenting opinion, Lighthouse in Crete and Samos case, P.C.I.J, Series A, Nos. 20/1, Judgement 14
1929:44.
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give any consideration to Tibet’s status prior to 1951, and the treatment it receives is in
context one of relative sympathy: ‘The case of Tibet highlights the rather arbitrary way
in which, for their own purposes, the ‘Powers’ decided upon a particular course of
action, and thus, in effect, determined the status of a people’ (Crawford 1979:213).
Nonetheless, Crawford concludes that in the case of Tibet ‘normal classifications of
‘sovereignty’ and statehood are only applicable with difficulty, and the facts are often
obscure and controversial.’ To be considered alongside this comment is Crawford’s
decision to treat Tibet circa 1911-1951 as an example of an autonomous region rather
than an illustration of a vassal state, a decision based upon the 1914 Simla Treaty,
Article 2 of which stipulates ‘The Government of Great Britain and China recognising
that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer
Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from
interference in the administration of Outer Tibet.’ On the basis of this, Crawford
concludes that ‘Tibet was not in 1914 regarded as independent, but that at least part of
the country possessed substantial autonomy.’ For Crawford, this therefore supports the
legitimacy of the PRC’s military takeover in 1951, although the legality of China’s
actions after that point remains open to question.
The importance of this case study is that it reveals a number of key
contradictions. Firstly, it is assumed that the use of the word ‘autonomy’ in Article 2
overrides the use of the word ‘suzerainty’. This establishes continuity with the
contemporary situation, which presents the Simla Convention as a logical precursor to
the incorporation of Tibet into the PRC as an autonomous region in 1951. As Crawford
(1979:211) puts it, ‘Autonomous areas are regions of a state, usually possessing some
ethnic or cultural distinctiveness, which have been granted separate powers of internal
administration, to whatever degree, without being detached from the state of which
they are part.’ However, the British usage of the term with regard to pre-1951 Tibet
did not imply such a restricted definition. The word autonomy was used
interchangeably in diplomatic documents with independence or de facto independence,
and seems to have been used to qualify the term suzerainty, underlining the
designation of China’s powers as nominal. The logical reference point for the
application of the term in 1914 is not the attitude of international law to autonomy
after 1951, but the views of British India on suzerainty in 1914.
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The British Government of India relied upon the concept of suzerainty to
establish relations between itself and the princely Native States, which were regarded
as internally self governing, extra territorial entities whose rulers were afforded
sovereign immunity. Crawford uses the Native States as an example of suzerain-vassal
statehood, a category placed further up the hierarchical tree of independence than
autonomy and classified separately from Tibet. His assessment of suzerainty is that it
defines the relationship between a dominant and dependent state, which differs from a
protectorate ‘only in that certain of its incidents are more likely to be undefined, or to
involve general claims of supremacy’ (Crawford 1979:210). Thus, unlike autonomous
regions, vassal states possess some form of international personality. British practice
did not ascribe to this view; in 1891 and 1928-9 the British Government of India drew
the line around the Native States’ rights in international law by claiming that ‘the
principles of international law have no bearing upon the relations between the
Government of India…and the Native States under the suzerainty of Her Majesty. The
paramount supremacy of the former presupposes and implied the subordination of the
latter’ (Crawford 1979:210).
In contrast to this, the British Government of India did wish to promote the
view that Tibet was a subject of international law. Indeed, it is hard to conceive that
the Simla Convention would have proceeded at all if this had not been the case. In
particular, the British pursued separate talks with Tibet to negotiate the Indo-Tibetan
border, this resulting in an Anglo-Tibetan agreement, and China was expressly barred
from these talks on the basis that the Indo-Tibetan frontier was not a direct Chinese
concern. As Charles Bell, the British Political Officer of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet
recorded, ‘it was my duties to negotiate with the Tibetan Plenipotentiary the frontier to
be established between Tibet and north-Eastern India…I was able to gain Sha-tra’s
consent to the frontier desired by Sir Henry, which stands back everywhere about one
hundred miles from the plains of India’ (Bell 1992:155-6). Whatever conclusion is
drawn regarding British imperial motives, this is a fair indication of the British
position regarding Tibet’s independent treaty-making powers. In this context, the
British emphasis on the word autonomy is designed to distinguish Tibet from the the
Indian Native vassal states. The British intention was to imply that Tibet did possess
some measure of international personality. For this reason, it would be hasty to
conclude, as Crawford does, that the British view that relations between themselves
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and the Native States were not governed by international law ‘seemed to be founded
on the erroneous view that international law only governed the relations of
independent and equal states’ (Crawford 1979:210). It is unlikely that the British
practice was impelled by a process of legal reasoning over and above political will.
Rather, suzerainty operated as a flexible term with multiple possibilities for the
conferring of rights and obligations according to political needs.
To return to Crawford’s analysis of the Native States, the implication is that
the British practice followed certain legal assumptions. Indeed Crawford’s entire
approach is to emphasise and affirm the primacy of law. Thus, the Crown’s position
regarding the status of the Native States in 1891 and 1928-9 was the result of an
erroneous view, because the Crown failed to uncover the truth of law. In contrast, the
view the Crown held in 1947 when the Native States were regarded as independent and
free to accede to India or Pakistan, or neither, was the correct legal truth (Crawford
1979:210). Supporting this reasoning is the decision of the ICJ in the Raan of Kutch
Arbitration, which held that international law only ceased to apply to suzerain-vassal
relations which had been replaced by specific clauses in treaties. However, the Raan of
Kutch Award occurred in 1968, and whilst the case establishes a legal position, it does
not follow that this is the position which operated as the ‘legal truth’ behind British
policy on the Native States in 1947 (Crawford 1979:210).
Given the widespread communal rioting, political factionalism and the
controversy surrounding partition it seems curiously ahistorical to postulate a position
which would have required Lord Mountbatten to have placed positive law first and
politics second. Creating the necessary alliance which sealed independence was by no
means a question of simply applying a judicial decision based upon substantive law,
but a matter of forging a workable consensus in the midst of disparity. Likewise, in
1914, to consider as Crawford does that the Simla Treaty presented ‘good evidence of
what the parties thought Tibet’s status was at the time, or perhaps what they hoped
Tibet could successfully claim’ (Crawford 1979:213) is to place priority on a concept
of law in which law is representational of truth and aspirational; a repository of the
optimum. Erased from view are the necessary compromises traded behind the scenes,
such as, in this example, Tibet’s ultimate compromise on recognition of its sovereignty
in return for a separate agreement with Britain in which the British pledged to supply
156
Tibet with arms to strengthen her border defence against China (IOR/L/PS/10/433 and
Mss Eur F80/202).
Crawford’s analysis achieves coherency only if the relative autonomy of law
is presumed. The historical facts follow the law, because the law is seen as a vehicle
for truth, an artefact that achieves representational value beyond the circumstances in
which it was formed. Thus the attitude of the PRC on the liberation of Tibet, that Tibet
was a province of China, achieves continuity and coherence if the term autonomy used
in the Simla Convention is given equal meaning. The legally inconsistent British
attitude to Native States in 1891 and 1928-9 is shown not to infer a dilution or
inconsistency in law because the practice was based upon a false perception of the law.
Thus, it is not portrayed as entirely beyond law because political will is not presumed
to have operated with untrammelled freedom. The key notion that politics are
subordinate to the Rule of Law is maintained. The error lay not in limitations of the
law, but in the limited view of those that sought to apply it. The tendency to
ahistorically and retrogressively bring past behaviour into line with the present is part
of this dynamic of representing law as coherent, rational and autonomous.
When Crawford states that ‘in cases of ‘autonomous regions’ such as Tibet or
Oman, normal classifications of sovereignty and statehood are only applicable with
difficulty and the facts are often obscure and controversial’ (Crawford 1979:213), the
implication is that in such obscure instances enquiry can legitimately begin and end
with what key legal texts exist, in this case the Simla Convention. The effect of this is
to empty law of history. A number of key points are masked by an underlying
disciplinary tendency to project law as a synthesis of the essential truth of an historical
situation.
Firstly, there is the question of why the British Government chose the term
suzerainty, despite recognising Tibet’s de facto statehood in internal documents. The
dynamics of a legal analysis which seeks an underlying coherence and historical
continuity in key terms such as suzerainty and autonomy will be predisposed towards
accepting that the use of the terms in a legal text reflects contemporary definitions.
This deemphasises discrepancy and variance, and privileges ahistorical definitions by
projecting received contemporary notions of suzerainty and autonomy onto the past. In
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assuming the internal coherency of law, these terms are imbued with an excess of
meaning, belying the possibility that their function may have been much more
superficial in the context of the political reality of the event. By privileging the
continuity of law as a system of objective thought, the effect is to dislocate it from its
temporal origins. The alternative, however, is to accept that law is subject to the whims
of political diplomacy, which negates its grounds. It is this split between the desired
supra-social functionalism of law and the contingent factors that bring law into being
that is displayed in Crawford’s analysis of suzerainty and autonomy.
Secondly, there is the question of what effect privileging legal continuity and
coherency has upon the understanding of how norms come into existence. Underlying
this is the modernist faith in progress and linear history, in which the present affirms
its own logic by appropriating what came before as a step on the path to development.
Whilst the temporal roots of the law may be deferred, along with other contingent
factors such as politics, morality, economics and culture, this is not to say that a
conception of origin is removed. A quasi-origin is retained, purified of unnecessary
elements that may destabilise the certainty and rationality of legal process. In the
example of Crawford’s analysis above, this is evident in the way in which
contradictory state practice is approached. As discussed, the British practice of not
recognising international law with regard to the Native States in 1891 and 1928-29 is
seen as an error of legal perception rather than an expression of political will. The
effect of such a method of explaining discrepancy is to uphold the logic of established
legal principles in current usage. The effect is also, however, to mask the origins of
state practice.
What is revealed here is the old Austinian dilemma of how states can both
create law and be bound by it in the absence of an overarching sovereign. To maintain
the autonomy of law and retain its authority in such a society, law to some extent must
always already be in existence. Because, paradoxically, states create law, the concept
of evolutionary progress becomes key to resolving the inherent contradictions.
‘Progress does not just go somewhere it comes from somewhere’ observes Fitzpatrick
in his discussion of the mythic origins of modern law (Fitzpatrick 1992:51). Because
the idea of progress is bound to a faith in the universal applicability of reason, the
origins of law, as a feature of this, can always be treated as a pre-existing step on the
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path of rational progress. Such a discursive displacement of origin has the effect of
placing the authority of law beyond contingencies, creating that ‘slippage from the
epistemic to the ontological’ described by Schlag (Schlag 1997:440).
In the case of our current example, the British practice towards Native States
is sidestepped, leaving the desired vision of rational order intact. It may well be that
the alternative, more inclusive, opinion of the ICJ as demonstrated in the Raan of
Kutch Arbitration is perceived as a more suitable point of reference for international
legal practice, bearing a postcolonial sense of  equality. It may also be considered that
the imperialist arrogance of the British position may be considered an undesirable
practice to retain. What is of interest here, however, is the outcome of such a method
of legal analysis. One effect is to remove alternative practice from view. The tendency
to fit state practice into a pre-existing vision of what the law is, or should be, not only
excludes contradictory practice from the frame, but enforces a concept of the state as a
rational entity developing in accordance with the progressive trends displayed by
international law generally. If such a dynamic is accepted as ordinary and real, rather
than perceived as arbitrary and constructed, the question then becomes to what extent
violence and injustice are rendered invisible by international law’s capacity to create
coherency and legitimacy from a vision of state practice that is both limited and
ahistorical. To return to the example of the British Native States, firstly unfettered
political action is presented as subordinate to law, for the British actions are presumed
to be based on law. Secondly, colonial manifestations of law are subordinated to
progressive modern law, for the British actions were based upon ‘false’ law. Modern
law itself emerges unscathed from the colonial encounter in this analysis. Thirdly,
because the colonial vision of international law not applying to unequal states is
explained as a failure to grasp the underlying truth of law, modern law is presented as
continuous and pre-existent.
This reading of Crawford’s analysis introduces the fundamental issue of
international law’s relationship with history. It reveals the effect that the reification of
law, the drive to make law operate above and beyond a particular temporal, cultural
and geographical location, has upon perceptions of what is open to legal consideration.
The obvious paradox here is that the maintenance of law’s coherency and continuity,
integral to its universalistic claims, requires the exclusion of certain voices, be they the
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now unsavoury expressions of colonialism or other articulations of the local and the
particular which threaten the general vision of modern international law’s unity
(Kennedy 1996:386).62 Hence, it becomes reasonable to present the existing status quo
as normal and rational in light of ‘obscure and controversial’ facts, without questioning
why or how obscurity is manufactured and maintained, or what this may reveal about
underlying mechanisms of power.
In the example of Crawford’s case study, this tension between the general and
the particular is reflected in the pairing of the view that ‘Tibet was not in 1914
regarded as independent’ and that this is affirmed by ‘the Chinese view in 1951’ with
the apology ‘the case of Tibet highlights the rather arbitrary way in which, for their
own purposes, the Powers decided upon a particular course of action’ (Crawford
1979:213). The de-emphasis upon politics that is the underlying dynamic of the overall
analysis does not succeed in removing the political elements of expediency from the
frame. Realistically, it cannot if the overall vision of a rational, humane, morally
justifiable system of law is to be maintained, alongside the claim for its universal
legitimacy. This is particularly so in a case such as Tibet, where there has not been any
sustained commitment to violent action in pursuit of independence, but where evidence
of aggression towards the Tibetan people by the PRC has been significant.63 This
tension is resolved in Crawford’s analysis by displacing the issue of injustice by
calling on the discourse of human rights: ‘it may still be that Chinese actions in Tibet
after 1951 have been illegal on other grounds.’ These manoeuvres therefore achieve a
delicate balancing act in which the concept of the universal rationality of state-driven
international law is implicated in and perpetuates the concept of the primacy of the
modern state as the vehicle and expression of this law. Any irregular historical events
and subversive social visions that destabilise this structure are marginalised as a result
of an underlying contradiction in the discourse as a whole, which requires that the
existing modern state structure of international society is given priority.
62 Kennedy discusses this: ‘Modernists all, today’s international lawyers remain acutely aware of what it means not to be modern,
and this, more than any doctrinal or theoretical heritage, remains with us as the nineteenth century we are glad to have done with.’
63 For detailed evidence and testimony relating to genocide and human rights abuses before 1959, see the International
Commission of Jurists 1960.
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Earlier in this discussion, the possibility was raised that a component of this
dynamic was the drive to cleanse modern international law of the vestiges of
colonialism. Hence, the pre-1947 British policy on Native States is seen as an
erroneous view of law. This ‘othering’ of colonialism raises several questions which
bear directly upon the status of Tibet, but also on the subject of international law
generally. There is the possibility that such a purging erases valuable information from
the received narrative of modern law. The dominant story of international law in which
the inequalities of colonialism are resolved by making the scope of the law more
inclusive, particularly through institution building, suggests that the colonial features
of law were removed in the process. Yet, this story of law’s ever expansive inclusivity
masks so many instances in which obscurity and anomaly are excluded from the final
narrative of what international law should be, such as extraterritoriality, the rise and
fall of rebus sic stantibus, suzerainty, or the status of Tibet, that the account of
international law as coherent and continuous potentially becomes the real anomaly.
The story of modern international law’s evolution from the particularity of
colonial arrogance to the universality of a rights-driven global order provides the
underpinning logic for Crawford’s dismissal of British attitudes to the Native States as
a matter of misperceived law. Within the context of such a narrative, his analysis is
rational, coherent and appropriate. It is an equation which does, however,
fundamentally rupture the relationship of the present to the past, altering radically what
is perceived as history. There is, I argue here, a direct association between this
discursive tendency of suppressing the colonial antecedents of international law and
the treatment of Tibet as an autonomous region rather than an independent self-
governing society that met the jural prerequisites of statehood. It is a comparable
hidden appropriation of history that renders Tibet a problematic case for legal analysis,
not simply because ‘the facts are obscure or controversial’ (Crawford 1979:213), but
because the dynamics of dominant legal discourse fundamentally require that they
must be and must remain so in order to resolve the problem of modern international
law’s progressive inclusivity in relation to its colonial origins. It may seem paradoxical
to assert that a country never directly under Western colonial rule should create such a
dilemma for the postcolonial world, but this paradox is made understandable if the
wider relationship between colonialism, Third World nationalism, international law
and modernity’s faith in material progress is considered.
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Before proceeding to examine this interaction between modernity, nationalism
and international law through an analysis of Tibet’s efforts to join the U.N. in 1949
and Tibet’s final capitulation to PRC rule under the Seventeen Point Agreement in
1951, a preliminary conclusion will be made, and that is that a suppression of anomaly
in the narrative of modern international law’s progressive universality has implications
for any understanding of power relations. This recalls Foucault’s argument that
‘History does ‘not’ gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at
universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity instils
each of its violences in a system of rules and this proceeds from domination to
domination’ (Foucault 1984:85). In suppressing the anomaly of colonialism,
international legal discourse fails to adequately address conceptual and structural
continuities that exist between universal vision of the present and the imperial past.
Not only does this ‘othering’ elevate the moral status of previous colonial powers, who
now become guarantors of rights rather than oppressors of rights, it also displaces
traditional societies that do not fit the template of the modern state. For example,
whilst the inclusion of the Third World in international institutions after decolonisation
prompted significant debate as to the direction that international law should take, and
encouraged the development of new doctrines such as Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources (PSNR), the expansion of international society did little to
challenge existing models of modernisation previously implicated in colonial
discourse. This is a theme taken up by Rajagopal in a discussion of the New
International Economic Order’s (NIEO) attempt to foster international equality, peace
and development:-
‘While NIEO proposals radicalised and expanded the U.N. as an
institution, the limited nature of these proposals also had the effect of
institutionalising the radicalism that was emerging from the Third World. In
other words, the radical challenges to international law levelled by NIEO
proponents had the paradoxical effect of expanding and strengthening
international institutions as the apparatuses of management of social reality in
the Third World, and, thereby, international law itself’ (Rajagopal 2003:74).
This fundamental linkage between the modernisation process and the
development of stable nation-states undercuts the assumption that:-
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‘The San Francisco Conference produced an (eventually) inclusive
and largely non-interventionist international legal order. The U.N. was given
no explicit mandate to promote particular ideological forms through military
intervention and the admissions policy of the U.N. was pluralistic’ (Simpson
2004:295).
The possibility remains that this pluralism and ethic of inclusion was
fundamentally limited by a correlation between the nation-state as an independent
sovereign unit and the nation-state as the vehicle for modernisation and development.
It is at this juncture that the jural conception of the state comes into conflict with the
normative political notion of the state. One of the ways that a suppression of anomaly
in the narrative of modern international law’s progressive universality has implications
for an understanding of power relations is, therefore, that by placing modernisation and
industrialisation at the heart of a nation-state building project, alternative discourses of
the state are excluded from consideration. Secondly, the suppression of anomaly
creates a predisposition towards accepting that anomalies are excluded for valid legal
grounds by privileging a vision of coherency and continuity in international law
generally. Thirdly, by linking the two, the space left for the articulation of an
alternative discourse of the state is not simply reduced, but displaced. This slippage
allows alternative discourses of the state to be treated as aspects of culture, rather than
features of sovereignty, and these discourses are thus open to appropriation by states
that conform to the dominant vision of modernisation and development.
6:5 The Tibetan Trade Missions
One of the key, but often unrecognised, factors in deciding Tibet’s status was
neither the policy of Britain nor China, but that of independent India. Whilst India
inherited much of the contradiction and many of the ambiguities of British policy,
embedded as they were in treaties such as the 1914 Simla Convention, Nehru’s ‘spirit
of the age’ modernity presented Tibet’s commitment to its traditional institutions as
indefensible (Chatterjee 1986:143). Before further examination of this disjuncture
between tradition and modernity in the postcolonial context, and its intersection with
received notions of Tibet’s legal status, it is necessary to present a brief historical
summary of post-Simla developments up to Indian independence.
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After 1914, the border issue between Tibet and China remained unsettled. The
Simla Convention had divided Tibet into Inner (Eastern) and Outer (Central-Western)
zones, with the Tibetan Government being guaranteed political and religious authority
in Outer Tibet only. Inner Tibet was seen to be under religious control of Lhasa, but its
political control was left undefined. Article 9 stated ‘Nothing in the present
Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing right of the Tibetan Government in
Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of
monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.’ The
reality was that the division of Tibet into two zones was never implemented and the
borderlands remained subject to a complex network of traditional alliances, local and
national, religious and political, Tibetan and Chinese.
In 1918, hostilities broke out which brought the unresolved issue of the border
to the fore. Following Tibetan victory, the British Vice-Consul, Eric Teichmen, at the
Chinese border town of Tachienlu, mediated in a Sino-Tibetan agreement, the Treaty
of Rangbatsa (Teichman 2000:115-122 and 161-169). Central to the negotiations was
the Tibetan claim to Nyarong, a territory which the Tibetan Government believed to be
under their full jurisdiction according to Article 9 of the Simla Treaty. This claim
confused the British, who believed Nyarong to be, as an Inner Tibetan town, under
Chinese influence. The Tibetan Government, however, interpreted Article 9 as an
affirmation not only of religious authority, but of their civil and military protection of
ethnically Tibetan regions that maintained a more autonomous local leadership system
than that found in Outer Tibet. The British concluded that the Tibetan interpretation of
the treaty was due to faulty translation of the original English treaty text.64 However,
the root of the conflict was ideological, concerning the limits of religious authority and
the intersection of locality with Tibetan Buddhist networks. The British considered that
the division of Inner and Outer Tibet was possible on the basis of a relatively
straightforward separation of religious and secular authority, whereas to the Tibetan
Government such a distinction was considerably more complex. The disagreement
reveals something about the perceived role of the state in relation to locality and the
relationship of both to a wider context of civilisation. The problem for the Tibetan
Government in 1918 was that the borderlands resisted definition as part of a Tibetan or
64 McGranahan (2003:49) referencing Campbell letter to Grant, Camp Pharijong, 17 September 1918, IOR L/P&S/10/714/1.
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a Chinese state, yet ethnically and culturally were identified as part of a Tibetan
civilisation. Teichman records that Eastern Tibetan states on the Sichuan border were
semi-independent, but under nominal protection of China. However, the actual
authority of Chinese officials is questionable and Teichman records that positions were
fabricated so that inhabitants could claim salaries from Chinese authorities (Teichmen
2000:8). The tenuous nature of the Chinese claim is further apparent in Chinese
sources. In a 1912 book, Fu Sung Ma, the Imperial Chinese Commissioner for Sichuan
and Yunnan Frontier Affairs under Zhao Erfeng described the border, stating that of
the territories east of Bathang, ‘some…were really quite independent of China.’ The
book also records that Bathang, Lithang, Derge and Chamdo were under their native
chiefs or monastic leaders, that Ngarong, Dragyab and Dzayul were under the Tibetan
Government, and that Shobando Riwoche and Markham had been ceded to Tibet by
the Manchu Emperor between 1725-27. Following this, on the ground survey Fu
concluded that the ‘Chinese had no right of interference in the secular administration
of these territories’ (IOR EUR MSS F80/177).
It is the existence of self-administrating localities which received ‘nominal
supervision’ from Sichuan provincial authorities which presented the biggest
difficulty, for the salaried Imperial Chinese posts in ethnically Tibetan regions did not
necessarily create a local cultural identification with China. On the other hand, the
monastic institutions and Buddhist values of the region did create local cultural
identification with Lhasa. After the 1911 revolution in China, Sichuan itself was
largely independent of the new government in Beijing, being ‘controlled by several
mutually independent military chiefs’ (Teichmen 2000:121).
When the Chinese Communist Party secured control over China in October
1949, the Tibetan Government increased efforts to obtain international recognition and
support. The vulnerability of the Tibetan position was evident from increasing Chinese
presence in ethnically Tibetan regions along the de facto border recognised by the
Tibetan Government since Simla. Also, the Communists had fostered irredentist
policies that had won them popular support in the Chinese civil war. This appealed to
nationalist sentiments in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War and gave force to Mao’s
general insistence that China had ‘stood up’ (Mao 1967:411-24).
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Two years prior to Communist victory in China, the Tibetan Government sent
trade missions to India, China, the United States and the United Kingdom, in order to
demonstrate independence and promote direct trade. The mission to India was
officially received by Lord Mountbatten, Prime Minister Nehru and Mahatma Ghandi
and, despite Chinese protests, was also received as an official mission in both Britain
and America, the status of the delegation being further confirmed by the stamping of
Tibetan state passports with requisite travel visas.65 The mission was not without
controversy, however, as both Britain and America were wary of upsetting relations
with China. Thus, the U.S. agreed to sell Tibet two million dollars of gold to back the
Tibetan currency, but refused to provide a loan to support the deal. This situation could
not be resolved without intervention from the Government of India, upon which Tibet
was dependent for hard currency and foreign goods.
As a landlocked country Tibet’s foreign exports passed through the port of
Calcutta, with the Indian government controlling tariffs. The major export was wool,
with the U.S. being the largest final purchaser via U.S. agents in India. The foreign
exchange generated was held by the Reserve Bank of India and credited to Tibet in
Indian Rupees. The Tibetan Government objected to this, arguing that they had a right
to receive the total in dollars, an amount they estimated at two to three million dollars
per annum. The Indian refusal to release funds from the Tibetan account in dollars was
therefore a serious setback for the Tibetan Government’s economic plans
(Goldstein.1989:Ch16; Shakya 1999; Shakabpa 1967). This refusal was marked not
just by economic self-interest but by an imperialistic arrogance that reveals something
of Nehru’s attitude to modernity. Thus, the Indian Government justified their position
by implicating that they knew what was best for the Tibetan Government. As the
deputy secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs explained to the U.S embassy, ‘the
Government of India did not consider the import of gold as an essential import’ (U.S.
Department of State 1949:1064; U.S. Department of State 1948:777,780). By 1949 the
Government of India had conceded that the Tibetan Government could withdraw
250,000 dollars from their account, but only if the dollars were used for the purchase
of machinery. By April, the Government of India finally gave permission for the
purchase of gold.
65 See Shakabpa (1967) for a first-hand account by the Tibetan Government minister and member of the delegation.
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The conflict between Tibet and independent India originated before
independence. The first official meeting between Indian Congress and the Tibetan
Government took place in 1946 in the pre-independence transition period at a semi-
official conference of Asian countries convened by the Indian Council of World
Affairs. Tibet was invited to participate alongside thirty-two countries, the British
representative in Lhasa seeing this to be a good opportunity Tibet to demonstrate its de
facto independence (Goldstein 1989:561). Despite opposition from Chiang Kai shek,
the conference itself was a success for Tibet. Nonetheless, Nehru, acting as Vice
President and Member in Charge of External Affairs of the Interim Government of
India, refused point blank to discuss Indo-Tibetan border demarcation and trade
agreements with the Tibetan delegation. This attitude is consistent with Nehru’s
commitment to a Pan-Asian regional alliance led by India and China, a commitment
given specific reference in the Indian policy to review Indian support for Tibet on the
basis that:-
‘while the Government of India are glad to recognise and wish to see
Tibetan autonomy maintained, they are not prepared to do more than
encourage this in a friendly manner and are certainly not disposed to take any
initiative which might bring India into conflict with China on this issue. The
attitude which they propose to adopt may be best described as that of a
benevolent spectator’ (FO371/63943).
The Indian position was never merely that of benevolent spectator. Firstly, the
Indian Government wanted to retain the benefits of the British Indian-Tibetan treaties,
as indeed was its right. It was on this basis that India claimed authority to restrict
Tibet’s access to currency, Tibetan rights being circumscribed by Article IX of the
1904 Lhasa Convention. Additionally, India claimed Tibetan territories ceded under
the 1914 Simla Convention, of which the Tibetan government sought the return at
Indian independence, along with other territories seized by British India such as
Sikkim and Darjeeling (Yang 1987:410). Due to lack of consensus in the Tibetan
Government over the wisdom of renegotiating the Simla Treaty with the newly
independent India, Tibet held off recognising the Government of India as legitimate
successor of the British (Goldstein.1989:606). This policy remained in place up to the
gold crisis of 1948-9, due to India’s refusal to negotiate over the territorial dispute.
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As the PLA forces gathered upon the Tibetan border in 1949, Tibet’s
international status was uncertain. On the one hand, participation in regional
diplomacy and the U.S. and British recognition of Tibetan passports indicated that
Tibet had some form of international personality. On the other hand, the exact nature
of this personality remained undefined. Tibetan independence had been formally
recognised by Nepal in 1949, when Nepal presented a dossier of evidence to the U.N.
supporting Nepal’s application for membership of the General Assembly. As proof of
sovereignty, Nepal affirmed its power to conclude treaties with reference to Nepalese-
Tibetan agreements, and provided details of the six countries where Nepal maintained
legations, these being the United Kingdom, France, the United States, India, Burma
and Tibet. Nepal had no official relationship with China.66 Even Shen Zonglian, the
last official Chinese Representative in Tibet, concluded that ‘since 1911 Lhasa [i.e. the
Government of Tibet] has to all practical purpose enjoyed full independence’ (Van
Walt Van Praag 1987:139). As early as 1945, the British had, however, concluded that
whilst there would be ‘advantage in bringing the position before the United
Nations…it is realised that the Chinese may be able to render such a course
ineffective’ (Goldstein. 2007:545; L/PS/12/4195A). This position was given more
forcible articulation in 1949 when the Tibetan Government dispatched two official
missions to the U.S. and the U.K. to discuss the appeal to the U.N.
Following the inauguration of the PRC on the 1st of October 1949, the
Government of Tibet sought clarification of its international position by sending
missions to the United States, Britain, Nepal and India. Having requested that the
Chinese Communist Government respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, the Tibetan
Government sought foreign military and diplomatic aid and support for their
application to the U.N. These missions were assembled in December 1949, but were
blocked from proceeding by both the United States and Britain. As a goodwill gesture,
the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Bureau had granted travel permits to two Americans for
transit across Tibetan territory. The resulting diplomatic engagement of the Tibetan
Foreign Affairs Bureau with the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi highlights the
impossibility of Tibet’s position. As with the purchase of U.S. gold earlier in 1949, the
American Government was happy to engage with the Tibetan Government in practice
so long as formal recognition of this did not occur. The U.S. Embassy was therefore at
66 Van Walt Van Praag.1987:139, referencing U.N. Security Council Document S/C2/16, 8 August 1949 and Enclosure 1-6.
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pains to correspond with the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Bureau orally, rather than in
writing (Goldstein 1989:629). This form of compromise represented less of a threat to
the Government of Tibet whilst the Kuomintang had control of China, but the superior
military power of communist China meant that whilst Tibet’s status remained de facto,
the threat of occupation was high. The continued semantic confusion concerning the
term suzerainty remained critical, if somewhat divorced from precise legal
consideration of the term. In 1948, the United States State Department sought to deal
with the Republic of China regarding the Tibetan Trade Mission by stating that the
U.S. had ‘no intention of acting in a manner to call into question China’s de jure
sovereignty over Tibet,’ but that China should ‘appreciate that the fact that it exerts no
de facto authority over Tibet is [the] root cause of [the] situation’ (U.S. Department of
State 1948:767). This choice of terms is clarified in a State Department report of 1949,
which explains that whilst suzerainty appears to fit the case, it also ‘carries the
connotation of a vassal state and does not fit as well into customary American concepts
as into British usage.’ The report therefore concludes that ‘it might be desirable to
avoid a possible controversy over ‘sovereignty’ versus ‘suzerainty’ by referring in the
future to Chinese de jure authority over Tibet or some similar comprehensive term’
(U.S. Department of State 1949:1069).
The Tibetan government found no support for its application to join the
United Nations. The British position, which the U.S. followed, was that admission was
impossible due to the operation of the veto in the Security Council. Further, the British
felt it inappropriate to intervene ‘since Tibet is of importance only in relation to the
security of India and any assistance to Tibet should be limited to supporting Indian
policy in Tibet’ (FO371/84465). There was considerable anxiety that substantive aid to
Tibet, or visible support at the U.N., would encourage communist propaganda against
imperialism. Related to this was the Foreign Office’s reluctance to provide military aid
in such an inaccessible territory, for ‘a Tibetan collapse would have a more serious
effect on morale in neighbouring countries if the issue had been played up in advance’
(FO371/84469 ).
As for India, Nehru’s response was that any suggestion that India could act as
a guarantor to a Sino-Tibetan agreement was ‘not acceptable in this day and age.’ He
denied any separate Anglo-Tibetan Declaration entirely, stating that ‘there is no
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separate treaty like this’ and upbraided the Tibetan delegation because ‘when you had
the time and opportunity to do something [about independence] you did nothing and
that was a mistake’ (FO371/84469). Nehru’s position was factually incorrect, for
British Government archives show that an Anglo-Tibetan agreement existed
(IOR/L/PS/10/433 and Mss Eur F80/202). It is also contradictory because in 1947 the
Government of India sent a telegram to the Foreign Office of the Tibetan Government
requesting that the Tibetan Government adhere to existing agreements, stating that:
‘This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited
treaty relations from His Majesty’s Government’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1959:39). The contradictions in Nehru’s policy suggest a desire to retain all of the
benefits of British relations with Tibet, without the inconvenience of reciprocity.
A decade later, Nehru stated of Tibet that ‘at no time did any country, any
foreign country, consider it independent’ (Yang 1987:416). That this marked a distinct
turnaround is apparent in a speech made on 22nd March 1949, in which Nehru
discussed Tibet as a distinct entity, separate from China. ‘Our relations with
Afghanistan’ he observed comparatively, ‘are exceedingly friendly and our relations
with Tibet, Nepal and all the neighbouring countries are also very friendly’ (Nehru
1984:465). It is inconceivable that Nehru would have phrased his speech in such a
manner had he considered Tibet to be a province of China. Nor, does it seem
reasonable that India would have maintained the British Indian Mission in Lhasa as the
Indian Mission for Tibet as it did after independence.
In 1954, India recognised Tibet to be a region of China in the Agreement
between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and
Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. The British Foreign Office
voiced private objection to India’s announcement that the agreement does not ‘depart
from the view of the U.K. Government before 1947’ affirming that Britain only
recognised Chinese suzerainty, but this objection was not made public (FO
371/110647). The treaty secured traditional trade privileges for India in Tibet in return
for the withdrawal of Indian military escorts and loss of extra territorial rights. Nehru’s
policy in 1954 was underpinned by a commitment to anti-imperialism, the renouncing
of British rights in Tibet being an affirmation of this. Nonetheless, Nehru proceeded in
the belief that the McMahon line which demarcated the Indo-Tibetan border would
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remain in force. On this basis, Nehru announced the 1954 Panch Shila or ‘Five
Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’ a Sino-Indian accord presented domestically as a
mark of India’s success as a new world leader. The situation in China, however, was a
different story, with Chinese publications issuing irredentist maps that lay claim not
only to Indian territories, but also Nepal and Bhutan. By 1959, China breached the
Indian border and declared the 1914 Simla Convention to be an ‘unequal treaty’ (Addy
1996:45). Accordingly, China refused to recognise the validity of the McMahon line,
precipitating the Sino-Indian War of 1962.
6.6 The Tibetan Appeals to the U.N.
In August 1950, negotiations began between Tibet and China in New Delhi to
settle the question of Tibet’s status, with Tibet claiming independence and China
asserting that Tibet must acknowledge that it was part of China. Whilst negotiations
were still in progress, the PLA invaded Tibet in October of 1950, destroying the main
Tibetan defence force and taking control of Khamdo. The Tibetan Government
claimed this was an illegal use of force undertaken whilst peaceful negotiations were
in progress. The Chinese ambassador in Delhi responded that the Tibetan Government
had been given ample time to respond to Chinese demands and ‘should bear the
responsibility for all consequences’ (Goldstein 1989:699). These events prompted
Tibet’s first appeal to the U.N., citing recent U.N. resolutions regarding Korea as a
precedent for international assistance. This first appeal was rejected because it had
been telegraphed from Kalimpong (Sikkim) which was outside of Tibetan territory.
The subject was not considered until El Salvador requested the issue be raised before
the General Assembly under Article 1, proposing in its draft resolution that a
committee be established to study ‘appropriate measures that could be taken by the
General Assembly’ (Goldstein 1989:714). The issue was subsequently brought before
the General Committee for a preliminary decision on whether the matter should be
considered, prompting considerable private consideration of Tibet’s legal status by
India, Britain and the United States.
One of the first issues considered by the British Foreign Office was whether a
Tibetan appeal was applicable under Article 35 (2) of the Charter. The conclusion
reached was that ‘since 1913 Tibet has not only enjoyed full control over her internal
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affairs but also has maintained direct relations with other states. She must therefore be
regarded as a state to which Article 35(2) of the Charter applies’ (FO371/84454).67
The key document referred to in support was the Simla Convention of 1914.
Several points were stressed. Firstly, Tibet participated in the tripartite conference in
her own right and that ‘whilst the Chinese Government subsequently repudiated the
initialling of the Convention by their representative…on occasion they have stated that
they accept the terms of the Convention apart from the clauses fixing the boundary
between China and Tibet’ (FO371/84454 ). Furthermore, if ‘China repudiated the
Convention in its entirety, as her present actions clearly show she has done, she has no
right whatever over Tibet, not even to a nominal suzerainty’ (FO371/84454).
Secondly, the Foreign Office distinguished between Tibet, which enjoyed the right to
engage in foreign relations, and British protected states with internal autonomy that did
not. Thirdly, recognition of Chinese suzerainty since 1914 ‘was conditional on
recognition by China of Tibetan autonomy; in other words the suzerainty which we
recognised was of the nominal kind’ and ‘accepted the right of Tibet to enter into
direct relations with other states.’ Having made this analysis, the Foreign Office
pointed out that the government had previously committed itself to the position that
Tibet possessed international legal personality in 1943. This refers to an official
communication sent by the foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, to the Chinese foreign
minister, Dr. Soong, which stated that Tibet had ‘enjoyed de facto independence’ since
1911 (FO371/93001).68
Additional examination of Tibet’s vassal status raised the following points.
Firstly, that the precise status of a vassal in relation to its suzerain lacked clear
definition and needed to be examined on an individual basis. Secondly, that it was
necessary to determine if all international treaties entered into by the suzerain state
ipso facto applied to the vassal, and also whether the vassal was ipso facto at war if the
suzerain was at war. Having examined the evidence on these points, the Foreign Office
67 Article 35 (2). A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the assembly any dispute to which it is a
party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
68 The document highlights how the term autonomy was used by the British to signify Tibet’s relative independence as a vassal
(in comparison with, for example, the Native States), thus implying Tibetan legal personality. In the process of affirming British
policy to deal with Tibet separately from China, the document states that the British Government recognised ‘the status of Tibet as
an autonomous State under the suzerainty of China, and intended dealing on this basis with Tibet in the future.’
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concluded that Tibet had a clear international identity (FO371/84454). The course of
action envisaged in its communication to the British delegation at the U.N. was that the
matter would be brought before the Security Council and a condemnation of Chinese
aggression be made. There was anxiety about avoiding a more explicit resolution
regarding withdrawal which could not be enforced, the result of which would be that
‘the United Nations would lose prestige’ (FO371/84454). An additional caveat was
that Britain should ‘recognise that initiative must lie’ with India (FO371/84454).
These anxieties were amplified by the British delegation to the U.N., who
observed that the Government of India had doubts about supporting Tibetan
independence and that if brought before the Security Council ‘there might be strong
pressure brought on us to support some far reaching resolution (FO371/84454)’. The
delegation therefore considered it best ‘to argue to the general effect that the legal
situation is extremely obscure and that in any case Tibet cannot be considered as a
fully independent country’ (FO371/84454 ). The British Delegation to the U.N.
persisted in this argument, despite the Foreign Office repeatedly and unequivocally
asserting that Tibet had independent legal status. With the U.N. debate imminent, and
no resolution between the departments forthcoming, the British Delegation to the U.N.
insisted that it would not proceed on the basis of the Foreign Office’s legal opinion
without a formal written ruling from the British Attorney General (Goldstein
1989:718).
The delegation’s position was maintained by the British representative on the
24th November 1950, when the General Committee debated whether ‘the invasion of
Tibet by foreign forces’ should be put before the General Assembly. The
representative argued as a matter of procedure the issue would be best served by
postponement in the hope of an amicable agreement. He then stated that ‘the
Committee did not know exactly what was happening in Tibet nor was the legal
position of the country very clear.’ The Indian representative expressed a similar
sentiment, asserting falsely that ‘Chinese forces had ceased to advance’ and the ‘Indian
Government was certain that the Tibet Question could still be settled by peaceful
means’ (FO 371/84454). These arguments held sway and the Tibetan appeal was
tabled. The impact of the adjournment was profound. It led directly to the Tibetan
Government entering into negotiations with the Government of China, resulting in the
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Seventeen Point Agreement. 69 This agreement formed the legal basis for Tibet’s
incorporation into the PRC.
Yet, the reason neither Britain nor India supported the appeal had little to do
with concerns over legal obscurity. Nor did it flow from the certainty that a peaceful
settlement was imminent. The Tibetan Government had made it clear to both the
British and Indian Governments that it intended to press on with the appeal rather than
negotiate and India, despite what it said at the U.N., had expressed clear doubt that
negotiations were viable (FO 371/84454). Instead, the position reflected the pressures
of policy, and this was why the British delegation to the U.N. sought to inject
uncertainty into the legal opinion. An internal letter sent by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the
British Ambassador to the U.N., sums up this attitude:-
‘if there is any doubt at all as to the validity of the legal argument that
Tibet is an ‘independent State,’ we might take profit from such dubiety by
failing to argue the legal case in detail and generally maintaining that the legal
situation is obscure…Politically, I have no doubt at all that what we want to
do is to create a situation which does not oblige us in practice to do anything
about the Communist invasion of Tibet’ (FO 371/84454, 15th November
1950).
As noted above, this political stance conflicted with legal analysis, the legal
argument that Tibet should be regarded a state being made with great clarity by Sir
Eric Beckett of the Foreign Office. When the British Delegation to the U.N. sought
written confirmation from the Attorney-General, it created a delay. It was this delay
that enabled the British representative to state that the legal status of Tibet remained
unclear.
The primary documents suggest that this delay was a calculated manoeuvre to
further the political aims expressed by Sir Gladwyn. There is no evidence of genuine
doubt over Tibet’s status within the department, only a clearly stated disagreement on
appropriate policy. In this regard, the British delegation to the U.N. displayed a similar
attitude to that of India, of which Beckett reported:-
69 The issue was brought before the General Assembly by El Salvador.
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‘I would say that it appears to me more probable that India is rather
more perplexed as to what she should do than doubtful about the legal
position…I get an impression rather of legal opinion being directed to fit
policy rather than the reverse’ (FO 371/84454).
Only four days before the General Committee debate on Tibet took place at
the U.N., Beckett reasserted his opinion that the legal position was clear, arguing that
‘a reference to the Attorney General is likely not to perpetuate the obscurity of the
legal situation, on which New York seem to be keen, but to dispel it if it exists’
(LO2/566). Despite his misgivings, Beckett was persuaded by the New York office to
consult with the Attorney General orally, and he recorded that an appointment had
been made for 22nd November.
Interestingly, handwritten notes made by the Attorney General, Sir Hartley
Shawcross, show that he concurred with Sir Beckett’s opinion. Replying to a letter
from New York which states:-
‘There is a slight misunderstanding on the question of Tibet on which
I believe you have been asked to advise.
We had here an opinion to the general effect that Tibet was to be
regarded as an independent State. It was not clear whether this was your
opinion or Beckett’s…’
Shawcross responded:-
‘No: I have not been asked to advise formally, but the papers which
deal in the core of this Foreign Office view seemed correct. I therefore said
that unless I was told on what view this position we had hitherto taken up was
challenged I saw no reason to disagree’ (LO2/566).
This was Shawcross’ written position on 4th December 1950, one week after
the appeal at the United Nations had occurred. It is highly likely, therefore, that this
had also been his position on the 24th November when the U.N. debate took place.
Indeed, it is probable that when he writes, ‘I therefore said that unless I was told on
what view this position we had hitherto taken up was challenged I saw no reason to
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disagree,’ that he was referring to what had been said in the meeting with Beckett on
the 22nd November. Due to pressure of time, the referral to the Attorney General did
not move beyond the informal level. This suited the purposes of the delegation in New
York, for it gave the British representative at the U.N. enough leeway to remain
uncommitted.
The correspondence highlights that the difference in opinion was political in
nature, and suggests that political influence was brought to bear on the legal advisors.
This diplomatic pressure is evident in notes made by the Solicitor General Baron Frank
Soskine, an acting Member of Parliament at the time. In a handwritten note to the
Attorney General, shortly after the Tibetan appeal to the U.N. had been adjourned,
Soskine suggested that Shawcross might like to look at the paperwork once more in
order to ‘form a considered view.’ However, earlier in his note he indicates that the
Attorney General had already given a considered view, although apparently one that
might cause political difficulty. ‘For the time being the Tibet issue has gone to sleep,’
he writes:-
‘If the matter does revive it would be politically very awkward if we
had to treat Tibet as an independent. My view on the information I had was
the same as yours…but in view of the importance of the question, if as I
gather you have not finally committed yourself, we might write to the F.O
saying that your view is not intended to be final’ (LO2/566).
The correspondence with the Attorney General is significant for several
reasons. Firstly, the particular file that contains these documents was classified under
the 50 year rule rather than the standard 30 year rule. Owing to the fact that it was
therefore released long after all other British government files on the subject, this has
meant that the correspondence has not been analysed in the key secondary texts.
Secondly, this is of significance because previous studies have given the
impression that Tibet’s legal status was held to be more uncertain than it in fact was.
That there was a disagreement between the British U.N. Delegation and the Foreign
Office was evident in previously released documents, but the new material removes
uncertainty about the nature of that disagreement. For example, Goldstein in his
authoritative survey states that the British Ambassador to the U.N., Sir Jebb, ‘argued
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that the Indians themselves had doubts about Tibet’s status as a state and that Britain
should therefore modify its views on the matter’ (Goldstein 1989:718). However, it is
suggested that the source material indicates there was no significant doubt about the
legal position on either the Indian or the British side. Placed in the context of other
correspondence, it is necessary to consider that Sir Jebb was attempting to influence
the outcome of the legal analysis for political reasons.
A second Tibetan appeal proposing a U.N. fact finding mission to Tibet was
prepared immediately by the Tibetan Government. As with the first appeal, the British
Foreign Office was supportive, but the British High Commission in India and the
British U.N. delegation were not. The High Commissioner was anxious to support the
Indian view and felt that encouragement of Tibet’s appeal would be regarded ‘as
further evidence of British interference’ (FO371/84455). The British U.N. delegation
felt that ‘in view of other issues now under discussion in the United Nations, we do not
consider that time is opportune for raising question of the Tibetan appeal, nor, if it
were, should we be willing to take the initiative ourselves in view of the Government
of India’s more immediate interest and responsibility in the matter’ (FO 371/93002).
The ‘other issues’ were the ongoing U.N. involvement in Korea, a situation cited by
the Government of India as a reason not to involve itself in Tibet. Linked to this was
Nehru’s statement that ‘if either the United Kingdom or the U.S. sponsored it, the
Chinese would inevitably talk of Anglo-American imperialist influence…even if India
sponsored it the same accusation might be made’ (FO 371/84454). Beyond this lay the
issue of India’s aggressive occupation of the Indian princely state of Hyderabad in
September 1948, with the Indian external ministry expressing concern that
involvement in Tibet would incite pro-Chinese nations to ‘drag out [the] old skeleton
of Hyderabad’ (U.S. Department of State 1950:546). The issue of Hyderabad had first
been placed before the Security Council in 1948 and remained on the agenda in 1950
without any resolution (Engleton.1950:279). Indian anxiety reflected similar concerns
within the British Foreign Office, but in relation to Tibet’s status remained
ambiguous:-
‘The United Kingdom has many protected States enjoying internal
autonomy but whose foreign relations are entirely conducted by H.M.G. We
certainly wish to maintain the position that questions between the U.K. and
these States (and indeed all colonial conflict) are domestic matters in which
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the U.N. has no rights under the charter to interfere. If we adopt a sort of half-
way house position we may be creating precedent which can be used against
us in the future’ (FO 371/84454).
These events surrounding Tibet’s appeal to the U.N. highlight several
significant factors. Firstly, although the proposal by El Salvador prompted the most
thorough evaluation of Tibet’s legal status to date, consideration of its status was
overshadowed by other affairs. Secondly, a primary concern was that a resolution
would raise the issue of enforcement under Chapter VII. Thirdly, in connection with a
perceived inability to enforce a resolution, there was anxiety about any ‘loss of
prestige’ for the U.N. Finally, there was anxiety about complications in connection
with the issue of colonialism, including Western involvement in matters devolved to
India, and continuing British relations with its protectorates. Likewise, in the case of
India, there was concern that its outward independence and resistance against
imperialism be maintained, yet its military occupation of the legally independent state
of Hyderabad (‘in area, population and financial strength…larger than many Members
of the United Nations’ (Eagleton 1950:302)) be treated as a matter of internal security.
6.7 The Seventeen Point Agreement and Tibet’s Changing Status in the
Postcolonial World
The second Tibetan appeal did not reach committee stage, for following
further advancement by the PLA and in light of diplomatic obstacles, the Tibetan
Government began direct negotiations with Beijing. The result of this, given Lhasa’s
inability to defend itself against the PLA troops, was the Seventeen Point Agreement,
handed over sovereignty to China with provisions for Tibetan regional autonomy. The
status of Tibet, much like Hyderabad, was therefore left unresolved. Given the
Security Council had been willing to consider the case of Indonesia, then under the
jurisdiction of the Netherlands, it is clear that there was a precedent for considering the
Tibetan appeal even if the full extent of its international personality was unclear. This
was in fact a point raised by the U.S. Ambassador to India at the time of Tibet’s
second appeal: ‘Is it logical for the U.N., which gave Indonesia which was under
Dutch sovereignty hearing, to ignore Tibet? Will India, for example, have greater
respect for the U.N. if mainly out of deference to it, the U.N. gives Tibet no
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opportunity to present its case’ (U.S. Department of State 1950:612). This comment
underlines the significant position that India occupied.
Its position is significant, not simply because the United States and Britain
were anxious to defer to India’s postcolonial status, but because the Indian
government’s policy involved a consolidation of normative values regarding
modernisation and development that mark the final erasure of the Tibetan state. The
politics of Nehru, who expressed considerable impatience with Tibetan viewpoints on
modernisation, reflect this dynamic. As far back as 1926, Nehru had established the
League Against Imperialism in cooperation with representatives of the Kuomintang,
Java, Indo-China, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Arabs from North Africa and with members
and patrons such as Einstein and a Nobel Laureate of Literature, Romain Rolland
(Nehru.1942:162-163). In 1927, Nehru issued a joint statement with the Chinese
delegation at the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities which declared:
‘British Imperialism, which in the past has kept us apart and done so much injury, is
now the very force that is uniting us in a common endeavour to overthrow it’
(Addy.1994:38). It is easy to see, therefore, that Nehru positioned himself as part of
the international vanguard and from this vantage, the Tibetan insistence on maintaining
an unindustrialised state, with minimal administrative organs, seemed irrelevant for the
modern postcolonial age. Indeed, he told the British Commissioner in 1959 that India’s
interest in Tibet was ‘historical, sentimental, and religious and not essentially political’
(FO371/141593).70 As the historian Goldstein puts it, ‘Tibet looked modernity straight
in the eyes and rejected change and adaptation. Its leaders saw Tibet’ greatness in its
religious institutions and held strongly that these should be continued without
competition or contamination from ‘modern’ institutions such as public schools or a
professional army’ (Goldstein 2007:1).  In 1951, institutions associated with the
modern state administration were largely absent. Tibet had no print capitalism, no cash
economy, no meaningful military, was unindustrialised and had no infrastructure.
There were few schools, no public health system and no banks. The government
bureaucracy was small, as were the costs of administration. State intervention into the
lives of the citizens was minimal, confined to administrating the tax obligations of the
aristocracy and peasantry. The primary purpose of this tax was to maintain the
70 In a similar vein, Nehru told the British High Commissioner that ‘he felt great sympathy for the Tibetans, but they were rather
difficult to help, for they were so ignorant of the modern world and its ways’( FO371/141593).
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monasteries by providing food and welfare resources to the 10-20% of the population
under monastic training.71
For Nehru, the role of the state was very different to that proposed by Tibetan political
thought:-
‘It can hardly be challenged that, in the context of the modern world, no
country can be politically and economically independent even within the
framework of international interdependence, unless it is highly industrialised
and has developed its power resources to the utmost. Nor can it achieve or
maintain high standards of living and liquidate poverty without the aid of
modern technology in almost every sphere of life. An industrially backward
country will continually upset the world’s equilibrium and encourage the
aggressive tendencies of more developed countries’ (Nehru 1946:144).
This is, therefore, an affirmation that peace is a matter of material
development and Nehru’s pragmatic, materialistic vision accords well with the type of
peace and stability promoted by international human rights law, particularly with
regard to second generation rights. There is a tacit acceptance that the state cannot be
based upon a theory of non-violence; on the contrary, violence may be necessary to
secure basic rights.72 As observed by Rajagopal, this sense of legitimate violence is
embodied in human rights discourse, so that for example, ‘the mass deportation of 1.5
million people from Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge in 1975 is argued to be a crime
against humanity, while the mass eviction/deportation of 33 million development
refugees from their homes due to development projects such as dams, by the Indian
Government, is simply seen as the ‘social cost’ (if at all) of ‘development’’ (Rajagopal
2003:195).
Nehru’s political thought anticipated this, correlating state existence with
development, industrialisation being the essential measure of equality and civilisation
in the postcolonial world, marking the arrival of modernity. This is, perhaps, best
71 Tax in the form of corvée labour also ensured the running of the national post, communities being under obligation to provide
transport and labour along the route (Goldstein 2007:1-16).
72 See Rajagopal (2003:195) for a more nuanced discussion of the link between human rights, development and state violence.
For Nehru’s acceptance of the necessity of violence, see Nehru (1942:Ch 63) ‘Conversion or Compulsion’.
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summed up by Nehru’s’ opinion on Ghandi, a figure who was, and remains, of
supreme influence to the Tibetan Government both before and after exile:73
‘the old ways of thought and custom and religion had become alien to
us. We called ourselves moderns, and thought in terms of ‘progress,’ and
industrialisation and a higher standard of living, and collectivisation. We
considered the peasant’s viewpoint reactionary…vaguely we had hoped
Gandhiji…would advance along the line that seemed to us to be right’ (Nehru
1942:254-255).
Writing about comparable comments made by Nehru elsewhere, Chatterjee
concludes:-
‘The critical point of Ghandhism’s ideological interventions was now
pushed back into the zone of the ‘purely religious’ or the metaphysical; only
its political consequences were ‘real,’’ and having been ‘retrieved from the
irrational trappings of its ‘language,’ the possibilities were endless: it could
justify everything that was progress’ (Chatterjee 1986:154).
There is a comparable dynamic evident in Mao’s policy for assimilating Tibet
into China. From the outset, Mao acknowledged that because of linguistic, social and
cultural differences, the incorporation of Tibet required a different strategy to that of
other areas classified as belonging to minority nationalities such as Inner Mongolia and
Sikiang. These presented less difficulty, in part because a larger Han population
existed in these areas, and also because Mao recognised that, ‘Although the population
of Tibet is not large, its international position is extremely important’ (Goldstein
2007:23). As late as 1957, Mao was reiterating the uniqueness of Tibet’s position
amongst the minority nationalities in his speech on the ‘correct handling of
contradictions among the people,’ in which he denounced ‘Great Han Chauvinism’.
With regard to Tibet, Mao announced the postponement of democratic reform
‘because conditions are not yet ripe’ and called for patience as ‘According to the
Seventeen Point Agreement between the Central People’s Government and the Local
Government of Tibet, reform of the social system must eventually be carried out’
73 The influence of Ghandi was discussed with Ven.Samdong Rinpoche, the Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile,
in an interview with the author in July, 2002.
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(Ginsburgs and Mathos 1959:259).  Tibet was the only region to be incorporated into
the PRC by such a written agreement, and it established the basis for wide ranging
social and economic development. In comparison with the mainland, however, this
reform was, in the first half of the 1950’s, considerably less far reaching. The Tibetan
legal system continued to function, for example, whilst in China following the repeal
of all legal codes from the Republic of China, the PRC’s legal system was largely
dismantled.74 The land reform movement on the mainland, in which private property
was confiscated and redistributed by the state according to the Agrarian Reform Law
(1950), was similarly delayed in Tibet.75
The Seventeen Point Agreement brought to an end Tibet’s appeal at the U.N.,
and effectively marks an end to the issue of Tibet’s legal status in international law,
with the next considerations of the General Assembly in 1959, 1961 and 1965 being
confined to the issue of human rights.76 The issue came before the U.N. at that time
following the breakdown of the Seventeen Point Agreement. This resulted from an
increasing compulsion on the part of the Central Government for reform in Tibet, with
Eastern Tibet in particular being forcibly reformed through such means as the
destruction of monasteries.  This led to a mass Tibetan uprising against the Chinese
and the voluntary exile of the Tibetan Government and numerous civilians (Shakya
1999:Ch 5; Norbu 1979; Shwartz 1994). The Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet,
convened by the International Commission of Jurists, presented detailed evidence to
the U.N. in 1959 and 1960 and found ‘that Tibet was at the very least a de facto
independent state when the Agreement on Peaceful Measures in Tibet was signed by
the Tibetan Government in 1951 and the repudiation of this agreement by the Tibetan
Government in 1959 was found to be fully justified’ (International Committee of
Jurists 1960:5). On this basis, the committee took the view that the agreement was a
treaty. The Tibetan Government’s unilateral termination of the agreement on the
grounds of violation by the PRC was held to have effected the resumption of Tibet’s
independent status, so that there was ‘no obstacle in the Charter of the United Nations
74 The 1949 Common Programme, a provisional constitution, put in place 148 regulations dealing with marriage, land reform,
corruption and the destruction of ‘class enemies,’ but with a mass purging of existing Kuomintang judiciary few formal cases were
brought to court.
75 See Shakya (1999: Ch 4 and 5) for a detailed analysis of how reform was implemented and resisted in Tibet between 1951 and
1959, including the events leading up to the Khampa revolt.
76 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1353 (XIV), 1959. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1723 (XVI), 1961. U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 2079 (XX), 1965.
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to the matter being raised before and decided by organs of that body’ (International
Committee of Jurists 1960:5), However, the Seventeen Point Agreement’s status as a
treaty remained unresolved, with the PRC maintaining the agreement to be an internal
constitutional matter.
Leaving aside the question of the legality of the Agreement, it is clear that the
successful assimilation of Tibet was seen to rest on the effective development and
modernisation of the country. The Agreement as a whole is framed, in the preamble, as
part of a wider effort to expel domestic and foreign imperialism ‘in order that the
Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the
Peoples Republic of China to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all other
nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural and
educational work.’77 This sentiment was affirmed in Article 1, which stipulated that
‘The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressor forces’ and ‘return
to the big family of the Motherland.’ With the overall sovereignty of China
established, and the position of the PLA affirmed (Article 2), the provision for ‘the
right of national regional autonomy under the leadership of the Central People’s
Government’ was dealt with in Article 3. This was in accordance with the policy
towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme (1949). Articles 4, 5, 6,
and 7 further defined the scope of autonomy, specifying that the Central Government
would ‘make no change to the existing political system in Tibet’ nor alter the
‘established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and that officials of
various rank shall hold office as usual’ (Article 4). Specific provisions were also made
with regard to the status and function of the Panchen Lama (Article 5 and 6).
Additionally, Article 7 detailed ‘The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in
the Common Programme’ and that ‘the religious beliefs, customs and habits of the
Tibetan People shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central
authorities shall not effect a change in the income of the monasteries and temples.’
This protection of traditional institutions and religious rights was, however,
from the outset potentially in conflict with the policy on development outlined in
Article 9 and 10. It was these articles as much as articles governing the entry of the
75 The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful
Liberation of Tibet, 23 May 1951: Preamble.
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PLA (Article 2 and 13) and the construction of military and administrative
headquarters (Article 15 and 16) which established the basis for Tibet’s integration.
Article 9 provided for development of the spoken and written language and for school
education. Article 10 stipulated development of ‘agriculture, livestock raising, industry
and commerce, step by step, and improvement of people’s livelihood.’  Both of these
policies came with the proviso that development would occur ‘in accordance with the
actual conditions in Tibet’. There was, however, an assumption that the masses would
support development and that a wide scale dismantling of the old social system would
occur organically as a direct result. This was something anticipated by Article 11,
which held that there would be ‘no compulsion on the part of the central government
for the local government of Tibet to carry out reforms’ but that reform would be settled
when ‘requested by the people.’
Fundamentally, the position adopted by Mao was in accordance with Marxist
historical materialist theory, assuming ‘a progressive development of human society
towards greater union and the eventual overcoming of cultural, racial and linguistic
barriers’ (Perry 1994:62). The concessions made for minority nationalities in this
context were, therefore, an indication of backwardness rather than an appreciation of
the value of their difference. By 1959, when the Seventeen Point Agreement broke
down, the primary point of conflict was the impossibility of the central government
reconciling the policy of development it envisaged in Article 9 and 10 with the
continued existence of religion as protected under Article 7. The breakdown is
particularly evident with regard to conceptions of productive labour and resource
management; within the context of the central government’s development plan,
religion was not simply ideologically incompatible with communist thought, it was
economically unproductive. The centrality of this issue is evident in articles published
by the Chinese Communist Party in Tibetan language papers in Eastern Tibet in 1958
which condemned monasteries as reactionaries under religious guise and stated that
‘the economic and cultural backwardness and sparse population (of Tibet) was due to
the poisonous effect of religion’ (International Commission of Jurists. 1960:19-20). As
concluded in the International Commission of Jurists Report, between 1951 and 1959:-
‘the overall picture is one of increased production, improved
communications, the building of houses, hospitals and power stations, the
abolition of feudal incidents and a general drive towards materialistic
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progress. The basic question is for whom and for what, and the account of
living conditions in Tibet indicates that the material progress in Tibet is being
absorbed by the Chinese, even at the cost of the previous living standards of
ordinary Tibetans. Moreover, the price paid for the development of Tibet had
included genocide against the Buddhist religious group, and also the large
scale violation of the most basic of human rights’ (International Commission
of Jurists 1960:117).
It was noted earlier that McKay, in his research of British diplomatic archives,
concluded that in the period following the Younghusband invasion of Lhasa, ‘there
was no dispute between the two powers [Britain and the Republic of China] over the
ideological model which Lhasa should follow for China was herself modernising on
the Western model. The point was who would control the process’ (McKay1997:15).
The Seventeen Point Agreement effectively brought this debate to a close, for despite
an ideological split between the West and China on the issue of socialism, the
commitment to state centred modernisation remained central to both. The occupation
of Tibet by the PRC did not in itself resolve the issue of Tibet’s status, so in that regard
there was no legal closure in 1951. The PRC, from 1951 onwards, has maintained the
position that the Seventeen Point Agreement was an internal arrangement, not a matter
of international law. It is not therefore attributed with conferring legality through
cession: its primary function was to stall debate on Tibet’s legal status at the U.N.
Adding to this impression, the Agreement remains unpublished by the Secretariat of
the U.N., although this reflects the fact that the PRC was not a member of the U.N. in
1951, and therefore not subject to Article 102 of the Charter, as much as it reflects the
legal and political controversy over status.
The effect of the Seventeen Point Agreement being widely treated as a
domestic matter is that it returns the issue back to the consideration of the Simla
Convention. The Simla Convention therefore remains key, being a recognised
international treaty insofar as it was published by Britain and relied upon by India for
the establishment of the Indian border, particularly within the context of the Indo-
China War of 1962. It does, however, present a contradictory representation of Tibet as
an entity straddling the colonial and postcolonial worlds, with the capacity to enter into
treaties, but without regional equality. The argument of the PRC that the Simla Treaty
was an unequal treaty and void in international law therefore finds some logic,
reflecting a general shift from the hierarchies of the nineteenth century to the state-
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based system visualised at the San Francisco Conference. It also deemphasises the
contradictions of postcoloniality, pushing back the conflicts that emerge within the
state centred development model of the Charter-based system of rights protection.
Indeed, the Seventeen Point Agreement reflects well the modern ideal of affording
special rights to minorities. In this, the significance of the split from the imperial-
positivist era, associated with an absolutist conception of sovereignty, and the more
fragmented concept of capacities, rights and obligations that emerged at the end of the
twentieth century, is shown to be something more than a rejection of unrealistic
formalism in favour of pragmatism. It seals the legitimacy of established nation-states,
not just territorially, but ideologically, by creating an illusion that transnational
engagement in justice at the level of broad rights groups within civil society will
resolve the dilemma that etatization poses to local subjects (Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981), Convention on
the Rights of the Child (1989), Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work (1998)).
The disaggregation  of sovereignty in the second half of the twentieth century,
with its blurring of the boundaries between public and private and the creation of hard
and soft law, therefore constructs its own peripheries which act to exclude what was, in
the case of Tibet at least, more visible in an era renowned for inequality and exclusion.
To revisit the arguments made in the first half of this chapter, the analysis of
Crawford’s discussion of Tibet prior to 1951 as an example of an autonomous region
illustrates, particularly when compared to the separate discussion of vassal states, the
effect of legal discourse’s imperative to construct continuity and coherency. Part of
this dynamic, visible in his discussion of the vassal states of British India, involves the
suppression of colonialism from what is the ‘legitimate’ historical narrative of modern
legal rationality. It is also indicative of a wider temporal displacement, in which the
progressive ethos of modern international law is presented as universally aspirational
and founded in practice, yet still largely autonomous from the particularity of historical
location and political will.
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Nonetheless, the history of the second half of the twentieth century provides
ample evidence to conclude, as Nathanial Berman does, that ‘the end of empire has
merely revealed most states to be imperial’ (Berman 1988:255). This presents a
disjuncture between the progressivist narrative of international law’s evolution from
colonialism, and the normative foundations of the modern nation-state which assert
‘the isomorphism of people, territory and legitimate sovereignty’ (Appadurai
1996:191). The question then becomes whether the suppression of colonialism in the
narrative of international law is genuinely progressive, or whether it really masks
undercurrents of violence and exploitation embedded within the state structure itself. A
key point here is made by Appadurai in his discussion on the production of locality,
and that is that ‘there do not seem to be any very reliable links between state ideologies
of welfare, market, economics, military power, and ethnic purity ... [yet]...they appear
to pose a rather similar set of challenges to the production of neighbourhood by local
subjects’ (Appadurai 1996:190). Despite apparent disparity in debates upon the ideal
mode of state governance across the political spectrum, and despite international law’s
general insistence that the resolution of such debate is, within bounds, a matter internal
to states, is there a normative template for state development impelled by the
overarching value system of modernity, which constrains local difference?
Appadurai’s work upon the production of locality suggests this to be the case, even if
the increased circulation of people, and transnational formations of locality, such as
diaspora or virtual networks, threaten the stability of the nation-state: ‘From the point
of view of modern nationalism, neighbourhoods exist principally to incubate and
reproduce compliant national citizens –and not for the production of local subjects.
Locality for the modern nation-state is either a site of nationally appropriated
nostalgias, celebrations and commemorations or a necessary condition of the
production of nationals’ (Appadurai 1996:191). For Appadurai, then, local subjects,
whilst still ‘in a position to generate contexts as they produce and reproduce their own
neighbourhoods,’ are nonetheless ‘increasingly prisoners in the context producing
activities of the nation-state which makes their efforts to produce locality seem feeble,
even doomed’ (Appadurai.1996:186).
The argument here is that the ‘obscurity’ of Tibet’s legal status reveals
something about the politics of knowledge and how the postcolonial is viewed within
international law. The failure to assess the legal status of Tibet at the time the
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Seventeen Point Agreement came into force does not explicitly reveal an imperialistic
disregard for a non-western culture comparable to that found in the standard of
civilisation. The British position, for example, was not impelled by any assessment of
how civilised Tibet was, but by concerns about the prestige of the United Nations,
enforcement, and the attitude of India. However, a standard of civilisation remains
implicit; not so much in what was said at the time, but in what has not been said in
subsequent years. It is reflected not so much in a debate about the civilised status of
non-western cultures, but in the shared faith in development displayed by the
Seventeen Point Agreement and human rights discourse, a faith which closes the
debate on how different philosophies of development might emerge from societies
such as Tibet, and what that might mean for how state, community and progress are
regarded.
Generally, the relevance of Tibet to international law is presented as being
about the implementation of rights in the PRC, as related to the Seventeen Point
Agreement construction of autonomy, rather than any evaluation of Tibet’s status as a
sovereign state. Continued treatment of the Seventeen Point Agreement as a domestic
document coincides with a general disciplinary distaste for discussion of Tibet’s status,
and a sense that a preoccupation with sovereign status is an irrelevance in a global
environment of complex legal interactions between governmental and non-
governmental organisations and an increasingly universal implementation of rights and
development. The continual deferment of the question of Tibet’s status away from a
meaningful appraisal of the Seventeen Point Agreement and the events of 1951, back
towards 1914, is related to this dynamic. Between these two documents, the space for
any articulation of what Tibetan statehood may mean has been erased. This erasure is
not simply about the lack of evaluation of statehood in the juridical sense; it also
involves the stalling of any debate upon alternative philosophies of the state, a debate
that perhaps cannot be had within contemporary disciplinary models of human rights.
As Rajagopal discusses, ‘While human rights discourse celebrates the retreat of the
state, the realisation of human rights is predicated on the expansion of the state’
(Rajagopal 2003:189) and that expansion is itself at odds with the minimal state system
of Tibet. At issue, therefore, is how postcolonialism should be assessed. The Simla
Treaty and the Seventeen Point Agreement present the limits not only of Tibetan
statehood, but of how the state is thought about as a philosophically founded social
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project. In relation to this, the historically deterministic approach of Crawford’s
analysis on Tibet’s status, in which ‘the Chinese view in 1951’ affirmed that ‘Tibet
was not in 1914 regarded as independent’ (Crawford 1979:210) is perhaps best
assessed as a reflection of the contradictions involved in the postcolonial in
international law; involving at once a pushing away of the imperialistic past and a
reaffirmation of the continuity with which the present attains value. The erasure of
Tibet from subsequent legal discourse is in this sense an example of the effect
described by Bhaba, for whom:-
‘the project of modernity is itself rendered so contradictory and unresolved
through the insertion of the ‘time-lag’ in which colonial and postcolonial
moments emerge as sign and history that I am sceptical of the transitions to
postmodernity in the West which theorise the experience of the ‘new
historicity’ through the appropriation of a ‘Third World’ metaphor’
(Bhaba1991:195).
The assessment of imperialism and its relationship with nineteenth century
international law is essential to explaining the events of 1951, but it is, perhaps, only
through a reassessment of the postcolonial that that the absence of discussion of
Tibet’s status in international legal discourse can be explained. Rather than being a
peripheral subject, its very marginalisation marks its significance by disrupting how
difference and history are considered in the space of the present, and by raising
questions about what the ‘post’ in postcolonial really means.
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Chapter Seven
As the plane descends, I am in low spirits, my mind is dazed,
Oxygen is supplied and medicine swiftly poured.
As I lie in bed, we speak first of the riots,
Sure enough, beyond the bowstrings, there are separate sounds.
Overtly opposing the government, instigating fury among the masses,
Secret plans in sinister rooms, moving forward their malicious intentions.
I lean on a stick to go up to [the building], we have detailed deliberations,
These violent people have themselves to blame for the bitter fruits.
Chen Kuiyuan, ‘Return to Lhasa (28 May 1993)’78
7:1 Introduction
In 2001, a PRC government White paper was published which argued that the
modernisation of Tibet was an historical inevitability (Information Office of the State
Council 2001). Leaving aside for a moment the question of the legality of the PRC
takeover of Tibet, this chapter will focus upon the legal framework governing regional
autonomy within which this process of modernisation has taken place. What
inevitability means in this context, and its relationship to legitimacy, is key to
understanding the nature of Tibetan autonomy within the PRC. It also locates PRC rule
over Tibet within a wider narrative of modernity which, by utilising the evolutionary
language of progress so beloved by Western imperialism, raises some interesting
parallels and paradoxes. As the White paper puts it: ‘Tibet's march toward
modernization conforms to the world historical trend and the law of development of
human society… from ignorance and backwardness to civilization and progress.’ That
this civilisation and progress has been achieved because ‘the isolated, stagnant and
declining old Tibetan society has been thoroughly smashed’ is a mark of the
ambivalence of autonomy, for despite the language of natural inevitability it is the
violent intervention of the man-made state that is shown here as the impetus of change.
This contradiction undercuts the narrative of progress and reveals the intrusion of state
78 This poem, written whilst Chen was acting as the Regional Part Secretary to the TAR, was published as part of a collection in
Lantian baixue ('Blue Sky, White Snow'),Beijing Chubanshe, Beijing, 1999. The translation was provided by the Tibetan
Information Network (TIN Doc 33(sd)).
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mechanisms to shape and define the legitimate features of ‘traditional’ minority culture
for modern times. Hence the White paper asserts:-
Tibet's ethnic characteristics and the fine aspects of its traditional
culture have won full respect and protection under the regional ethnic
autonomy system; with the progress of the modernization drive, they have
been imbued with the current contents that reflect the people's new life and
the new requirements of social progress, and have thus been carried forward
in a process of scientific inheritance.
A slightly different perspective on inevitability is offered by the poem that prefaces
this chapter. The poem was written by the Han Chinese official Chen Kuiyuan, who as
the Regional Party Secretary in the Tibetan Autonomous Region occupied the highest
position of authority in Tibet from 1992 to 2000. The inevitability alluded to by Chen
is that of state reaction to ‘sinister’ and ‘malicious’ dissent.  In the oxygen-starved
space he describes, the government is the medicine and ‘these violent people’ have
only ‘themselves to blame’ for the consequences of resisting treatment. As a self-
conscious contribution to, and engagement with, ‘high’ culture Chen’s politically
charged collection of poems undercuts the articulation of egalitarianism that ethnic
autonomy seeks to maintain. It signifies the disjuncture between the state’s act of
modernising and its gestures of minority right protection, where traditional cultures are
continually translated into the language of the modern state. Change is inevitable, but
its conformity to the normative values of modernisation is not. That will depend upon
who controls the process of cultural translation between past and present, and for Tibet
this is perhaps the true measure of genuine autonomy.
7:2 The Seventeen Point Agreement
Tibet’s position was unique in that it was the only minority nationality region
to be incorporated into the PRC by a legal agreement, the Seventeen Point Agreement
of 1951.79 The agreement remains a touchstone of PRC claims to legitimacy, often
cited today as evidence of the central government’s commitment to peaceful reform
79 Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of
Tibet, 22 May 1951.
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and its patience in dealing with a wayward local government.80 This reflects the
preamble, which stated:
In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet
might be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and
sovereignty of the People's Republic of China accomplished, and national
defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan ethnic group and people might
be freed and return to the big family of the People's Republic of China to
enjoy the same rights of national equality as all the other ethnic groups in the
country and develop their political, economic, cultural and educational work,
the Central People's Government, when it ordered the People's Liberation
Army to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send
delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion of an
agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.
The Agreement was the result of negotiations between the Tibetan and
Chinese Governments following the defeat of Tibetan forces in Khams by the PLA.
The Tibetan Government lacked the military capabilities to mount further resistance to
any PLA advance to central Tibet, and so sent a delegation to Beijing to conduct peace
talks. The delegates were not given full plenipotentiary powers and did not carry the
official seals of the Tibetan Government, meaning that the Agreement was not
formally ratified.81 For this reason, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile has argued that
the Agreement had no legal validity. The argument has also been made in secondary
literature that the agreement was void because it was signed under the threat of force.
This point is supported by Article 52 of the Vienna Convention which states that an
agreement imposed by ‘the threat or use of force’ lacks validity. Certainly, the claims
made by the Tibetan delegates that they were told to accept the terms offered or face
the military invasion of Lhasa have weight given the fact that 40,000 PLA troops were
already stationed in Khams. Nonetheless, as a point of law this particular argument on
‘the effect of duress on treaties’ is uncertain, the counter argument being that peace
treaties, resulting as they do from acts of war, are by their very nature signed under
duress (Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet. 1960:164).
80 As the official PRC history of Tibet puts it, ‘Such a lenient agreement signed between a militarily powerful Central
Government and a local government that has been far from patriotic during negotiations is truly rare.’ (Wang and Nyima
2001:214).
81 The Agreement was signed and stamped by the delegates, but not with the official Tibetan Government Seal.(Tenzin Gyatso
the 14th Dalai Lama. 1990:69).
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In the specific case of Tibet such an argument, in order to be consistent,
would have to be extended to other treaties which have been cited as evidence of
Tibetan independence. Thus, the validity of the peace treaty between Tibet and Nepal
in 1856 would be open to question. Likewise the 1904 Agreement between Great
Britain and Tibet, which was clearly concluded under threat of force, would be void.
The paradox therefore arises that if the Seventeen point plan is considered invalid
under Article 52, so to would the treaties of 1856 and 1904. Yet, the treaties of 1856
and 1904 are cited by the Tibetan Government in Exile as evidence of Tibet’s
international legal personality.
This is in fact the position that the PRC takes towards the 1904 Lhasa Treaty,
considering it void because it was signed under duress. As such the PRC position has
been that the 1904 treaty was not legally binding.  The definition of inequality applied
by the PRC has generally led to a far more stringent test of validity than that provided
for by the Vienna Convention. The PRC considers the 1904 treaty to be an unequal
treaty due to political and economic factors also, as indeed it does all British-Tibetan
treaties. This was one of the arguments that the PRC put forwards during the Sino-
Indian boundary dispute that led to the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The PRC argued that
the Simla Convention of 1914, which fixed the Indo-Tibetan border, was a product of
imperialism imposed without consent and thus disputed India’s right to succession of
territory (Chen 1974:192). If these same stringent criteria on equality were to be
applied to the Seventeen Point Agreement then it too would be considered an unequal
treaty. Evidently the PRC has argued that the Seventeen Point Agreement is not an
international treaty but an agreement between a central and local government; the
preamble of the agreement is used to express this very point. Nonetheless, this
represents a basic contradiction in how a valid agreement between two governments is
concluded.
The Seventeen Point Agreement is a contradictory document in many ways.
Its status as a treaty was unclear from the outset. As discussed in Chapter Six, the
Tibetan Government undertook negotiations only after an appeal to the United Nations
had been adjourned.
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That discussion adds to the understanding of the Seventeen Point Agreement,
for the international context in which the Seventeen Point Agreement came into being
explains contradictions within the document. Despite the PRC’s insistence that the
Agreement was an internal one, the document does not provide straightforward support
for this view. Article 1, for example, states that ‘the Tibetan people shall return to the
big family of the Motherland, the People’s Republic of China,’ indicating that Tibet
was not part of the PRC when negotiations took place. Article 8 makes clear reference
to the fact that Tibet had an independent military and was in charge of its own defence:
‘Tibetan troops shall be reorganised step by step into the PLA and become a part of the
national defence of the PRC.’ Article 14, meanwhile, specifies that ‘the PRC shall
have centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet.’ That there was a
necessity to clarify this particular issue is an acknowledgement that the Tibetan
Government had previously conducted its own foreign relations. Paradoxically,
therefore, the Agreement which legitimises PRC control of Tibet serves to draw
attention to the fact that Tibet was not, at the time the agreement was negotiated,
simply one more province of China and nor, does it seem, did China treat it as one.
Underlining this point is the fact that throughout the peace talks China referred to the
Tibetan representatives as plenipotentiaries, an unusual choice of title to use for local
delegates.82
There are further significant contradictions in the document that serve as
warning flags for conflict that was yet to come. Article 3 states that ‘the Tibetan people
have the right to exercise national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of
the Central People’s Government.’ The problem here is that the nature of the ‘unified
leadership’ to be exerted by the central government remained uncertain, particularly in
relation to Article 4, which states: ‘The central authorities will not alter the existing
political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established
status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold
office as usual.’ Yet, central control was already a significant alteration of the existing
political system in Tibet. This contradiction was further compounded by Article 15
82 A 2011 PRC government White paper that cites official sources from the time describes the Tibetan delegation thus: ‘The
plenipotentiary representatives included the Chief Representative Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, and Representatives Kemai Soinam
Wangdui, Tubdain Daindar, Tubdain Legmoin and Sampo Dainzin Toinzhub’ (Information Office of the State Council 2011). As
mentioned earlier the Tibetan government stopped short of granting full plenipotentiary powers to the Tibetan delegation, the
intention being only to conduct preliminary negotiations. China’s use of the term plenipotentiary forms part of its argument that
the Agreement was legitimate.
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which stipulated ‘that In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the
CPG shall set up a Military and Administrative Committee and a Military Area HQ in
Tibet.’ The conflict this posed to Article 4 is clear. It should be noted that this
provision stated that personnel were to be provided by the Central People’s
Government, with local, patriotic, Tibetan personnel being appointed only where
possible and only if approved by the central government.
Nonetheless, the Agreement did allow for significant autonomy for Tibet.
Article 4 was backed up by Article 11, which provided that: ‘In matters relating to
various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central
authorities. The local government of Tibet shall carry out reforms of its own accord,
and, when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of
consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.’83 Given the dual religious-political
system of Tibet law and governance which channelled both economic and political
power into the monasteries, Article 7 too is significant: ‘The religious beliefs, customs
and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and lama monasteries shall be
protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the
monasteries.’
For all its contradictions and flaws, and despite its contested origins, what is
striking about the Seventeen Point Agreement is that it allowed for the continuation of
a different political system within the borders of the PRC. This is evident in the actual
terms of the agreement and also in its implementation, for under its terms the Tibetan
legal system continued to operate, with Tibetan courts deciding cases on the basis of
Tibetan law codes (French 1995a; Ginsburgs and Mathos 1959). Additionally, Tibet
was exempt from reforms that were implemented throughout the rest of China. As late
as 1957, Mao distinguished Tibet from other minority nationalities explaining that
reform would not be carried out in Tibet and could only go ahead ‘when the great
majority of the people of Tibet and their leading public figures consider it
practicable’(Mao 1957). The Seventeen Point Agreement offered something far
beyond the type of autonomy that had been implemented for minority nationalities
elsewhere in China.
83 Goldstein has pointed out that during negotiations the term ‘local government’ was translated into Tibetan as ‘the government
of an area’ misleading the Tibetan delegation (Goldstein 1989:765).
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It is not uncommon for secondary literature dealing with regional national
autonomy in the PRC to discuss Tibet primarily within the context of the PRC’s
general policy for minorities. Such an approach tends to de-emphasise the Seventeen
Point Agreement. This is, I would suggest, because it is an anomaly and as such
disrupts the narrative of legislative development. As shall be discussed below the
general legislative framework governing minorities in the PRC is indeed essential to
understanding the nature of Tibetan autonomy in its current form. However, the
significance of the Seventeen Point Agreement as a piece of of PRC legislation should
not be underestimated.
The Agreement has, of course, remained controversial. From the point of
view of the Tibetan-Government-in-Exile and its supporters the Agreement was made
between two independent governments and is therefore an international treaty. As
argued above the international diplomatic context adds to an understanding of the
Agreement and merits its discussion within the context of international law. However,
it is not necessary to abandon this argument in order to consider the position of the
Seventeen Point Agreement within the context of PRC law. The PRC does, after all,
maintain that it was a valid domestic legal agreement.
A critical point is that the Seventeen Point Agreement implemented a type of
autonomy that has far more in common with the ‘one-country-two systems’ approach
found in the Basic Law governing Hong Kong and Macao than it does to the
framework governing minority nationality regions.  The PRC government has
remained hostile to such comparisons, stating in a 2004 White paper on Tibet that:
‘The situation in Tibet is entirely different from that in Hong Kong and Macau. The
Hong Kong and Macau issue was a product of imperialist aggression against China; it
was an issue of China’s resumption of exercise of its sovereignty’ (Information Office
of the State Council 2004). Yet, the Seventeen Point Agreement suggests otherwise,
specifically citing imperialist aggression as the root cause of the need for Tibet to
‘return to the Motherland’.  Contrary to what the White paper argues, this seems to
reinforce the similarity between the Tibet and Hong Kong rather than lessen it.
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The same White paper states that the ‘peaceful liberation [of 1951] laid the
foundation for regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet’ and that ‘the establishment of the
Tibet Autonomous Region marked the full implementation of the regional ethnic
autonomy in Tibet’(Information Office of the State Council 2004). The implication
here is that the Seventeen Point Agreement was only ever intended to be transitional.
Certainly, in the same 1957 speech mentioned above Mao commented that ‘according
to the Seventeen Point Agreement reached between the central government and the
local government of Tibet, reform of the social system must eventually be carried out’
(Mao 1957). Whilst this reveals political intent it also clearly overstates what is in the
actual agreement and implies an element of compulsion that was not explicitly
provided for. The Agreement provides for military reorganisation in line with the
central takeover of defence and foreign relations, but it does not stipulate that social
reform must occur. At best, the only Article that supports such a statement is Article
10, which states that ‘Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce
shall be developed step by step and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by
step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.’ Mao’s speech therefore
highlights the profound contradictions within CCP policy on Tibetan autonomy.
By 1959 these contradictions had created extensive conflict between the
Tibetan and Chinese governments. The Tibetan government’s primary complaint was
that reform was being forcibly implemented in contravention of Article 11. This shift
towards coercion led to the 1959 Tibetan uprising. This resulted in the Dalai Lama
going into exile, where he repudiated the Seventeen Point Agreement.  Meanwhile, in
Tibet the central government pushed forwards with Democratic Reform, and in 1965
central Tibet became incorporated into the wider framework of regional national
autonomy as the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
Mao’s speech of 1957 and the White paper of 2004 present difficulty to the
rule of law narrative which has been carefully constructed by the PRC in recent years.
On the one hand the Seventeen Point Agreement has been incorporated into this
narrative of rule of law.  On the other hand, presenting the Agreement in this fashion
only serves to draw attention to the fact that its provisions for significant autonomy
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were, in practice, subservient to a policy of assimilation.84 In both cases the Agreement
has been subjected to a political reinterpretation that seems inconsistent with the
original document. What is interesting about this is that whilst in many ways the
Seventeen Point Agreement is an anomaly within the context of PRC minority
autonomy law, its susceptibility to the politics of assimilation is a shared feature with
other PRC minority legislation. It is precisely because it is anomalous that the
Seventeen Point Agreement deserves to be considered part of a general legislative
trend, for it disruption of the evolutionary narrative constructed around PRC minority
autonomy law sheds light upon the wider context within which that law takes form.
One of the effects of this is to highlight the disparity between reform-era
policies that have ‘led to a reflorescence of minority identities’ and the historical
cultural reality from which these newly (re)emerged identities are derived (Sautman
1999:84). Regional National Autonomy Law is one aspect of a growing body of
‘ethnic law’ (minzu fa) which seeks to equalise economic, cultural and political
relations between Han and non-Han in China. A significant corpus of this law involves
preferential policies which benefit minorities in diverse sectors such as family
planning, school and university admissions, employment, regional subsidies and tax
breaks (Sautman 1998). Such provisions are not confined to minority issue specific
legislation and are found in a range of national laws such as Tobacco Monopoly Law
(1991, Article 6) and Mineral Resources Law (1996, Article 10) (Sautman 1999:289).
In this regard China leads the way internationally.85 The development of such
legislation has very rightly challenged a ‘Western discourse on human rights in China
[that] typically assumes that China’s minority rights law must be a sham because
China is an authoritarian state’ (Sautman 1999:283). Nonetheless, there remains a
fundamental contradiction between the state’s role in protecting minority rights and its
84 See Judge Sefariade, Dissenting opinion, Lighthouse in Crete and Samos case, P.C.I.J, Series A, Nos. 20/1, Judgement 14
(1929), p.44. The term assimilation is here used to highlight the process by which the CCP sought to implement policies of reform
in Tibet that had already been implemented elsewhere in China. There is however a longstanding debate about Chinese ethnic
policies in which ‘assimilation’ is distinguished from ‘integration.’ This suggests a spectrum of ethnic incorporation, in which
assimilation is the most extreme form and involves minorities losing their unique characteristics. Integration, meanwhile, involves
minorities retaining ethnic characteristics within a new political context where both Han and minority sectors of the population
adjust their political identification (Sautman 1999:300).
85 For an international comparison of preferential policies, see generally Sowell (2005).
198
role in defining the limits of those rights within a one-party system that restricts
minority participation.86
7:3 Regional National Autonomy in the Mao Era
The legal origin of autonomous ethnic governments within the PRC as a
whole dates back to the 1949 Common Programme, and it is from this document that
the Seventeen Point Agreement took its authority.87 The provisions in this interim
constitution for autonomous administrative bodies at the regional, provincial,
prefectural and county levels reflected an ongoing debate in the republican era
concerning federalism, which fluctuated between the unequivocal rejection of a
multiethnic society, and the notion that ‘the government should help and guide the
racial minorities in the country toward self-determination and self-government’ (Sun
1953:10). The CCP made strategic use of inconsistencies within Kuomintang policies
by promoting a unifying version of federalism that sought to bring the outlying
territories into a PRC state. This vision of federalism was deployed throughout the
1930’s and 1940’s when the CCP was endeavouring to attain central control. During
this period the party endorsed, in the form of a constitution and a written resolution,
the concept of autonomous self-government and self-determination for ethnic
minorities, and promised them the right to secede and form their own states (Lee
2001:274).
Nonetheless, despite this element of voluntarism, the emphasis was upon
solidarity and unification was the goal. In the context of international class struggle
Marxist theory rejected nationalism as a final outcome. More immediately, the
minority nationalities also figured prominently in the PRC’s strategy for national
security, for whilst the minority nationalities only comprised 6 percent of the PRC
population, they inhabited nearly 60 percent of PRC territory, much of it in border
86 Of particular relevance is the requirement for party members to be atheist, which prevents the participation of religious
minorities in the party. There is a lack of minority representation within the CCP generally, particularly within its higher strata
(Sautman 1999:297). Figures for the 7th TAR’s People’s Government (1998-2003) show 58 percent of chairmen were Tibetan and
that 42 percent of top officials in the TAR Regional Party Committee were Tibetan. The Regional Party Secretary has never been a
Tibetan. To place this in the wider context, statistics for all political and administrative bodies in the TAR suggest that only 34
percent of regional department level officials and above were Tibetan. In their analysis of this data, Conner, Barnett and Shakya
(1997) argue that the posts occupied by Tibetans in the TAR are of a nominal, decorative nature.
87 The Common Program of The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, September 29th 1949.
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areas.88 The significance of this was bought into focus by the Second Sino-Japanese
war, the minority nationalities playing a critical role in national defence. Mao’s 1938
speech on ‘CCP Policy On Minority Nationalities’ placed particular importance upon
this:-
In view of the enemy's scheme to split the national minorities in the
country which they have put into effect and are now trying to expand further,
the eighteenth item of our present task is to unite all nationalities and to fight
together with them against the Japanese. ….In the common struggle against
Japan, they shall have the right to handle their own affairs and at the same
time to unite with the Hans in building a unified country (Mao 1938:7).
It is clear that the CCP believed the minority nationalities were strategically
essential to the success of China and that this had a strong influence on policy both
before and after the founding of the PRC in 1949.  It is also clear that from the outset
the policy on minority nationalities contained contradictions. Minority nationalities
were to have the right to handle their own affairs, yet the requirement ‘to unite with the
Hans in building a unified country’ suggested a process of assimilation. Underlying
this was the contradiction inherent to the ‘common struggle’ against foreign
imperialism, for whilst the minorities helped to defend the Han mainland the flip side
of this was that the minorities represented a unique vulnerability.
These concerns helped to shape policy on regional national autonomy, and
indeed still form the backdrop of autonomy policy today. As the government’s White
Paper on minority autonomy in 2005 puts it:-
At the critical moment when China faced the danger of being carved up,
and when the nation was on the verge of being subjugated, the Chinese people
of all ethnic groups united as one, and put up the most arduous and bitter
struggles against foreign invaders in order to uphold the country's sovereignty,
and win national independence and liberation (Information Office of the State
Council 2005).
88 These figures are common across the literature, but importantly they are cited in primary sources originating from to the CCP
(Mao 1956:55; Shaoqi. 1956:60).
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However, although this common struggle against aggression has been the
general framing language for minority policy, Tibet has always been set apart. The
preamble of the Seventeen Point Agreement suggests a very different dynamic when it
states:-
And the Local Government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist
deceptions and provocations, and adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards our
motherland. Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were
plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering.
As discussed above the Seventeen Point Agreement provided for a very strong
form of autonomy but this was undercut by an increasing political requirement for
assimilation. One of the results of this requirement was the abandonment of the
Agreement and Tibet’s incorporation into the legislative framework that governed
minority nationalities in the PRC as a whole. This process has not remained
uncontested. That conflict has persisted is evident in the 1989 mass unrest in Lhasa
which marked the 30th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising and led to the
declaration of a state of emergency. More recently, in 2008 mass riots in Lhasa led to
the region being closed to outside observers. Tibet’s distinction from other PRC
minorities has potential relevance to this conflict. If minorities who had supported the
struggle against foreign imperialism represented a potential weakness in state security,
then the risk posed by Tibet was double fold. Similarly, if autonomy was about co-
opting the minorities in the socialist endeavour, the nature of Tibet’s incorporation into
this framework only highlighted the contradiction between autonomy and central CCP
control.89
When the CCP gained power these contradictions were embedded in the 1949
Common Program, which allowed for the creation of autonomous areas ‘where minority
nationalities are concentrated’ (Article 51). Setting the standard still in place today, the
Common Program declared that any act threatening to split ‘the unity of the various
nationalities shall be prohibited’ and exhorted that all nationalities ‘shall oppose
89 The challenge that the 1959 Uprising represented to the CCP was significantly increased by the popular nature of the revolt.
Despite the PRC’s insistence that it was the work of upper class ‘feudalists’, in fact the participants did not emerge from one
particular economic class. This is usefully discussed in Norbu (1979).
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imperialism and their own public enemies’ (Article 50).  Despite this after the party
came to power it initially allowed laws to be made at the provincial level under a
multi-layer legislative system (Pahn 1996:91). However, this multi-layer system was
abolished in the 1954 constitution, and whilst autonomous regions for minority
nationalities were still provided for legislative control was returned to the centre.
This shift towards greater central control was foreshadowed by the General
Program of the People's Republic of China for the Implementation of Regional
Autonomy for Minority Nationalities (1952), which provided a more detailed
framework for regional autonomy than that given by Article 51 of the Common
Program.  130 national autonomous regions had already been established by the time
the General Program was promulgated, and it was clear that the party felt it necessary
to clarify the limits, and the purpose, of autonomy. A brief survey of the document shows
the manner in which this was to be achieved. Minority nationalities were guaranteed the
right to form people’s governments in autonomous areas, with proportional
representation for other nationalities inhabiting the same regions (Article 12).
Accordingly, an autonomous government could draft ‘special regulations for the area’
providing they were ‘within the limits of its autonomous jurisdiction’ (Article 23) and
could carry out internal reforms ‘in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its
people’ (Article 18).
The legislation imposed potentially significant limits. Article 2 stressed that
autonomous organs were local governments operating ‘under the unified leadership of
the central people's government.’ Article 3 emphasised the importance of central
policy in this process by stipulating that ‘in administering the internal affairs of their
own nationality, the people in each national autonomous region shall advance along
the ‘general line’ set by the Common Program. Meanwhile, Article 34 highlighted the
paternalistic nature of the central government’s relationship to minorities, stating that
‘The people's governments of higher levels shall take appropriate measures to acquaint
the people of the national autonomous regions with the advanced experiences and
conditions in political, economic, and cultural development.’ The clearest indication
that regional national autonomy was seen as a means to achieve to greater unification
is given in Article 35. ‘The people's governments of higher levels shall educate and
assist the people of all nationalities in observing an attitude of equality, fraternity,
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unity, and mutual assistance among the nationalities, and in overcoming all tendencies
to domination by the majority nationality or to narrow nationalism.’
In a report made the week the General Program was promulgated Ulanhu, the
Vice-Chairman of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, highlighted the nature
of the contradictions autonomy posed, asking ‘Since we believe in progress toward
universal harmony, why should we now bring about regional autonomy for
nationalities? Will its implementation foster narrow nationalism?’ The answer, he
suggested, was:-
It is just because we want all nationalities to go forward together into a
future where all mankind shall live in peace, because we want to eliminate
narrow nationalism, and because we want to hasten and enhance the political,
economic, and cultural development of areas inhabited by minority
nationalities that we must establish regional autonomy for nationalities
(Ulanhu 1952:23).
From this point of view there was no contradiction between regional
autonomy and socialist unification, for autonomy was a method to achieve unification
rather than a means of protecting cultural difference. However, this leaves another
contradiction unresolved, for if the version of autonomy on offer is one that dictates
that the goal is the end of autonomy, the question must asked: is this is any kind of
autonomy at all?  If this is a contradiction present in the general framework governing
minority legislation in the PRC, it is a contradiction that is particularly significant in
the case of Tibet which was bought back to the motherland with an agreement that ‘the
central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet’ (Seventeen Point
Agreement, Article 4). In many ways the development of legislation on autonomy in
the PRC can be seen as an attempt to resolve, or at least contain, this contradiction.
Shortly after the creation of the TAR in 1965 these contradictions between
autonomy and the socialist unification became the source of intense division within the
party. With the onset of the Cultural Revolution it was declared that the nationality
issue was, in the final analysis, a class issue. Accordingly, those who supported
regional autonomy were accused of advocating national separatism and ‘obliterating
the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Heberer 1989:24). The Cultural
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Revolution’s insistence that the cultural differences of minority nationalities were a
problem of class led to a systematic attempt to abolish minority customs, costumes,
languages and scripts. Preferential policies were abolished on the grounds that they
ultimately prevented minority nationalities from participating in the revolution.
Agencies for the minorities were abolished, as were many autonomous regions.
The TAR survived as an administrative unit throughout this period, but the
aggressive and coercive attempt at assimilation during these years led to the wholesale
abandonment of the features of autonomy that had survived the democratic reforms of
1959. It was not until the post-Mao period that regional autonomy was rehabilitated as
a method of dealing with the minority issue. However, despite the massive
regeneration of minority cultural institutions that this prompted, in the case of Tibet
there has never been a restoration of the kind of autonomy implemented under the
Seventeen Point Agreement. On the contrary, after a brief period of liberalisation in
the 1980’s, there has been a shift back towards greater central control. In the
contemporary setting, however, this has been implemented through legal mechanisms
rather than direct policy, and this has formed part of the PRC’s engagement with
international standards for rule of law.
7:4 Regional National Autonomy in the Post Mao Era
The current legal framework for autonomy was established by the 1982
Constitution which recognises two types of autonomy. Article 4 establishes regional
autonomy for minority nationalities. Article 31 allows the state to ‘establish special
administrative regions when necessary,’ prescribed by law ‘in the light of the specific
conditions’. The implementing legislation for Article 4 is the Law on Regional
National Autonomy (LRNA), first promulgated in 1984 and revised in 2001. It is this
legislation that governs autonomy in Tibet. Article 31, meanwhile, provides the
authority for the ‘one country two systems’ type of autonomy implemented in Hong
Kong and Macao.
Article 4 lays out the basic features of minority autonomy, placing it in the
context of state protection of equality. Autonomy is granted ‘where people of minority
nationalities live in compact communities’ and it stipulates that ‘the people of all
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nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written
languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs.’ Article 4 is fleshed
out by Section 6 of the constitution which outlines the basic functions and powers of
‘the Organs of Self-Government of National Autonomous Areas’, and provides the
authority for autonomous areas to enact and adapt legislation subject to central
approval (Articles 115 and 116). The articles in this section are subsequently repeated
and elaborated upon in the LRNA.
Although commentators have remarked on an explosion of local level
legislation in recent years, legislation in Tibet does not follow this pattern. It must be
recognised that the definition of autonomy is not legally precise. There is considerable
uncertainty as to what exactly autonomous legislative powers should and can be vis-à-
vis the over-arching principle of ‘democratic centralism’ (LRNA, Article 3).  Articles
19 of the LRNA allows National Autonomous Areas (NAAs) to ‘enact regulations on
the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations in the light of the political,
economic, and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the area
concerned’ and Article 20 grants power to modify any central legislation for local
requirements. However, Article 5 places NAAs under obligation to uphold the unity of
the PRC and to guarantee the implementation of other laws. There is no clarification as
to what exactly these other laws are and this question remains un-addressed in the
relevant legislation of the TAR People’s Congress (Keller in McCoquodale and Orosz
1994:65). Furthermore, any legislation or modification originating from TAR
administrative bodies requires approval from the Standing Committee of the NPC
(Article 19 and Article 20). Critically, the very nature of Tibet’s incorporation into the
PRC potentially makes any exercise of legislative autonomy a threat to national unity
and subject to central veto. Certainly, local legislation has consistently followed in the
footsteps of central directives. Furthermore, compared to other major provinces in
eastern China the TAR has enacted fewer laws in fewer areas (Keller in McCoquodale
and Orosz 1994:65; Chao 1994;  Cho 2006).
Recent changes in education policy serve to clarify this point. A significant
piece of autonomy implementing legislation passed by TAR congress was the Trial
Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the Tibetan Language (1987). The
regulations were in keeping with Article 10 of the LRNA, which guarantees NAAs’
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freedom to develop their own languages. It stipulated, inter alia, that by 1997 most
subjects in secondary and tertiary institutions would be taught in Tibetan and that
Tibetan would be used in official documents and meetings. Significantly, it also
stipulated proficiency in Tibetan to be a qualification for government employment
(UNPF 1997:Ch.6.3.3). However, the regulations have never been implemented.
Instead, by 1997 only one of seventeen courses at Lhasa University was taught in
Tibetan and a Chinese official who did not speak the Tibetan language was the
university head (UNPF 1997:Ch.6.3.3). The central government has since pursued a
policy of promoting Mandarin Chinese as the primary language of instruction at the
secondary and tertiary level, and whilst Tibetan language classes are provided for in
the syllabus such classes are supplementary rather than foundational.
Underpinning this development was a perception in the government that the
Tibetan language creates nationalist sentiment. Certainly, as most Chinese cadres in
the region cannot readily understand Tibetan, security issues are undoubtedly of direct
concern to Chinese authorities.90 However, there is evidence to suggest that there was
a strong ideological basis for this shift in policy and that this has remained a driving
force of policy since. This shift is associated with Chen Kuiyuan, who was appointed
TAR Party Secretary in 1992, although this is not to presume that the shift is the result
of one individual. The appointment of Regional Party Secretaries in the PRC is a
highly secretive process carried out by the Party's Central Committee in Beijing. It is
worth noting here that whilst one of the Four Cardinal Principles on which Chinese
politics is based is ‘Leadership by the Communist Party’, China’s autonomy laws do
not provide for the role of minorities in the Party (UNPF 1997:Ch6.3.1). The TAR
Party secretary has never been a Tibetan, and whilst a Tibetan occupies the highest
government position in the TAR, the post affords only nominal power (TIN 2001:8).
In 1994 Chen participated in the Third Tibet Work Forum, which set the
guiding principles for work in the region. Work Forums have been the main policy
organ for Tibet since 1980 and ultimately dictate the requirements of local legislation.
90 Compounding this anxiety over national security is the fact that many refugees go into exile to seek an education, access to
education being guaranteed to all refuges by the Tibetan-Government-in Exile. When I worked at a Tibetan school alongside the
U.N Tibetan Refugee Reception Centre in Nepal (1999-2000), it was evident that a significant number of the refugees, who
arrived weekly, came to be educated, with lay people primarily seeking Tibetan and English language instruction. Religious
education was also cited as a reason to undertake the formidable journey across the Himalaya.
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Chaired by the General Secretary of the CCP, even the Regional Party Secretary is
excluded from the working group (Conner, Barnett and Shakya 1997:39).91 Without a
doubt, policy decisions concerning Tibet are made at the highest level of the Party.
The 1994 Forum was important for it ushered in a new hard-line set of policies for
Tibet and initiated increasing central control. These policies, although implemented
very quickly, have taken time to surface in formal legislation. However, much of the
legislation that has been promulgated since 2004, particularly that concerned with
religious issues, can be traced back to this Forum. Whilst there have been two other
Forums since, one in 2001 and another in 2010, the more recent Forums have not
demonstrated any significant shifts in policy (CECC 2010:219-232). For this reason
the 1994 Forum remains highly significant.
Shortly after the Third Forum, Chen firmly underlined the political
requirements of education in the TAR, stating that, ‘the essence of educational work is
to cultivate qualified constructors and successors for the socialist cause, and this is the
sole basic mission in ethnic education’.92 A key concern that arose in relation to this
was that use of the Tibetan language facilitated the spread of religious propaganda in
schools. Chen expressed sentiments such as these when he said:-
Splittist elements try to infiltrate the educational circle by using narrow
nationalism and religion. Scriptures have entered some schools and become
textbooks in the classrooms. Some students have joined the ranks of monks.
Some people purposely interpret this phenomenon as a national feature in an
attempt to legalise religious interference in educational affairs. 93
The basic premise here was that cultural autonomy interrupted the
transmission of correct political thought. In his speech Chen identifies a struggle over
the definition of authentic Tibetan culture in which autonomy law becomes a
battleground between the state and ‘splittist elements.’ ‘Narrow nationalism’ and
‘religion’ are both cited as threats. The suggestion is that there is some other from of
nationalism that can incorporate ‘Tibeteness’ but religion, it seems, cannot be
rehabilitated so easily. Religion is separated from other aspects of culture, and marked
91 The RPS is currently Chen Quanguo, who took office in 2011.
92 Chen Kuiyuan, in a speech during an inspection tour of Chamdo, November 1994. Cited in TIN 2001:13.
93 Chen Kuiyuan, Tibet Daily, October 28th 1994; cited here in TIN 1996:41.
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out as a dangerous interloper in national identity. Indeed, Chen’s suggestion that
religion is not an authentic ‘national feature’ is something he went on to argue with
great force in a 1997 speech. Stating that ‘we must distinguish the essence from the
dross’ when inheriting traditional culture he questioned if ‘Tibetan national culture’
was ‘equivalent to a Buddhist culture.’ To view them as synchronous is, he argued,
‘utterly absurd,’ for ‘Buddhism is a foreign culture’ that ‘came into being only a little
over 2,500 years ago.’ Thus, elevating religion serves only to weaken the nationality
and fuel separatism:-
The view of equating Buddhist culture with Tibetan culture not only
does not conform to reality but also belittles the ancestors of the Tibetan
nationality and the Tibetan nationality itself. […] Making use of religion in
the political field, separatists now go all out to put religion above the Tibetan
culture and attempt to use the spoken language and culture to cause disputes
and antagonism between nationalities, and this is the crux of the matter.94
It has been noted that whilst the system of regional autonomy in the PRC does
not offer significant political autonomy it does provide meaningful autonomy over
‘soft issues’ such as education, culture, the environment, sports, health care, and
science and technology (Moneyhon 2002:141;  Pahn 1996:107). Significantly absent
from this list is religion. In the past twenty years there has been a rapid proliferation of
central legislation regulating Tibetan religious activity that, despite its profound
implications for Tibetan culture, has emerged outside of the framework of regional
autonomy law. This will be the subject of detailed analysis in Chapter eight. What is of
interest here is that by placing education, the spoken language and culture in the frame
as potential vehicles of anti-state activity, Chen illustrated that even soft issues were
open to central state control. This is particularly so when these features are contingent
with religious activity, which he treats as a non-authentic add-on to Tibetan national
identity. Ultimately, these views were able to achieve consistency with the law
governing autonomy, for autonomy granted by the LRNA is always subject to central
government veto, and the legal framework is such that any centrally promulgated law
can take priority over regional legislation. Article 66 of the Legislation Law (2000)
makes the limits placed upon autonomous area legislatures very clear:-
94 Chen Kuiyuan, Xizang Ribao, 16th July 1997; cited here in Barnett 2001:12.
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Where certain provisions of the laws and administrative regulations are
concerned, adaptation on the basis of the characteristics of the local
nationality (nationalities) may be made in autonomous regulations and
separate regulations, but such adaptation may not contradict the basis
principles of the laws and administrative regulations; where the provisions of
the Constitution and the Law on Regional National Autonomy as well as the
provisions in other laws and administrative regulations specially formulated to
govern the national autonomous areas are concerned, no adaptation may be
made.
Whilst it is not unreasonable that NAA’s should lack capacity to amend the
constitution or the LRNA, the restriction on amendments to ‘other laws and
administrative regulations’ governing ethnic minority areas casts a potentially wide
net.  The failure of the ‘Trial Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the
Tibetan Language’ should be understood in this context. Despite the codification of
minority rights, protection is far from guaranteed when ‘other laws’ can be called upon
to implement policy concerned of with all aspects of Tibetan culture. In this case, the
introduction of Chinese language classes and the withdrawal of pilot studies to extend
Tibetan language teaching was inconsistent with the Trial Regulations. It was not,
however, inconsistent with Article 6 of the the centrally promulgated Compulsory
Education Law of 1986 (revised in 2006) which, whilst allowing for ethnic languages
as an option, called for the promotion of Putonghua (common speech based on Beijing
pronunciation).95 The Education Law of 1995 restates this provision (Article 12) and
reinforces central government control in the stipulation that ‘educational activities
shall conform to the State and public interests’ (Article 8).
On 22 March, 2002 the China Daily reported ‘the first government
regulation[s] ever passed in China on preserving an ethnic language’. The report
referred to the 'Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the Tibetan
Language' promulgated by the TAR congress the day previously (TIN 2003). These
new regulations remove the preferential provisions of its successor and rather than
providing for the gradual promotion of the Tibetan language over and above Chinese,
95 This provision has been excluded from the 2006 revision, but it has been retained in the Education Law of 1995. This concedes
that minority languages ‘may be used for instruction,’ but the emphasis is upon mandarin Chinese: “Putonghua (common speech
based on Beijing pronunciation) and the standardized characters designed for use throughout the country shall be widely used in
instruction in schools and other institutions of education.” (Article 12).
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place emphasis upon the equality of the two languages. In effect this raises the status
of Chinese and places non-Chinese speakers at a disadvantage.  Article 10, for
example, stipulates that the state should give priority to employing ‘those who are
proficient in the use of both Tibetan and the common national language’. The
‘common national language’ was defined by the centrally promulgated Law on the
Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language (2000), which places ‘local
governments and other relevant organs’  under obligation to ‘adopt measures to
popularise putonghua and to promote standard Han characters’ (Article 4).
The evolution of the Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the
Tibetan Language offers an instructive example of the process by which lawmaking in
autonomous areas can be moulded to central policy, even when it concerns ostensibly
‘soft issues.’ In their latest, significantly watered down, form the regulations have been
lauded by state media as an example of the progressive nature of ethnic governance
and as a triumph for the rule of law in securing minority rights. As the above analysis
shows, securing minority rights is a double edged sword, for as the features of Tibetan
culture have become increasingly subject to legal codification, the legitimate space that
it is allowed to inhabit becomes subject to increasing layers of legal restriction. The
new regulations are, in the final analysis, consistent with Article 10 of the LRNA,
which guarantees Autonomous Areas ‘the freedom to use and develop their own
spoken and written languages.’ Nonetheless, despite the framing language of equality,
this is a freedom defined by its exceptionality. That is, the freedom granted is the
freedom to depart from the preferred standard, and when this preferred standard
expands into greater areas of Tibetan cultural life the room left for such a departure
gets ever less.96
7:5 The 2005 Provisions on the Implementation of the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Regional Autonomy
The above analysis suggests that despite the withdrawal from the intense
assimilationist policies of the Cultural Revolution, there is reason to conclude that in
96 The impact of this language policy can be seen in a number of significant protests. An outbreak of protests in 2012, involved
thousands of Tibetan students and concerned the removal of Tibetan language textbooks in middle schools (CECC 2012:164).
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keeping with the approach of the General Programme autonomy is the method not the
goal. In other words, autonomy is a process by which the socialist modernisation of the
unitary state can be best achieved. As the preamble of the Constitution declares:-
The People's Republic of China is a unitary multi-ethnic state created jointly by the
people of all its ethnic groups. Socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual
assistance have been established among the ethnic groups and will continue to be
strengthened. In the struggle to safeguard the unity of the ethnic groups, it is
necessary to combat big-ethnic chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and also to
combat local-ethnic chauvinism. The state will do its utmost to promote the common
prosperity of all ethnic groups.
The 2005 Provisions on the Implementation of the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Regional Autonomy place this in perspective. Its thirty-five
articles do little to clarify the legislative functions of autonomous areas or to provide
for the enforcement of minority nationality rights. Rather the law expresses the wider
development plan of Beijing and sets priorities for achieving this.
Several of the provisions are articulations of existing state wide policies on
areas such as health (Article 26), welfare (Article 27) and education (Articles 19-21),
and where they make specific minority provisions, such as in preferential policies for
minority students accessing higher education,  the emphasis is upon bringing minority
areas up to the level of national standards. To this end the provisions layout
preferential policies on public finance and tax (Article 9 and 10), mechanisms to
provide financial loans (Article 11) and measures to support ethnic trade (Article 12
and 13). The state has placed itself under an obligation, albeit not necessarily an
enforceable one, to ‘intensify the poverty relief and development of ethnic autonomous
areas’ (Article 16), a goal that is to be further met through the mobilisation of ‘non-
public sectors of the economy’ for aid in infrastructure and utility (re)construction
(Article 17).97
The 2005 implementation measures expand upon amendments to the Regional
National Autonomy Law made in 2001, where Articles 55, 61 and 65 were amended to
stipulate preferential policies on investment, trade and resource extraction. In as much
97 Articles 30-32 provide for the supervision of the implementation of the provisions.
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as the 2005 provisions were already largely actionable under the existing legislation
they are therefore best read as a statement of intent; a directive on where focus should
be placed, rather than a clarification of the existing legislative function of autonomous
areas.
The 2001 additions to the preamble of the Regional National Autonomy Law
offer additional insight into what this process entails —and the language does
emphasise that it is a process— adding for example, that ‘regional national autonomy
shall be adhered to and perfected continuously so that it will have a still greater role to
play in the country’s socialist modernisation in the years to come.’ The amendments
stipulate that autonomous areas shall ‘persevere in reform and opening to the outside
world’ and that they shall ‘develop socialist market economy, strengthen the build-up
of socialist democracy and legal system, strengthen the build-up of socialist spiritual
civilisation.’ The goal the preamble sets is the transformation of the unitary
multinational state into a socialist country that is ‘prosperous, powerful, democratic
and culturally advanced.’
The key words are ‘prosperous’ and ‘powerful’, to which might be added the
term that appears in the introductory articles of the implementing provisions: ‘ethnic
solidarity.’ Such language suggests that the Autonomy Law has been positioned within
the wider context of state development. In 2000 a government white paper proposed a
twenty year plan for China to achieve the status of a developed country, and launched
the ‘Western Development’ plan to bring the western regions, including the TAR and
other Tibetan autonomous areas, up to the level of the east.
Given the fundamentally universalistic ethos behind this vision of socialist
modernisation, and the fact that it is largely centre driven, it raises clear challenges to
the exercise of regional autonomy. This raises the question of whether the existing
legislation is robust enough to protect autonomy and Tibetan cultural rights. As
discussed above it is apparent that the lawmaking process gives the central government
significant freedom to pursue policies in Tibetan Autonomous Areas that may have
profound impact upon areas seemingly protected under the LRNA. It is therefore
instructive to consider what the implementing provisions bring to this framework.
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Development is evidently not a culturally neutral process. The implementing
provisions themselves suggest as much. Article 5, for example, contains the first
reference to culture in the document, where it is cited as something to be developed
alongside ‘economy, education, science, technology’ and ‘health, sports, etc.  so as to
realise the overall, concerted and sustainable development.’ This tidy separation of
‘culture’ from other components of society and state, combined with the notion that it
too is something to be developed raises fundamental questions about the nature of
Tibetan autonomy in the PRC. Indeed, by positioning culture in this way, asserting it
to be a discrete, free-floating unit, the state is effectively taking control of the act of
definition. This means that the space left for articulating what ‘culture’ is, or is not,
becomes circumscribed by state demands.  Article 5 provides that the government
‘shall solicit the opinions of the autonomous areas’ when formulating mid and long
term economic and social development plans, but without a clear obligation for
consultation, or any requirement to meet certain thresholds of consensus, decision
making remains a top-down rather than bottom-up process.
Other provisions in the document support this analysis. The term culture
appears another four times. Article 14 calls for special measures to integrate and
develop the ‘inhabitance, living, culture, education, medical health, environmental
protection, etc.’ of border areas, with an emphasis on the significance of such areas to
national security and defence. Article 15 sets much the same requirement for minority
areas generally, only without the emphasis upon defence and security, stating that:-
The superior people's governments shall integrate the areas inhabited by
ethnic minorities into the economic and social development plans, and give
them more support, especially in the aspect of transport, energy, ecological
environment protection and construction, rural infrastructure construction,
radio, film and television, culture, education, medical health, mass production
and living, etc.
Article 18, outlines further methods of development by seeking  greater
engagement between economically developed areas of China and ethnic autonomous
areas in order to ‘accelerate the development of economy, culture, education, science
and technology, and sports.’
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There remain two articles that approach an articulation of specific protections
of minority culture. The first is Article 24 which stipulates:-
The state shall lay emphasis on the inheritance and development of the
traditional culture of ethnic minorities, regularly hold traditional sport games of
ethnic minorities, and give cultural and art performances of ethnic minorities to
promote the ethnic cultural and art creation and enrich the cultural life of all ethnic
groups.
The article also provides for state support in translating, publishing and
broadcasting minority languages. The state does however retain a clear supervisory
role, specifying an ‘emphasis on the public-good cultural cause in ethnic forms and
with ethnic characteristics.’
Article 25 offers the most straightforward expression of cultural protection in
the provisions:-
The superior people's government shall support the protection and
rescue of the non-physical cultural heritage, ancient and historical sites,
cultural relics and other material cultural heritage of ethnic minorities, shall
support the collection, sort-out and publishing of ancient books of ethnic
minorities.
As important as this protection is to the preservation of the history and
memory of the Tibetan nation, in the context of a document that emphasises centre led
development it creates a sharp contrast.  Set against the drive to socialist modernisation
it suggests that autonomy is an act of curatorship, an act of acknowledging the past
without allowing it to divert the state from its chosen path of progress. That this
progress is separated from the functions of autonomy is, I would suggest, a reflection
of this dynamic. Progress is a duty derived from the state gift of cultural rights. Hence,
Article 34 creates the obligation that autonomous areas must ‘formulate concrete
measures in accordance with the present Provisions, and report their implementations
to State Council.’
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In a 1956 speech Mao discussed the relationship between the Han and the
minority nationalities. Reminding the audience that minority nationalities occupied 50-
60 percent of the territory of the PRC he said:-
We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large
in population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population is
large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose
resources are rich, or at least in all probability their resources under the soil
are rich.
The air in the atmosphere, the forests on the earth, and the riches under
the soil are all important factors needed for the building of socialism, but no
material factor can be exploited and utilized without the human factor. We
must foster good relations between the Han nationality and the minority
nationalities and strengthen the unity of all the nationalities in the common
endeavour to build our great socialist motherland (Mao 1956).
The LRNA implementing provision achieves continuity with this exhortation,
and it is within this context that the drive to development and resource extraction
should be placed. Autonomy is, in this context, the effective management of the
‘human factor’ that facilitates this process. As Article 1 states, the provisions are ‘For
the Purpose of helping the ethnic autonomous areas to accelerate the economic and
social development, enhancing the ethnic solidarity and promoting the common
prosperity for all ethnic groups.’ Article 3, meanwhile, stresses that autonomous areas
shall ‘actively protect the interests of the state as a whole.’  Between these statements
of purpose and obligation falls Article 2, which requires people’s governments at all
levels to strengthen public awareness of existing law and policy and to develop further
measures ‘so as to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the ethnic minorities.’
The preliminary conclusion drawn here is that whilst language of rights protection seems a
noble public face for the law this is belied by its mechanisms of action, for as legislation
proliferates the space within which culture can be expressed is subject to ever greater
restriction. Set against this, the educative role of the law inferred by Article 2 suggests a state
controlled process of identity creation and recalls Foucault’s thesis that ‘Discipline “makes”
individuals; it is the specific techniques of a power that regards individuals both as objects and
as instruments of its exercise’ (Foucault 1995:170).
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In the past decade the use of legal education as a tool of social engineering
has reached full expression in the compulsory ‘Patriotic Education Drive’ carried out
in Tibetan monasteries and nunneries. As noted earlier, recent legislation governing
Tibetan religious activity has been enacted outside the framework of Regional
National Autonomy. A particular feature of this engagement with religion is the use of
the law to create and transmit a historical narrative that shapes Tibetan national
identity, and it is this which will be examined in Chapter eight.
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Chapter Eight
8:1 Introduction
With regards to the unique characteristics that mark out religious policy in
Tibet, there is a correlation with developments in the policy of regional autonomy
which has mapped a similar path. It is clear, however, that whilst the system of
regional autonomy has provided a framework which allows the state to manage ethnic
difference, there is a separate regulatory system, centre led and party controlled, that
has shaped religious policy China wide. There are a number of interesting observations
that arise from this. Legislation concerned with regulating religious activity has
developed rapidly in the past decade. Much of this recent legislation has been
formulated and issued by the central government. This includes legislation designed to
deal with the specifically Tibetan Buddhist tradition of reincarnation lineages.
Evidently Tibetan religious activity is perceived to be of critical importance to the
unity and stability of the country as whole.
A consistent argument made in official Chinese sources is that the conflict
between Tibet and China is primarily a product of the British invasion of Tibet in
1904. Specific to this is the notion that Tibetan nationalism was artificially created by
the British, along with the myth of Tibetan independence, in order to further British
imperial interests. It is clear that the British involvement had enormous ramifications
for the legal status of Tibet, but the question that remains unanswered is why, if the
Sino-Tibetan conflict is indeed the result of British imperialism, should the locus of
conflict remain so resolutely centred upon matters of religion?  Certainly, British
government sources show that it was policy to encourage Tibetan nationalism and
consolidate Tibetan independence. However, what was striking about this policy is that
it aimed to develop a uniquely secular Tibetan identity. To this end the British
sponsored the Tibetan nobility, and actively sought to coalesce a distinctly modern
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Tibetan nationalism around such cultural imports as football, sweet tea drinking and
British military dress (McKay 2001, Goldstein 1989:Ch3). 98
These activities were encouraged amongst the lay nobility, and were
perceived by the religious establishment as a direct threat to Tibetan society.
Additionally, this emphasis upon developing the secular components of Tibetan
government ran counter to a structural bias within the Tibetan social system that
favoured ecclesiastical power over and above that of the nobility. This bias resulted
from the requirement to give land and resources to reincarnated lamas and their
families. As incarnations did not restrict themselves to being (re)born into the nobility
the situation developed in which limited resources were constantly circulated amongst
an ever expanding group. In these circumstances it was the nobility that suffered, their
land being confiscated to meet the needs of the newly reincarnated (Goldstein 1973).
The British engagement with Tibetan nationalism was therefore a direct intervention
into the balance of power in Tibet at a time when this recirculation of land had made
the system inherently unstable.
The British engagement with Tibetan nationalism was on many levels a
failure. The scale of this British intervention was highly limited in comparison with the
intervention of the PRC after 1951. There are parallels to be drawn, however, with the
emphasis both governments placed upon the value of secular rule. Certainly it places
significant doubt upon PRC claims that current Tibetan unrest derives from the
creation of this elite and distinctly secular form of nationalism in the early twentieth
century. Following on from this, it must be asked how much of the continuing Sino-
Tibetan conflict derives from ideological difference rather than material circumstance.
This question opens up enormously complex areas of debate, and cuts to the heart of
the contradictions and continuities in PRC thinking about the Tibet issue. If this
question can be answered at all, and I suspect that it will resist closure, then it must
involve cross-disciplinary study of an array of social and economic factors that are
beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, ideological difference is placed squarely
in the frame by the PRC’s guiding principle that materialism is the route to liberation,
98 In the primary sources there are some illuminating files detailing the British attempt educate a modern Tibetan elite suitable for
secular rule, see in particular IOR L/PS/10/536-540
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a belief that is difficult to reconcile with the Buddhist tenet that attachment to material
existence is the barrier to liberation rather than its cause. The notion that material
progress will bring about the natural withering away of religion has remained a
consistent touchstone of PRC policy since 1951. Significant tension has developed in
relation to this for Tibetan religious activity has proved remarkably resistant to change.
This raises inevitable challenges to the official party line, which has trod a contentious
path between coercion and persuasion in response.
Buddhism is one of five officially recognised religions in China, these being:
Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam.  As such it enjoys legal
protections and privileges that are not afforded to faiths that fall outside of these five
religions.99 Buddhism has more followers than any other religion in China (Laliberté
2011:109). In recent years Chinese Buddhism has undergone a significant revival and
has steadily gained political influence, particularly at the local level. The CCP has
shown support for this revival, a trend linked to the fact that Chinese Buddhism
provides revenue to local governments, projects an image of the PRC ’as a rising
power striving toward “peaceful development”’ and facilitates dialogue with Taiwan
(Laliberté 2011:110). Tibetan Buddhism, however, is significantly different from
mainland Chinese Buddhism. Tibetan Buddhism has remained resistant to socialist
assimilation in a way in which Chinese Buddhism has not. The two traditions are
philosophically different as well as historically grounded in different cultural and
political institutions. Due to the perceived political threat of the Dalai Lama, religious
activity in Tibet is routinely regarded as a threat to national security. Essentially,
Tibetan religious activity is equated with Tibetan resistance, and is seen as more
dangerous than the equivalent in the Chinese population.
This Chapter considers the development of legislation governing religious
activity in the PRC. It reveals contradictions in the attempt to create a coherent body of
law that outwardly projects a broad tolerance of private religious belief and the attempt
to adapt religion to socialism. The state seeks to derive legitimacy from an espousal of
materialistic progress that is set in contradistinction to feudalistic and backward
cultural traditions. As such Tibetan religious activity is presented as an irrational
99 Religious organisations are required to register with one of five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations. Those that do
not, or cannot, affiliate with one of these associations are denied legal protection under Chinese law.
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obstacle to social and economic progress. Yet, despite efforts to separate religion from
politics, the PRC has become increasingly involved in the daily management of
Tibetan Buddhism. The attempt to adapt religion to socialism has forced the state to
engage with metaphysical and historical realties in a way that undermines its ‘rule of
law’ rhetoric. An examination of the contradictions in official attempts to regulate
religion reveals the limitations of the state’s ideological commitment to modernity.
This engagement also challenges the view that present day Sino-Tibetan conflict is a
product of British imperial intervention. Whilst the PRC’s territorial claim to Tibet can
be seen as part of a defensive response to Western imperialism, this cannot adequately
explain the ongoing threat that Tibetan Buddhist activity presents to the CCP.
8:2 Background
Chinese policy on religion in Tibet since 1951 can be divided into five
periods. Broadly speaking these reflect developments in CCP thinking on religion
throughout China and are therefore not unique to ethnic Tibetan areas. However, this is
not to say that there are not unique characteristics in how these policies have taken
effect and in many ways it is apparent that Tibet has been treated as a special case.  At
times religious activity in Tibet has been subject to more liberal policy than the
equivalent in the mainland, and at other times it has been subject to relatively greater
coercive control.
1. The Seventeen Point Agreement (1951-1959)
The first period, in particular, is unique, for it covers the period in which the
Seventeen Point Agreement was in force. The pace of socialist reform was limited by
Article 11, which states ‘In matters relating to various reforms in Tibet, there will be
no compulsion on the part of the central authorities.’ The administrative reach of
socialist reform was limited by Article 4 which states ‘The central authorities will not
alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the
established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks
shall hold office as usual.’ Finally, the impact socialist reform had upon religion was
limited by Article 7:-
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The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the common
programme of the CPPCC shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs
and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and lama monasteries shall
be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of
the monasteries.
These provisions protected central Tibet from measures implemented in
mainland China, where agricultural land belonging to Buddhist temples and
monasteries was confiscated and redistributed under the Land Reform Act of June
1950 (Welch 1961:2). Thus, by 1953 agrarian land reform in the mainland was largely
complete and many monks and nuns, being deprived of income, had rejoined the laity.
In Tibet, meanwhile, such change had yet to begin. Indeed during this period whilst
land was being confiscated from mainland monasteries, the CCP was giving alms to
the monasteries of Lhasa (Shakya 1999:101).
One of the key developments of this period was the establishment of the
Buddhist Association of China (CBA) in 1953.  Three of the four honorary chairmen
were Tibetan Buddhists, these being the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama and the Grand
Lama of Inner Mongolia. Similarly Tibetan Buddhists of Tibetan and Mongolian
origin made up nearly half of the sixty-eight monk directors. The key purpose of the
CBA was to act as a bridge between the CCP and Buddhist citizens and organisations.
In its present form – renamed the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) — the
association retains this role today. It is the official supervisory organ of Buddhism
operating under the supervision of the State Administration of Religious Affairs
(SARA) department, overseen by the State Council. The high proportion of Tibetan
Buddhist representatives in the association in its early days reflects the importance the
CCP placed upon bringing Tibetan Buddhism into the folds of a state controlled
administrative network. Unlike Chinese Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism had developed
into a highly centralised, hierarchical organisation that was directly involved in the
functions of the Tibetan state. As such, the institutional organisation of Buddhism in
Tibet represented a much greater challenge to the CCP than the de-centred Buddhist
networks of the mainland.100 The CBA was a way of constructing an alternative
100 In response to the threat of increasing secularisation in the early twentieth century Chinese Buddhists established national
associations, the most important of which was the Chinese Buddhist Association. To some extent the CCP was able to utilise this
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religious network under the supervision of the CCP, and the involvement of high
ranking Tibetan Buddhist leaders was essential to this process.
By 1955, CCP patience for the gradualist approach was waning, and the pace
of reform in the ethnically Tibetan areas of Khams and Amdo was increased, with an
acceptance that this ‘must necessarily be a violent, sharp, and most complicated class
struggle’ (Yeshe 6th September 1958). Mao pushed for quicker reform on the basis that
backward nationalities had the potential to bypass intermediate stages of economic
development and make a ‘great leap’ forward directly into socialism. The policy of
encouraging gradual transformation through education was therefore dropped in favour
of radical, coercive reform with the rationale that ‘one step to heaven is completely
possible and necessary’ (American Consulate General 1966:35).
Despite this change in policy, reform in central Tibet remained limited.
However, the violence that accompanied accelerated reform in the ethnically Tibetan
areas of Khams and Amdo led to the 1956 Tibetan revolt. By 1959 this unrest had
spread to central Tibet, culminating in the Lhasa Uprising of 10th March and the Dalai
Lama’s flight into exile.
2. Democratic Reform (1959-1966)
This second period saw monasteries and religious teachers targeted and their
economic and administrative power destroyed. Many monks and nuns went in to exile.
In 1958, Tibet had 2,711 monasteries and a monastic population of 114, 103.
According to Chinese sources by 1960 the monastic population was reduced by 84
percent to 18, 104 and there were only 370 monasteries (Ma 1998:50).101
network after 1949 and the new Buddhist Association of China was largely established through voluntary reform of existing
Chinese Buddhist Association groups in conjunction with political study groups (Ji 2008:243).
101 These figures are consistent with figures used by Tibetan-Government-in-Exile.
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3. The Cultural Revolution 1966-1977
The Cultural Revolution led to the wholesale closure of religious institutions
such as temples and monasteries throughout China. The Religious Affairs Bureau
ceased to function, as did the Buddhist Association of China. In Tibet by 1976 only 800
monks and 8 monasteries remained (Ma 1998:173).
4. Post-Mao Reform Era 1978-1988
In the early Post-Mao period there was a considerable liberalisation of
religious policy. The allocation of government funds for reconstruction led to a rapid
growth in the number of monasteries and to the monastic population. By 1986 there
were 234 monasteries and 6,466 monks according to Chinese sources (Ma
1998:183).102
5. Lhasa Unrest 1989 – Present day
On the 5th March 1989, the 30th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, widespread
riots occurred in Lhasa leading to the imposition of martial law. Set alongside the
Tiananmen Square protests of June 4th and also the breakup of the Soviet Union, there
was a hardening of attitudes in the government at this time (Ye 1996:79) The People’s
Daily reported that by 1990 there were 34, 680 monks (Ma 1998:183). In 1991, this
rapid expansion was curtailed by the introduction of legal measures that imposed
quotas and prohibited the further building or reconstruction of places of religious
activity without government approval. A 1997 government white paper states that
there are 46,000 monks and nuns in the TAR, a figure repeated in a 2003 whitepaper
(Information Office of the State Council 1997, Information Office of the State Council
2003).
102 To provide some context, In 1982 Document no 6 cited the population Buddhist monks and nuns in the whole of China to be
27,000 (CCCP 1982).
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8:3 Contemporary Constitutional Framework
Religious activities in China remain strictly controlled by the state. Religion is
permitted a discrete space, delineated by law, revealing a frequently contradictory
relation between private belief and the public duty that the state attaches to that belief.
Thus, whilst Article 36 of the constitution guarantees the freedom of religious belief, it
is a freedom that is granted only in the expectation that believers will fulfil reciprocal
obligations to the socialist state.
The constitution offers a useful lens through which to view law and policy
regulating religion in Tibet. The preamble states the normative framework for how
religion is viewed:-
China will be in the primary stage of socialism for a long time to come. The
basic task of the nation is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernisation
along the road of Chinese-style socialism. Under the leadership of the
Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao
Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory.
Article 1 prohibits ‘disruption of the socialist system’ by either organisations
or individuals. Article 33 reminds us that an individual’s entitlement to rights entails a
reciprocal obligation to ‘perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and other
laws.’ This is further backed up by Article 51, which states that citizens ‘in exercising
their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the State, of society or
of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.’  This is
reinforced by Article 53’s exhortation that citizens ‘must abide by the Constitution and
other laws, keep State secrets, protect public property, observe labour discipline and
public order and respect social ethics’ and also by Article 54 which states that citizens
must ‘not commit acts detrimental to the security, honour and interests of the
motherland.’ Taken together, these five requirements operate as a significant
counterweight to the individual freedoms guaranteed elsewhere in the document, of
which freedom of religion is one.
It is also noteworthy that Article 36 is the only article in the constitution to
reference religion. This would not necessarily deserve comment if it is to be accepted
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that religion can be adequately dealt with as a separate individual right. Nonetheless, in
a document that also deals with the group rights of minority nationalities to exercise
cultural autonomy, it is interesting that religion is not mentioned again in this context.
Thus, whilst Article 4 states that ‘All nationalities have the freedom to use and develop
their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own folkways
and customs,’ religious freedom is something that is considered in the context of the
individual alone. This reflects a wider suspicion of religious activity in the public
sphere, a suspicion that is explicit in Article 36’s cautious phrasing:  ‘The State
protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in
activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the
educational system of the State.’ Article 36 also expresses the view that religion has
ramifications for state security, resurrecting historical comparisons with Qing hostility
to Western missionaries: ‘Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any
foreign domination.’
To this list of duties limiting the expression of freedom should be added
Article 52’s exhortation that ‘It is the duty of citizens of the People’s Republic of
China to safeguard the unification of the country and the unity of all its nationalities.’
As shall be seen, religious activity in Tibet is routinely regarded as a particular threat
to national unity and security. Particular emphasis is placed upon this obligation in law
and policy dealing with religious activity in Tibet. Thus, we are returned to the initial
difference between Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism and also reminded that
the multiple contingencies that religious activity involves raises questions about the
plausibility of free floating individual rights in the absence of corresponding protection
for the group.
8:4 Subsidiary Legislation Governing Religious Activity
An observation frequently made of the PRC constitution is that it lacks any
corresponding mechanism of enforcement. Despite evidence of increasing citizen
constitutional activism, the constitution remains an aspirational document (Hand 2008,
Hand 2011, Lynch 2010). Attention must therefore be drawn to subsidiary legislation
in order to consider the implementation of freedom of religion. What this reveals is a
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robust core of regulation aimed at controlling religious activity. As with the
constitution, emphasis is upon public order and socialist modernisation.
An important development of the past twenty-years is the adaptation of the
regulation of religious activity to the ‘rule of law.’ Initially, however, religious activity
was regulated by policy rather than specifically developed legislation. The 1982
Constitution protected ‘normal’ religious activities providing that they did not cause
disruption to public order or interfere with the health or education of citizens (Article
36). This was reiterated in Article 11 of the Law on Regional National Autonomy
(1984, 2001). Beyond this, there was little further elaboration as to what the legal
parameters of ‘normal’ religious activity might be.
The primary source of reference for discerning where these limits were
intended to fall is Document 19, ‘The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious
Question During Our Country's Socialist Period,’ an internal party document circulated
in 1982 (CCCP 1982). Document 19 laid out the basic framework for dealing with
religious issue in the reform era, and argued for a level of tolerance to religious
activity. This tolerance was based on two assumptions. Firstly, that religious believers
could be co-opted in the work of achieving wider state goals: ‘Marxism is
incompatible with any theistic world view. But in terms of political action, Marxists
and patriotic believers can, indeed must, form a united front in the common effort for
Socialist modernization’ (CCCP 1982:372).
Secondly, the party remained committed to the view that religion would
inevitably wither away under socialism. Document 19 identified three basic causes for
the persistence of religious belief in socialist society, these being:  natural and man-
made disasters, continuing class struggle, albeit now limited, and a ‘complex
international environment’(CCCP 1982:364).  In light of these factors it was argued
that the eradication of religious belief should be viewed as a gradual, if certain,
process. For these reasons Document 19 cautioned against coercive attempts to wipe
out religious thinking and practices. Instead, the party was called upon to show
patience and reminded that: ‘Religion will eventually disappear from human history.
But it will disappear naturally only through the long-term development of Socialism
and Communism when all objective requirements are met’ (CCCP 1982:365). In
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addition to this, the document acknowledged that there were potentially complex
interactions and continuities between ethnic identity and religious identity and that
these would have policy implications (CCCP 1982:378).
In light of this acknowledgement it might be presumed that the Regional
National Autonomy Law would be the framework of choice for dealing with religious
activity in ethnic areas. The previous chapter suggested that autonomy within the PRC
was perhaps best seen as a method rather than a goal. This seems comparable to the
approach taken to religious freedom in Document 19:-
Under socialism, the only correct fundamental way to solve the
religious question lies precisely in safeguarding the freedom of religious
belief. Only after the gradual development of the Socialist, economic,
cultural, scientific, and technological enterprise and of a socialist civilization
with its own material and spiritual values, will the type of society and level of
awareness that gave rise to the existence of religion gradually disappear
(CCCP 1982:383).
What is striking, however, is that legislation governing religious activity has
increasingly been promulgated by the central government outside of this framework.
This includes legislation specific to Tibetan Buddhism such as the Management
Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism (2007) and
the Measures for the Administration of Tibetan Buddhism Temples (2010).
This is a fairly recent phenomenon for the first laws governing religious
activity in the Post-Mao era were promulgated at the regional level. This was in
accordance with 1986 guidelines issued by Bureau of Religious Affairs which stated
that provinces and regions should formulate local religious regulations to fit local
circumstances (Yang 2008:64). Some of the first of these emerged from southern
provinces such as Guangdong Province (1988) and reflect a long standing concern
about interaction between the resident population and foreigners. In the case of
Guandong this concern was centred upon missionaries from nearby Hong Kong and
Macao as well as foreign travellers and overseas Chinese.
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The Guandong Regulations attempted to reduce this risk by allowing the state
a supervisory role over religious donations. They also required all places of religious
activity to be registered and approved by the state and stipulated that religious activity
must be confined to these state approved spaces. Of particular importance was the
creation of a category of ‘religious professionals,’ who were to be vetted by the state
before undertaking religious duties. All of these provisions occur as central features of
subsequent legislation governing religious affairs in other regions, including Tibetan
Autonomous Areas. This continuity would suggest that the central government
retained strong influence on the law making process at the regional level, despite the
fact that national level legislation on religious affairs had yet to be promulgated.
Legislation governing religious affairs in Tibet took some years to emerge and
coincided with a shift in central policy that emphasised the role of ‘rule of law’ in
mediating between the state and organised religion. This was expressed in the 1991
‘Notice on Guidelines for Religious Affairs’ (Document 6). Document 6 reiterated the
need to tolerate limited religious activity, but also expressed concern that ‘hostile
forces beyond our borders’ were using religion to disrupt the country (CCCP and the
State Council 1991:385). This, combined with reports of religion interfering with
government administration, the judicial process and education in schools at the
grassroots level, led to calls within the party for state action. Accordingly Document 6
recommended the speeding up of legislation governing religious affairs at both the
national and the local level. The first of such regional regulations governing Tibet in
the Post-Mao era was promulgated shortly after: The Interim Measures of the TAR on
the Administration of Religious Affairs (1991).
These measures incorporate specific points laid out in Document 6 such as the
requirement for the registration of places of religious activity, their administrative
supervision, restrictions on foreign donations or foreign visitors, and state vetting of
religious publications. The measures also implemented quotas of monks and nuns for
places of religious activity and stipulated that applicant monks and nuns must be
examined and registered, stating that ‘applicants must be patriotic and observe the law,
must be devoted to their religious beliefs and must respect religious codes and temple
rules.’ Within this framework the government pledged to protect ‘normal religious
activities’ and extend protection to all places of registered religious activity, an
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obligation consistent with Article 36 of the constitution. The measures, as with the
Constitution and the Law on Regional National Autonomy, did not provide any
definition of what ‘normal’ religious activity might be.
The 1991 Interim Measures represent a significant development in the state
regulation of religion in the TAR. Their continuity with other regional legislation
reflects the fact that the TAR regulations followed central party directives. Yet despite
the primacy of the central government at the level of policy, these regional regulations
were the primary legal mechanism for regulating religious activity in the region. At the
time the measures came into force there was no superior national legislation governing
religious affairs. As such, the 1991 Measures operated within the basic framework of
the Law of Regional National Autonomy, under which they gained authority as per the
Constitution. The retention of the central government’s control on policy shows that
the regional measures did not signify a devolved approach to religious affairs
legislation. However, the regional nature of the law making process placed these
Interim Measures in close proximity to other legislation governing Tibetan ethnic
autonomy. At a basic level, despite the lack of Tibetan autonomy in the formulation of
religious policy, this legal framework reinforced the very close association between
ethnic and religious identity in Tibet.
This framework has undergone significant change in the twenty-first century,
particularly since the State Council’s Regulations on Religious Affairs came into effect
in 2005. This is not to say that promulgation of regional regulations on religious affairs
has ceased. On the contrary, in 2006 the TAR formulated its own regionally specific
Implementing Measures for the Regulation on Religious Affairs (Trial Measures
2007). These measures are comparatively important in that they implement stricter
provisions than either the overarching State Council regulations or many of their
mainland provincial equivalents. For example, Tong looked at mainland provincial
provisions enacted after the State Council’s Regulations on Religious Affairs came
into force and compared them with both previous provisions in these provinces and the
new central regulations. He concluded that:-
In both statutory enactment as well as policy implementation, and at
both the central and provincial levels, the overall trend has been one of the
increasing institutional autonomy of religious organizations, greater protection
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of religious organizations, venues and personnel. Even for the more
authoritarian provinces, no retrogression towards greater restriction on
religious freedom is evident either in the legislative stipulations or policy
enforcement of its new provincial regulations (Tong 2006:7).
This has not been the case in Tibetan Autonomous Areas, where provisions
have become comparatively stricter. In addition there has been a fundamental change
in the legislative structure, for local level legislation in Tibetan Autonomous Areas has
become incorporated into a superstructure of law governing religion within the PRC as
a whole. This serves to distance religious affairs legislation from the regional
autonomy framework.  The fact that the 2007 TAR Implementing Measures bucked
the trend of liberalisation identified by Tong is not incidental to this process. This
distancing of religious issues from other features of Tibetan ethnic identity is a key
strategy of state regulation of religious activity within Tibetan areas and the
development of national legislation on religious affairs has strengthened this dynamic.
What is particularly interesting is that the development of central legislation
on religious affairs should ostensibly have bought consistency to religious regulations
throughout the PRC. Indeed this is implicit in the government’s pronouncements on
such legislative development and is in keeping with the requirements of the Legislation
Law (2000) which addresses conflict of laws. Yet contrary to this, the regulation of
religious affairs in Tibetan Autonomous Areas has departed from general practice.
These departures are significant and raise questions about the nature of the central
governments attempts to develop a coherent body of law governing religion. This
should be considered alongside two pieces of legislation promulgated by SARA and
the State Secrets Protection Bureau which stipulated that government analysis, policy
and measures related to ethnic and religious affairs must be classified as top-secret
(Regulations on State Secrets and Specific Classification Limits in Religious Affairs
Work (1995), Regulations on the Specific Scope of State Secrets and Classification of
Ethnic Work (1995)).103 The use of local level legislation to enforce stricter provisions
in Tibetan Areas raises some challenge to the principles of coherency, predictability
and equality necessary to such a framework. The sanctioning of a hidden sphere of
103 See also HRW 2005:6
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law and policy at the local level significantly adds to this challenge and suggests that
the public face of the central law does not reflect legal reality in Tibetan areas.
To elucidate this process it is first necessary to summarise the bureaucratic
framework within which religious affairs are regulated. It is then necessary to examine
in what ways the TAR Implementing Measures enforce stricter regulation of religion
than the State Council’s Regulation on Religious Affairs. Finally, consideration will be
given to other legislative developments that impact upon religious activity in Tibetan
areas. The intention here is not to document every piece of legislation governing
religious affairs in Tibetan Autonomous Areas, but to discuss certain issues that inform
such legislative development generally. With this in mind, the discussion will focus
upon the 2007 State Religious Affairs Bureau Order Number 5 ‘Management
Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism’ (MMR).
The Regulations on Religious Affairs were the first comprehensive
regulations of their kind to be issued by the central government.104 Originating from
the State Council rather than the National People’s Congress, the regulations fall in the
legislative class of administrative measures rather than national law. It is possible that
this reflects a government desire to retain more flexibility in regards to future
amendments, particularly given the sensitive nature of the measures (Bays 2005).
Perhaps more significant, however, is that the State Council directly oversees the
SARA, which is the department responsible for supervising the five state recognised
religious organisations within China.105 Within this capacity SARA has extensive
control over religious affairs including the selection of clergy, the interpretation of
religious doctrine and the administration of annual inspections of religious venues. The
State Council is therefore uniquely positioned as a legislative unit when it comes to
dealing with religious matters.
104 It should be noted that in 1994 the Religious Affairs Bureau and State Council issued three separate regulations: The
Regulations on the Supervision of the Religious Activities of Foreigners in China, the Registration Procedures for Venues for
Religious Activities and the Regulations Regarding the Management of Places of Religious Activities.
105 The Buddhist Association of China, Chinese Taoist Association, Islamic Association of China, Three-Self Patriotic Movement
and Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association.
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The State Council sits at the apex of an extensive bureaucratic network that
involves the state in all aspects of religious activity down to the grassroots level.106 In
the case of Tibet it is the regional offices of SARA that undertakes the most important
policy work. Most Tibetan centres of religious activity are supervised by local county
or municipal branches of SARA. This is a departure from practice in other areas where
more duties are devolved to provincial branches of the five Patriotic Religious
Organisations, which for Buddhists would means supervision by the Buddhist
Association of China. As noted earlier in this chapter, in the mainland the Buddhist
Association of China developed a close working relationship with political study
groups, which strengthened its function as a bridge between the party and Buddhist
citizens. The reduced role that the BAC plays in Tibet suggests a lack of confidence
about its ability to function in this capacity in Tibetan areas. This administrative
structure places religious institutions in Tibet under more direct government
supervision than religious institutions elsewhere in China. This has potential relevance
to the law making process for SARA has powers to issue legislation at the level of
administrative measures.
The most significant bridge between the government and Buddhists in Tibet
has historically been the Democratic Management Committees (DMCs) set up within
all monasteries and nunneries. These committees are not unique to Tibetan areas, and
the recent 2005 State Council Regulations on Religious Affairs make their
establishment mandatory for all sites of religious activity in the PRC (Article 17). In
Tibet DMC’s were established during the democratic reforms that took place after the
1959 Tibetan uprising (Shakya 1999:272, McCoquodale and Orosz 1994:208). DMCs
replaced the existing hierarchy within Tibetan religious institutions with elected
management bodies charged with administrating funds and property. The government
has placed great importance upon the role of DMC’s in ‘abolishing theocracy,
separating religion from state, and protecting religious freedom.’ (Information Office
of the State Council 2009). Appointments are overseen by SARA and candidates are
vetted to ensure that political credentials are met (Cabezόn  2008:273). DMC’s have a
critical role in policy implementation. They also serve as a conduit of information to
106 The State Council itself receives policy instructions from the highest level of the CCP, such as the Standing Committee of the
Politburo (Cabezon. 2008:272, Spiegel 2000:6).
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government departments and therefore have an equally important role in policy
formulation.
8.4.1 The Religious Affairs Regulations
The State Council’s Religious Affairs Regulations are the product of a six
year drafting process that involved extensive consultation and research. Comprising 48
articles the Regulations implement provisions on the establishment of religious
organisations, the management and registration of religious personnel, venues and
property and the legal liability of both state and religious bodies. The regulations allow
for extensive state involvement in the religious activities of its citizens. There is a
general requirement for collective religious activities to be held at registered religious
sites and for them to be presided over by registered religious personnel (Article 12).
Religious organisations must be registered (Article 6). Religious sites must accept
supervision and inspection by the religious affairs department (Article 19) and ‘other
relevant departments of the local people’s government’ (Article 18). Religious sites
have a legal requirement to both prevent and report any occurrence that ‘disrupts the
unity of all nationalities or impairs social stability’ (Article 22). New religious sites
cannot be constructed without approval and must show that there is a local need for
such a venue and that it is ‘rationally located’ (Article 13 and 14). Religious personnel
must be ‘determined qualified as such by a religious body’ (Article 27). Large scale
religious activities must obtain prior approval (Article 22).
Within these limits, religious activity is given a level of state protection. For
example, land or sites legally used by religious bodies are protected by law, as are the
cultural relics possessed or used by a religious group (Article 30 and Article 33).
Qualified religious personnel have a legal right to preside over religious duties,
conduct religious ceremonies, sort out religious scriptures and pursue religious
research (Article 29). Religious bodies are allowed to accept donations from ‘home or
abroad’ —a right explicitly denied in previous local regulations (Article 35). Of further
note is the right given to religious bodies and sites to ‘operate public undertakings’
which leaves open their possible engagement with social welfare projects such as
hospitals and care centres. Finally, religious groups and individuals have the right to
appeal administrative acts carried out by the religious affairs department (Article 46), a
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right which is backed up by explicit provisions that punish administrative abuse or
negligence (Article38). The regulations also outline civil and criminal liability for
infringement upon ‘the lawful rights and interests of a religious body, site for religious
activities or a religious citizen’ (Article 39).
In summary, the regulations do not signify a ground breaking shift in the
government’s approach to regulating religious activity in the post-Mao era. They do,
however, bring more clarity and predictability to existing registration procedures and
articulate a subdued acceptance of religious activity, albeit within closely supervised
spaces.  Yet this consistency is undercut by a continuing lack of definition as to what
constitutes ‘normal’ religious activity. There remains a shadowy realm of potentially
illegal religious activity. Religious groups that do not belong to any of the five state
authorised religions fall into this realm. In addition, Article 300 of the Criminal Law
(1997) criminalises ‘Whoever organizes and utilizes superstitious sects, secret
societies, and evil religious organizations or sabotages the implementation of the state's
laws and executive regulations by utilizing superstition.’ This provision was reinforced
by the 1999 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, Preventing and Punishing Cult Activities and
also by the explanations of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s
Procuratorate on China’s Law on Heretical Cults, issued the same year. However, it is
not only cults and sects that may fall foul of government constraints on religious
abnormality. The five ostensibly ‘normal’ religions also have to maintain theological
standards which meet government requirements.
8.4.2 The TAR Implementing Measures
The TAR Implementing Measures follow the basic template of the State
Council’s Regulations. It is clear that the State Council’s regulations are drafted in
such a fashion that government departments retain a considerable amount of
discretionary control over who can practice religion and where and how they can do
so. The stricter provisions within the TAR Measures therefore send quite a clear
message about how this discretion should be applied in Tibetan areas.
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The TAR provisions which depart from the State Council regulations fall into
two broad categories. Firstly there is a group of provisions that add regionally specific
controls. This includes three provisions that outline the procedures governing the
succession of religious teachers through reincarnation (Article 36, 37 and 38). There is
also a specific ban on re-establishing, or re-establishing in disguised form, ‘previously
abolished feudal privileges.’ This encompasses the traditional labrang system, under
which reincarnations of lamas received estates, and the hierarchical relationship
between monasteries (Article 6).
The second category of provisions qualifies the Standing Council Regulations
with additional restrictions and requirements. For example, the Standing Council
regulations give religious organisations the right to publish religious publications for
internal use (Article 7). Article 11 of TAR Implementing Measures qualifies this right
by requiring religious sites and organisations setting up a ‘printing house’ to obtain
prior approval from both the religious affairs department (at the regional level) and the
news publication department. Religious personnel are also subject to greater restriction
under the TAR measures. Article 33 stipulates that, with the exception of simple
religious ceremonies at open air burials or in citizen’s homes:-
religious personnel may not carry out such activities as initiations into
monkhood or nunhood, consecrations, expounding Buddhist sutras,
proselytizing, or cultivating followers outside of venues for religious
activities, if they have not received approval from the people’s government
religious affairs department at the county level or above.
Article 34, meanwhile, provides for the state censorship of religious materials
by stipulating that religious followers may not ask religious personnel to recite from
banned religious texts. It also creates an obligation for religious personnel and citizens
to take on the role of the censor by stipulating that they ‘may not “disseminate and
view” [chuankan] books, pictures, and materials that disrupt ethnic unity or endanger
national security.’ There is no further elaboration on what such unlawful materials
might be, potentially creating a presumption that the individual has liability for
recognising such material and acting upon that knowledge.
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Article 34 reflects an ideological standpoint that informs government law and
policy on religious issues generally, which is that loyalty to the socialist state takes
precedence over religious belief. This is built into constitutional framework of
corresponding rights and duties and is also fundamental to the government’s
exhortation that religion must adapt to socialism. This requirement of adaptation is far
reaching in effect, and absolutely integral to the legislative process.
This was implicit in the directives issued to the National United Front Work
Conference by President Jiang Zemin in November 1993. These specified three key
aspects to the handling of religion in China: correct implementation of the Party’s
policy toward religion; strengthening the administration of religious affairs according
to law and actively guiding religion to adapt to socialist society (Ye 1996:98,
Goosseart and Palmer 2008:326). A 1996 article in a party journal went further by
identifying theological implications to such adaptation: ‘By religion adapting itself to
the socialist society, we mean that with the establishment of the socialist society,
religion must adjust itself with corresponding changes in theology, conception, and
organization’ (Luo 1996:103). In the same year, Ye Xiaowen, then director of the
Bureau of Religious Affairs of the State Council, argued that Jiang Zemin’s three
phases represented ‘the crystallization of the integration of the Marxist view of religion
with the actual conditions in Chinese religion’ (Ye 1996:99). He also explicitly linked
the development of legislation on religious issues with the goal of adaptation:-
The law and regulations governing religion represent the
institutionalization and codification of the policy toward religion.
Administration according to law is coercive in nature. The purpose of all-
around correct implementation of the policy toward religion, and of
strengthening the administration of religious affairs according to law is
actively to guide the religions to adapt themselves to the socialist society (Ye
1996:99).
The requirement of adaptation has played a critical role in law and policy in
Tibetan areas. It is key to understanding the stricter controls on Tibetan religious
activity and the ways in which these controls operate beyond the established
framework of regional national autonomy law. In the TAR Implementing Measures
this requirement gives rise to the legal obligation for:-
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All levels of the people’s government shall actively guide religious
organizations, venues for religious activities, and religious personnel in a love
of the country and of religion, in protecting the country and benefiting the
people, in uniting and moving forward, and in guiding the mutual adaptation
of religion and socialism (Article 5).
There is no such provision in the State Council regulations and whilst party
policy on adaptation may provide a general backdrop for legislative development
throughout the entirety of the PRC, its specific implementation in Tibetan areas is
quite distinctive. Such distinctiveness in policy implementation in Tibetan areas is not
a new phenomenon. It has been a feature of previous government campaigns such as
the Strike Hard campaign, for example. This was launched nationally to target
‘extreme violent crime, gun and gang crime, telecom fraud, human trafficking,
robbery, prostitution, gambling and drugs’ (Jin 2010). However, in Tibetan areas the
campaign was first launched in monasteries and had an explicitly political character,
focussing upon cracking down upon ‘splittism’ and combating the ‘Dalai clique’ (TIN
1998, TIN and HRW 1996). The implementation of religious regulations follows a
similar pattern. It also raises some unique problems.
8.5 Problems Arising From the Unique Implementation of National Policy in
Tibetan Areas
A primary problem faced by the government is that the discriminatory
treatment of Tibetan Buddhism potentially conflicts with China’s international
obligations. The government has signalled that it is preparing to ratify the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and in 2011 undertook judicial and legislative
amendments to ensure compliance (China Daily 14th July 2011). The ICCPR seeks
protection for three key freedoms in relation to religious belief. Firstly, the freedom to
have or adopt a religion of the individual's choice (Article 18), Secondly, the freedom
to manifest this religion in private or in public, individually or communally (Article 18
and Article 27) and thirdly the right to be free from discrimination on religious
grounds (Article 26). There are multiple areas of conflict between these obligations
and Chinese law. For example, Article 18 stipulates that ‘The States Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children
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in conformity with their own convictions.’ However, China enforces a strict separation
of religion and education (Education Law 1995, Article 8), and has imposed specific
limits on the study of Tibetan Buddhist texts (Measures for the Administration of
Tibetan Buddhism Temples 2010). These include restricting study classes to over-18’s
who have met political criteria, restricting freedom to travel to classes in other areas,
and the banning of  lay practitioners from attendance of study classes  (Article27 and
Article 29). Students in Tibetan universities and colleges are explicitly barred from
participating in religions activities, and so too are Tibetan monks and nuns banned
from entering university grounds and other public buildings.107 Similar discriminatory
policies ban religious adherents from being members of the CCP.
The state’s role in censoring religious materials and deciding what constitutes
‘normal’ religion is another area of conflict, as is the mandatory requirement that
religious bodies are affiliated to state nominated religious associations who control the
financial, administrative and theological affairs of such bodies.
It is doubtful that the ICCPR’s list of acceptable derogations is broad enough
to cover the extensive restrictions on religious freedom found in Chinese law.
Certainly the government in legislating on religious matters has committed itself to
regulating religion according to law, fulfilling the first part of the ICCPR’s derogation
clause:-
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others.
However, the enforcement of strict quotas in monasteries, restrictions on
religious personnel’s freedom of movement and the requirement that they first meet
political criteria move beyond standard maintenance of public health and safety,
particularly when placed within the broader context concerning adaptation to socialist,
atheist society.
107 ‘Party members, state employees and students, all of them, are not allowed to participate in religious activities such as
Sagadwa [annual circumambulation of the old city centre and Potala Palace] and so forth.’ Annual Order of the TAR Discipline
Committee and the TAR Supervision Department 2012 (Barnett 2012:84).
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The problem of the PRC’s compliance with the ICCPR is even more critical
in relation to Article 27 which extends further protection to minorities by stipulating
that ‘minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to
use their own language.’ This suggests that minorities should be afforded additional
state protection in relation to their religious freedom and, unlike Article 18, Article 27
lacks a derogation clause. This makes the instances of stricter implementation of
religious regulations in Tibetan Autonomous Areas particularly problematic. Some of
the differences in legislation have already been discussed, but to cite a specific
example of how this applies: in 1996 the Buddhist Association of China issued an
order banning photographs of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan areas; from this date onwards
there have been numerous reports of detention and beatings of Tibetans – especially
monks and nuns—caught in possession of such photos.108 However, in the mainland,
photos of the Dalai Lama have remained in circulation via state media. 109
Compliance with Article 27 does not demand a system of regional autonomy.
Nonetheless, the move to shift religious regulations away from the framework of
Regional National Autonomy raises questions about the government’s commitment to
enforcing the rights articulated by Article 27. This is compounded by the
discriminatory elements of policy implementation mentioned above. Nonetheless,
compliance with the ICCPR is not the only problem created by such policy, nor
arguably the most critical. After all, China has continually argued that the particular
situation in Tibet is a matter of national security rather than the freedom of religion. Ye
Xiaowen, director of SARA from 1995 to 2009, made this argument in 1996 at the
start of the Strike Hard campaign in Tibet:-
Our struggle against the splittist Dalai [Lama] clique over the Tibetan
question is in essence not a matter of whether there should be religious belief
or whether there should be autonomy, but whether there should be stability or
disorder in Tibet; a matter of safeguarding the unification or dividing the
motherland, of upholding the dignity of national sovereignty or interfering in
China’s internal affairs in collusion with hostile foreign forces (Ye 1996:87).
108 I received a first-hand account from a participant in such an incident (UNCR Refugee Reception Centre, Kathmandu 1999).
See also Barnett (2011).
109 This is discussed in Barnet 2011:80. For examples see huanqiu.com 2012.
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In the context of the global war on terror, China has gained a degree of
latitude. There remains some indeterminacy over what derogations ‘are necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals,’ and the government’s campaign against
‘the use of religion by the dark forces’ has achieved some legitimacy through China’s
significant role in international counter-terrorism (Ye 1996:97, HRIC 2011).
There is a second, critical, problem created by the discriminatory
implementation of religious regulations in Tibetan Autonomous Areas. This is that
such policy creates inconsistencies and contradictions within the Chinese legal system.
A recent development illustrates this point. In late 2011 the government began
establishing direct rule over all monasteries in Tibetan areas. Under the new policy for
the ‘Complete Long-term Management Mechanism for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries’
unelected,  government or party officials have been permanently stationed inside
monasteries. In some Tibetan Autonomous Areas officials directly supervise existing
DMCs. In the TAR the system requires new unelected Management Committees who
have authority over DMCs. Depending upon the size of the institution this can mean
up to thirty lay officials being stationed to supervise both religious and administrative
affairs (HRW 2011). This is a significant shift away from a long-standing policy of
monastic self-management. The existing system of Democratic Management
Committees, still in place in mainland China, followed the principle that religious
institutions were best run internally by religious personnel, with the government taking
on a supervisory role.  Such supervision can be extensive: the selection process of
candidates is controlled by the government and party officials, and committee
members have to meet political requirements (Cabezόn  2008:273).  Yet despite these
significant limitations DMCs are elected members of the local community.
Permanently stationing unelected officials inside monasteries marks a clear break from
established practice.
There are direct local implications to this policy. The change in approach was
a response to the 2008 unrest in Tibetan areas which has been followed by a number of
self-immolations. Monasteries are regarded as a significant source of unrest. Evidence
suggests that previous government crack downs within monasteries have escalated,
rather than reduced, tensions and sources indicate that the recent self-immolations are
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protests against increasing state control (Barnett 2011, CECC 2012). However, there
are also broader national implications.
The introduction of direct rule in Tibetan monasteries raises several
contradictions.  As touched upon above such policy undermines the framework of
Regional National Autonomy. The central government has attempted to legitimise the
separation of religious and ethnic identity by arguing that:
Religion and nationalism are two different categories. Religion has
never been a prerequisite for the formation of a nation, nor does it constitute a
basic characteristic of a nation. The two should not be mixed up (Ye
1996:85).
Accordingly the central government has attempted to link religious belief to
the performance of patriotic duties to the state: ‘To love religion, you must first love
your country’ (CECC 2009:33). Ultimately, this process implies the disconnection of
religious culture from ethnic culture and it is on this basis that adaptation to socialist
society becomes possible.
The challenge raised to Regional National Autonomy is only one problem.
There are also considerable contradictions in the state increasing its direct involvement
in Tibetan religious affairs. Firstly, such policy runs counter to the sentiments
expressed in Documents 6 and 19, which argued very strongly that coercive policy
drives religion underground and ultimately strengthens its social base. Document 19 in
particular stated that religious belief no longer represented an antagonistic challenge to
religion (Barnett 2011:57, CCCP 1982). Document 19 did not simply represent an
ideological shift; it had practical political consequences. The policy of allowing a
certain measure of social and economic autonomy, or ‘zones of indifference,’ was a
means for the Post-Mao government to assert regime legitimacy by providing a basis
for popular support. If, as Potter (2003:318) argues, ‘Religion represents a fault line of
sorts in the regime’s effort to build legitimacy through social policy,’ then the
increasingly coercive approach in Tibetan areas weakens the government’s claim to
legitimacy on these grounds. By separating religious regulations from the framework
of Regional National Autonomy the government has been able to increase its direct
control over religious activity in Tibet. The problem is that this has not entirely
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removed the contradiction between state control and social autonomy. That
contradiction still exists in the wider context of the Post-Mao Chinese state. This has
not insignificant implications given that the government has already faced internal
criticism of its persecution of a wide range of religious groups, some of which
originated from whistleblowers within the Ministry of State Security (Fu 2003:4).
8.6 Managing Religion According to Law
One particular way in which the government has sought to minimise such
contradiction is by strengthening the ‘rule of law’ in managing religious affairs. After
the 3rd Forum officials began denouncing the Dalai Lama as a religious leader by
arguing that his teachings were heretical and that he was involved in international
terrorism (Chen 1996a:3). Previously official reform-era criticism focussed upon the
Dalai Lama’s political role, leaving his religious role untouched. As a result of this
change in emphasis Tibetan Buddhist activity became increasingly represented as an
antagonistic challenge to socialist society:-
In the spiritual realm, in particular, the masses would not be heading
towards towards socialism if they fully accepted the guidance of religion.
Because of their religious belief, many people are following the Dalai Lama
in splitting the motherland and doing what is endangering socialism (Chen
1996b:55).
The 3rd Forum explicitly utilised the language of the revolution to put forward
this point. In the general context of reform-era politics the return to ultra leftist
justifications of coercive policy was both conspicuous and inconsistent:-
The struggle between ourselves and the Dalai clique is not a matter of
religious belief nor a matter of the question of autonomy, it is a matter of
securing the unity of our country and opposing splittism. It is a matter of
antagonistic contradiction with the enemy, and it represents the concentrated
form of the class struggle in Tibet at the present time. This struggle is the
continuing struggle between ourselves and the imperialists since they invaded
Tibet a hundred years ago (Ragdi 1994:156).
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This language was increasingly replaced by the language of the rule of law.
Shortly after the 3rd Forum took place the government launched an extensive re-
education campaign to ‘enhance the knowledge of the monks and nuns about
patriotism and law’ (TIN and HRW 1996:28). This involved work teams being sent to
each monastery and temple in the TAR, and to monasteries in other Tibetan
Autonomous Areas, over a three year period. These teams were directly supervised by
the CCP rather than SARA and oversaw compulsory daily study sessions covering
history, law, religious policy and politics. After three months monks and nuns were
required to sit a written examination, and if successful were issued official permits
allowing them to remain at their institution (The Patriotic Education Programme Work
Team in Yardoe, Nedong County 1997, TIN 1998:35). The study sessions resulted in
numerous expulsions followed by protests and arrests (TIN 1998:44-45).
The syllabus placed considerable emphasis upon various aspects of the
Chinese legal system, including the nature and scope of constitutional rights governing
freedom of religious belief and how this applied to monasteries. Integral to this legal
education was the insistence that certain features of Tibetan Buddhist teaching were
inauthentic and by extension unlawful. The assertion in the study materials that the
Dalai Lama was not a genuine Buddhist is a specific example of this: ‘the Dalai’s
actions are totally contradictory to the basic codes of conduct applicable to a Buddhist’
(GOPPE 1996b:10). Beyond this, the re-education process also involved a much wider
reinterpretation of Tibetan Buddhism that has profound implications to Tibetan
Buddhist philosophy, and indeed Buddhism generally.
In recent years the Dalai Lama has given philosophical teachings, particularly
on the Buddhist principle of Universal Responsibility, which contribute to what
Cabezόn has called the ‘Tibetan political philosophy of liberation’ (Cabezόn
1996:133). The Patriotic Education study books criticise such political engagement
and state that it contradicts ‘the principles of the separation of religion and politics as
espoused by Lord Buddha’ (GOPPE 1996b:12). The study materials suggest that
authentic Buddhist practice cannot engage in politics on the basis that ‘Shakyamuni,
the founder of Buddhism, voluntarily renounced his kingdom to seek enlightenment’
(GOPPE 1996b:12). By logical extension this argument also suggests that the
traditional Tibetan system of law and governance was founded upon a heresy because
243
it failed to adequately separate the domains of worldly existence from the realm of
other-worldly spiritual pursuits.
As well as being a remarkably unequivocal and reductive interpretation of
Buddhist philosophy this argument undermines official attempts to present the state
control of Tibetan Buddhism as a matter secular administration. It is fundamentally
self-contradictory for the CCP to advocate the separation of religion and politics on the
one hand, yet on the other hand to directly engage in the interpretation of Buddhist
doctrine. The Patriotic Education campaign remains a central feature of official policy
in Tibet, and has continued to seek legitimacy from its emphasis upon regulating
religion according to the law. Recent campaigns have specifically been styled as legal
education drives designed to increase the legal awareness of monks and nuns in order
to ensure the normal practice of Buddhism (Xinhua  9th March 2009, Global Times
13th March 2013) This explicit engagement of law as an educative tool in Tibetan
religious institutions is a practical application of the party’s view that ‘strengthening
the administration of religious affairs according to law is actively to guide the religions
to adapt themselves to the socialist society‘(Ye 1996:99).
Since Document 19 official policy has sought to project a broad tolerance of
individual religious belief and adopted the attitude that atheist materialism will prove
an irresistible civilising influence. The development of legal strategies to distinguish
between lawful and unlawful religious activity has allowed the government to distance
itself from explicitly coercive attempts to eradicate religious belief. Yet by demanding
that ‘Religious tenets and practices which do not comply with a socialist society
should be changed,’ the party has shown a willingness to coercively alter the
foundations of religious thought (TIN 1996:28).
To summarise, it is clear from official statements that the separation of
religious and ethnic identity is a considered government strategy and that this strategy
forms the basis of actual policy development. It is also apparent that this has resulted
in a bifurcated state policy on religion, wherein Tibetan Buddhism is subject to direct
state management in contrast to a general advocation of religious self-management.
This contradicts the well publicised position on religion adopted in the reform era. The
problems such a policy poses to the exercise of Regional National Autonomy are
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significant, particularly in light of the commitment that China has made to ratify the
ICCPR. Beyond this, there is the question of whether the contradictions raised by such
policy have significance in the wider legal context of the PRC.
One of the ways that the government has sought to reconcile such
contradictions is through an emphasis upon the regulation of religion according to the
law. The use of more coercive controls in Tibet has been justified as a necessary
response to unlawful behaviour. The government’s denouncement of the Dalai Lama
as a religious leader forms part of this response. By linking the Dalai Lama to
international terrorism the government has sought to educate citizens to accept
coercive controls in Tibetan areas as a matter of state security rather than as a religious
issue. A second way in which the government has sought to legitimise direct state
intervention in Tibetan Buddhism is through reference to historical tradition. This
involves the (re)construction of both legal and religious roles.
8.7 The Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in
Tibetan Buddhism
There is some continuity in modern day regulation of religion and historical
restrictions upon religion in the Qing dynasty. As argued by Goosaert and Palmer
(2010:36) the development of an anticlerical discourse ‘prefigured secularist religious
modernity by condemning clerical institutions and rituals while valorizing individual
spiritual practise.’ This continuity is not insignificant and suggests that caution is
necessary when assessing the changes that have occurred in post-revolution China.
Profound as these changes are they nonetheless have historical precedent. Care must
be taken, however, when discussing such continuity in the case of Tibet. As discussed
in Chapter two,  the image of the Qing Court as the unequivocal, pure Sinic centre
from which the civilising influence of Confucian culture radiated has given way to an
image of the Qing empire as ‘a confederation of discreet, culturally distinct blocks’
(Berger 2003:9). It is therefore important to remain sensitive to the anomalous aspects
of Qing engagements with Tibetan political and religious institutions. One of the
arguments made in Chapter Two was that passing over such historical anomalies
reduces the visibility of modern day social and cultural change in Tibet by obscuring
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aspects of traditional Tibetan law and governance. It also reduces the visibility of how
historical narrative is constructed and used by the modern Chinese state to bolster
regime legitimacy.
The latter, is explicitly brought to bear in the 2007 State Religious Affairs
Bureau Order Number 5 Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living
Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism (MMR). This provides the legal framework for state
intervention in the process of reincarnation. This marks a significant departure from
previous practice in the PRC, but the central government has presented these measures
as a continuation of traditional methods of intervention established in the Qing
dynasty. The measures therefore have dual significance, both as a component in an
expanding contemporary legal framework aimed at regulating Tibetan identity and as
part of a historical narrative.
The 2007 measures are the most comprehensive set of regulations for
registering and approving reincarnations yet to be issued in the PRC.110 In the post-
Mao era the state has shown itself increasingly willing to directly engage with
reincarnation matters through national and regional level legislation. This engagement
takes place within the constitutional framework that guarantees freedom of religion.
By referring to this wider framework, subsidiary legislation dealing with reincarnation
therefore remains consistent with general policy, despite the apparent oddity of an
atheist government legislating on such matters.
The Constitution protects the right to believe or not to believe in religion
(Article 36), and the rationale for state management of reincarnation is that careful
regulation protects wider social harmony, within which the freedom of religion
operates. Hence Article 3 of the Regulation of Religious Affairs places importance
upon the duty to ‘safeguard unification of the country’ and states that: ‘No
organization or individual may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt
public order, impair health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the
State, or in other activities that harm State or public interests, or citizens' lawful rights
110 The MMR was preceded by an obscure piece of legislation enacted by the TAR People’s Congress in 1995, The Detailed Rule
on the Reincarnation of the Living Buddha. This coincided with the controversial detention of the newly reincarnated 11th
Panchen Lama. Whilst reported on by the official state news agency Xinhua, the contents of this regulation were never made
public (HRW 1997:49).
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and interests.’ The Implementing Measures of the Tibetan Autonomous Region on
Religious Affairs (2006) expand upon this by exhorting government departments to ‘
actively lead’ religious organisations, venues and personnel ‘to be patriotic, protect the
state and be beneficial to the people, further unity and guide religion to be appropriate
for a socialist society’ (Article 5). Within this framework it is not necessary for the
state to believe in the reality of reincarnation; it is only necessary that the state
regulates reincarnation in a manner consistent with the fact that some of its citizens do.
Nonetheless, the act of bringing the law to bear upon a metaphysical event gives rise to
contradiction and paradox.
The measures have been formulated in accordance with Article 27 of the State
Council’s Regulations on Religious Affairs which laid the ground for legal
intervention in reincarnation matters by stating that ‘the succession of living Buddhas
in Tibetan Buddhism shall be conducted under the guidance of Buddhist bodies and in
accordance with the religious rites and rituals and historical conventions.’ Article 27
also requires that successors be approved by the Religious Affairs Department of the
People’s Government at or above the municipal level. The TAR Implementing
Measures repeat these requirements with added provisions stipulating that venues for
religious activity should plan for the education and management of resident
reincarnated living Buddhas (Articles 36-40).
The MMR extends the requirement for approval in three significant ways.
Firstly, the system of approval by the lowest levels of government is replaced with a
new hierarchical approval process that stretches to the uppermost levels of
government. Secondly, the MMR outlines specific conditions that have to be met by
both the reincarnating living Buddha and the institution to which it is associated.
Thirdly, the MMR widens the jurisdiction of the law into new metaphysical territory
by imposing conditions on living Buddhas throughout the reincarnation process.
The primary conditions to be met before an application for reincarnation is
successful are laid out in Article 2. These include the requirement that the
reincarnating living Buddha ‘should respect and protect the principles of the
unification of the state, protecting the unity of the minorities, protecting religious
concord and social harmony, and protecting the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism.’
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Article 2 also stipulates that ‘reincarnating living Buddhas shall not be interfered with
or be under the dominion of any foreign organisation or individual.’
Each application for a living Buddha reincarnation now requires examination
and approval by the provincial or autonomous regional people’s government religious
affairs department.  Living Buddhas with a ‘relatively large impact’ must be approved
by the provincial or autonomous regional people’s government; those with a ‘great
impact’ must be approved by the SARA, and those with ‘a particularly great impact’
must be approved by the State Council (Article 5). Approval requires that living
Buddhas be of a historically verified lineage and that they be registered at an
authorised place of religious activity that has the ability to train and raise living
Buddhas (Article 3).  Reincarnation rights are not guaranteed and local governments at
city-level and above retain the right to prohibit reincarnations from occurring in
delineated districts (Article 4).
The law requires that applications for reincarnation be made on behalf of the
living Buddha by ‘a majority of local religious believers and the monastery
management organisation’ (Article 3). Once this initial application has been approved
an authorised search team is established to search for the ‘soul child’ (Article 7). When
identified, the living Buddha must be approved by the same level of government that
oversaw the search application (Article 9). If approved, the living Buddha is issued
with a living Buddha permit by the China Buddhist Association and registered by the
SARA (Article 10). The state retains the right to supervise the training of the living
Buddha after he or she has been installed, and requires training plans to be submitted
for approval to the local Buddhist Association (Article 12).
Enforcement of the MMR is to be carried out in accordance with the
administrative sanctions laid out in Regulations on Religious Affairs, which Article 11
of the MMR makes applicable to individuals and units who contravene the MMR or
who ‘without authority carry out living Buddha reincarnation affairs.’ Due to their
potential impact upon individual livelihood and institutional existence these sanctions
whilst classified as administrative are significant, providing for the possible
confiscation and demolition of property associated with religious organisations and the
disqualification of religious personnel (Regulations on Religious Affairs Articles 40,
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41, 43 and 45). In addition, the MMR stipulates a specific punishment applicable to
incarnations ‘who send secret reports or collude with foreign separatists, assist in
disturbances, tolerate them, or incite others,’ which is that they ‘will be stripped of the
right to hold the incarnation lineage’ (Article 12).
8.8 The MMR in Historical Perspective
The contradiction of an atheist party maintaining control of the reincarnation
process is striking. However, the government takes particular care to place this
approval process in a historical context that that invokes legitimacy through reference
to customary practice. In particular it presents the measures as a continuation of legal
methods for ascertaining high ranking Tibetan incarnations in the Qing dynasty. This
too is contradictory and also anachronistic, being a self-conscious revival of imperial
policy by a party that campaigned against excesses of traditional feudalism. Yet, this is
perhaps the lesser contradiction, slotting expediently into a pre-existing narrative of
Chinese control in Tibet. Moreover, by opening this narrative up to a revisionist legal
interpretation, the expansion of state control over religion in Tibet is presented as part
of the development of the rule of law. Even, it seems, a necessary component of the
protection of religious freedom in modern society.
There has been one exceptional instance in which the PRC state has directly
intervened in the recognition process of incarnations, and that occurred in 1995 in the
case of the 11th Panchen Lama. The intervention occurred in response to the 14th Dalai
Lama’s recognition of the young Tibetan boy Gendun Choekyi Nyima as the
reincarnation of the recently deceased 10th Panchen Lama.  PRC authorities placed the
boy, his family and many of those involved into protective custody and announced
their own candidate, Gyalcen Norbu. Neither Gendun Choekyi Nyima nor his family
have been seen by independent observers since. The Resolution of the Third Meeting
of the Sixth People’s Congress of the TAR Concerning Resolutely Opposing the Dalai
Lama’s Illegal Acts of Unilaterally Declaring the Reincarnation of the Panchen Lama
(May 25th , 1995) affirmed the criminal nature of the Dalai Lama’s claims ‘from the
point of view of religious tradition, historical convention and legal standpoint’ (Losel
1996:6).
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On 29 November 1995, a secret divination ceremony was organised by TAR
authorities which resulted in the government naming Gyancen Norbu as the 11th
Panchen Lama. The divination was criticised by witnesses for being fixed, most
notably by the Deputy Chairman of the Buddhist Association of China, Arjia
Rinpoche, who went into exile shortly after (Arjia 2010:204). The divination involved
the drawing of lots from a Golden Urn, a method first implemented by the Qianlong
emperor in 1793. Forming the basis for the government’s dismissal of the Dalai
Lama’s choice, this ceremony allowed the government to claim that they controlled the
only valid customary method of recognition and that the Dalai Lama was disregarding
traditional practice.  These events are also key to understanding the origins of the
Measures for Managing Reincarnation.
The use of the Golden Urn has attracted considerable controversy, not only
for its role in the fate of the 11th Panchen Lama but also for its role as a method of
intervention in Tibetan affairs by the Qing imperial court. The official PRC history of
Tibet states that the the Golden Urn came into use following the the implementation of
Article 1 of The 29-Article Ordinance for the more efficient Governing of Tibet (1793)
and that this document represents ‘a systematic summary of the Central Government
rule over Tibet during the early and middle period of the Qing dynasty’ (Wang and
Nyima 2001:69).111
An assessment commonly found in literature on the subject, and the view
endorsed by the Tibetan-Government-in-Exile, is that the Golden Urn was used
inconsistently and that its use is not an indication of direct Qing rule over Tibet (Bell
1987:51, Van Walt Van Praag 1987:21, Smith 1996:135-140). Although the
implications of the urn’s existence remain controversial, there is consensus that the
Golden Urn was introduced as a consequence of the emperor Qianlong being drawn
into a costly and complex campaign against the Gurkhas on behalf of Tibet.
Specifically, evidence suggests that Qianlong considered corruption and inefficiency in
the Tibetan government to be a contributing factor in the failure of Tibet to resolve the
Gurkha crisis without Qing intervention (Sperling 2012).
111 It should be noted that there is no complete Chinese source of the regulations and the only extant copy of the final document is
in Tibetan. It is reproduced in original and translation in Sperling (2012).
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For the Chinese government, the Golden Urn has become an unlikely symbol
of the rule of law. Chinese sources pay considerable attention to The Golden Urn,
highlighting its historical importance. It is photographed and described in the official
history, it is referenced in government speeches, and the most comprehensive study of
it was authored by Liao Zugui and Li Yongchang in Zhongguo Zangxue(Wang and
Nyima 2001:73, Sperling 2012:98). It is also part of the curriculum in the Patriotic
Education Campaign carried out in monasteries and nunneries (GOPPE 1996a:8).  The
Ordinance which mandated its use is described as the ‘most important law at that time’
and by presenting it as such, the government has established historical precedent for its
legal control of the reincarnation process (Wang and Nyima 2001:66). Article 8 of the
MMR stipulates that the Golden Urn is to be used to select Living Buddhas if it has
previously been used for this purpose. Given the particular historical use of the Golden
Urn in the selection of Dalai Lama’s it is probable that the government is positioning
itself for the selection of the next Dalai Lama. For example, in 2011 a spokesperson
for the Foreign Ministry stated:-
The title of the Dalai Lama is illegal if not conferred by the Central
Government…According to the Regulations on Religious Affairs and the
Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan
Buddhism enacted by our country, the reincarnation of any living Buddha,
including the Dalai Lama, should follow the religious rituals, historical
conventions as well as laws and regulations (Hong 26th September 2011).
By imposing political conditions upon citizens throughout the process of
death and rebirth the MMR reveals the numerous contradictions embedded within the
PRC’s attempt to regulate religious activity according to the law. Despite the assertion
that the enforcement of religious regulations in Tibet will ‘separate political actions
from religious affairs and ensure the freedom of religious belief’ the conditions
imposed upon reincarnation process explicitly extend the jurisdiction of Chinese law to
non-physical planes of existence traversed by the deceased before rebirth (TIN and
HRW 1996:30). This is both a mimicry and a subversion of traditional Tibetan beliefs
concerning the intersection of Dharma, law and politics. If, however, the intention was
to extend secular control over Tibetan Buddhism then this subversion cuts both ways.
In revealing the ideological content of the ‘rule of law’ the MMR also subverts its own
claim to rational authority.
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This then is the deeper contradiction of the PRC’s religious affairs legislative
project. Its particular commitment to secular modernity renders it unable to adequately
engage with religion without drawing attention to its own ideological origins. Key to
this is the contradictory nature of modernity’s faith in progress, ‘the tale of
secularism’s graded triumph over a diminishing force of the religious’ (Fitzpatrick
2008-2009:323). Following Document 19, law governing religion in the PRC has
become specifically linked to a process of adaptation derived from Marxist
evolutionary discourse. In Tibet, in both its coercive and persuasive roles, such law is
presented as a civilising force of change. This particular articulation of progress, of
modernity, relies upon the construction of a backward, uncivilised past:-
The day that the spring wind of science and technology blows
vigorously across the snow highlands will certainly be a time when the broad
masses of the people consciously throw off the spiritual bondage of religion,
bid farewell to ignorance and backwardness, and move swiftly towards a
civilised society (Liu 19th January 1997).
The difficulty with such a formulation is, as pinpointed by Bhaba, that:-
The value of modernity is not located, a priori, in the passive fact of an
epochal event or idea—of progress, civility, the law—but has to be negotiated
within the ‘enuciative’ present of the discourse (Bhaba 1991:201).
In other words, modernity’s commitment to the idea of progress hinges upon a
continual iteration of the present as a sign; a compulsive insistence upon its
‘contemporaneous reality … making problematic its own discourse not simply “as
ideas” but as the position and status of the locus of social enunciation’ (Bhaba
1991:201).The argument that emerges from this is that by divorcing itself so
irrevocably from a pre-modern, uncivilised past, modernity is unable to recognise its
own contingencies.
To return to the PRC’s Measures on Managing Reincarnation, what is
revealed is that such contingencies can force a contradictory engagement with
alternative cultural and historical realities. As Fitzpatrick put it: ‘A present so derived
cannot provide a carapace keeping out other historical engagements with law and
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religion’ (Fitzpatrick 2008-2009:324). At issue then, is if, and how, this contradictory
engagement challenges the foundations of the ‘socialist modernisation’ project.
What I want to suggest here is that in addition to the multiple, specific
contradictions within the contemporary legislative system governing religion in the
PRC there is a fundamental contradiction which weakens the legislative project, and
that this weakness cannot be automatically resolved through a proliferation of legal
measures.
The explicit commitment to a particular notion of progress, of backwardness,
places significant constraints upon the official engagement with Tibetan Buddhism.
The assertion of backwardness involves a denial of a complex and sophisticated
history of philosophical enquiry. Yet, far from being an artefact from a lower stage of
evolution, Tibetan Buddhist philosophical tradition has shown itself to be a living
tradition capable of entering into a dialogue with divergent scientific disciplines such
as neuroscience, quantum and nuclear physics, artificial intelligence and experimental
psychology. The assumption that science will invalidate Tibetan Buddhism
misunderstands the methodology of Tibetan Buddhist philosophical enquiry. Simply
put, Document 19’s belief in an age in which:-
the vast majority of our citizens will be able to deal with the world and our
fellowmen from a conscious scientific viewpoint, and no longer have any
need for recourse to an illusory world of gods to seek spiritual solace (CCCP
1982:383).
is not antithetical to the Tibetan Buddhist philosophical goal of understanding the
nature of reality. The contradiction is that by insisting upon the backward nature of
Tibetan Buddhist belief, the government has committed itself to engaging on only the
most superficial of levels. Rather than reinforcing the backwardness of Tibetan
Buddhist philosophy, what this suggests is an official incapacity for sophisticated
enquiry. This has implications for state attempts to adapt religion to socialism through
persuasion, for such an incapacity means that the grounds for persuasion will remain
intellectually insubstantial and weak. Seen in this light, the state has sown the seeds for
its own failure, at least within the terms of this particular ideological argument. The
exact impact of this theoretical failure is hard to gauge. I suggest however that it is
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relevant to understanding the PRC’s attempts to regulate religion according to law. It
also undermines the official claim that the struggle against the ‘Dalai clique’ is ‘the
continuing struggle between ourselves and the imperialists since they invaded Tibet a
hundred years ago’ (Ragdi 1996:156).
254
Chapter Nine
9:1 Introduction
This thesis began with the observation that there were fundamental differences
in how Tibet and China sought to resist Western imperialism. One reason for this was
that the religious foundations of the Tibetan state necessitated a different kind of
negotiation with modernity. A second, equally critical factor was Tibet’s role in the
‘Great Game.’ The ensuing rise of British influence in the region had the important
effect of rendering Tibet’s legal status ambiguous. This ambiguity in legal status cannot,
however, fully explain the subsequent loss of international legal identity. This leads to a
third key aspect, which is that Tibet’s relationship with British India during the era of
decolonisation set Tibet apart from a rapidly modernising society of postcolonial states.
The legacy of the British involvement in the region is therefore much more
complex than a direct effect of the imposition an unequal relationship between a colonial
power (British India) and its neighbours. Whilst British incursions into Tibetan territory
initiated conflict in the region, decolonisation revealed a new hegemony which operated
to exclude Tibetan representation. The PRC has adopted the position that British
imperialism in Tibet is responsible for continued unrest in the region, stating that, ‘There
was no such word as "independence" in the Tibetan vocabulary at the beginning of the
twentieth century’ (Information Office of the State Council 1992). However, it must be
considered that coercive policies of adaptation pursued by the PRC in Tibet reveal
contradictions in this position. The ‘Tibet Question’, has also revealed contradictions
within postcolonial international legal discourse. This suggests that the convergence of
the British imperial legacy with PRC law and governance has been largely mediated
through the discourse of modernity, and that this has facilitated the production of
subalternity in the postcolonial context.
9:2 A Summary of Findings
Chapter two argued that three factors have reinforced the PRC’s territorial
claims to Tibet by creating an image of Tibet as a ‘pre-legal’ society that possessed
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few or none of the institutions necessary to the modern state. Firstly, Tibetan social
theory, including law and politics, has seldom been the subject of detailed analysis in
Western studies of Tibet. This chapter took the important step of drawing together a
wide range of sources on Tibetan law, many of which are obscure and embedded in
studies not specifically concerned with the law. Secondly, this paucity of scholarship
has been compounded by the emergence of a popular discourse in the West that
presents Tibet as an other-worldly ’Shangri-La’. Thirdly, the philosophical grounds of
the Tibetan system of law and governance were not readily adaptable to Western
concepts of the ‘rule of law’ and this created difficulty for Tibetan attempts to join the
family of nations.
One position which emerges from this is that Orientalist traditions of colonial
scholarship have impeded Tibetan political aspirations by encouraging a
misrepresentation of Tibetan society. In this, British imperial exploits in the region can
be seen to have had an enduring effect upon the understanding of Tibetan legal
identity, owing to their role in the creation and dissemination of a broader colonial
discourse which neutralises Tibetan political and legal agency.
Meanwhile, Western encroachment of China’s ports challenged the legitimacy
of the Qing Court and altered China’s perceptions of its frontier territories.
Consequentially, traditional relations between Tibet and the Qing dynasty underwent a
profound shift, with the Buddhist foundations of this relationship, and its reciprocal
nature, becoming obscured by the Court’s attempts to assert its sovereignty. This shift
was compounded by events in Tibet, where continued Tibetan resistance to British
India’s frontier policy resulted in the 1904 British invasion of Lhasa. The result was
the further disintegration of traditional Chinese and Tibetan systems governing
international relations. The invasion was also the precursor to several treaties that had
significant ramifications for the legal status of Tibet.
The analysis of these events in Chapter three led to the conclusion that by the
turn of the twentieth century, Tibet had come to occupy a contradictory space, neither
independent nor part of the Russian, British or Chinese empires that sought to control
Tibet’s status as part of their own frontier defence strategies. In Western discourse
Tibet was at once an other-worldly domain that transcended the temporal, mundane
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concerns of Western colonialists, and, in British Indian sources in particular, a
potentially dangerous worldly frontier, across which a Tibetan-Russian alliance might
threaten India. Despite the paradox of Tibet’s other-worldly mystery and its menacing
worldliness, in both constructions Tibet represented the limits of the British Empire, a
space that hovered on the borderlines of civilisation, but remained somehow apart
from it.
One way of understanding the significance of these events is to consider how
the engagement of Imperial China with Western Imperialism was transformed by the
modernising moves of the Republic of China into an affirmation of the universal
standards of civilisation that had arisen within Europe as a result of the colonial
encounter. This was the subject of analysis in Chapter four. The significance of this
analysis is that it reveals the complex nature of the British imperial legacy. The
position suggested by Chapter two was that processes of Western colonial domination
have altered understandings of non-European systems of knowledge. Chapter three
extended this by showing how British imperial encroachment transformed traditional
geopolitics across the Himalaya and purposefully rendered Tibet’s legal status
ambiguous.
In a recent discussion on why there no subaltern studies for Tibet, Hansen
(2003:8) observed that ‘the absence of subaltern studies in Tibetan studies is rooted in
a belief in what might be called “Tibetan exceptionalism.”’ In light of the analysis
presented in Chapters two and three, the question might be asked: to what extent is this
absence a product of the British imperial legacy in the region. Shakya (2001:183) has
argued that the ‘orientalist descriptive mode’ which continues to pervade the field of
Tibetan and Buddhist studies can be traced back to colonial traditions of scholarship.
Given this to be the case, there maybe grounds for arguing that the lack of subaltern
studies for Tibet is due to the persistence of this British imperial legacy. Nonetheless,
subalternity is not only to be understood as a product of colonialism. In the words of
Spivak (2005:476) ‘Subalternity is a position without identity…Subalternity is where
social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognisable
basis of action.’ The broader answer to this question therefore requires a consideration
not only of colonialism, but of other totalising ideologies that coalesced around the
colonial encounter such as nationalism and modernity.
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The circulation of modernity in Chinese nationalism discussed in Chapter four
is informative in that it reveals an interface between an assumedly superior set of
modern, universal normative values and traditional culture. Whilst China’s
appropriation of European Public Law operated as a tool of resistance, it also
perpetuated and reinforced the concept of a ‘standard of civilisation’. The circularity of
modernity created paradoxical sympathy between China and the West. This had
ramifications for how traditional relations between Tibet and China became translated
into the terms of international law. Beyond that, the Chinese nationalist project
reinforced a notion found in European positivism that legal and political systems
operated at a supra-national level, leaving the uniqueness of the nation intact. That this
gives rise to a contradictory position was illustrated in the discussion of the
problematical rise of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine, which revealed the impossibility
of maintaining a clear distinction between law and politics in the face of actual state
practice. This in turn drew attention to the contradictions inherent in the Chinese
Nationalist project to create a modern nation-state from the ashes of empire.
Chapter five extended this discussion through a consideration of how the
Republic of China used modernity as a tool to enforce and restructure power relations
at the local level as part of a drive to extract revenue. As part of the Republic’s effort
to restore sovereign equality profound institutional changes were implemented in the
name of modernisation not only to meet Western standards, but also to appropriate
village institutions as part of a state drive to extract resources. The significance of this
is that it is therefore inadequate to consider modernity to be an externally imposed
force.
The Nationalist’s attempt to eliminate the irrational and unscientific from
secular law and governance did however reflect an international drive to develop the
science of administration in the framework of law. Chapter five argued that rather than
being tangential to and superseded by the era of institutional international law, the
‘standard of civilisation’ remained central and pervasive, achieving continuity in
modernist assumptions of rationality and scientific administration, which rather than
being universal and neutral are intimately indicated in assertions of state power.
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Chapter Six revisited a topic first touched upon in Chapter two, the absence of studies
on Tibetan social and legal theory. The starting point for discussion was that this
absence echoes difficulties involved in Tibet’s struggle to claim an international legal
identity. One difficulty discussed arises from the necessity of articulating that legal
identity in the terms of modernity. A point raised was that the events that mark the
encroachment of Tibetan identity paradoxically become the markers of its
independence. Thus, the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 is cited as proof of legal
identity despite the fact that it was imposed by force.
The significance of this lies in the linkage between legal identity, the capacity
to be modern, and British imperialism. In the early twentieth century it became clear
that Tibet could not rely upon its traditional institutions of law and governance to
protect itself from foreign encroachment. For these reasons Tibet began a process of
modernisation: educating members of the elite in British schools, modernising the
army, undertaking legal reform and infrastructure improvement. As discussed in
previous chapters, China faced similar demands to meet the ‘standard of civilisation’.
This resulted in the appropriation of Western ‘technologies’ of law and science in
order to create a modern national identity capable of resisting imperialism. There are,
therefore, parallels between Tibetan and Chinese efforts to engage with modernity.
There are also significant differences. One issue frequently discussed in
primary and secondary sources is that in Tibet there was significant controversy
attached to this modernisation project due to the perceived threat of secularisation.
This resistance to modernisation is often cited in primary and secondary sources as a
cause of the failure of the Tibetan state. Such analysis achieves continuity with
contemporary PRC criticism of Tibet’s cultural incapacity for modernisation, a
criticism that is used to legitimise coercive state intervention. This particular difference
between China and Tibet has therefore become imbued with consequence.
However, the fixation on proving or disproving Tibet’s capacity for
modernisation distracts from a critical issue, which is that Tibetan efforts in the early
twentieth century to create a modern identity involved increasing Tibetan ties to the
British Empire. The problem is not simply that this relationship was a by-product of
Curzon’s ‘Great Game’, or that it was the British invasion of Tibet that created the
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legal basis for British and Tibetan relations. Neither is it simply that British imperial
interests dictated that Tibet’s status should be left undefined. The problem is also that
when Tibet turned to Britain in order to protect itself from, first the Republic of China,
and later the People’s Republic of China, it set itself apart from a rapidly modernising
society of postcolonial states.
Chapter six examined this problem by looking at two of the most significant
legal instruments concerning Tibet’s status in the twentieth century; the Simla
Convention (1914) and the Seventeen Point Agreement (1951). The Simla Convention,
the last treaty between Britain and Tibet, looks backwards to an era of imperial
expansion in which legalised hierarchy allowed sovereign equality to be something
enjoyed by only the most civilised of nations. In contrast the Seventeen Point
Agreement looked forwards to a time of legalised equality within the modern socialist
state. Yet it was the Seventeen Point Agreement, with its provisions for PRC
sponsored development of education, agriculture, livestock raising, industry and
commerce in Tibet, that marked the end of Tibet’s independent existence. This raises
some uncertainty about what the measure for equality is; for the boundaries drawn
around Tibet’s status in 1914, despite disavowing equality, did affirm legal
personality.
The conclusion reached following this examination was that it is inadequate to
blame British imperial expansion in the region for Tibet’s lack of legal status or for the
PRC’s subsequent incorporation of Tibet. Certainly, the evaluation of imperialism is of
critical importance: it marks the dividing line between the PRC’s claim that Britain
created the myth of Tibetan independence and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile’s
claim that Tibet’s interaction with the British empire proves Tibetan independence.
However, the incoherency and inequality of British imperial policy in the region
cannot fully explain the lack of appraisal of Tibet’s legal status in the discipline of
international law. Whilst imperialism changed Tibet’s significance on the map, it was
the end of empire that saw its erasure; and this erasure is a very twentieth century
phenomenon, emerging at the moment in which the colonial became the postcolonial.
The influence that independent India had upon the failure of Tibet’s appeal to
the U.N is one example of this phenomenon that was discussed in Chapter six. The
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examination of Nehru’s dismissal of Tibetan idealism highlighted the difficulties Tibet
faced in defending its position in the postcolonial world. However, the exclusion of
Tibet from legal discourse points to a deeper contradiction created by the impulse to
disavow the colonial antecedents of law in the postcolonial age. The argument put
forwards in Chapter six was that the exclusion of Tibet from legal discourse reveals the
limits of the ‘post’ in postcolonial, or in other words that subalternity is the creation of
the postcolonial, as well as the colonial world.
The effect that this has had upon perceptions of Tibet’s legal status is
significant and has implications for the way that legal argument is made. This was
illustrated by a detailed critique of Crawford’s analysis of Tibet’s status in his classic
study on the creation of states in international law. This critique identified a theoretical
split between the desired supra-social functionalism of law and the contingent factors
that bring law into being and argued that this impinged upon Crawford’s analysis of
suzerainty and autonomy. By privileging the continuity of law as a system of objective
thought, Crawford’s analysis becomes dislocated from historical event. Chapter six
argued that the dynamics of a legal analysis which seeks an underlying coherence and
historical continuity will create flaws in the logical structure of the analysis. In the
example used Crawford’s argument relied upon the fallacy that the historical use of the
terms suzerainty and autonomy reflects contemporary definitions. The argument made
in Chapter Six is that this dynamic within legal argument is intimately related to
modernity’s faith in progress and linear history, which requires that the present affirms
its own logic by appropriating what came before as a step on the path to development.
As previously noted, the appropriation of modernity by the Republic of China
reinforced the notion that European Public Law was founded upon universal normative
values. It also enforced a concept of scientific rationality that devalued traditional
belief systems by associating them with irrational superstition. This dynamic was
strengthened by the adoption of atheist materialism in the People’s Republic of China.
Given the PRC’s self-identification as a liberating force against imperialism this gives
rise to some interesting questions when considered against the backdrop of the analysis
in Chapter six: if the postcolonial position within international legal discourse is
contradictory, are there similar contradictions within the position adopted by the PRC
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towards Tibet, and if so, to what extent does this alter an understanding of Tibet’s
contemporary status as an autonomous region of the Chinese state?
An analysis of legislation governing Tibetan autonomy in Chapter seven
revealed a tension between the state goal of socialist modernisation and the state
protection of Tibetan ethnic difference. This tension can be traced back to Mao’s
observation that ethnic minorities occupied 50-60 percent of the territory of the PRC
and that these areas contained economically significant natural resources that could
only be exploited with correct management of the local population. In this context the
system of Regional National Autonomy can be seen as a method rather than a goal, or
in other words that autonomy is the process by which the socialist modernisation of the
unitary state can be best achieved.
A result of this tension is that the state has used the law to mould Tibetan
cultural identity so that it becomes compliant to overarching goals of modernisation. A
particular feature of the state’s efforts to redefine Tibetan culture in the terms of
socialist modernisation is the separation of religious and ethnic identity, which was
discussed in Chapter eight. This revealed contradictions in the PRC’s attempt to create
a coherent body of law that outwardly projects a broad tolerance of private religious
belief and the attempt to adapt religion to socialism.
The attempt to adapt religion to socialism has forced the state to engage with
metaphysical and historical realties in a way that undermines its ‘rule of law’ rhetoric.
An examination of the contradictions in official attempts to regulate religion reveals
the limitations of the state’s ideological commitment to modernity. This engagement
also challenges the view that present day Sino-Tibetan conflict is a product of British
imperial intervention. Whilst the PRC’s territorial claim to Tibet can be seen as part of
a defensive response to Western imperialism, this cannot adequately explain the
ongoing threat that Tibetan Buddhist activity presents to the CCP. This suggests that
the PRC insistence that British imperialism has created Sino-Tibetan conflict operates
as no more than a straw man, and that this serves to mask weaknesses in the state’s
ideological position. Paradoxically, the state’s attempt to derive legitimacy from an
espousal of materialistic progress parallels the discourse of the ‘civilising mission’
used to legitimise Western colonialism.
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Furthermore, the PRC’s adoption of the rule of law has facilitated processes
of domination and subjugation that have worked to obscure Tibet’s legal identity. A
particular way that this has achieved authenticity is through the linkage of the rule of
law to concepts of universal development which suggest that modernisation is both
inevitable and desired. This suggests the possibility that it is not simply the obscurity
of Tibet's legal identity that is of issue, but the manner in which a commitment to the
rule of law may operate to close down debate of alternative theories of modernisation,
thus preventing critical analysis of dominant normative values.
9.3 Placing the Findings in Context
By examining issues broadly related to the British imperial legacy in Tibet,
this thesis has largely focused upon firstly, the processes which have led to Tibet’s
current status as an autonomous region of China and secondly, the processes that have
influenced perceptions of that status. This can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate the
issue of Tibet as a topic worthy of consideration in international legal discourse, the
argument being that the lack of consideration of Tibet’s status reveals something about
how subalternity is produced and maintained within the discipline. It has been beyond
the scope of this study to consider developments in public international law that may
have future significance for the Tibetan people’s right to self-determination, although
this represents a potentially fruitful area for further research. It is therefore useful to
briefly consider how the issues explored within this thesis might intersect with such
fields of inquiry. One way of approaching this is to consider recent developments
concerning the rights of indigenous peoples, as articulated in the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 (DRIP) of which China is a
signatory.
The fact that Tibetans are a distinct people under the terms of international
law has been usefully dealt with by Bello (in McCorquodale and Orosz (eds.):35) and
is supported by the 1961 U.N General Assembly Resolution 1723 which called for ‘the
cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people of…their right to self-
determination.’ Whether or not the Tibetan people maybe classed as indigenous is a
separate issue, but a claim could be made on the basis of a shared cultural, linguistic
and religious Tibetan identity within the boundaries of a historic homeland. It should
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be noted that whilst the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs includes
Tibetans on its database, it observes that the Tibetans consider themselves an occupied
nation rather than an indigenous people (IWGIA). Meanwhile, ethnographic studies
suggest that it is more meaningful to talk about a Tibetan civilization (Stein 1972).
Further complicating the issue is the fact that DRIP does not specify a definition of
indigenous people, nor does it provide an enforcement mechanism.
There is, nonetheless, some value in considering what the principles of DRIP
might add to the understanding of Tibetan autonomy. That DRIP has specific
relevance to systems of autonomy is implicit in Article 46(1), which states that: -
‘Nothing in this Declaration maybe interpreted as implying for any
State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States.’
This particular provision has provoked criticism on the basis that it is a
retrogressive limitation of indigenous rights, ‘a travesty of a mockery of a sham,’ that
consecrates in law the structure of internal colonial domination (Churchill 2011).
However, inasmuch as DRIP suggests options for a stronger form of Tibetan
autonomy, the affirmation that a right to self-determination need not automatically lead
to secession is perhaps, for the Tibetan people at least, a useful one.
An articulation of Tibetan autonomy that accorded to DRIP would potentially
offer a number of advantages. A minority exists only in relation to a majority within
the State, while an indigenous group does not. Definitions of indigenous peoples place
emphasis upon historical continuity and ancestral territories, as expressed by the notion
of ‘priority in time’ employed by Special Rapporteur Daes (UN Doc.E/CN.4/1996/2
paras.10-41). This potentially carries great force. It goes beyond a right to protect the
past, or preserve cultural memory, and suggests that a shared history as a unique
people gives rise to the right to a process of continuity. Article 11, for example, states
‘Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions
and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present
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and future manifestations of their cultures…’ This is reinforced by Article 13 which
places states under an obligation to protect indigenous peoples’ ‘right to revitalize, use,
develop, and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions,
philosophies, writing systems and literatures…’
In comparison with the system of regional autonomy in place in the PRC, this
affords a stronger protection of cultural rights. As discussed in Chapters seven and
eight Tibetan autonomy within the PRC is significantly constrained by a state
commitment to the idea that self-identification as a minority is a transitory experience
which will recede as a progressive attainment of socialist unity comes into being. The
state apparatus of development and modernisation accommodates minority culture
within the context of this process of becoming, but the evolutionary paradigm within
which this occurs works to transform these components of lived culture into memento
mori artefacts; the expression ‘remember you will die’ here being articulated in state
displays of traditional culture which act as reminders of how far the modern state has
come. In such a context traditional culture operates as a counterpoint to modernity’s
progress, a static point of origin. Hence, Tibetan language is taught as an adjunct to
Tibetan history, and both are non-essential components of the modern education
syllabus.
Meanwhile, a system of autonomy based upon the principles of DRIP could
challenge the state’s right to enforce a particular process of becoming modern. It could
envisage the right not simply to retain access to cultural traditions, but to establish and
control contingent systems and institutions capable of transmitting those traditions, as
expressed in Article 14’s right to control education, for example. Additionally,
autonomy based upon DRIP would be required to protect the right ‘to manifest,
practice, develop and teach’ religious traditions, thus collapsing the distinction
between ethnic and religious identity articulated in current PRC legislation (DRIP
Article 12).
However, it is by no means clear how or if the theoretical possibilities
suggested by DRIP could translate into practice. The PRC as a signatory to the
declaration has signalled support for the rights of indigenous peoples, but this support
is placed emphatically in the context of resistance to Western colonialism. The PRC’s
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response to a draft of the declaration in 1995 was: ‘The Chinese Government believes
that the question of indigenous peoples is the product of European countries’ recent
pursuit of colonial policies in other parts of the world’ (U.N
Doc.E/CN.4/1995/WG.15/2). Speaking at the 53rd session of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights (1997), Long Xuequn, adviser of the Chinese
delegation, said:-
‘As in the case of other Asian countries, the Chinese people of all ethnic
groups have lived on our own land for generations. We suffered from invasion
and occupation of colonialists and foreign aggressors. Fortunately, after
arduous struggles of all ethnic groups, we drove away those colonialists and
aggressors. In China, there are no indigenous people and therefore no
indigenous issues’ (Long 1997).
It is worth noting that the working definition of indigenous peoples referred to
in drafting process of the declaration placed particular emphasis upon the role of ‘self-
identification’, stating that: ‘This preserves for these communities the sovereign right
and power to decide who belongs to them, without external interference’ (UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 paras 379-382). Clearly, the rights of an indigenous people
derive from the particular experience of being a people and DRIP identifies the need to
protect that experience from encroachment by dominant sectors of the society within
which such people exist. If the purpose is to neutralise the effects of inequality
between indigenous peoples and the states within which they reside, then there can be
no logical basis for permitting the state to unilaterally decide who are, and who are not,
indigenous peoples.
Nonetheless, by placing the issue within the context of resistance to
colonialism China has side-stepped this objection by returning the issue to the question
of inequality between the First and Third World. This position recalls the argument
that Tibetan nationalism was the artificial creation of the British, as expressed in Chen
Kuiyuan’s attack against the Dalai clique, ‘This struggle is the continuing struggle
between ourselves and the imperialists since they invaded Tibet a hundred years ago’
(Chen 1994:156). Such an argument self-consciously places China at the forefront of
the movement for resistance and reform which bought the postcolonial world into
being.
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There is support for this position. For example, the League of Nations used
the term 'indigenous' to distinguish between colonial powers and peoples living under
colonial domination (U.N Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2, paras.14, 16). More
recently, Special Rapporteur Martinez suggested that the definition of an indigenous
people should give priority to their historical precedence in a territory rather than a
concept of self-identification. This had the effect of shifting the classification process
away from the collective perceptions of the group, and onto assessments of political
history. The issue here is: who controls the ‘authentic’ historical narrative? Given the
presumed inequality in power relations already at play, the legitimacy of a historical
narrative is likely to be highly contested and subject to immense political influence.
The PRC governments’ employment of the Golden Urn as a mechanism for extending
legal control over reincarnating Tibetan Buddhist lamas, under the rubric of protecting
the freedom of religion, is a case in point.
Martinez concluded that: ‘the end of traditional colonial power in Africa and
Asia necessarily and radically changed the concept of what was meant by 'indigenous'
as a result of a new political context whose most visible symbol was the independence
of the State’ (UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/27 para.114). Whilst Martinez did not deny
that other indigenous peoples might inhabit postcolonial African and Asian states, his
conclusion had ramifications. His point was that because all peoples within these
territories are effectively indigenous to the area, non-dominant peoples within African
and Asian states are generally identified as minorities. Therefore, their complaints are
better dealt with by the U.N Working Group on Minorities, not the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations.
The dichotomy that Martinez identifies between minorities and indigenous
peoples is significant (UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/27 para.125). The distinction
implies a difference in the threshold of self-determination. The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights protects the rights of ‘persons belonging to minorities’ to
‘in community with other members of the group to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.’ However, the use the
wording ‘persons belonging to minorities’ (Article 27) places emphasis upon the
individual rather than the group. In contrast, the rights of indigenous people’s are
articulated primarily as collective rights. One of the conclusions suggested by Chapter
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eight of this thesis was that the protection of the individual right to freedom of religion
was inadequate for protecting the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Indeed, the focus upon
individual freedom of religion is arguably detrimental to the survival of Tibetan
culture because it has enabled the state’s claim to be upholding international standards,
whilst implementing a separation of religious and ethnic identity that in reality
facilitates increased state control.
Placing emphasis upon minority rights, rather than indigenous rights, also has
implications in relation to what has been termed the ‘developmentalisation of human
rights’ (Rajagopal 203:222). Chapters four and five of this thesis discussed how the
standard of civilization achieved continuity in modern institutions, from the League
Mandates’ scientific administration of peoples unable to achieve self-governance
unaided, through to development models that prioritise economic expansion regardless
of environmental and social costs. A comparable dynamic is discernible in the
Republic of China’s appropriation of Western modernity, which facilitated increasing
state intervention in civilian life, restructured power relations at the local level and
legitimised revenue extraction. That this dynamic persists in the contemporary system
of Regional National Autonomy within the PRC was shown by Chapters seven and
eight.
Identification as a minority rather than an indigenous people potentially alters
the context within which development occurs. DRIP provides for indigenous peoples
to control ‘lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired’ (Article 26) and also stipulates a right to
redress when such lands, territories and resources have been exploited without consent
(Article 28). In combination with the strong rights to control and revitalise cultural
institutions noted above, autonomy based upon these principles would therefore be
significantly different to the system currently governing the Tibetan Autonomous
Region.
As observed in Chapter seven the PRC can be considered at the forefront of
international policies in preferential treatment for minorities. The difficulty, as
revealed in the analysis of the Regional National Autonomy Law, is that the emphasis
upon implementing equal access to state resources for persons belonging to minorities
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does not automatically allow minorities to articulate alternative models of cultural,
political and economic development. In this context, even allowing for the points of
conflict discussed in Chapter seven, the PRC may realistically expect to meet most of
its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights whilst at
the same time developing policies aimed at cultivating the adaptation of Tibetan ethnic
identity to the modern socialist state. Arguably, what the threshold between the rights
of minorities and indigenous peoples implies is a different negotiation with modernity.
One possibility that arises from this is that by emphasising a process of continuity,
rather than representing traditional culture as a point of origin in the process of
becoming modern, the articulation of indigenous people’s rights might help to resolve
the contradictions inherent to modernity’s myth of progress.
To revisit arguments made in Chapter five, the discourse of modernity was
shown to be an enabling strategy for the Chinese Nationalist party espousing the
sovereign equality of China, but it was also a limiting and contradictory one because it
produced positions incapable of recognising their own origins.
Chapter six, found comparable contradictions are created by a tendency to fit
state practice into a pre-existing vision of what the law is, or should be, because this
not only excludes inconsistent practice from the frame but enforces a concept of the
state as a rational entity on a path of evolutionary progress. The primary contradiction
that arises in relation to this is that the maintenance of law’s coherency and continuity,
integral to its universalistic claims, requires the exclusion of certain voices, be they the
now unsavoury expressions of colonialism or other articulations of the local and the
particular which threaten the general vision of modern international law’s unity.
Contradictions are also to be found in the PRC’s commitment to modernity as
expressed in the state’s project of socialist modernisation. This is particularly visible in
the government’s handling of religious issues. Chapter eight concluded that by
insisting upon the backward nature of Tibetan Buddhist belief, the central government
has committed itself to engaging on only the most superficial of levels. Because this
creates an official incapacity for sophisticated enquiry, the state has undermined its
own ideological argument.
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One way of interpreting this, is that because such contradictions subvert the
foundational philosophy of the state, they therefore represent a fundamental threat to
the state’s legitimacy. In this context, the suppression of aspects of Tibetan culture
represents a suppression of weakness within the state’s ideology. To return to an
earlier event, this is one way of reading the 1959 Tibetan rebellion that resulted in the
termination of the Seventeen Point Agreement. The official PRC interpretation of this
revolt is that it was the work of a section of the ruling class in alliance with Western
imperialists. This interpretation forms part of an official PRC narrative of liberation
and progress (Information Office of the State Council 1992). However, the nature of
the rebellion was far more complex and involved a cross-section of Tibetan society not
represented by a particular economic class demographic (Norbu 1979; Shakya 1999).
The widespread, popular, Tibetan insistence upon maintaining traditional social
systems and institutions therefore represented a significant challenge to the legitimacy
of the central government’s ideological position that the Tibetan people were
oppressed and in need of socialist intervention.
There are similar contradictions embedded within the PRC’s claim to
legitimacy through identification with the postcolonial. Whether or not China’s
historical claim to Tibet is valid, the dynamics of Chinese rule over the Tibetan people
is played out in distinctly imperialistic terms, the legitimising narrative of liberation
and socialist intervention achieving continuity with Western accounts of colonialism’s
civilising mission. The PRC’s denial that DRIP might have any application to its own
system of law and governance has parallels with the Republic of China’s argument
against international trusteeship at the 9th Institute of Pacific Relations Conference; the
argument being not against decolonisation per se, but against the implications that this
would have for China’s claims to Tibet and Mongolia. In both cases, this engagement
therefore subverts the concept of a strict dichotomy between the First and Third World,
or the colonial and the postcolonial. This is not to deny the profoundly inequitable
dynamics of colonial rule, rather it is to consider that the colonial encounter opened up
an interface between different cultures. The possibility that arises from this, is that
such an interface allowed for the cross-cultural dissemination of systems of
domination and subjugation, in which the ‘rule of law’ became intimately implicated.
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps useful to recall the argument made by Mattei and
Nadar (2008:12) that ‘the mechanisms through which the transnational rule of law, as a
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deeply Western idea, has led incrementally to patterns of global plunder…independent
of explicit political or military colonialism.’ This provides another way of framing the
issue of how the British imperial legacy in the region has converged with
contemporary PRC law and governance to alter understandings of Tibet’s legal
identity. In such a context it is also perhaps prudent to question whether the principles
articulated in DRIP are robust enough to carry force.
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